**Modern Movements Among Moslems**

Modern Movements Among

Moslems

By

SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON, D.D.

*Thirty-two Years Resident in Persia*

*Author of “Persian Life and Customs”*

*“Bahaism and Its Claims,” etc.*

New York Chicago Toronto

Fleming H. Revell Company

London and Edinburgh

Copyright, 1916, by

FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY

New York: 158 Fifth Avenue

Chicago: 125 N. Wabash Ave.

Toronto: 25 Richmond St., W.

London: 21 Paternoster Square

Edinburgh: 100 Princes Street

**PREFACE**

THE Western world is showing increasing inter-

est in Moslems. The great movement which

has developed so marvellously in Eastern Asia

affects Moslem peoples as well. Recent political up-

heavals in the Near East resulted in the proclamation

of Constitutional governments in Turkey and Persia.

In one year three autocratic Moslem rulers were de-

throned. A spirit of Nationalism is growing. Events

have followed in quick succession, leading up to the

participation of Turkey in the World War. Her call

has gone forth to all Islamic peoples to engage in a

Holy War of deliverance. The Ottoman Empire

occupies a unique position in the great contest of arms.

Study of Islam as a religion has made great prog-

ress in recent times; critical examination of its his-

tory and traditions by eminent scholars has thrown

much new light upon it. Its present remarkable ad-

vance in Africa and Indonesia and the entrance into

it of modernist influences from Western civilization

have engaged the attention of all students of religion.

The awakening of the Christian Church to its duty

to evangelize the Moslems and its undertaking work

to this end is enlisting another large element to con-

sider Islam. So it has come about that the statesman,

the historian, the sociologist, the theologian, the mis-

sionary give thought to the affairs of the Islamic

world as never before. Contemporary literature indi-

cates the spread of this interest, especially new period-

icals in different European languages which are de-

voted exclusively to Islam. Even fiction is seeking

its themes and plots among the followers of Mo-

hammed.

Residence in the Near East, for a generation, in

personal contact and converse with Moslems, with

opportunities of travel among them in Persia, Russia,

Turkey, Syria, and Egypt, and study and observation

of contemporary events, supplementing knowledge of

the history and doctrines of Islam, have given Mos-

lem peoples a large place in my vision and thought.

For this reason, when I was elected to deliver the

course of lectures on the L. H. Severance Founda-

tion before the Western Theological Seminary of the

Presbyterian Church, at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, I

chose a subject connected with Islam. These lectures

on “Modern Movements Among Moslems,” in a

much enlarged form, constitute the present volume.

Study about the Moslem world has a fascination for

me, and I trust this review of present-day events and

movements in the life, thought, religion, society, and

politics of Mohammedan lands may arrest attention

and inspire efforts for the welfare of these millions

of our fellow-men.

S. G. W.

**CONTENTS**

I. Innovations in Islam 11

Is Islam Inflexible? Opinions of Fairbairn,

Muir, Cromer, Palgrave—Modifications: In

Lifetime of Mohammed; by Sufiism, Panthe-

ism, Darvishes—The Stages—Zikr—Sheikhs

—Saint-worship—Veneration of Tombs—

Intercessors—Apotheosis of Mohammed—

Uncreated Koran—Development of Clergy

—Their Orders—Pirs—Marseyakhans—The

Shariat, Law—Its Growth—Adaptation from

Romans and Christians—Urfi in Persia—Code

Napoleon in Turkey—Accommodations about

Commerce, Jihad, Caliphate, Superstitions—

Caste—Rites—Present-day Question: Shall

Islam be Modified?—Possible Methods—Dif-

ferent Parties—Subjects to be Treated.

II. The Revival in Islam 52

Eighteenth-century Decline—“The Revival”:

Its Cause—(1) Wahabism: Its Founder—

Doctrines, History, Influence; in India;

Faraiis; Danfodio; Revival in Turkey—(2)

Pan-Islamism: Its Purpose—Racial Divisions

—Osmanli Caliphate—Qualifications—Not

Character—Attitude of Arabs—Its Propa-

ganda—Khojas—Dallals—With Shiahs—

Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din—From Mecca—Hajis—

In Malaysia, China, Russia, India, Africa—

Repression of Christianity—Armenian Mas-

sacres, as a Victory for Islam—Triumph over

Greece—Anger at Christian Aggression—

Holy War—Its Doctrinal Basis—Dar-ul-Harb

—Recent Jihads—The Present Jihad—Mili-

tary Pan-Islamism a Failure.

