Harlan Cleveland on America's Impotence

Foreign Service Journal

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JUNE 1982

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Foreign Service Journal

COVER: *Four models pose as the mythical "typical" young Foreign Service family—Mom, Dad, Bobby, Susie, and a stuffed skunk. Our report on raising children overseas begins on page 20. Photo by Jim Wells.*

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LETTERS

Discouraging Ambition

A factor which has been insufficiently stressed in articles on the appointment of non-career ambassadors in the *Journal* [April] is the effect it cannot help but have on the young seeking a rewarding career. The knowledge that when young officers reach senior positions the chances of their receiving an ambassadorial appointment will be materially diminished by the present haphazard system must discourage the most ambitious. We all have known exceptionally able young officers who have left the Service because they believed, and they were often right, that they could get to top responsible positions faster outside the Service than in it. How can we develop the best possible Foreign Service under these conditions? Obviously we can't, and it is remarkable we do as well as we do.

RANDOLPH A. KIDDER
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Washington, D.C.

The Reign in Spain

I have the impression that Charles R. Foster, who reviewed my book, *The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974–1979,* in the March issue of the *Journal* (1) was in a hurry, and (2) got up on the wrong side of the bed the day he did the review.

The main point of the book is that it is the changes in the Spanish society resulting from economic and social progress that were the principal factor in the success of the Spanish political transition. Yet Mr. Foster says the book does not give due attention to changes in the society. One gets the impression that he, and the editor who approved his review, did not read the first and the final chapters of the book. If they did, they simply missed the main point.

Mr. Foster criticized the author for making such extensive use of consultations with official and private leaders. I find this surprising. Do not scholars place high value on direct access to principal participants in historical events? The content of the conversations illustrates and confirms the main analytical conclusions of the book, but they are not a substitute for the analy-

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

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

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sis—which is there for even the rather casual reader to see.

Finally, Mr. Foster may be right that chargés would often do better than ambassadors, especially when the ambassadors lack preparation for their jobs. But that certainly was not my point in this particular case. Wells Stabler was a fine ambassador, and the book says so, on pages 120 and 132.

SAMUEL D. EATON
International Consultant
Washington, D.C.

Charles Foster replies:

Mr. Eaton's letter is no better than his book. The book contains no data on the changes in Spanish society—no electoral statistics, no literacy and education rates, no newspaper circulation figures, nothing on the composition of the labor force.

One needs to compare the opinions of the parade of leaders on whom Eaton bases his analyses with data and documents. For example, the Basque nationalists told Eaton after several brandies that they believe in ultimate independence, yet the official platform of the Basque National Party adopted less than a year before rejects total independence in favor of autonomy.

For historical purposes the work of Ambassador Wells Stabler (who is only mentioned *en passant*) was, in my view, more important than that of Deputy Chief of Mission Eaton. Surely Ambassador Stabler's negotiations with the King merit as much praise as Eaton's efficient handling of the Pan Am plane crash in Tenerife.

Fine Reporting

My appreciation—and admiration—for Leigh H. Bruce's most excellent article entitled "Papandreou's Greece" in the January issue of the *Journal*.

This is one of the finest pieces of political reporting that I have ever read: no fancy rhetoric, no 50-cent words, just the straight story, clean and clear.

Although I have lived here for nearly eighteen years, nevertheless, I learned things from this article about Greece that I did not know before. Similar views were expressed by several friends here to whom I showed the article.

My congratulations to the *Foreign Service Journal* also for such a fine selection.

HEYWARD G. HILL
Athens, Greece

Correction

Below is a photograph of Rep. Jim Leach (R.-Iowa), who delivered the second talk in the AFSA lecture series on "Public Diplomacy in the '80s" at the Foreign Service Club in February. Due to a production error, a picture of Jim Lehrer, co-host of the *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* and the third speaker in the lecture series, was substituted in our May issue. We regret the error.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ehrlichman's Catharsis

WITNESS TO POWER: *The Nixon Years, by John Ehrlichman. Simon & Schuster, 1982. $17.50.*

Few deep thoughts of any kind—and little insight except into how rough and mean and petty it can be at the top—are to be found in this latest telling of the Watergate years. There is nothing scholarly, and little or nothing new except this particular bird's-eye view of events. Historians may be pleased at tiny gleanings; Washington lunchtime gossips will read it. The only person who really benefits from the writing of it is its author.

For Ehrlichman, it is a catharsis; his account of what happened, his way of getting even with those who really gored him, such as Henry Kissinger, or Dan Rather, or Judge Sirica. And Mary McGrory. He lets a thousand gratuitous mean little digs fly about offhandedly. Gee, that must have felt good. There is an undercurrent of bitterness, though perhaps that is understandable. He admits there are things he might have done differently, or ought to have known, but he makes certain we understand how frequently his advice was ignored.

In fact, he goes to some effort to be sure we know how little control he had over what happened. Even the title of the book—*Witness to Power*—suggests that he just stood there, baffled, exasperated, and out of the line of command while things got all messed up due to the colossal egos and neurotic hang-ups involved. He was often bumped from the "in" list; he is still bitter that Kissinger talked Nixon out of letting Ehrlichman be advance man on the China trip.

There I was, he seems to say, minding my own business in Seattle, practicing law and doing well, when along came this pied piper and lured me into politics. I was bored and restless. I never did take this Nixon character seriously, as all the rest did; I had better sense, and I should have used it, the book implies—rather unpersuasively, however.

I was prepared to dislike Ehrlichman as thoroughly as I always thought I would when he was in the White House and I was working in an office that took its marching orders from the executive office of the president. In those days, he had a reputation only slightly less awful than the Nazis to whom his style was so frequently attributed. (Ehrlichman blames this particular bum rap on Bob Haldeman, his partner but, it seems, never really his friend.) Yet, to my surprise, he emerges from the book as almost likeable. He has a sense of humor—biting, sardonic, sarcastic, sometimes ironic, once or twice even whimsical; he frequently takes a rueful poke at himself. A man who can go to prison while the president he served gets pardoned, who can lose the right to practice his profession, who has had to explain to his children how he came to be involved in the disgrace of the century, and can still retain a sense of humor does earn, finally, my grudging respect.

—MARIANNE KARYDES

Lively Little Memoir

215 DAYS IN THE LIFE OF AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, *by Martin F. Herz. School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1982. $9.85.*

Ambassador Herz's "diary"—selected vignettes of his service as ambassador to Bulgaria—is one of the liveliest little memoirs of recent years. He covers everything from the trivial-but-necessary (farewell speeches upon the departure of an ambassadorial colleague) to the important-but-dispensable (advice freely offered to senior officials). His account is readable and informative, but likely to be ultimately frustrating to Foreign Service readers.

Herz deals with some very important issues for the Foreign Service—problems of modern diplomatic practice, whether State Department officers should testify about their advocacy of policy positions, the dangers (and opportunities!) of dissent, and the relative merits of career vs. political appointments. His format does not allow him to treat any of the issues in the depth and detail many (including this reviewer) will want. Still, the author provides some imaginative insights into diplomacy as practiced in the mid-1970s and nicely focuses those insights on some chronic difficulties. Two particular examples stand out. In chapter 24, Herz describes the problems of senior officials, particularly the necessity of playing bureaucratic politics effectively. He concludes by admitting that a former political appointee learned these lessons better than himself, the career officer. Earlier in the book, he outlines the high-level selection process for ambassadorial appointments,

including the indignities suffered by men whose time is past. He concludes that "the 'system' is not very effective in the niceties of human relationships, not even at the top, and sometimes especially not at the top." True, and often forgotten by workers in the ordinary vineyards.

215 Days is a tasty slice of diplomatic life, but only a slice. It tickles our palate for a more detailed, analytical main course.

—JOHN D. STEMPEL

Effective Sanctions

ECONOMIC COERCION AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: *Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration, edited by Sidney Weintraub. Westview Press, 1982. $22.*

If any foreign policy tool ever deserved to be abandoned forever on the sole basis of its ineffectuality, a good candidate might be economic coercion. Despite the record of failure, from Ethiopia in 1936 to Poland in 1981, we continue to respond to other countries' political offenses by disrupting their economic relations with the rest of the world. The reason for this persistence is obvious: We may have no other means short of violence to respond to their behavior. The reason for failure is equally clear: Most states are not particularly vulnerable to coercion because competition exists both in world economic and political power. Thus, we cannot coerce because there is little we can withhold that cannot be obtained elsewhere at some price. The result is often even more determined persistence by the offending nation in its action, with some cost imposed both on sender and target nation.

The contribution of Sidney Weintraub and his seven graduate student collaborators to this analysis is rather modest, but still interesting. By examining previously unavailable presidential documents in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library at the University of Texas, they explore six instances of U.S. coercion in the 1960s. Weintraub agrees that sanctions rarely accomplish their explicit objectives, but explicit objectives are not the only purposes served. Objectives reserved for the privacy of presidential documents may be just as important, and a policy should not be judged a failure until one examines all its goals, for sanctions may achieve these subsidiary and unpublicized purposes.

Certainly, one possible, and important, purpose of sanctions is simply to punish an adversary for its actions. But secondary goals often have more to do with the behavior or status of the sending state than with the actions of the putative target. The sending state may want to demonstrate its power in world affairs, its ability to intervene effectively. Often states use sanctions to maintain relationships with allies by acting against a common enemy. Such actions have a symbolic content, but their usefulness is ultimately dependent on their real threat. What Weintraub and his collaborators fail to point out is that sanctions, whether or not they coerce, clearly do punish. The post–Afghan invasion grain embargo, for example, did not induce the Soviets to withdraw, but it did substantially raise the cost of their grain imports. Likewise, near-total isolation from world trade did not finally topple the Rhodesian government, but the costs imposed by fifteen years of embargo must have been substantial.

The question is whether these subsidiary goals are themselves an adequate case for sanctions. On this issue, Weintraub is absolutely silent, instead offering the more modest advice that policymakers "develop a range of primary and secondary objectives," "precisely define objectives," and "select appropriate instruments." These are modest conclusions indeed, bordering on the self-evident. It is this kind of cautious scholastic analysis, backed by an exceptionally ponderous prose style, that makes one wonder if Weintraub was fully awake while writing this book. Still, some interesting issues are raised. It is just possible that we will continue to use economic coercion, not despite its failures, but because of its successes.

—PETER L. KAHN

Friends and Allies

THE END OF AN ALLIANCE: *James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War, by Robert L. Messer. University of North Carolina Press, 1982.*

Robert L. Messer has written a distinguished book about a rather undistinguished subject. Messer is a first class historian who writes well and who knows how to tell a story. But the main subject of the book is James F. Byrnes, a South Carolina politician who had been in the Senate, on the Supreme Court, and a war mobilizer in the White House before President Truman appointed him secretary of state in July 1945. (Truman thought Edward Stettinius, Byrnes's predecessor, was "as dumb as they come.")

Byrnes did define a new course for U.S. policy toward Germany in an important speech in Stuttgart in September 1946. And he did negotiate peace treaties with Italy, Finland, and the Balkan countries before resigning in January 1947. None-

theless, Byrnes was an undistinguished secretary of state who, after an initial honeymoon period, lost the confidence of his boss. The end of the Byrnes-Truman alliance coincided with the end of the Washington-Moscow alliance and, while the book deals with the interaction of these two subjects, the focus is on the Byrnes-Truman relationship.

It all started with Yalta. President Roosevelt took Byrnes to Yalta, not because he wanted Byrnes's advice on negotiating with Churchill and Stalin but because he wanted his support at home after Yalta. So Byrnes was sent home early, before the conference ended, as the Yalta salesman and FDR's legman. Byrnes was most effective. After hearing him, Republican Governor Thomas Dewey called the Yalta outcome "a real contribution to peace" and Republican Senator Warren Austin called Yalta a "constructive step toward peace." Truman appointed Byrnes secretary of state because "I think it's the only way I can be sure of what went on at Yalta."

Yet in fact Byrnes sold a "very personalized and often inaccurate version of the meaning of Yalta." Byrnes had not been invited to important negotiating sessions at Yalta, and he was unaware of the military pressures on Roosevelt to obtain a Soviet commitment to enter the war against Japan. Byrnes did not know that Roosevelt agreed to turn over the Kurile islands or half of the island of Sakhalin to the Soviets. He did not understand the significance of the fine print in the Declaration on Liberated Europe or in the Polish settlement. Byrnes oversold Yalta and the tortuous destruction of the myth he created led to his own downfall.