III. Islamic Missions 94

Zeal in Propagating Faith—Darvish Orders—

Conversions by Sword, by Persuasion; in

Africa—Methods—Their Spirit—The Sanusi-

yahs: Founder, Organization, Zeal, Principles,

Results—Other Islamic Missions—Russia—

India—Malaysia—Japan—Mission Societies

and Congresses.

IV. Mahdiist Movements 112

Expectation of a Mahdi—Traditions—History—

Modern Mahdis—(1) The Bab: His Claim;

the Name; Life; Imprisonment; Insurrec-

tions; Doctrines—Abrogation of Islam;

Morals; Effect; Offshoots of Babism—(2)

Subh-i-Azal—(3) Baha Ullah; Their Quar-

rel; Baha’s Claim; Doctrines; an Incarna-

tion; “Return”; Allegorizing; Symbolism;

Rites; Laws; Quarrel over the Succession;

Propaganda in America; Pilgrimage; Abdul

Baha; Visits Occident—(4) Gulam Ahmad:

Ahmadiyas; His Claim; Teaching About

Christ; Peaceful Mahdi; Prophecies; Propa-

ganda; Results; Mission in England; Com-

parison with Bahaism—(5) Mohammed Ah-

mad of the Sudan: His Preaching; Egyp-

tian Rule; Mahdi’s Conquests; Doctrines and

Laws; Character; Death; Khalifa Abdullah;

Gordon at Khartum; Overthrow; Results.

V. Modernism in Islam 149

Neo-Islam. Source of—Influence—Repressed in

Turkey—Later Liberalism—Sheikh-ul-Islam

—In Persia—Restrictions—Mullah Sadra—

Sheikh Ahmad—Sigat-ul-Islam—Haji Hadi—

Egypt—Sheikh Mohammed Abdu—El Bakri

—“Back to the Koran”—Actual Reforms—

Malaysia—Society of Islam—Russia—Con-

forming in Social Life—Gasparinski—Among

the Tartars—Congress at Petrograd—India—

Advanced Position—Ahmad Khan—Aligarh

—Justice Amir Ali: On Inspiration; the

Supernatural; Right of Private Judgment—

Ali Hasan—Khuda Bakhsh—Mulvi Abdullah

—Reformers on Assassination—Loyalty to

Mohammed—Mutazalis—Influence of Neo-

Islam.

VI. The New Education in Islam 172

Modernism in Education—Mosque Schools—

Curriculum—Arabic a Hindrance—Madressas

—Al Azhar—Its Conservatism—Influences

from Europe—Students Abroad—Aspirations

—Persia—Shah’s College—Modern Schools—

Turkey—Schemes of Reforming Sultans—

New Vernacular Literature—Under Abdul

Hamid—Under Constitution—Turkish Boy

Scouts—Egypt—Khedive’s Schools—Girls’

Education—French Africa—India—Con-

gresses—Aligarh College—The New Educa-

tion, a Reflex of the Christian Learning—Not

under Mullahs—Is Liberalizing—The Press

—Newspapers—Translating of Koran.

VII. Neo-Islam and Society 194

In Social Life—Islam and Society—Woman

before Islam, in Arabia, Africa, East In-

dies—Marriage Law—Seclusion—Neo-Islam

against Polygamy and Harem—Review of

Countries—Under Young Turks—Slavery—

Decreasing—Abolition of Slave Trade—Neo-

Islam Concerning Religious Liberty—Disap-

pointing—Advance in Practice—Can Modern-

ism Change Islam?—Opinions.

VIII. Political Movements Among Mos-

lems 217

Christian Rule over Moslems—Extent—Process

—Influence of Opposition to—Expatriation—

Legal Adjustments—Attitude of Christian Gov-

ernments; Partial; Favourable to Its Prog-

ress—Moslems Unreconciled—Nationalism—

Influence of Japan on—In India—In Egypt

—Khedive Ismiel—Arabi Rebellion—Assassi-

nation of Poudros Pasha—Young Egyp-

tians—Roosevelt—Kitchener—National As-

sembly—British Protectorate—Sultan Husain

—In North Africa—Russia—Arabia—Al-

bania—Moslem Countries Influenced by

Christian Civilization—Dependent Economic-

ally—Persia—Reformers—Amir-i-Nizam—

Malcom Khan—Jamal-ud-Din—Tobacco Mo-

nopoly—Assassination of Shah—Constitution

—Revolution—Causes—Participation of Mul-

lahs—Effects, Religious, Civil—Economic

Conditions—Political Outlook.

IX. Political Reforms in the Turkish

Empire 255

Reforming Sultans—Hatti Sherif—Humayun—

Constitution of 1876—Abdul Hamid—Reign—

Armenian Massacres—Young Turks—Revo-

lution—Constitution—Mutiny—Sultan Mah-

mud V—New Régime—Italian and Balkan

Wars—Ottomanization—Abolition of Capitu-

lations—Of Privileges—Of Millats—Of Lib-

erty of Religious Instruction—The Holy War

—Germany and England—The Jihad in Per-

sia—In Egypt—British Protectorate—Sultan

Husain—Attempts on His Life—Results of

War on Turkey—Armenian Atrocities—Need

of Christian Missions.

Index 293

**1**

**INNOVATIONS IN ISLAM**

THE modern age is one of movement and change.

The Moslem world is swept by currents of

thought and life. The action and reaction of

influences local and worldwide are affecting Islam.

The Faith, to the Moslem, has intimate relation to all

affairs, whether political, social, or religious. I wish

to review Modern Movements among Moslems,

whether these have been set in motion within Islam or

from without, whether they have resulted in its de-

terioration or reform, in its decline or progress.

As a preliminary question, it is well to inquire how

far it is possible to influence Islam by new forces,

external and internal, and to what extent this has

occurred. Is Islam changeable or not? Do Moslems

vary their belief and worship? Has the mode of in-

terpreting and executing their Law remained station-

ary? True conceptions of the past and the present

will show what it is reasonable to expect in the future.

It is a common conception that Islam is fixed and

stationary. It is said to be its boast that “it is always

the same,—inflexible, neither requiring adaptation nor

capable of it.” Concerning this, Principal Fairbairn

says: “It is the most inflexible of all positive religions.

A religion, to be permanent, must be progressive,—

capable of formal without essential change. But a sys-

tem in which the form is as divine as the spirit, the

institution as the truth, is a system which can allow

no change, no progress. Islam is an elastic spirit

placed in an iron framework. The progressive is sacri-

ficed to the stationary” (*Contemporary Review*, Vol.

XL, p. 806). In accordance with this opinion are the

words of Sir William Muir (“Caliphate,” p. 594):

“Swathed in the bands of the Koran, the Moslem

faith, unlike the Christian, is powerless to adapt itself

to varying time and place, keep pace with the march

of humanity, direct and purify the social life, and

elevate mankind.” And with the philosopher and the

historian agrees the statesman. Lord Cromer writes

(“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 202): “The Moslem

stands in everything on the ancient ways, because he

is a Moslem, because the customs which are inter-

woven with his religion forbid him to change.”

Lastly I quote the opinion of the great traveller in

Arabia, Palgrave (“Arabia,” Vol. I, p. 372): “Islam-

ism is in itself stationary, and was framed thus to

remain. It justly repudiates all change, all develop-

ment. To borrow the forcible words of Lord

Houghton: ‘The written book is there, the dead man’s

hand, stiff and motionless; whatever savours of vitality

is by that alone convicted of heresy and defection.’”

Undoubtedly these views state correctly the genius

of Mohammedanism. Such has been the orthodox

position. It asserts that “no advance, no change has

been admitted into orthodox Islam during the past

thousand years” (Stanley Lane-Poole). Islam, as

settled from the traditions by the great Imams, Abu

Hanifa, Shaft, Ibn Malik, and Ibn Hanbal, must re-

main fixed.

But this is only one side of the shield. Historically

and actually these dicta of our great writers are but

partially true. Let it not be considered strange that

I should take as a subject, “Movements Among Mos-

lems.” For remarkable modifications have taken

place in Islam in the past, and conspicuous changes

are occurring and are being attempted at the present

time. It is all the more interesting to consider these

movements because of the idea that is in many minds

that Islam is immovable.

In his own day the Prophet exercised his authority

to make modifications, such as changing the Kibla

from Jerusalem to Mecca and introducing the semi-

idolatrous and superstitious rites of the pilgrimage

around the Kaaba. After his death many things were

added on the authority of traditions,—reputed sayings

of the Prophet, created to suit circumstances. The

details of the system had not been fixed, and disputes

over doctrines, forms, and polities culminated in fierce

and bloody struggles. Persecution fixed the religion

and made disputes dangerous. The spirit arose which

is shown in the story told of Omar, that he appointed

a commission of six to settle certain points and decreed

that the minority, if any, should be decapitated. Under

such persuasion to agreement, unanimity would doubt-

less prevail. But notwithstanding the often arbitrary

rule of the Caliphs, Islam has been influenced and

modified. Some changes have been wrought from

within; more have come through the influence of con-

verted races; not a few from the creeds and philoso-

phies of rival and alien peoples. Most modifications

have been received unconsciously by accommodations

and adaptations. Doctrines and rites have been as-

similated which seem even contrary to the spirit and

to the letter of the Faith. The conceptions of Mo-

hammedans have varied and do vary. So much is

this the case that “The Report on the Special Prepara-

tion for Missionaries to Moslems in the Near East”

says: “One cannot obtain a complete knowledge of

Mohammedanism from books, especially those that

deal with its early history and the claims and contents

of its Faith. The modern missionary meets and deals

with a *modified Mohammedanism*, and it is this he

should know and understand.”