As secretary of state, Byrnes's policies were erratic. He told Truman that possession of the "atomic bomb might put us in a position to dictate our own terms" to the Soviets. This did not work and, as Ambassador Averell Harriman observed, "only served to provoke a hostile Soviet response." Then Byrnes seemed to move in the other direction and Senator Arthur Vandenberg and others in Congress feared he would become too cooperative with the Soviets on atomic energy. Some critics accused Byrnes of applying a Yalta "fig leaf" to agreements about Romania and Bulgaria reached at a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in December 1945. Yet when Truman's policy toward the U.S.S.R. hardened, Byrnes "with typical ease . . . was able to . . . scramble aboard the accelerating cold war bandwagon." But by then the Truman-Byrnes relationship had reached the breaking point. The alliance and their friendship ended. —DAVID LINEBAUGH

Media Dominance

THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION: *How Western Culture Dominates the World, by Anthony Smith. Oxford University Press, 1980. $4.95 (paper).*

Recently President José Napoléon Duarte told a crowd of his countrymen to vote in the upcoming election; that the future of El Salvador would be decided by them, not the American press. Duarte was referring to the army of 100–200 newsmen, mostly U.S. media, on hand to cover the guerrilla war and the political campaign likely to bear on its outcome. That these foreign journalists might affect local attitudes in this tiny state, as well as elsewhere, typifies the problem that Anthony Smith deals with in his important study *The Geopolitics of Information.*

Smith offers a powerful argument for those Third World citizens who object to the West's cultural dominance of other nations. He traces the intriguing origins of this condition, showing that it began with the early European explorers like Prince Henry of Portugal, Columbus, and later Henry Morton Stanley. These men expected to find that the farther they journeyed from Europe, the center of their universe, the more primitive would be the humans they encountered. This mindset was self-fulfilled by what they met abroad. So when they reported back home on their travels, they easily fell into the habit of describing non-Europeans as savages; "natives" of backward, heathen societies. When the globe was at last totally "discovered," Western journalists still portrayed peoples of the southern half as benighted and incompetent in contrast with the population of the north.

This tendency, coupled with the technological improvements of the twentieth century, has led, says Smith, to a sorry situation for the Third World. Not only do Western reporters still picture that area as insignificant, but they are the principal purveyors of information about the Third World to the rest of the planet. To compound this one-sided handling of information, Western news agencies and electronic media also bring into the developing countries the lion's share of information about the outside world. Since the Third World suffers from a dearth of news facilities of its own, it must rely on the West's mass-produced, imported information.

Smith notes that a battle has raged in UNESCO since 1972 to redress this information imbalance by the creation of a New International Information Order. In essence, the Third World representatives want to control the flow of information in and out of their territories. They believe that the negative image created and perpetuated by the Western press must be corrected by law. They wish to replace the foreign journalists with their own, and keep them on short tether. They want to eliminate any criticism of the development process which might impede its progress.

Smith cites other aspects of the Western steamroller: films, television, short wave radio, books, magazines, as well as the Western styles—particularly American—depicted via these cultural conduits. He investigates in well-researched detail the latest category of dominance: invasion by computer. Smith implies that a New International Electronic Order should be formed before the massive and pervasive strength of companies like IBM and AT&T get a grip on computer services world-wide. He warns that these firms are on the verge of preempting each country's chance to build its own individual data base which it needs to govern its own destiny.

The author presents fairly the plight of weak countries drowning in the information flood from their mighty competitors.

But he concedes that a muzzled press will usually harden the hand of corrupt dictators.

He might also have suggested that for one kind of culture to achieve general usage, especially if it is based on the enlightened concepts of democracy and a free press, may be just what our shrinking globe needs. Homogenizing language and culture is surely a path to better communication among peoples. Instead, Smith's sympathetic thesis may encourage the self-centered Third Worlders whose bleating fills UNESCO's meeting halls. If only they could see that mankind may have been brought to the threshold of peace and understanding. Perhaps the West's informational influence, which does not really hurt anyone but Soviet imperialists, may be moving us closer to international brotherhood by happenstance.

In addition to ignoring the merits of the present state of information geopolitics—for example, the West's news and cultural overkill at least reduces news poverty in the Third World—Smith burdens the reader with a heavy prose. Despite the fascination of his topic, Smith has produced a book that anyone but the most motivated specialist will lay down after a few pages.

—FITZHUGH GREEN

BOOK ESSAY

Kissinger on Kissinger

YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, *by Henry Kissinger. Little, Brown and Co., 1982. $24.95.*

This second volume of the Kissinger memoirs is in no way less exciting, instructive, or controversial than its predecessor, *White House Years*. It covers the period from just after the Vietnam agreement of January 1973 until the resignation of Richard Nixon in August 1974, leaving the foreign policy of the Ford administration to a final volume. While volume one focused on Vietnam, the breakthrough to China, the Indo-Pakistan war, and SALT, volume two has the high drama of the Yom Kippur war and its aftermath, the relationship between Watergate and our declining position in the world, and the abortive Year of Europe, in addition to chapters about Cambodia, the life and death of Allende, and other aspects of "upheaval."

But everything is overshadowed by what Kissinger has to say about U.S.-Soviet relations. In volume one, an early chapter described his developing relationship with Anatoly Dobrynin—a relationship that embodied elements of ambiguity of which Kissinger seems to have been unaware; namely that by his close contacts with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, he was giving the Russian a virtual monopoly on the transmission of American views to the Soviet leadership. This excluded the U.S. ambassador in the U.S.S.R., who could not, perhaps, have conveyed nuances and undertones as effectively but would have been an American conveying and explicating American views to the Soviet leaders.

However, during the 1973 showdown that almost led to war, such close relations with the Soviet ambassador were enormously useful to Kissinger and thus to the United States. He was able to interpret Dobrynin's silences—what the Soviet ambassador did *not* say—in a manner that was of crucial importance to the dialogue. It was the failure of Dobrynin to engage in diplomatic circumlocutions or embellishments or even qualifications of the harshness of those exchanges, that Kissinger correctly interpreted as a sign of the occasion's seriousness:

> Kissinger: We are assembling our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.
>
> Dobrynin: Yes, all right.
>
> Kissinger: This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us.
>
> Dobrynin: All right.

"In a subtle way," Kissinger points out, "this conversation added to the impact of Brezhnev's threatening letter. It would have been easy for Dobrynin to say that the Soviets would in no case act until they had heard from us. He might have indicated in the hundred ways available to a seasoned professional that we were overreacting, that the threat of unilateral action was a figure of speech, the normal recourse of a sovereign country that feels pushed against the wall. Instead, Dobrynin permitted the impression to stand that the crisis was indeed impending, and that nothing had changed to defer the possibility of a unilateral Soviet military move in the Middle East. That awareness dominated the deliberations that our government was about to start."

The United States stood firm, and the Soviets backed down. This happened at the very time when President Nixon's position and authority had suffered terrible damage due to the beginning moves for his impeachment. In his memoir Kissinger recalls that he commented during that crisis: "We are at a point of maximum weakness but if we knuckle under now we are in real trouble."

Considering that there could be no good reason to suppose that the Soviets were bluffing during the final phase of the 1973 war, one shudders at the risks that were taken—that probably *had* to be taken to ward off even worse jeopardy—when the United States went on "Defcon 3" alert in order to dissuade the Soviets from sending troops to help the Egyptians. This was at a time, it might be recalled, when our allies were offering us no support whatsoever—some of them even failed to interpose obstacles to Soviet overflights of their territory.

A chill ran down this reviewer's spine when reading about the telephone conversations between Kissinger and Dobrynin during the 1973 crisis—precisely because there seems to have been so little pretending on either side. When the cease-fire seemed to be collapsing because Israeli troops were tightening the noose around the Egyptian Third Army in violation of its terms, and when it appeared that the Soviets were scheduling flights of troop transports, Kissinger called the Soviet am-

bassador and recalls the conversation in the following terms: "With the preliminary battle lines thus drawn, I called Dobrynin again at 7:25 p.m. I urged him not to push us to an extreme. We would cooperate on sending more U.N. observers; we would not accept Soviet troops in any guise. Dobrynin replied that in Moscow 'they have become so angry they want troops.' He blamed us for allowing 'the Israelis to do what they wanted.' " The Soviets were wrong: We were trying to lean on the Israelis, but with indifferent success. The remarkable feature in what Dobrynin said is that he referred to emotions—"anger" in Moscow. It is quite possible that the Soviet leaders felt tricked and believed they had to move so as to avoid appearing weak and foolish—the very situation in which, Kissinger tells us again and again, one must not place a powerful adversary.

Only a complete reading of the chapters dealing with the diplomacy of the 1973 war and its aftermath permits readers to understand the critical nature of the confrontation with the Soviet Union at the time and the extraordinary skill, persistence, and vision that enabled the United States to emerge from the crisis with its position in the Middle East improved. This is worth stressing because previous accounts, notably Edward Sheehan's superficial and seemingly documentary summary of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East that appeared in a 1976 issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine, have not done justice to this chapter of U.S. diplomacy. In *Years of Upheaval,* Kissinger elucidates this important chapter as no one else could do.

The volume's hero, if there is one—aside from the author, of course—is Anwar el-Sadat, just as the most fascinating personality of volume one was Chou En-lai, with whom Kissinger spent seventeen hours in discussion, thereby cementing a personal relationship that was of utmost importance to this country. Whereas in volume one we learned little about the wide-ranging talks with Chou, volume two treats us to an analysis of Sadat's mind based on a mutual opening-up that would have been inconceivable between Sadat and, say, Kissinger's immediate predecessor or successor: neither of them would have had enough interest to say to Sadat (or, for that matter to Chou) to keep the dialogue going.

The book contains defensive chapters about Cambodia and Chile that will be required reading for historians dealing with those issues. And it abounds with aphorisms or philosophical observations, notably in connection with East-West relations and also with Vietnam. Here, for

instance, is a passage relating to Indochina ten years ago which might just as well be applied to Central America today:

> The American response to this historical phenomenon [the vicious circle of violence and repression that tends to 'destroy whatever moderate center exists'] is usually expressed in the conviction that a government under siege can best maintain itself by accelerating democratic reform and by expanding its base of support by sharing power. But the fundamental cause of civil war (of which guerrilla war is a special category) is the breakdown of domestic consensus. Compromise, the essence of democratic politics, is its first victim. Civil wars almost without exception end in victory or defeat, never in coalition governments—the favorite American recipe. Concessions are ascribed to the weakness of those holding power, not to their magnanimity, and hence accelerate rather than arrest the disintegration of authority. The proper time for reform is *before* civil wars break out, in order to pre-empt their causes—though this does not always work when the insurrection is inspired, financed, trained, and equipped from outside the country. The next occasion for conciliation is *after* victory. . . .

This observation would no doubt also have had applicability to Iran. That the author, notwithstanding his skepticism about coalitions emerging from civil wars, nevertheless worked on such a formula with respect to Cambodia, comes as a surprise. That the formula failed does not, of course, surprise at all. And it is interesting that Kissinger describes with copious circumstantial detail, and no little asperity, the barely contained rage of Chou En-lai when he was told by an American senator that Congress was about to put a stop to the American bombing of Cambodia, a military activity which the Chinese leader correctly perceived as essential to the success of the secret U.S.-Chinese effort to promote a compromise peace. But since Kissinger makes such a good case against any likelihood of reconciliation during a civil war, one feels that the opportunity for a compromise peace in Cambodia must have been slight even before the bombing halt, if it ever existed.

Even though he had been surrounded by FSOs in the White House, Kissinger arrived at the State Department in 1973 with the same suspicions that Nixon, for instance, harbored vis-à-vis the Foreign Service. (The fact that he knew living examples of FSOs who did not conform to his stereotype comes in the same category, I suppose, as the anti-Semite who says that some of his best friends are Jews—it does not affect the ingrained demonology.) Thus he refers to "the State Department" wanting to do something of which he disapproved—at a time when he himself was in charge of the department! He also ascribes to the Foreign Service "a philosophy honed through the common trials of a close-knit fraternity," which seems to refer to working habits rather than a foreign policy philosophy, for Kissinger must know the Foreign Service has no ideological preferences. It is true, as Kissinger points out, that "the Foreign Service emphasizes negotiability," but this should be seen as an asset to the political decision-makers.

Some of the charges that Kissinger lays at the door of the Foreign Service should in fact be cheerfully endorsed, though with a slightly different interpretation. He says that the professionals display "less sensitivity to the pressure and incentives that, if boldly applied, can alter the perceptions that in turn define negotiability. Institutionally, the Foreign Service generates caution rather than risk-taking; it is more comfortable with the mechanics of diplomacy than with its design, the tactics of a particular negotiation rather than an overall direction, the near-term problem rather than the longer-term consequences."

It is a good thing, I would maintain, that the Foreign Service can serve as a counter-weight to those political leaders and appointees who tend to emphasize risk-taking. If it is true that professional diplomats think more in terms of accommodation than confrontation, this is a valuable contribution to a country's diplomacy. If the professional diplomats of a country were to bend with every political wind, if they were to become risk-takers and prefer showdowns to negotiations because the electorate happened to favor a leadership that displayed such characteristics, then our foreign policy would risk becoming all sail and no anchor. This is what has happened to the diplomacy of some dictatorships, whose politicians later regretted that they had not listened more to their professional diplomats. Fortunately, the United States has in recent times always had loyal professionals who were willing to risk the displeasure of their superiors to point out the consequences of risks too lightly assumed. Conservatism as a political label (just as liberalism) is surely misapplied to the Foreign Service, which is a quintessentially non-political institution. But conservatism in the sense of asking the political leader, "Sir, have you considered all the consequences of the action you propose to take?" may be inconvenient—but it may also be the best service that a professional diplomat can give to his or her country.

—Martin F. Herz

AFSA

Service Discipline in Today's World

Tradition holds that in the past members of the Foreign Service marched off bravely to the post to which they were assigned wherever it might be and that those who declined an assignment might or might not be given another choice before they were asked to resign. Like stories that Marines tell about the discipline of the "old Corps" it may well be that this perception of discipline in the "old Foreign Service" has grown with age.

It is evident, however, that recent changes in outlook, greater questioning of authority, and increased hardships overseas have diminished the willingness of members of the Foreign Service and their families to go where they are told.

The Foreign Service is nonetheless a "Service" with all that implies, and one of the implications of Service life is discipline—a willingness to accept a higher degree of interference in one's life by the Service to which one has given one's allegiance than is required in most jobs or most professions. It is this relinquishing of some degree of control over one's fate which places unusual strains on Foreign Service families and unusual responsibilities on the managers of its assignments process. Every family lives with the dilemma posed by the competing and often contradictory pulls of duty to the Service and duty to the family. Each member must balance his or her ambition and professional satisfaction against his or her responsibility to a family. This is the age-old personal challenge of life in the Foreign Service.

Concurrently, the managers of the assignments process must be perceived by their colleagues in the Foreign Service to be fair and equitable. They must also be perceived as having a caring institutional memory which will reward or at least be mindful of each individual's accomplishments, and his or her willingness to accept difficult or dangerous posts. We do not believe that this perception of a fair and just process can be achieved if responsibility for assignments is not clearly established and if the process appears to permit certain members of the Service to go from one prestigious and comfortable assignment to another. AFSA has sought and will continue to seek a fair "open assignments" process for its members in AID. At the same time, we recognize that the balance between individual needs and Service discipline lies at the heart of the complexities of Foreign Service life. We do not mourn the days of "go or resign," but at the same time we do not believe that arrangements by which Service needs are met and personal obligations accommodated have yet been realized, notwithstanding the many permutations through which the system has gone. □

Impotent America

Effective Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy Will Require a New Style of Leadership

By HARLAN CLEVELAND

Americans are not so much overwhelmed by the international problems we face as underwhelmed by the leaders who are urging us to face them. *New York Times* writer James Reston described the problem with the style of U.S. leadership in the course of explaining what bothered him about then–Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles, he wrote, doesn't fall into traps; he digs large holes in his own path, then jumps into them.

But these days the American people are also peering into a large, self-dug hole. We are plagued by a sudden sense of impotence, a feeling that the United States has quite suddenly become—as the Chinese put it—"Big Noise on Stairs Nobody Coming Down."

Obviously, we are not impotent. We are still the world's most relevant society—more involved in more aspects of more people's destinies than any other nation. We are also, to our continuing surprise, still the world's most attractive society: A heavily disproportionate number of the world's refugees (who now number 16 million, one million more than all the refugees and displaced persons in the world after World War II) want to come to the United States, by hook if possible and by crook if necessary.

But if we are going to cope with the responsibilities this magnetic attraction places on us, and if our elected leaders are not coping and are unlikely to cope, then the people are going to have to assume that leadership.

Americans have had quite a lot of practice, in the past twenty years, in showing their leaders the way. The federal government was the last to learn that the war in Vietnam was over. President Nixon and his staff were the last to realize that Nixon was through. The tidal movements of social change—environmental sensitivity, civil rights for all races, the enhanced status of women, recognition of the rights of consumers and small investors—were not generated by established leaders but boiled up from the people at large.

No New Ideas

Although the practical capabilities for change exist, the established leadership of this country has run out of new ideas on several policy frontiers at once. We do not yet have a post–Keynesian economics that explains and seeks to rectify our current situation of inflation and recession glued together at one end of a business cycle that may not even be cyclical. We do not yet have a post-New Deal social policy that goes beyond creating new categorical subsidies and authorizing larger appropriations. And we do not yet have a post-Kissinger, post-Brzezinski doctrine that corrects for the distortion of the U.S.-Soviet prism and accepts the inherent linkage between arms control and the rest of world policies; a doctrine that recognizes the modernization process in the developing world as the primary engine of international insecurity and knows U.S. policy can no longer be divided into domestic and foreign questions.

We have certainly been learning the hard way that traditional forms of power have certain shortcomings—that there are terrorist threats for which there are no military counterthreats, energy problems for which there are no military remedies, environmental risks for which there is no military insurance, even military actions to which military power can be only a partial response. The annual debates on defense budgets still tend to obscure the growing content of nonmilitary factors in national security policy. The fresh theory for which we are searching will certainly have to move well beyond concepts of national security defined as a military defense based on complex weapons systems, to encompass oil supplies, global environmental risks, population growth, refugees, terrorists, unsafe streets, religious revolutions, and a global epidemic of inflation.

Henry Kissinger now says with refreshing candor that we are living on inherited intellectual capital—assumptions about defense strategy carried over from the 1950s, about arms control from the early 1960s. I would

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Association News

AFSA Critical of AID Management in Report to Hill

The Association found several flaws in AID management's first year of implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as expressed in AFSA's report required along with management's under Section 2402 of the act. Noting that the act requires the five foreign affairs agencies to use a single Foreign Service personnel system, AFSA's report said that "compared to AID the changes in existing personnel systems that must be made by the other four agencies are relatively minor."

The AFSA commentary continued, "The essential fact that must be faced by AID—and a reluctance to do so remains all too obvious—is that the agency can no longer continue business as usual in the administration of its personnel who must serve abroad."

Unfortunately, said the commentary, "what AFSA has yet to detect is any meaningful move in the direction of the total reorientation of personnel management. . . . The result, AFSA perceives, is the continuing debilitation and demoralization of AID's Foreign Service. The new act was supposed to remedy this, but it hasn't. Current agency management has done very little to bring AID under the career Foreign Service system mandated in the act."

In addition, AFSA's commentary was critical of slow movement toward an open assignments system; slow development of a career development program; treatment of the Obey amendment "as if it were basically inoperative"; and "reliance on ad hoc reactive workforce control mechanisms because the required time in class and career extension mechanisms do not exist."

Association Honors Merit Award Panelists

Betty Haselton and the 20 volunteer panel members for the 1982 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards were honored at a wine and cheese party hosted by Ambassador H. G. Torbert Jr. at the Foreign Service Club on April 29. The occasion was the completion of the special panels which reviewed 103 applications from Foreign Service Juniors for $500 awards based on the academic excellence and extra-curricular activities of these graduating high school seniors. This year the awards were named in honor of Elizabeth and Norris S. Haselton, and financed by the Association of American Foreign Service Women's Book Fair Fund and AFSA's Scholarship Fund. The names of the 22 winners and the 10 honorable mention applicants are given in the FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE section of this issue (page 31).

Ambassador Torbert, chairman of the Committee on Education (pictured), welcomed the panelists and guests and thanked the volunteers for serving on the review boards. Betty Haselton (also pictured) was greeted enthusiastically by many friends and the informal gathering provided a relaxed conclusion to the Merit Award activities.

Association Lauds State Report But Finds Some Flaws

While the Association found cause to "applaud the development and submission of the first annual detailed flow modeling report" required by Section 2402 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, saying it was an "important step toward management in the sunshine," in its own commentary required by the act AFSA called for more general distribution of the department's personnel data that it used for the report, criticized the current number of non-career appointments in the Senior Foreign Service, and expressed "grave concern" over planned reductions in secretary and security officer promotion rates. In addition, AFSA expressed hope that Congress and management "watch closely" the promotion, attrition, and retention system of the SFS and management's projections for career conversion and lateral entry at the SFS level.

"State Department management deserves proper credit for developing a highly creditable report in this first year of implementation of the act," AFSA said. "We are generally satisfied that there is a genuine commitment on both sides to improve both the process and product in the future." The test of that commitment, the commentary said, would be the outcome of interagency negotiations on standardized regulations governing the consultative process. The report did observe, however, that initial management consultations with AFSA were "unnecessarily stressful" and hoped that cooperation would make it possible to meet future target dates.

AFSA, AID Negotiate Commissioning of FSOs

For many years, AFSA has pressed for the commissioning of AID's Foreign Service employees. While earlier AID administrators agreed in principle, they always found some rationale for stopping short of actually approving commissioning.

In recent months, AFSA stepped up its campaign to secure this benefit. Our actions proved to be successful when AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson announced on April 16 that he had decided to exercise the authority the agency has to commission its Foreign Service officers. AFSA expressed its appreciation to McPherson for his decision and is now preparing for negotiations with AID management to assure commissioning in fact takes place quickly and fairly.

The CDC File

Have you checked your CDC file lately? Do you know what a CDC file is? To our never-ending surprise a majority of Foreign Service employees answer no to both questions.

CDC stands for Career Development Counseling. The CDC file is kept by the employee's career development officer (CDO). It is not to be confused with the Official Performance Folder, which is maintained by PER/PE and is seen by Selection Boards. CDC files may contain copies of performance evaluations. The more general contents include records of telephone calls or correspondence between the employee and the CDO, memoranda of conversations the counselor might prepare after conversations or telephone calls with the employee, and the employee's bid lists.

Our concern regards the inappropriate material that may be found in the CDC file. Notes regarding the "corridor reputation" have been discovered by unsuspecting employees. For example, a memo to the files we recently saw gave the counselor's explicit and personal judgment as to why the employee had not been promoted for a number of years. Unless an employee specifically requests such a judgment, we fail to perceive its usefulness, especially since such a judgment cannot help but influence future CDOs' opinions of the employee.

Management has agreed with us that employee photographs, as well as BEX comments on the employee's Foreign Service candidacy, are inappropriate and has assured us that all CDC files have been purged of such materials.

The department maintains, however, that exam scores and biographies are an important addition to assist CDOs and assignment officers in determining onward assignments. We disagree and believe that their only place is in the pre-employment file. We view this procedure as a none-too-subtle tool to identify minorities, since such information has usually been found in files of officers admitted through affirmative action programs.

The CDC file is an important element in determining onward assignments. From the contents of the file, CDOs will gain substantial (but sometimes hearsay) information such as assignment preferences, family considerations, and performance. Assignment officers within the geographic bureaus, whose job it is to identify candidates for openings in their bureau, may have access to the CDC file (some counselors have stated, however, that due to their confidential nature, they have not released CDC files to anyone but the employee). It is at this point that we cannot help but fear that some employees' assignments chances were hurt by inappropriate or outdated material in the file.

We advise employees to drop in on their counselors when in Washington and review their CDC files. No pre-arranged appointment is required since the file is kept in the CDO's office, nor would the counselor need to be present during the review. Employees may not remove contents without the counselor's permission but may request photocopies of any documents in the file. If the employee objects to some of the material and the counselor refuses to take it out, the employee may request removal through a grievance, as long as a solid case can be made that the material is inaccurate, erroneous, and/or falsely prejudicial.

TV Newsman Jim Lehrer Speaks At Club on Foreign Affairs Reporting

Americans "really do care about their country, they really do care about the world, and they care enough to sit down in front of their television sets for 30 minutes and listen to some intelligent talk about just one happening on any given day," Jim Lehrer told an audience of more than 100 persons at the Foreign Service Club on March 17. Lehrer, co-host of the award-winning *MacNeil-Lehrer Report*, which is broadcast nightly on public television, discussed the program's framework and objectives as they apply to reporting foreign affairs at the luncheon lecture, the third in a series on "Public Diplomacy in the '80s" sponsored by AFSA. Guests of honor included ICA Director Charles Z. Wick and Public Liaison Director Phyllis Kaminsky.

The show began in New York in 1975, airing exclusively on the east coast. Said Lehrer, "We haven't changed much in seven years. We're a small operation and we're still relatively new as a television institution and as a way of doing things."