Only from a knowledge of what changes Islam has

undergone in the past, can it be rightly estimated

what may be the effects of the present-day move-

ments. And only from the knowledge of the latter

and the conditions that prevail can the agents of the

Christian propaganda rightly direct their efforts and

exert their influence.

SUFIISM MODIFIES ISLAM

One element which has permeated and modified

Islam is Sufiism. This is universally recognized.

Sufiism is a pantheistic mysticism. It is a philosophy,

almost a religion, which has been added to and mixed

with the religion of the Prophet and wrought a strange

transformation. Its first great development was in

Persia. Persian thought and literature are imbued and

permeated with it. And the influence of Persia on

Mohammedan thought has been without measure.

The Arab historian Ibn Chaldoun says: “The ma-

jority of those who taught and preserved the sacred

traditions were Persians, and the same is true of our

systematic theologians and commentators on the Ko-

ran.” Many of these were pantheists in philosophy,

and they sought to find a basis for it in the new re-

ligion by explaining texts of the Koran in accordance

with it. By Sufiism the rigid monotheism of Islam

has received a pantheistic mode among millions of its

votaries. The simple creed, “There is no God but

God” has come to mean to them, God is the only be-

ing,—the universe is but a mode of God’s existence.

As the poet Jami says (Browne, in “Religious Sys-

tems of the World,” p. 327),

“Thou art absolute being, all else is but phantasm,

For in thy universe all things are one.”

The absolute supreme Being, perfect Goodness, per-

fect Beauty, manifested the world that he might be

known and loved, according to the saying of the

Koran, “I desired to be known, therefore I created

the world.” The first creation was the Primal Intelli-

gence or Will, and from it and through it came into

being all spirits, intelligences, and the elements.

Man’s soul is from God and “verily unto Him do we

return.” Belief in the *tohid*, or unity of God, means

to hold to, and to desire to attain to, union with Him

as the aim of all things. Man is God. Mullah Jalal-

ud-Din exclaims to his spiritual Guide, “Oh, my

Master, you have completed my doctrine by teaching

me that you are God and that all things are God.”

The waves when they settle down become the sea,

so men are the waves of God and after death return

to His bosom. Hence the injunction, “Adore God in

His creatures” (J. P. Brown: “The Dervishes,” p.

333). Since all is God, there is no idolatry, for all

worship is rendered to the One, though maybe with

imperfections.

Sufiism gives allegorical and mystical interpreta-

tion to the doctrines and rites of Islam. It delights

to picture the relation of the soul to God as that of

Lover and Beloved, the enraptured, entranced one con-

templating the Supreme Beauty. All the imagery of

love and the thrill of amorous passion set forth spiritual

communion. The delights of the senses, the intoxica-

tion of wine and hasheesh, are symbols of divine things.

The great Persian poets, Fardusi, Saadi, Hafiz, and

Nizami, abound in praises of wine and love. One party

considered them unorthodox. Fardusi was on account

of this accusation refused his reward for his poem

and burial in the public cemetery. A Shiah Mujtahid

destroyed the first monument erected over Saadi’s

grave at Shiraz. Hafiz, now regarded as a saint and

his tomb as a shrine, was at first refused burial by

Mohammedan rites. Finally they drew lots to settle

it. A child opened at random upon the following

verse of Hafiz:

“Withhold not thy foot from Hafiz;

For though he be drowned in sin,

He fareth to heaven.”

He was considered a libertine, fond of wine, women,

and music. Sufis pretend that his amorous and bac-

chanalian poetry is allegorical. He has the fortune

to be “adored by both saints and sinners.” It requires

much credulity to believe that their antinomian verses

relate to spiritual desires. Even this summer, a Mos-

lem writer (*Islamic Review*, July, 1915) interprets

the secularism and pessimism of Omar-i-Khayyam as

spiritual and orthodox. In truth, Sufis are free from

the Law, and not only from its rites but from its re-

strictions on conduct. Shams-i-Din says (quoted in

Canon Sell’s “Sufiism,” p. 64):

“The man of God is beyond infidelity and religion,

To the man of God infidelity and religion are alike.”