The *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* operates on a well-planned, yet flexible schedule that gives it the time to research subjects in greater depth than the network news programs, yet enables it to move quickly on a fast-breaking story. This has been accomplished, said Lehrer, by having the reporters cover subjects rather than certain buildings or institutions. The job of scheduling stories itself then becomes fairly easy, because "most news is fairly predictable. You may not know the exact day a particular decision is going to be made, but you do know the general framework."

As a newsman, Lehrer takes pride in the show's fulfilling the needs and desires of the American public, crediting part of the success of the *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* to the tremendous support it receives from public television. Concluded Lehrer: "What is so deliciously satisfying to us is that we have proven that *not* insulting the people's intelligence is successful television." —Linda J. Lavelle

AID Time Limited Appointments and Tenuring

All AID Foreign Service personnel under time-limited appointments should be familiar with the regulations that govern their potential conversion to career status. For those employees who joined AID prior to February 15, 1980, the conversion criteria are contained in Handbook 25, Chapter 5F, whose effective date is March 18, 1980. These criteria are fairly clear, and employees need to know that conversion is not automatic. When the criteria are met, the employees are eligible for consideration for conversion by a tenure board.

The agency has not yet established these boards, nor has it devised a review schedule. AFSA understands that management is now preparing to do this. Procedures will be negotiated with AFSA. In the meantime, employees who entered before February 15, 1980, should have been converted to "Career Candidate" status to meet the requirements of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. For many employees, an extension of their initial time-limited appointments may be necessary to permit them to meet the conversion criteria. AID has been doing this in a relatively routine fashion. AFSA is prepared to assist in problems that are not handled satisfactorily by personnel officers.

MONEY

A Long, Cool Look at the Individual Retirement Account

When all the ballyhoo about the IRAs and the All-Savers Certificates finally dies down, what will we really have? Something of value? Or have we "been had"?

To begin with, one of the above is already on the way to extinction. The Treasury has elected not to continue the All-Savers program, for it appears not to have achieved its intended objective. A *Washington Post* editorial entitled "Epitaph for a Bum Idea" claimed that the Treasury had already "wasted" over a billion dollars on an experiment whose true intent was to rescue the ailing savings and loan industry. Though All-Savers sales of $120 billion to $230 billion had been projected, in fact they never reached $50 billion. (The excitement paled with the first rate revision from 12.67 percent to 10.18 percent.) Furthermore, commercial banks captured over 43 percent of the funds which were supposed to have stimulated a housing recovery. Incidentally, All-Savers interest is federally tax free only.

The IRA is an entirely different ballgame. It is an idea whose time has come, largely because of the serious threat to Social Security, to government-pension COLAs, and the inadequacy of many private pension plans. If we're lucky (and smart enough to take maximum advantage of the opportunity) the IRA is here to stay. Look to expanded limits and liberalized conditions: A bill introduced in March by Rep. Hal Sawyer (R.-Mich.) allows early withdrawals without penalties or immediate tax liability if used for purchase of a principal residence.

Basic IRA mechanics and regulations have previously been covered in these pages and in locally available magazines. But a recent visit to several far-flung posts has convinced me that the information has not traveled in many cases. Write for a packet of general articles if you've missed seeing them. I propose to address here some of the more persistent and difficult questions.

Are there some people for whom an IRA might not be a good idea? Possibly. For a privileged few, anticipating substantial wealth and sustained high income, it could be preferable—maybe—to plan an alternative course of tax-sheltered or tax-free investment, with the counsel of financial and estate planning professionals. Moneys withdrawn from an IRA account in retirement are taxable at ordinary income tax rates, which presumably will be reduced at that life stage. There are many ways to plan withdrawals, including lump-sum or yearly payouts, and some permutations in between, all with differing tax consequences. The current tax regulations may well be changed (the pattern is evident) and they are too complex to be discussed in this space.

Many young people have so far avoided the IRA, concerned about locking away all their savings dollars when they might well be strapped for cash many years prior to age 59½. Detailed analyses have been produced to show that an IRA owner will be well ahead of the game in terms of actual cash in hand, even if forced to withdraw funds after 10 years and pay tax and penalty. Consider the following example, assuming a 12-percent return and a 40-percent tax bracket, for a five-year old IRA:

Total invested:	$10,000
Account value:	14,230
Penalty for early withdrawal (10%):	(1,423)
Tax liability:	(5,692)
Net	$7,115

But

Original taxes saved ($800 per year) invested at 7.2% after-tax return:	4,951
Total value of utilizing IRA for 5 years	$12,066

Compare these figures with a non-IRA annual allocation of $2,000. Remember that the first thing you have to do is to pay income tax, so that what's left to invest is $1200 per year. Again, a 12-percent return and a 40-percent tax bracket:

Total invested:	$ 6,000
Account value (12% return taxed to 7.2%):	7,427

Some miscellaneous comments, in answer to frequent questions:

- A "spousal" IRA is not a joint account; there must be two separate accounts with specified amounts in each name even if only one spouse works and contributes $2,250 per year.
- While you are eligible to withdraw funds at age 59½, only after age 70½ *must* payout be scheduled, and then on an actuarily computed and regular basis (no skipped years).
- If the owner of an IRA dies and a spouse is the only beneficiary, the spouse can take out the remaining assets over a five-year payout period. Alternatively, a young spouse could leave the assets in the IRA, change the name on the account, and use it as his/her own, with payout beginning at survivor's age 59½.
- Most state and local jurisdictions do not allow IRA contributions to be deducted from state taxable income nor are accumulated earnings tax-deferred.

Finally, the most prevalent question concerns the best use of an IRA vehicle. There are clear do's and don'ts. Do look for the highest yield. Don't lock funds into 18- or 30-month savings certificates (there are stiff penalties for busting them, if you must withdraw, on top of the 10 percent fine and immediate tax liability). Stay flexible enough to control or direct the investment, at least on a yearly basis. Use a family of funds that includes a money market fund or practices "internal market timing" and does keep some funds in cash at the current advantageous rates. Be aware of the strong consensus in favor of a rising securities market over the next few years; there have rarely been such bargains as are now available.

Last but not least, recognize the cost of delay. Over the long term, funds invested early each year not only add substantial dollars to your account, but also convert dollars from a tax-exposed to a tax-free position.

—Margaret Winkler

Margaret Winkler is a certified financial planner and investment broker with Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc., 1747 Pennsylvania Ave. NW. Washington, D.C. 20006. She has served abroad with a Foreign Service spouse.

Journal *Interview with Malcolm Toon Sparks National Media Coverage*

Former Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon's forceful opinions on the Reagan administration's record-breaking level of political appointments to ambassadorial posts, expressed in an interview with the *Journal* that appeared in the April issue, unleashed a flurry of reports and commentary in newspapers and magazines and on radio and television.

When a reporter from Long Island's *Newsday*, the largest afternoon daily in the United States, learned from Toon of the interview, the paper printed a long story headlined "Ex-Ambassador Blasts Current Ones." Said writer Roy Gutman: "Toon's criticism was almost unprecedented, as he singled out specific examples of 'poor talent,' accusing the Reagan administration of naming 'klunks' to some key diplomatic posts."

In an editorial the next day the paper said, "Toon's undiplomatic criticism of recent ambassadorial appointments isn't simply a case of a Foreign Service professional defending his turf." *Newsday* sided with the ambassador and advocated that the president and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "make sure that America's diplomats, amateur or professional, are the best Washington can find." While noting that some outstanding diplomats have come from outside the service—a position also taken by AFSA and by Toon—the paper observed that thus far the current administration's non-career appointments have risen 20 percent over the post-war norm.

The *Newsday* story was picked up by the *Los Angeles Times/Washington Post* wire and appeared in several newspapers, including the *Toronto Star* and the *Dayton Journal-Herald*. United Press International sent out a story the next day, and two stories appeared in both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. UPI said Toon thought "some of the most important U.S. embassies are being put in the hands of unqualified amateurs." The *Times* story sparked a letter to the editor a few days later suggesting that AFSA rate ambassadorial appointees in the manner that the American Bar Association appraises potential judges — an idea put forth in a letter in the April *Journal*.

Several radio stations and networks broadcast accounts of the *Journal* interview in early April, including Mutual Radio News and National Public Radio, which ran its own interview with Toon.

Recognizing a growing national flap, *Time* magazine charged in a week later and printed excerpts from the *Journal* under the rubric "Pols and Pals." The newsmagazine called Toon's assessment of Reagan appointees "grumpy" but acknowledged that "the tradition of presidents' rewarding their followers with ambassadors' credentials has long been a morale problem for career diplomats. Reagan has not helped matters: of his 100 nominations so far, 48 have been political appointees, while about 40 percent of Jimmy Carter's first year choices" were non-career. The *Time* correspondent disagreed with some of Toon's opinions but sided with him on the ambassador to Mexico, who is an actor. The magazine quoted one Mexican official referring to that country's best-known comedian: "Maybe we should have sent Cantinflas to Washington."

While the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Kansas City Star* were printing thousand-word excerpts from the interview on their op-ed pages, the White House counterattacked. White House personnel director E. Pendleton James told the *Los Angeles Times:* "The question is not whether we have too many political appointees—we don't have enough. I fight in every case for a political appointee instead of a career officer. Access [to the president and White House] is everything."

The *L.A. Times* editorialized the next day that James's "defense of White House appointment policy is bound to tip" Foreign Service "anger into outrage." It will, the editorial said, "also spread the sense of alarm far beyond the ranks of the Foreign Service to those of us who think that foreign policy works best from a solid base of professionalism." The *Times* called James's reasoning "bizarre" and accused the White House of

the worst appointments record since Herbert Hoover. The personnel director's attack on the Foreign Service, the paper said, "was destructive, rooted in stereotypes, and unsupported by facts." In the May *Journal*, AFSA itself printed an editorial disagreeing with James's contention that "access is everything and career officers don't have it."

A letter from AFSA's president supporting the *Times*'s editorial appeared in that paper, along with an opinion column by Senator Claiborne Pell (D.-R.I.), a former Foreign Service officer, who called the White House position toward career diplomats "not only demeaning but dangerous. In these perilous times it is essential that our country be represented abroad by the best and most experienced talent available. For the most part, that talent resides in the career Foreign Service." Concluded Pell: "If political appointees are needed to improve the quality of U.S. diplomacy, why should we limit the benefits from the downgrading of career personnel to the State Department? Why not appoint advertising executives to serve as generals and admirals? Why not place washing-machine manufacturers in top echelons of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?" President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig disavowed James's remarks.

In mid-month, Toon appeared on NBC's *The Today Show* during its "Affairs of State" segment. Asked reporter Chris Wallace: "You say that this practice endangers U.S. foreign policy. Does it really matter who the ambassador is in an era of instant communication and jet travel?" Responded Toon: "It is terribly important to have a man on the scene who is able to convey an accurate picture, a man with experience and perception. If I were the president, I would want to make sure that I had the most experienced, the most able, the best possible men, rather than cronies or ideological soulmates."

New Watercolors Exhibited At Foreign Service Club

Twenty-three watercolors by Adele Porter, wife of Ambassador (Ret.) Dwight Porter, are being exhibited in the Foreign Service Club. Titled "Observations Along the Road—1950 and After," the collection depicts scenes from countries to which the Porters were assigned during their years in the Foreign Service.

go further. Too much of our foreign policy creaks along on a chassis that dates from the late 1940s. Then, the builders of the postwar world thought of international politics not as a dynamic flow system but as architecture. Their concept of peace was not a process but a structure. Those who were, as Dean Acheson said of himself, "present at the creation" made some assumptions that seemed sensible at the time. But their assumptions could not be expected to survive indefinitely.

They assumed, for a start, that the big powers would manage the world. That was the basis for the League of Nations Covenant; it was carried over into the United Nations Charter. But the problem turned out to be the management of pluralism in a world where nobody is in charge. Moreover, the big powers were not really eager to manage the world. The American people certainly did not want to be in charge. Others, we thought, should take up their own responsibilities and mold their own destinies. A discomfiting posture, as things turned out: we avoided making the Europeans, the Japanese, and much of the Third World into burdens for ourselves but soon found quite a few of them treading on our tail.

Unusable Weapons

The postwar architects assumed that nuclear weapons would be usable. But the postwar decades have been crammed with instances when the nuclear powers were unable to use even kilotons, let alone megatons, of explosive power in real-life situations—in Korea, the Mideast, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia, not to mention Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and El Salvador. We ourselves spent ten embarrassing years in Vietnam without using our supposedly most powerful weapons. They are not even very useful for brandishing any more. The last good brandish was when Nikita Khrushchev threatened to "incinerate the orange groves of Italy and reduce the Acropolis in Athens to radioactive ash." The effect was to galvanize Italy and Greece as loyal members of NATO—which, given their internal politics, was quite an accomplishment.

As long as our war gamers depend in their theories on weapons that are not usable in practice, we will fail to develop the flexible conventional forces we may need in real-life emergencies.

What the potential big bang does seem to accomplish is mutual deterrence, a new-style balance of power based on the absence of precedent for nuclear war–fighting. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is in consequence the most stable element in world politics. The Soviets don't know what we would do if confronted by the choice to use or not to use nuclear weapons. Their uncertainty is soundly rooted in our own: we don't have the slightest idea what we would do if confronted with that choice either. Our uncertainty is therefore credible, and therein lies the deterrent.

Nuclear deterrence has limited the intensity of the rivalry between the two superpowers. It might also be effective in sobering up two smaller powers (India and Pakistan? Egypt and Israel?) that have achieved the capacity for mutual assured destruction. But, we do not know whether nuclear deterrence will work as a multilateral system. And if we define nuclear weapons capacity the way Thomas Schelling has suggested—as a "mobilization capacity" in which a government has access to the necessary scientists and equipment and nuclear fuel and knows just how many weeks or months it would need to complete a deliverable weapon—the spread of nuclear energy for power guarantees the spread of nuclear energy for politics.

Each government—and some nongovernmental groups—still faces the puzzle of how to use so large an explosion in a manner that is immune to boomerang effects. This unsolved puzzle has probably been the main reason for the surprisingly sluggish rate of proliferation so far. But the uncertainties of proliferation will assuredly multiply, and the balance of uncertainties may not continue to be so benign as it has been for the past third of a century.

Meanwhile, nuclear weapons are still too powerful to use, except in such extreme circumstances that all other assumptions are exploded too. Yet instead of trying to codify their unusability, the Soviets—and during the last two years the Americans as well—have been wracking their brains to think of ways to make nuclear war–fighting practical, even desirable. If by our actions, our presidential directives, and our defense budgets, we both persist in testifying to the supreme value of nuclear weaponry, we will certainly not persuade smaller powers that nuclear weapons technology is not worth the cost.

Moreover, as long as our war gamers depend in their theories on weapons that are not usable in practice, we will fail to develop the flexible conventional forces we may really need in real-life emergencies. Parliaments and publics in the industrial democracies are protected from facing the reality of our defense needs by the nuclear illusions of their political rhetoricians and de-

fense experts. They can pretend to defend their constituents' vital interests without spending the kind of defense money that might be relevant to maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Those present at the creation made many other assumptions. They believed energy would be cheap—but it is not. The dollar would be an international currency—but we can now see the need for an international means of exchange and measure of value that does not depend on the vagaries of one country's economic management. Free trade, they assumed, would be fair—and so it was for the strong, the early arrivals. But competition, first from our peers and then from newly industrializing countries, made *fair* trade converts of us all. Now everyone seems to agree that international markets will be subject to restraints; the remaining questions have to do with who will determine those restraints, and for whose benefit.

Region vs. Function

The founding fathers of the United Nations and NATO thought that the main building block of world order would be cooperation among geographically regional states. But the most dynamic regionalisms have turned out to be functional: apart from the European Community, OPEC is the world's most important region. And OECD has grown in relevance because the club of Atlantic industrial democracies bypassed geography and reached out to include Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. In political and security matters as well, the NATO powers will have to get over their reluctance to consult on threats outside the NATO perimeter. As a military command, NATO has to stay within the treaty's bounds, but its main components should be ready to form coalitions very quickly with regional leaders to project power as required in other parts of the world.

An essential step toward coping with the changed dynamics of world politics will be the realization that no policy is either strictly domestic or strictly foreign.

The early architects' most enduring error was to see the rest of the world—the part that came to be called "Third"—as a dependent variable of Atlantic and East-West politics. Three U.S. administrations in the 1970s were agonizingly slow to learn that the animation and agitation, the turbulence and terror, the rising expectations and rising resentments of developing countries are the driving force behind our older, seemingly more stable relationships: the U.S.-Soviet standoff and our Atlantic and Pacific alliances. The greatest dissension within our alliances has to do with issues external to allied defense perimeters—the politics of Mideast oil, the PLO, and the question of imposing sanctions when hostages are taken and countries attacked. As for the Soviets, we no longer seem to tangle with them in Berlin or even the Mediterranean; instead, we run across them in the politics of Angola and Ethiopia and Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean—and in Afghanistan. Certainly the naked Soviet aggression in Afghanistan helped us understand that given the nature of the Soviet regime, détente could only be the continuation of tension by other means. But we will have to learn to look on Third World countries as more than incidental players on a U.S.-Soviet stage. In the 1980s they will likely be the most dynamic and turbulent force in world politics.

Yet for more than a dozen years we have devalued development, assigned a low priority to relations with the Third World, and scratched our presidential and congressional heads each year about whether two-thirds of the world deserves our cooperation. The Nixon and Carter doctrines were first cousins: They both focused on superpower geopolitics without realizing that dynamic change in the rest of the world was equally important—and might even set the big powers at each other's throats.

During the electoral campaign of 1976, Carter was eloquent in advocating more attention to poverty, hunger, and cultural identity in the developing world, and to expanded world trade and aid that might enable the Third World to pass without violence through an obviously rough transition to modern life. Yet, in four years the Carter administration and Congress never tackled the dilemmas of development, never attempted to revive the still moribund dialogue with the southern world. Even now, as it appears that the maintenance of a stable world order is the key to U.S. security, the Reagan administration is still matching its predecessor in its capacity to neglect the dynamics of development and the politics of modernization.

The centerpiece of world order politics is the management of modernization. That makes it essential that we think much harder about the triple collision disrupting a hundred countries on three continents. The accident seems always to occur at that dangerous intersection where full-speed mod-

(Continued on page 28.)

Is it Time for a Principal Officer's Course?

By MICHAEL A.G. MICHAUD

The current Foreign Service Institute catalog of courses lists an impressive variety of offerings for virtually every specialization—political, economic/commercial, consular, administrative. For people who will run embassies, there are executive seminars and a DCMs' course. But one thing is missing: a training course for principal officers.

This is no small problem. Almost half of our overseas posts are consulates or consulates-general—100 compared with 134 embassies, according to the current list of key officers of Foreign Service posts. Among them are such large establishments as Hong Kong, Frankfurt, Naples, Montreal, and Rio de Janeiro. Many are quite busy places—four of the top ten immigrant-visa-issuing posts are consulates-general. They absorb significant personnel and financial resources. And, they are the best possible training ground for future ambassadors and DCMs. Yet we do not prepare people to run them.

Consulates-general (if not consulates) are now designated by functional cone. Thus, Belfast is a "political" post, while Edinburgh is "consular," and Sydney is "commercial." In theory, the department fills the principal officer slots at these posts with officers from the appropriate cones. But this practice, however sensible it may be from one point of view, does not recognize the multi-functional nature of most consulates-general and many consulates.

In some cases, these branch posts are like small embassies, with a front office, political section, economic/commercial section, consular section, and administrative section. Even smaller posts are expected to perform a wide variety of functions, with each officer wearing several hats. Many constituent posts do contact work, representation, and substantive reporting. Most have consular responsibilities. And all have to perform at least basic administrative functions. Why do we expect that specialists will be able to walk in cold to a principal officer job and manage all these functions well?

The Biggest Weakness

Principal officers, it is said, can call on the wider range of skills available at their embassies to fill in the gaps. But anyone who has served in branch posts knows how limited an option this is for the everyday conduct of business, particularly when the embassy is hundreds of miles away. Embassy officers have their own problems to worry about and inevitably think of their own posts first. Constituent posts must be as self-sufficient as possible, capable of doing their own thing and doing it well.

At large consulates-general, the management responsibilities are obvious. The principal officer must see that all sections run well in a coordinated post effort. Such posts tend to have officers from each major area of specialization to do the work, but it remains important for the principal officer to understand all the functions of his or her post.

The biggest weakness at small posts—confirmed by the Inspection Corps—is in administration. Such posts usually have no administrative officer. Political, economic/commercial, and consular specialists who become principal officers seldom have administrative experience, much less administrative training. Yet they are responsible for seeing that post properties are properly managed and maintained, that inventories are kept up to date, that post funds are accounted for, that communications are efficient and secure. Even if there is an experienced Foreign Service national to handle administrative affairs, the principal officer is ultimately responsible for that administrative work.

It is time to remedy this situation with a principal officer's course. It should be kept short, since we all know that there is little time to take courses before most assignments. Since every Foreign Service employee is now required to take a two-day seminar on combatting terrorism, why not make it three days to allow the full utilization of a week? The course should be designed to provide an overview of post functions and principal officer responsibilities, not detailed training in each field. The first day might cover embassy–branch post relations, plus typical constituent post responsibilities in political, economic, and commercial work. The second day would review all significant consular functions, clarifying the basic authorities and responsibilities in visa services, citizens services, and other fields. The third day would review basic administrative functions and responsibilities, including general services, budget and fiscal, communications and records, and personnel.

No one will become an expert in any of these fields after a three-day course. But each officer would know what is expected of the supervisor of a post, and our consulates and consulates-general would function more smoothly. Finally, the course would produce a group of officers better prepared to become DCMs and ambassadors. □

Michael A.G. Michaud, whose frequent contributions to the Journal *include "Caveat Transferee" in the December issue, is consul general at Belfast.*

Parenting Abroad

A primer on how to handle the problems brought on by unfamiliar societies, different moral codes, cultural displacement, frequent moves, and parental guilt about pulling children from familiar turf

By JOEL WALLACH and GALE METCALF

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Parenting in any setting is not an easy task. Parenting abroad offers some uniquely challenging stresses and opportunities for parents. For families recently posted to a new assignment, complaints such as "I don't want to be here . . . These people are really weird . . . This place is the pits . . . I miss my friends back home" may prevail for weeks or even months as children adjust—or fail to adjust—to their new environments. Fortunately, most children not only make a successful adjustment but benefit greatly from the experience of living abroad. There are, however, five major areas in which problems surface again and again in child-rearing when families transport themselves overseas: teaching responsibility; relations with host country nationals; family communication; peer relationships; and returning home. These deserve special attention and consideration.

Teaching Responsibility

MIKE, AGE 13, HAS BEEN GROUNDED BY HIS DAD FOR MISBEHAVIOR AT HOME. "BUT IT'S THE FIRST DANCE OF THE YEAR," PLEADS MICHAEL. "IF I DON'T GO, I WON'T GET TO KNOW ANYBODY. YOU KNOW I DON'T HAVE ANY FRIENDS HERE. NOT LIKE BACK HOME WHERE I KNEW EVERYBODY AND WAS REALLY POPULAR. I NEVER WANTED TO COME HERE. I KNEW IT WOULD BE TERRIBLE. YOU JUST HAVE TO LET ME GO!" DAD DOES.

The need to develop in one's children a sense of responsibility is certain-

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ly not limited to life abroad, yet it may be more difficult to accomplish in an overseas setting. Parents often feel guilty about bringing their children overseas and may try to compensate for this by being more permissive than usual. If the family has servants, they frequently feel that pleasing the children is an important part of their job. They may cater to unreasonable whims, take orders from a six-year-old or an insolent teen, and leave few jobs for the children to share. Parents, the school, and servants frequently handle much of the decision-making for children and also often rescue them from any unpleasant consequences of their actions. With servants ever ready to pick up after them, with mothers more willing to come to the rescue when lunch is forgotten or books mislaid, with the school providing a whole host of ready-made activities, with Dad a soft touch for extra spending money, children have less motivation to take responsibility for themselves. Last, in many communities, teens perceive themselves to be—and in some cases are—invulnerable to the legal sanctions of the host country. This can foster an attitude of "anything goes" as teens push and push in search of limits.

It is extremely important for parents to make a conscious effort to build in conditions which will help their children learn to assume responsibility. This could take many forms: involving children whenever possible in family decision-making (i.e., planning weekend or vacation time); providing children with choices rather than ready-made decisions, so they can practice their decision-making skills; allotting young children unstructured blocks of time to manage on their own; creating special jobs around the house for which the children have sole responsibility, even though it may be incomprehensible to servants; trying to refrain from rescuing children from the unpleasant consequences of their actions; having clearly defined limits for children and consistently enforcing consequences when kids overstep these bounds.

Relations With Host Country Nationals

SARA, FIVE, IS A WELL-BEHAVED CHILD WHEN WITH HER PARENTS. WITH HER ASIAN MAID, HOWEVER, SHE IS A TERROR. SHE ORDERS THE MAID AROUND IMPERIOUSLY, DELIGHTED TO DISCOVER THAT THE WOMAN ALMOST ALWAYS COMPLIES.