The “Masnavi” of Jalal-ud-Din says: “When one is

out of the Kaaba, he looks towards it, but for him who

is in the Kaaba, it imports not what direction he

turns.” One in God’s love need not fulfil the Law.

Sufiism involves a different conception of salvation

from Islam. Salvation, according to it, is to be freed

from self, to be in union with God, by means of in-

crease in the knowledge and love of Him. Man the

seeker after the Truth is a traveller on life’s journey.

The goal is God. The Way has various stages or

degrees. Beginning with the Law, obedience to the

Shariat, the traveller passes to the Path of Mystic

Rites, bringing purity, then to Knowledge, immediate

communion with God, and further on to the stage

when he is in Truth itself, united to God. The last

stage is called *fana*, which is usually translated “anni-

hilation.” The word is interpreted by Al Sarraj, a

philosophic mystic (R. A. Nicholson, Roy. Geog. Soc.,

1913, p. 61), to mean a “passing away,” in opposi-

tion to the word *baga*, “continuance,” a passing away

of conscious thought of self, a passing away from pas-

sions and desires and even perceptions and the concen-

tration of all entirely on God. Others regard it as

such an entire absorption of self in God that the

individual can say, “I am God.”

The means of progress in the Way are contempla-

tion, meditation, adoration, remembrance of God, in-

duced and aided by rites peculiar to Sufiism. After

the first stages, ordinary forms of prayer and worship

and reading of the Koran are neglected, and emphasis

is placed on the inner light, “the eye of the heart,” as

the instrument of direct communication with God.

The ritual used to incite this condition is called the

Zikr. This includes various recitations, repetitions,

and physical and mental gymnastics, by which the mind

is fixed on God and the emotions and nerves excited.

The formula for repetition is varied, but the most

common words are the name Allah, repeated 1,001

times, or the ninety-nine names of God, or the first

clause of the Creed, the kalima, “La ilia ill Allah.”

These words are repeated until an ecstatic or hypnotic

stage is reached. This zikr is pronounced by no less

an authority than Professor Margoliouth to be a com-

pound of “various hysterical and hypnotizing proc-

esses.” The zikrs are of two kinds, silent and vocal.

They are sometimes accompanied by a variety of mo-

tions, as swaying, whirling, dancing, or by ejacula-

tions, singing, or howling like a dog. Musical instru-

ments are used either for the soothing effect or to give

vivacious movement. The order of the Maulavis have

a band of six or more instruments. This is a striking

innovation, for tradition says that Mohammed stopped

his ears when he heard the music of a pipe. Some

orders prepare for the zikr1 by long periods of soli-

tude, fasting, and vigils. The disciples, who are called

darvishes or fakirs, when in this state of trance see

visions, experience ecstasies, are excited to frenzy, or

fall into unconsciousness. In this state some of them

perform wonderful feats, such as eating, without pain,

red-hot coals, handling and placing in their mouths

red-hot irons, eating live snakes and scorpions, pound-

ing their bodies with rocks, or lying prostrate to be

trodden upon by the Sheikh’s horse.

ORDERS OF DARVISHES

The one who has passed through the stages and at-

tained oneness becomes a Sheikh or Murshid, to guide

others to attain. The disciple must submit his will to

the Sheikh’s will, vow to obey him and forsake self,

surrender all control of his thought and personality

to the Sheikh. Certain classes of darvishes take vows

of poverty and beg from door to door. From this the

name is derived, *dar* meaning door in Persian. There

are many Orders. A very few of them have the vow

of celibacy as the Baktashi had at first. But this is

contrary to the genius of Islam. Tradition reports

that Mohammed said: “When the servant of God

1 Some students of Islam attach considerable value to its mys-

ticism and to more spiritual forms of the zikr as a means of

soul-uplift. Among these are Prof. D. B. Macdonald and Rev.

G. Swan of Egypt. The latter (*Moslem World*, 1912, p. 380) ex-

presses the conviction that the study of the aims and effects

of the zikr might aid the evangelistic missionary, and that

Christians, by imitating it or by finding a substitute for it, might

disclose a source of satisfaction to the heart. He puts the query

whether it is not in it that the secret power of Islam lies. Most

observers despise the zikr as a religious rite of little value.

marries, he perfects half his religion,” and “One

prayer of a married man is worth seventy of a

bachelor.” Sheikh Abdul Kadir, the founder of the

Kadiris, had four wives, some concubines, and forty-

five children. A Nakshbandi Sheikh told Dr. Hughes

that he had wished to remain celibate, but his disciples

insisted that he should perfect his religion by taking a

wife. Asceticism is practised by neglect of the body

and indifference to worldly comforts. A Persian dar-

vish, half naked, covered with rags and vermin, suf-

fering from hunger and exposure, said to me: “Will

not this subjection of my body purify my soul?” It

is common for darvishes to live in *takias* or lodges,

sometimes in the crowded city, sometimes in solitary

spots.

The traditions attributing the founding of orders

of darvishes to Abubekr or Ali are no doubt apoc-

ryphal. But Sufiism certainly manifested itself early

in the history of Islam. By the second century this

innovation began to creep in. Perhaps the first order

was that founded by Sheikh Alwan, a Sufi celebrated

for his knowledge and worth (a.h. 149, a.d. 766).

The movement met with great opposition as contrary

to the orthodoxy of Islam. Some Sufis were punished

as heretics. In a.d. 923 Al Hallaj, a disciple of Al

Junaid and of Imam Reza, uttered the celebrated

words, “I am the Truth, I am God,” and was put

to death for blasphemy. But Al Junaid claimed that

they were not breaking with Islam, and said: “Our

system of doctrines is firmly bound up with the dog-

mas of the faith, the Koran, and the Traditions.”

Imam Al Gazzali, called the Plato of Moslems, se-

cured recognition in Islam for Sufi mysticism as a

system in opposition to scholasticism. Ibn Tufail ac-

complished the same in the West, i.e., Spain and North

Africa. Palgrave says (“Essays on Eastern Ques-

tions,” p. 52): “The Darvishes, secretly subverting

the very foundations of Islam, have nevertheless,

thanks to legists like Abu Hanifa, doctors like Ahmad

al Ghazali, and Sultans like Bayazid II, succeeded in

vindicating to themselves a sufficient though not an

unquestioned reputation for Orthodoxy. Different

orders were organized from time to time and spread

throughout Islam. Each founder gave a distinct prac-

tice and rules to his order. The coming to the throne

of Persia of a Sufi dynasty, in 1501, was the signal

for an effort to suppress the darvish orders in the

Ottoman empire, as the enemies of Sunniism. In

1656 the suppression of the orders was again at-

tempted, by the government combined with the Ulema,

and aided by the popular passion of the orthodox

Sunnis. Again on the destruction of the Janisaries,

1826, the darvishes of Constantinople were exiled and

some of the Sheikhs of the Bektashi executed. But

all these attempts came to naught.

Of late years the growth of the darvish orders in

number and influence has been striking. Dozy says:

“The influence which Sufiism has exercised over the

Moslem world, and which in our day is rather in-

creasing, has been extremely great.” Since his time

there has been a greater increase. Now Von Kremer

says: “Sufiism is the preponderating element in Mos-

lem civilization.” The system is spreading in Turkey

and Syria. Abdul Hamid is said to be a member of

the Rufai, or Howling darvishes, as well as of the

Sanusiyah, and to have often attended the zikrs

(Ramsay: “Impressions of Turkey,” p. 150). The

present Sultan, Mohammed V, is of the Maulavi or-

der. There are two hundred lodges in Constantinople.

Professor Macdonald says, in “Aspects of Islam”:

“To the bulk of the population of Egypt, their real

religion is Sufiism as represented in the zikr.” Simon

says: “Nearly every devout Mohammedan in the

Dutch East Indies is a member of such an order”

(“Progress, etc.,” p. 145). In North Africa public

sentiment strongly insists on every person being a

member of some order, and pressure is used to ac-

complish this end. In some provinces every one is an

initiate. The majority of the people of the Sudan

belong to a darvish order. The opposition of the

mullahs has been silenced and conquered, for as Dr.

Hughes says (“Dictionary of Islam,” p. 116):

“There is scarcely a maulavi or learned man in Islam

who is not a member of some religious order.” The

separate orders number well-nigh a hundred.

If Sufiism was a natural expression of religious

conception among the Aryans and owes its origin to

Hindu, Greek, and Persian philosophy, its propaga-

tion in Islam is a striking instance of Persian con-

quest over the religion of its conquerors. The

Semitic races, as well as the Turanian, African, and

Malay, have adopted Sufiism. Even if it did not

spread from Persia as a reaction against Islam, but

took its inception subsequently and independently in

Islam, it is anyhow a foreign element and one that

has influenced the whole fabric of the religion, its

doctrines, its worship, its life. It shows how foreign

elements have been and can be introduced into the

system of Mohammed. It shows that the need was

felt of something more than Islam provided; that

Islam had not that which would satisfy the religious

instincts of the heart, that man desires to draw near

to God and to find a Path, a Way of Approach, and

that he knows that the performance of rites and the

merit of his own works do not secure him this access.