JIM AND ANGIE, BOTH 15, ARE DEEPLY IN LOVE. THEY SPEND EVERY POSSIBLE MINUTE TOGETHER. THEY OFTEN WALK DOWN THE STREET ARM IN ARM, OCCASIONALLY KISSING. SOMETIMES, THE PEOPLE IN THEIR MIDEASTERN HOST COUNTRY SIMPLY STARE. SOMETIMES THEY SAY THINGS IN AN ANGRY WAY. SOMETIMES THEY THROW ROCKS.

For parents of younger children, the availability of domestic help may relieve Mom of some of the more onerous chores of housekeeping and child-rearing. It also requires her to share child-rearing responsibilities with someone who, more likely than not, has markedly different views on the appropriate way to raise children. As mentioned before, servants may perceive their job to be dependent upon the child's liking them, Sara's case being a good example. In such situations, it is extremely difficult for servants to enforce limits. With young children, this can manifest itself in two ways. One, the children are overgratified, picked up, played with, and always entertained by servants. Two, the children relate to servants with little respect, ordering them about and generally being overdemanding. Both of these are potentially dangerous to the long-term development of the child. The former inhibits the child's ability to be alone and entertain him or herself. The latter can lead to significant interpersonal problems.

Parents can deal with this situation in several ways. They can teach the child appropriate ways of dealing with servants by modeling such behavior themselves and by correcting rude or disrespectful behavior whenever they see it. The parents can define for servants how they are to deal with the children, providing both the servants and the children with clear guidelines of what is and what is not acceptable behavior. They can assume that servants will not automatically be able to enforce discipline. Finally, parents can teach young children how to entertain themselves by giving them increasing opportunities to manage unstructured time.

For adolescents, cross-cultural differences present other types of problems. Living overseas during the teenage years comes at a time when adolescents want to be doing what is normal for their age group in their own culture. Instead, they find themselves in a foreign environment with people behaving in ways that often make no sense to them. For most, motivation to explore that environment and to see what it has to offer is low. Quite often, without meaning to, teens, such as Jim and Angie, tread upon cultural sensitivities and provoke negative reactions from host country nationals. This is often perceived as harrassment and can result in a negative cycle of alienation and hostility between the two groups. A number of steps can be taken by parents to minimize teens' being hassled and, in the process, to increase the potential for the youngsters to enjoy and benefit from their overseas experience. For one thing,


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parents can serve as a model for their children, being aware of their own attitudes and behavior toward local people. They can learn about and communicate to their teenagers specific behaviors (i.e., public displays of affection, dress standards) that are offensive in the host country's culture but which may not be in their own. Last, they can help teens find functional ways of dealing with host country nationals' behavior they find offensive.

It is also important to remember that children are not immune to culture shock. Younger children often return to forms of behavior parents thought they had outgrown (for instance, toddlers may revert to needing diapers). They may cry more or just demand more attention from parents. Older children may become extremely negative, evidence changes in school performance, activity levels, or relations with family. What makes this most difficult is that parents may be going through the same changes themselves and therefore have less energy and patience to cope with their children's adjustment.

Family Communication

JEANIE, AGE 17, SAYS THAT SHE WOULD LIKE TO SPEND MORE TIME WITH HER FAMILY. BUT, SHE EXPLAINS, HER SCHEDULE IS SO BUSY, SHE JUST CAN'T FIT IT IN. AFTER SCHOOL, THERE'S BASKETBALL PRACTICE THREE DAYS A WEEK. THEN THERE ARE THE SPEECH AND DEBATE TOURNAMENT FOR WHICH SHE HAS TO PREPARE AND, COMING UP, TRYOUTS FOR THE PLAY. AFTER DINNER, THERE IS HOMEWORK. WEEKENDS ARE JUST AS BUSY. SHE WOULDN'T MIND SPENDING TIME WITH HER FOLKS, BUT IT NEVER SEEMS TO HAPPEN.

Some, though certainly not all, families discover that there is less time spent together as a family when overseas. Whether or not the Foreign Service employee's work involves extensive travel—which it frequently does—his or her position overseas is likely to be very demanding of time, keeping the employee at the office long past normal working hours. In addition, there are often numerous social obligations which keep both parents away from home. Add to this the vigorous school-activities program that exists in many overseas communities and one is likely to see family members busily going off, each in a different direction.

Family members need to have the opportunity to spend *quality time* with each other, time when sharing and real communication take place. Consciously building in such opportunities is one way parents can contribute to overall family well-being. In the overseas setting it seems especially important for fathers and mothers who work to spend some special time with each of their children each week. This can be as little as thirty minutes spent with each child. During this special time, the focus should be on the child—what the child wants to talk about or do. It is a small investment which can go far towards strengthening family communication.

Peer Relationships

ROY'S MOTHER WAS CONCERNED. HE HAD BEEN IN HIS NEW SCHOOL FOR SIX MONTHS AND STILL HAD NO FRIENDS. MOREOVER, HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN MAKING ANY. SHE ASKED THE SCHOOL COUNSELOR TO SPEAK WITH ROY. ROY'S EXPLANATION WAS QUITE SIMPLE. AFTER MOVING FOUR TIMES IN THE LAST SEVEN YEARS, HE WASN'T ABOUT TO MAKE ANY MORE FRIENDS HE COULD LOSE. AND HE DIDN'T.

ANNE WAS 15, A BELOW AVERAGE STUDENT. IN THE STATES, SHE HAD

SMOKED MARIJUANA ON AND OFF BUT HAD GOTTEN INTO NO SERIOUS TROUBLE. THEN, HER FAMILY WAS TRANSFERRED OVERSEAS. THE HIGH SCHOOL SHE ENTERED WAS PRIMARILY FOR THOSE COLLEGE-BOUND. SHE FOUND IT HARD TO FIT IN. HASHISH WAS PLENTIFUL AND THOSE WHO SMOKED IT WERE FRIENDLIER THAN MOST. THREE MONTHS LATER, SHE FOUND HERSELF FAILING SCHOOL AND IN CONSTANT CONFLICT WITH HER PARENTS. GETTING HIGH EVERYDAY WAS AN EASY WAY TO AVOID FACING THESE PAINFUL REALITIES.

For any child, changing friends, schools, locales can be traumatic. Many children go through a grieving period, mourning the loss of friends and a familiar environment. Those who are naturally shy and reserved can be especially affected, fearing that they will not be able to make friends in their new home. Encouraging children to talk about their feelings, as well as discussing with them ideas on how to go about making friends, can help. Making friends can be stressful, but losing them can be even more distressing because it occurs so often in the transient overseas community. Frequently, children find that when a friendship is just beginning to feel comfortable and established, the friend has to leave. Roy's reaction may have been exceptional, but many children share his feelings. While there is little parents can do about this situation, awareness of the loss their child is experiencing can help them to be more tolerant during this period.

Once the child has made friends, these friends tend to be a source of great influence, especially at the junior and senior high school level. This fairly normal phenomenon is intensified when the school is small, as it often is in an overseas setting. The desire to be, and to remain, part of the group is very strong when the choice of groups is limited. This makes the influence of peers quite powerful, especially in the areas of drug and alcohol use. It is important that parents know their children's friends and monitor what their kids are doing. A laissez-faire attitude at this stage is likely to be detrimental.

Re-entry: Returning Home

KATHY, AGE 13, COMPLAINED, "IT WASN'T SUPPOSED TO BE LIKE THIS. ALL THE TIME WE WERE IN BONN, I COULDN'T WAIT TO COME BACK HOME. NOW THAT I'M HERE, EVERYTHING IS DIFFERENT. MY FRIENDS AREN'T INTERESTED IN WHAT I'VE DONE AND I FEEL REALLY OUT OF PLACE."

Coming back home seems to be more difficult for adolescents than for younger children. Adolescents like Kathy who have spent more than two years overseas feel themselves to be very much outsiders when they return to their home country. They are out of date, out of touch with the current songs, slang, dress, etc. They feel the odd person out. This can be excruciatingly painful at an age when they are so dependent upon the approval of their peers. Having a home leave every year or two helps to minimize this but causes an additional difficulty. On home leave, they are the special friend or relative from overseas. They do fun things, travel, enjoy those things they never get to do when overseas. It is vacation time. Unfortunately, living back in one's home country is not nearly so glamorous. Sometimes it is actually boring! If expectations are geared towards home-leave-types of experiences, then the landing, when reality hits, can be quite jarring.

There are some things parents can do to smooth the inevitable bumps and shorten the period of frustration that re-entry necessarily entails. They can encourage each child to share his or her feelings, fears, and frustrations about going home. This is important before, during, and after the move. Also, they can try to pop the myth about how great life will be back home and help children to develop a realistic view of what to expect.

Parenting is both rewarding and taxing wherever one is. Being aware of some of the predictable hurdles of parenting abroad makes it easier for you to anticipate problems your child may encounter and to assist him or her in coping. As reported by families who have successfully and happily raised children overseas, the following six guidelines appear to go a long way towards ensuring effective parenting overseas:

- Be concerned about your child's adjustment. Acknowledge that it may be stressful. Create opportunities to share feelings and talk about solutions;
- Be aware of your own attitudes and behavior. You are a powerful model for your children;
- Make child-rearing decisions (regarding rules, chores, etc.) consciously during the first few months. Re-affirm acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. The patterns you establish early on will be maintained;
- Set clear and consistent limits. Overseas, parents are the most significant, and often the only, effective limit-setters for their children;
- Assist children in viewing the behavior of host country nationals as different from what they are used to rather than "bad";
- Try to minimize any guilty feelings you have about bringing your children overseas. Your guilt encourages and legitimizes their negativity. Encourage them to maximize whatever opportunities exist in your new environment. □

THE JOURNAL

Murder

The 1924 slaying of a U.S. vice consul by religious fanatics foreshadowed the embassy seizure, but in this early case U.S. claims were satisfied

By HENRY S. VILLARD

When I entered the Foreign Service in 1928, Persia seemed as far away as the planet Jupiter, of very little interest to Americans, save for rug merchants, missionaries, archeologists, and an occasional venturesome tourist. My geography book showed an arid land of turbaned figures, mosques, primitive agriculture, and a feudal society almost medieval in its lack of transport and low standard of living. Rather at the end of the line was how one of my British colleagues described Teheran, then a sprawling city of 300,000 inhabitants.

I had set my heart on going to Melbourne or Stuttgart, naively assuming I would be granted one of my two post preferences. It was something of a shock to be assigned to the Persian capital instead, as vice-consul-in-charge of the consulate general—especially so because one of my predecessors, Robert W. Imbrie, had been savagely murdered by a howling mob for trying to photograph a fountain said to be sacred. There, but for the grace of God . . . ! I thought. I, too, liked taking pictures.

As part of my indoctrination in Near Eastern affairs, I was required to study a bulging file on the Imbrie case, mostly labeled confidential, a disconcerting reminder of the perils of a Persian assignment and certainly the most sensational episode in the history of U.S.-Iranian relations until the seizing of the embassy and the holding of its staff as hostages in 1979. There it all was—telegrams incoming and outgoing, diplomatic notes delivered and received, memoranda, letters, newspaper accounts. But instead of being published in *Foreign Relations of the United States,* as is customary after a lapse of 20 years, the documents—no longer classified—lie buried to this day in the National Archives for the simple reason that the Iranian government, for reasons of its own, never saw fit to give its consent to their release.

The half-forgotten story begins at 11 o'clock on the morning of July 18, 1924, when Vice Consul Imbrie ordered the carriage in which he was riding to stop at the Sakkeh Khaneh, a public drinking fountain that two weeks before had been declared the scene of a miraculous occurrence. Since then there had been numerous street demonstrations in which the Bahais, a minority sect, had been roundly denounced. Religious feeling was running high with the feast of Muharram only two weeks away. But no order had been issued forbidding photographs, and Imbrie had no reason to anticipate danger as, camera in hand, he descended from the vehicle and approached the crowd around the fountain. He was accompanied by his *kavass,* or native messenger-interpreter, and another passenger named Seymour.

At the sight of the camera an angry murmur began to run through the crowd—foreigners were not only regarded by the ignorant with suspicion but were thought capable of any evil or mischief. Noting the throng's menacing attitude, a policeman came up to the *feranghi* and advised them to leave. What happened next was like the touching of a match to tinder. It is probable that Imbrie, not a man to take unnecessary risks, closed his camera and the sound of it shutting was mistaken for the taking of a picture. "They are Bahais!" shouted a fanatical cleric by the name of Seyid Hossein. "They have poisoned the waters of our sacred shrine and killed Moslem women and children!"

An Enraged Crowd

Instantly, the crowd set upon the Americans. Imbrie and Seymour managed to regain their carriage and make off at top speed, a screaming horde in pursuit. A mile or so further on, directly in front of military headquarters, their headlong flight was brought to a halt by two motorcycle police. Despite the frantic cries of a servant in the employ of Dr. H. P. Packard, a respected medical missionary, that Imbrie was not a Bahai but the American consul, the unfortunate men were dragged from the carriage and assaulted by a crowd that had now grown into the thousands. Although the city streets were generally well policed, not a single shot was fired in their defense; worse, among the leaders of the attack were cossack officers of Prime Minister Reza Khan's own Pahlavi regiment, whose sabers inflicted some of Imbrie's most serious injuries. In its fury the

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"The Journal" is a section for articles on diplomatic history and personal experiences by our readers relating to life in the Foreign Service.

in Teheran

Carly Delaney

mob tore off the roof of a small tea house where the victims had found temporary refuge, then, harangued by the ringleader, broke into the police hospital to which they had been taken. Imbrie was on the operating table with more than 138 wounds when the assailants burst through the doors and windows and beat him to death with anything they could lay their hands on, including a chair and heavy tiles torn from the floor. Seymour, bludgeoned into unconsciousness, was left for dead in a room next door. The *kavass,* caught in the melée, had the American insignia and buttons ripped from his uniform but was otherwise unhurt.

'The Soviets Will Get Me'

Robert Whitney Imbrie, born in Washington on April 27, 1883, had an adventurous career, short though it was. A graduate of George Washington University and holder of a law degree from Yale, he distinguished himself as a much-decorated ambulance driver with the French army in World War I. Returning to the United States in 1917, he was offered an unusual appointment: vice consul and special representative at Petrograd and "other nearby points" in revolutionary Russia. There he formed a lasting and deep-seated antipathy to the Bolsheviks. He was transferred to the border listening post of Viborg, Finland, in 1919, and in 1920 to Constantinople. The following year he was assigned to the office of Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, U.S. high commissioner to Turkey. There he met Katherine Gillespie of Boston, Massachusetts, director of the Near East Orphanage and intermediary between the Near East Relief Foundation and the nationalist government of Kemal Atatürk at Angora. The two were later married.

Imbrie next asked to be sent to Riga to report on the political, military, and economic situation in the Soviet Union. But the Communists had set a price upon his head. Soviet agents had sought to bribe the Turks with $40,000 in gold to let them do away with Imbrie, with the result that an armed guard was put around his car. "The Soviets will get me if there is any way of doing it," he was said to have told Lewis K. Davis, a consulting engineer in Turkey. An article in the *Russkaya Gazeta,* an anti-Soviet daily then being published in Leningrad, later said that Imbrie was regarded as one of the bitterest enemies of the Soviet republic, a man whom Moscow had intended to dispose of at the first opportunity.

The mission to Riga was considered too risky. Instead, Imbrie was ordered to Angora to report on conditions there and in Anatolia. He was a delegate at the 1923 Lausanne conference, which ended hostilities between Turkey and Greece after the former had driven out the Greek population of Smyrna.

There followed an assignment to Tabriz, another intelligence post on the Soviet border, but an irony of fate switched him at the last moment to Teheran, to take charge while Consul Bernard Gottlieb was on home leave.

At 7:22 p.m., Washington time, on the day of Imbrie's death a Very Urgent telegram from Joseph S. Kornfeld, American minister in Teheran, broke the news to a shocked Department of State. In the absence of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew, a seasoned diplomat destined to be ambassador to Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor, was in charge of the department. Heading the division of Near Eastern affairs was 31-year old Allen W. Dulles, later to achieve fame as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. President Calvin Coolidge was in the White House. Their collective response in the crisis was swift and vigorous.

It was not the first time that an American had been murdered in Persia. A missionary named Larabee had been killed in 1904. Adequate justice had not been done; an indemnity had been paid and the culprits arrested but five of them had been allowed to escape. This time the government of the United States would make sure that appropriate action was taken and carried out. To start, Minister Kornfeld was instructed to underline the extreme gravity with which Washington viewed the slaying of its consular representative and to seek out every available fact bearing on the case—a difficult task because of the welter of conflicting evidence and because the legation, although not the consulate, was located at Zargundeh during the hot summer months. It was seven miles out of town and without a telephone. At the same time, Acting Secretary Grew warned the Persian chargé d'affaires in Washington, Bagher M. 'Kazemi, that reparations would have to be made and nothing left undone to bring the guilty persons to full account.

While the State Department waited for a detailed report, the diplomatic corps in Teheran was under no such restraint. Martial law had been declared and a wave of apprehension was sweeping over the foreign colony. Two days after the murder the corps made strong representations to the prime minister. In a note signed by the Turkish ambassador as dean, and speaking for the governments of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Germany, France, and Italy, it expressed "profound horror" at the attack and charged that the mob's forcible entry into the police hospital proved that the authorities were either unwilling or unable to prevent the additional outrages there on Imbrie.

A Cossack's Condolences

The prime minister, the autocratic Reza Khan, had been an uneducated cossack officer who helped to overthrow the corrupt Kajar dynasty in 1921, making himself first minister of war, then prime minister, and in 1925 crowning himself Shah. Two days after the murder, accompanied by his foreign minister, Zoka-ol-Molk, he made an official call on Minister Kornfeld to convey condolences. Coincidentally, the foreign minister expressed regrets in a note of apology and explanation which, however, Kornfeld found "entirely inadequate." It blamed Imbrie for being careless in taking pictures and asserted that the police and military had made "extreme efforts" to rescue the Americans: several policeman had been injured, he said, three seriously, and one had died of his wounds. In the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Kornfeld was unable to swallow these allegations and wired Washington that it was "perfectly preposterous" to say the military had offered resistance. Even Reza Khan, who had threatened to "cut the tongue out of any officer or man who opens his mouth about the tragedy," was soon compelled to back down in his efforts to protect the army's reputation.

Exactly one week after the killing, a telegram went out to the Teheran legation with the text of a forceful note for the Persian government. The United States not only insisted on full reparation and punishment for the guilty but it demanded that "assurances should be given and enforced of adequate protection for the lives of American citizens; and that the safety of its officials in Persia should be guaranteed." Further, it demanded that the expenses should be covered of sending an American man-of-war to transport Imbrie's body to the United States; that a military guard of honor should be provided for the body while on Persian soil; and that appropriate honors should be rendered at the time of leaving Persian territory. Finally, in language that would have been singularly appropriate when the hostages were seized, it stressed that the "maintenance of relations between countries is primarily dependent upon the according of adequate protection to their respective nationals and to their official representatives." American relations with Persia had not been severed, but their continuance would depend upon the action the Persian government might take "to vindicate this fundamental principle of international law upon which international intercourse is predicated."

Across the country, editorial opinion was solidly behind the firm tone of the American note. "For too long we have permitted the United States to be affronted by small and impotent countries," said the *San Francisco Bulletin.* It was not "the threat of a great power against a weak government," observed the *Brooklyn Eagle* "but the protest of an outraged people." American honor, declared the *Springfield News,* "must be protected wherever Americans travel or represent their country." The *Minneapolis Tribune* thought that "the mob spirit toward Americans is intolerable and must cease," while the *Pittsburgh Times* characterized the protest as "notice to the world that there can be no trifling with American rights, no disrespect to the American flag, no mistreatment of Americans anywhere." Private citizens appeared fully in accord. "Your stand and demand on Persia incident has a fundamental soundness to American homes," read one telegram to the secretary of state. "Would say step forth and let the world know that rights must be respected."

It didn't take long for the Persians to comply fully with the department's demands. On July 29, Zoka-ol-Molk, "extremely chagrined and depressed" by the incident, replied with positive assurances that the culprits would be

apprehended and afrer their trial would receive drastic punishment. Though it would become worthless 55 years later, he pledged that the security of American citizens and particularly American official representatives would be "the explicit duty" of the government and rhat Persia would "make it in the future an essential point to respect the principles of international law." As it was, the Persians got off better than they expected. Within the week, rhe expression "moral vicrory" was being batted about Teheran, for the note was regarded as surprisingly lenient.

After two months of haggling, Persia paid to the United States in behalf of Mrs. Imbrie an indemnity of $60,000 (later increased by Congress to $90,000). For the cost of transporting Imbrie's body home it paid $110,000. In his message to Congress on February 17, 1925, President Coolidge proposed that this money should be spent for educational purposes. In 1950 it became a fund to educate Persian students in the United States. The hope was that the program would foster friendly relations between the two countries, but to the embittered widow of a man who had been murdered by Persians, it was understandably hard to take. Seymour, who survived rhe mob's violence, was paid $3,000 by Persia, largely for the purpose of defraying his hospital and medical expenses and the cost of his return to the United States.

Considerable pressure had to be applied by Washington, however, before Teheran produced three of the worst offenders, tried them by military tribunal, and sentenced them to death: a soldier named Morteza, the young son of a vendor, and Seyid Hossein, chief instigator of the attack. Executions were delayed, in part, because the court had recommended clemency, which carried special weight in respect to the convicted cleric. Reza Khan had no desire to antagonize the Shi'ite clergy, whose power, under the leadership of a senile old man named Seyid Hassan, was disturbingly on the increase. But Morteza paid the penalty on October 2 and by the end of the year the two others had been executed, a rhird lieutenant had been made the scapegoat for rhe army's part in the affair by being beaten and banished, and some thirty other participants had been sentenced ro hard labor and flogging.

Imbrie's body left Teheran on Augusr 17 with an honor guard of eight Persian officers, one a general, and four non-commissioned officers, all in uniform with black mourning bands. Since Persia had no railway, the journey was performed by motor convoy. Mrs. Imbrie had suffered a miscarriage and traveled in the company of her physician, Dr. Packard, and Major Sherman Miles, the military atraché at Constantinople, who was designated by the War Department as an official escort. The cortège crossed Iraq by rail and on the 22nd the coffin was placed on a steamer at Basra that carried it to the port of Bushire. There, on the 25th, it was transferred ro the light cruiser *U.S.S. Trenton*. After an elaborate exchange of salutes, the warship sailed for rhe United States. "All honors demanded of the Persian government," said Major Miles in his report, "were rendered in full, to the best of their ability."

Conspiracy Theories

When I arrived in Teheran to assume charge of the consulate general, people were still talking about the Imbrie affair—not so much the Persians, of course, as the foreign diplomats and businessmen. What, really, was behind the crime? Echoing traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry and intrigue in Persia, the Soviet legation had openly tried to implicate Great Brirain in the murder. Others suspected a Soviet plot if for no other reason than because Russian officials in Teheran claimed to be well informed of Imbrie's sympathy for the anti-Bolsheviks in Russia and Turkey. My Armenian clerk, reflecting the venomous anti-British feeling of many Persians, assured me that the killing was unquestionably the result of a conspiracy by the hated Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Then there was the "wrong man" theory: that feuding between two American companies, Standard Oil and Sinclair, both jockeying for concessions in Persia, was responsible; that the mob's fury was directed by mistake against Imbrie, who had been taken for Ralph Soper, the local Sinclair representative. Later, when I returned to the department as rhe Persian desk officer, I was surprised ro hear from Mrs. Imbrie that she herself favored this theory, perhaps because she had been barred from the operating room on the ground that the wounded man was nor her husband. There was even the absurd suggestion of a Jewish plot; America's politically appointed ambassador, Rabbi Kornfeld, who resigned after the indemnity was paid, seemed something of an anomaly in a Muslim country. Finally, there was the far-fetched theory that Reza Khan himself had engineered the affair in order to consolidate his posirion as a strong man and put the mullahs in their place. In an isolated and parochial community, the death of a diplomat—whether by violence or other causes—was an endless excuse for gossip and speculation.

I, too, couldn't help wondering whether there was something more behind the murder than met the eye. But in the absence of proof to the contrary, I could only subscribe to the general belief that Imbrie was the hapless victim of a highly inflammable religious fanaticism aroused to a dangerous pirch by constant preaching from the clergy. Added to this was the reverence of the masses for the fountain, the Sakkeh Khaneh: a certain gardener, who when asked to pay a few cents for water given him in the name of Abbas, a Shi'ite martyr, had replied that he would give any amount for the late Bahai leader by that name bur not a cent for the Shi'ite, had been stricken blind on the spot. The foreign colony, as well as the Persian intelligentsia, regarded the legend as a fantasy, but within the rank and file it was another matter.