It shows that the Moslem heart yearns for that which

the Christian finds in his union with Christ and com-

munion with the Holy Spirit and in his worship of

the Father in spirit and in truth, not in a formal

prayer-ritual.

SAINT-WORSHIP

Another modification and corruption of Islam is seen

in the prevalence of saint-worship. Veneration of

the Imams, regarding them as manifestations of God,

and rendering them honours as semi-divine, has pre-

vailed among Shiahs and their sects; the development

of creature worship among the Sunnis is connected

with the spread of the darvish orders. Many Sheikhs

or Pirs are regarded as Valis, blessed spirits, possess-

ing superhuman powers, capable of working miracles

of healing by the touch, the breath, or the saliva. Vo-

tive offerings are brought to them to procure their

intercession for blessings. Kissing their hands, with

the expression “I repent on your hands,” is

common, with accompanying trust in their media-

tion. It is believed that pardon is secured through

them for the living suppliant and for the dead.

Ill-gotten gains receive purification through their pro-

nouncement, a percentage being retained. These

Sheikhs are friends of God; they see -visions and

dream dreams for the guidance of the people. Sheikh-

al-Akbar Ibn Arabi claimed that his book was re-

vealed to him in a dream by the Prophet Mohammed.

They are credited with interpreting dreams, exorcis-

ing evil spirits, empowering charms and talismans

against witchcraft, sickness, theft, snake-bite, and all

calamities. Some are supposed to have spiritual

power over souls as kings have over temporalities.

God makes known to them His will with regard

to the actions of men and all the purposes of men

come under their cognizance previous to their being

carried out in deeds (Brown’s “Dervishes,” pp.

80-81).

The takia of the order, the cave or hut of the dar-

vish, or especially the tomb of the venerated Sheikh,

becomes a shrine. For example, Bagdad is called the

City of Saints. In that seat of the Abbasides are

many sacred tombs, including that of Sheikh Abdul

Kadir Jilani. Professor Siraj-ud-Din refers (“Vital

Forces,” p. 168) to the “divine honours paid to this

great Pir,” and adds, “There is nothing more soul-

stirring in Mohammedan worship than to hear these

prayers and hymns chanted in the service of the Pir

Sahib,—continued until early morning.” These dead

Sheikhs are invoked everywhere; vows are made to

them; healing is expected from them. Especially the

pilgrim expects the blessing. He salutes the grave,

prostrates himself, kisses it, holds sacrificial feasts at

it, endows the shrine, carries earth away from the

grave to rub on the sick or a pressed cake of it to

place under his forehead, when he prostrates himself

in prayer. These shrine tombs are very common.

For example, near my home, at Tabriz, on a ridge of

the mountain, there is one called Ainal-Zainal, the

reputed grave of two descendants of Ali. To visit

this on seven successive Fridays is said to be equal

to a pilgrimage to Mecca. So in the surrounding vil-

lages, at Sofian, Sardarud, Ilkachi, on the Ujan, on

Mt. Sahend there are others. So everywhere in trav-

elling one sees Imamzadahs and zayaretgahs. So not

only in Persia, but all over the Islamic world, these

centres of superstition and creature-worship are scat-

tered. Though unauthorized by the Koran or

Shariat, this innovation has spread far and wide in

Islam. The transformation wrought in the religion

by this doctrine of human mediation and intercession

is striking. On the part of the Shiahs it is very deep-

rooted. Imam Husain is deemed a real atoning medi-

ator who by his death at Kerbala has merited the

position of availing intercessor. (See writer’s article,

“The Atoning Saviour of the Shiahs,” *Presbyterian*

*and Reformed Review*, V. 1891.) This is constantly

kept in mind by the Muharram month of mourning,

the Passion Play, and the Readers of Lamentations.

The saint-worship has spread everywhere among the

Sunnis in Turkey and Arabia. In Afghanistan

“adoration of the Pirs is universal and constitutes the

religion of the masses.” In Beluchistan Pir worship

at pre-Islamic shrines is widespread. In truth, shrines

of pagan saints are usually turned into Moslem ones.

In Algeria and Maghrib and among the Berbers

Maraboutism is a special characteristic of Islam.

Revered marabouts swarm everywhere and the tend-

ency to deify men and worship saints has eclipsed

the primitive faith (“Encyclopedia of Islam”; Arts.:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Beluchistan). In other parts

of Africa the same is true. There, as well as in

Malaysia, these Sheikhs and the maalims or teachers

have a powerful influence. They are representatives

of God and inherit the reverence given to the heathen

sorcerers. In Java the drosky driver, even with a

European passenger, dismounts when he meets one of

them. Says Mr. Simon: “They are worshipped as

demi-gods. Many people look upon them as their

god. For they are Allah’s friend and work miracles

before one’s very eyes; their curse brings misery;

their blessing happiness. They know the hearts of

all men.” Their supposed influence as intercessors

is very real. As Professor Macdonald says, “In the

lives of the saints we find them exercising again and

again flat pressure upon Allah” (“Vital Forces,” p.