Ir all came down to the strength of religious fervor. As Wallace Murray, second secretary of the legation at the time of the murder, prophesied in a secret and strictly confidential despatch dated August 10, 1924, "Viewing the tragedy in its larger issue, one is led to the inevitable conclusion that . . . unless the malign power of the clergy can be broken forever in this land, there is every reason to believe that the killing of Imbrie is but a foretaste of more terrible events to come." □

Impotent America

(Continued from page 18.)

ernization collides with claims that modernity enriches the few and deprives the many, and at the same time crashes into the tenacious resistance of cultural patriots and religious reactionaries. We watched these two powerful resentments converge on our television screens—the mullahs in their long robes and the left-wing students in pseudo-Western dress, unlikely pairs married by convenience, shouting not quite in unison for tradition and fairness, pouring into the streets of Teheran to set fire to tanks and automobiles, those quintessential symbols of modernization. A second collision was bound to follow, and we have seen it begin in Iran this year as the partisans of fairness and the defenders of tradition have found little common ground once the great satan is removed.

Rapid modernization can be reconciled with fairness and tradition. In a few developing countries—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Israel—full speed modernization has been spread quite fairly through whole populations, and rapid economic growth has been reconciled with the dominant local culture. Japan had already demonstrated that this could be possible by racing into the post-industrial era while remaining strikingly Japanese.

Widening Our Focus

We have a long way to go in working with—not just aiding—the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America so that more countries can avoid the triple collision of modernization. The first step is to widen our focus to include this matter in our concept of national security, and not to think of it as something we can turn to some other time, after we have confronted the Soviets and shored up our allies. Indeed, a vital part of East-West relations and alliance strategies for the 1980s will be to find workable relationships with the peoples whose dynamism and turbulence are drawing us into confrontation with the Soviet Union and driving wedges between the United States and its allies.

The most frightening nightmare of the 1980s may not be the familiar mushroom cloud but the disintegration of governance in more and more developing nations—the product of social upheavals about future fairness and the sturdy defense of past traditions. For it is the explosive mix of these two movements with the culture of modernization that already pockmarks the globe with the degenerative political disease so evident in the Lebanons, Cambodias, El Salvadors, Irans, Turkeys, Italys, and who knows how many other future examples of the incapacity of national governments to cope.

Our sense of American powerlessness is not, for the most part, a judgment on our economic or military potential. Rather, it is the consequence of not yet having recognized the changed dynamics of world politics and the kinds of power required to participate in the new order.

An essential step toward coping with this world dynamic will be the realization that policy issues have become more interconnected and interdepartmental; that indeed, no policy is either strictly domestic or strictly foreign. What we mostly want from other

countries—and what they mostly want from us—are changes in domestic preconceptions, priorities, policies, and practices. By the same token, most of the domestic policy actions we take—decisions about the level of agricultural subsidies, the direction of research and development, the rescue of uncompetitive companies, the degree of emphasis on energy conservation, the supply of U.S. dollars, the amount of acceptable unemployment, the size and shape of our budget deficit, and many, many others—are enormously important to nearly every other country. Yet the U.S. government is unambiguously divided between domestic and foreign affairs. Every matter of public policy is born in the domestic or foreign sphere, and is so treated as it grows up through the processes of decision, both in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill.

One of the most elementary doctrines about the management of large-scale systems is that a supervisory office should not be organized in the same manner as its subordinate offices. Instead, it should be deliberately organized to cut across the vertical divisions below, to throw new light on their interrelationships and inconsistencies before issues come to the top executive for a decision. Each of the cabinet departments was established essentially to deal either with national security/foreign policy matters, or with domestic policy. Yet, for three decades, the White House has been

organized the same way, coordinating the State and Defense Departments and the intelligence community through a National Security Council, and channeling the rest of the government through a domestic policy staff. Since the system does not fit the function, dissonance between foreign and domestic policies is normal. Review the history of energy policy, the law of the sea, the sale of arms, the issue of selling grain to the Soviet Union, and the export of nuclear fuels, and many examples of unpredicted, ignored, or suppressed international ramifications will be found.

One example is enough. North America is the centerpiece of a world food system which is not yet delivering enough food to prevent large numbers of people from suffering from malnutrition. Yet most federal farm legislation, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, still tilt toward restricting food production. The primary concern is to maximize the return to the producers, and there is nothing wrong with that. But the U.S. government has hardly even started to change the system so that producing to meet world *needs* (not merely the "effective demand" of the affluent hungry, such as the Soviets) is made profitable for the American farmer.

Siamese Twins

Despite the melding of domestic and international issues in the actual world, it is still almost literally true that only one person in the executive branch is hired to work on *both* domestic and foreign policy—the president. And no one occupying that office has organized the White House staff as though foreign and domestic policy were more than distant cousins, let alone Siamese twins.

The need to make so many public policy decisions in consultation or agreement with other countries and international enterprises, and the influence of international interdependence on the domestic politics of our own country and others, require a special kind of leadership. In the simpler days of the Marshall Plan, the decisive actions needed to meet an international crisis were essentially taken by a few legislative and executive leaders—and the remainder of Americans participated in passive ways by reading the newspapers, paying their taxes, and reelecting Harry Truman. But the chronic crisis of interdependence, of which the problems of energy, food, arms, and inflation are only the most obvious examples, requires action by dozens of government agencies, hundreds of state and local governments, thousands of business executives, hundreds of thousands of teachers, and millions of householders, automobile owners, investors, and organized and unorganized workers.

The style of national governance appropriate to these circumstances is more akin to wartime leadership, engaging the cooperation of whole populations to take those domestic actions without which the requisite international cooperation cannot be arranged by even the most skillful diplomats. Such leadership goes far beyond the capacity to guide legislation through the labyrinth of enactment to the capacity to educate whole populations. Except perhaps on energy policy, the task of mobilizing the United States to cope with interdependence has not been seriously tackled. Modern interdependence and national security require changes in attitudes and assumptions, life styles, and workways—the capacity to elicit millions of willing actions, more or less voluntary, backed up by self-interest, market economics, social pressure, and only at the margin by governmental intervention.

If our leaders, under whatever party label, persist in using old theory to deal with new problems, they will keep digging those inviting holes in their own path. The central problem is not one of management or administration. The effective management of diplomacy is not so arcane an art that it cannot be effectively mastered through on-the-job training. Harry Truman taught us that. The priceless ingredient of diplomacy is an understandable general strategy—a clear-headed sense of where we as a nation are trying to go, what we are trying to do, what kind of world order we really want to build. An ad hoc foreign policy is not good enough for the world's leading power. □

FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE

Seventh Annual AFSA/ AAFSW Merit Award Winners for 1982

The Honorable H. G. Torbert Jr., chairman of the AFSA Committee on Education, is pleased to announce that the four review panels consisting of 24 volunteers from State, AAFSW, AID, and ICA have completed their work on the 1982 AFSA/ AAFSW Merit Awards. This year, the $500 awards for academic excellence are given in honor of Elizabeth and Norris S. Haselton for their years of devoted service to both AFSA and AAFSW, and for their work with the Book Fair, which provides funds for AAFSW's generous contributions to the scholarship programs.

The 22 graduating high school students who are winners of the 1982 Haselton Merit Awards are listed below. The September *Foreign Service Journal* will include pictures and brief biographies of these talented Foreign Service Juniors. Congratulations!

Winners

Anne E. Birn
Karen A. Bofinger
Christopher P. Bolster
Louise M. Brown
Susan L. Duncan
Sonia E. Flaten
Robin L. Fritts
David R. Heatley
Paul R. Hughes Jr.
Gretchen A. Lamb
Richard J. Lyne
Sheila R. Moore
Steven Q. Morefield
Michelle J. Nadeau
Brian K. Nelson
Catherine A. Piez
Frederic H. Rogers
Christopher D. Rowell
Andrew G. Russell
Jerome D. Sayre
Jennifer L. Smith
Jonathan E. Tarrant

Honorable Mention

Joseph P. Brogley
Joyce E. Burson
James W. Busch
Christie Eustis
Martin G. Gross
John W. Kimball III
Lewis A. Lukens
Michael A. Powers
Sherry L. Savage
Elizabeth A. Sterner

Deaths

David Page Coffin, who had been a Foreign Service officer and an economic analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, died on January 28 of a heart attack in Warrenton, Virginia.

Born in Salem, Massachusetts, Coffin earned three degrees from Harvard. His first post was Shanghai, China, 1946–48. He took Japanese language training at Yale University until 1949, followed by a tour as Japanese language officer in Osaka, Japan. Resigning in 1950 to return to Harvard, he rejoined the government in 1953 as a writer with the C.I.A. During 1956–58 he was posted to London.

Upon retirement from the CIA in 1972, Coffin opened The Boxwood School for children from three to eight, which was modeled after the schools his children had attended in England. He is survived by his wife, the former Elizabeth Gring, children David Jr., Kit Dukas, Winthrop, Ann Lauterbach, and Sarah McCormack, and grandchildren Lili and Alexandra.

Dorothy Solon de Borchgrave, executive assistant to former Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, died of cancer in Boston on January 6. She was 65.

De Borchgrave entered the Foreign Service in 1942 and served in Stockholm, Brussels, and Paris. She retired from government service in 1965, having worked in both the State and Treasury Departments as administrative assistant to Dillon.

She is survived by a son, Arnaud de Borchgrave Jr., and a sister, who is now Mrs. Frederick M. Koss, and a brother, Eugene Solon, both of Boston.

Richard Ford, former consul general in Barcelona, Spain, died in that city on January 26. He was 83.

Born in Texas, Ford served as an aviator in the Marine Corps during World War I. He later joined the Foreign Service, serving in Barcelona, 1945–49, and also in Tegucigalpa, Seville, Montreal, Buenos Aires, Tabriz, Teheran, and Tel Aviv. After retirement he served for several years as president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Spain, headquartered in Barcelona.

Ford is survived by his wife and children.

Margaret Harrell, wife of Raymond Harrell, a retired Foreign Service officer, died at Cape Canaveral Hospital on April 5 after a brief illness.

Harrell accompanied her husband to embassies in Bogata, Havana, Mexico City, and Bonn. She is survived by her husband, who resides at 1525 Minuteman Causeway, Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931.

Kenneth Lee Herrick, navigator on the Illinois Air National Guard KC135 tanker that crashed near Chicago on March 19, was killed as a result of the accident, which claimed the lives of three other crew and 23 passengers. He was 36.

The son of Ruth and Lee Herrick, he was a Ph.D. candidate in aeronautical engineering at University of Illinois, where he had received bachelor's and master's degrees in the same subject. He joined the Air National Guard in 1979. Herrick accompanied his parents to several posts, including Karachi, Buenos Aires, and Jos, Nigeria, where his father was poultry adviser for AID. He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth Thompson Herrick, son Jason Lee, sister Ruth, and his parents.

Clare Timberlake, the first U.S. ambassador to the Congo, now Zaire, died February 22 of an aneurysm at a nursing home in Bethesda, Maryland. He was 74.

Timberlake entered the Foreign Service in 1930 and held posts in Canada, Latin America, Europe, and Asia. He became minister-counselor at embassies in Argentina and West Germany before being named to Leopoldville in 1960, when the Congo gained independence from Belgium. During his year of service there the country was in constant civil war. Timberlake is credited with saving a photographer from a group of Congolese troops who were yelling for him in front of the U.S. embassy. The ambassador persuaded the soldiers to leave.

Survivors include his wife, Julia M., of Bethesda, sons Charles B. and William L., daughters Frances T. Lillis, Katherine T. Hostage, and Mary Anne Timberlake, and seven grandchildren.

HELEN NUFER WINCKEL, a retired vice-consul, died on March 10 in Monterey, California. She was 90.

Winckel joined the Foreign Service in 1910, when she was 18, as a local clerk in Bremen, Germany. She later served at posts in Germany and the Netherlands, where she met Richard L. Winckel in 1917. They were married in 1920, and under prevailing U.S. law she lost her citizenship. Her husband died in 1924. She rejoined the Foreign Service, working in The Hague and Brussels, then immigrated to the United States for a succession of government jobs before the war.

She joined the Foreign Service for a third time as vice-consul in Cairo, replacing her sister, Frances. During the war she served in Mexico City and Ciudad Juarez. Post-war assignments included Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamilton, and Monterrey, from where she retired in 1955. She was the sister of the late Albert F. Nufer, ambassador to the Philippines. Her sister died in 1970.

Achievement

EDMUND F. BECKER, Washington representative of the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany, was awarded on February 19 the chamber's silver medal for distinguished service in promoting German-American trade relations.

Becker has served as the chamber's Washington representative since 1969, when he retired from the Foreign Service having served in the Bonn embassy as commercial counselor and at the U.S. Trade Center in Frankfurt as director.

Event

REUNION of students, parents, faculty, and friends of the 75-year-old American Community School of Beirut, Lebanon, will be held Saturday, July 17, 1982 at the Ramada Inn, Old Town, Alexandria, Virginia. Details via Cindy Abuzaid, 9213 Hidden Creek Drive, Great Falls, Virginia 22066. (703)759-5470.

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

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