234). To many a Moslem the Vali has become more

real than the Prophet; the Sheikh more powerful than

the mullah; the zikr more efficacious than the namaz

(prayer-rite); the Path more holy than the Law; the

brotherhood of the Order more intimate than the fel-

lowship of the Faith.

THE GLORIFICATION OF MOHAMMED

Another modification of Islam is seen in the glori-

fication of Mohammed. Wahabis, stating the primi-

tive doctrine of Islam, deny Mohammed’s pre-exist-

ence, his power of present intercession, and the law-

fulness of the reverence given to his person and his

tomb. The majority of Moslems, disregarding the

accusation of sacrilege, are increasing in this tend-

ency. The traditions which have grown up may be

seen in the “Life of Mohammed,” the *Hiyat-ul-*

*Qulub*, translated by my predecessor in Tabriz, the

Rev. J. L. Merrick. The traditions referring to the

creation and the pre-existence of Mohammed are re-

ceived by Sunnis as well as by Shiahs. According to

these the first creation was the Light of Mohammed—

the Nur-i-Mohammed. Before all else it was created

from the Light of God. This Light of Mohammed

existed alone through several periods of seventy

thousand years and its dwelling-places and experiences

are described with the details of a Milton. When

God decided to make the worlds, He divided the Light

of Mohammed into four portions and from these cre-

ated the Word, the Tablet, the Throne, and from the

fourth portion the angels, the heavens and the earth,

and all intelligences. So Mohammed was before all

things and from him were all things made. It is the

Sufi doctrine of the Primal Will, the Arian doctrine

of Christ, of which it is an evident imitation. In

Shiah Islam, Ali and the other Imams are exalted

almost to the rank of divinity, but orthodox Islam has

not been content without the apotheosis of Moham-

med. Not only is there ascribed to him an unparalleled

glory in the pre-existent state, but there is an idealiza-

tion of his earthly life. His sinlessness is taught,

contrary to the plain statements of the Koran itself

and of the Traditions, which, in the deathbed scene,

among his last words report prayers for pardon. That

which would be sin in other men is made to be only

a sign of divine favour to him, who was granted every

privilege, even though contrary to the Law. He is

regarded as the mediator not only at the Day of Judg-

ment but now and under all conditions,—the inter-

cessor, supreme and all-efficient and availing for his

sinful followers. One cry for pity in the name of

Mohammed blots out the sins of two hundred years.

“Ya Mohammed,” says Dr. Zwemer, “is the open

sesame to every door of difficulty—temporal or spirit-

ual. Sailors sing it while hoisting their sails; ham-

mals groan it to raise a burden; the beggars howl it,

to obtain alms; it is the Beduin’s cry in attacking a

caravan; it hushes babes to sleep, as a cradle song;

it is the pillow of the sick and the last word of the

dying; it is written on the doorposts and in their

hearts as well as since eternity on the throne of God;

it is to the devout Moslem the name above every

name (“Islam: A Challenge,” p. 47). Professor

Siraj-ud-Din, a convert from Islam, now professor in

Forman Christian College, Lahore, says: “No Mo-

hammedans, except perhaps the Wahabis, are truly

unitarian; all others have been led to deify Moham-

med more or less. … Hymns to the Prophet are

sung most enthusiastically and devotionally. Their

whole nature is stirred up and their whole heart goes

out in worship and adoration when these hymns are

sung. The entire popular religion as well as litera-

ture is filled with the deification and glorification of

Mohammed. One popular hymn runs thus:

“‘In every flower and in every plant,

The Light of Mohammed is reflected.’”

(“Vital Forces,” pp. 167-68; comp. pp. 228-30). Pro-

fessor Simon testifies that a similar exaltation of the

personality of Mohammed has occurred in Malaysia.

The same is seen also in the manner of celebrating the

birthday of Mohammed (molud) with increasing en-

thusiasm and devotion. Prof. Stewart Crawford de-

clares that in Syria (*International Missionary Review*,

1912, p. 608) it amounts to “a practical deification of

the Prophet.” The worshipper, “with all the florid

rhetoric of Oriental imagery,” in direct address sa-

lutes Mohammed “with enthusiastic expressions of

loyalty and devotion, and associates himself with the

heavenly beings in adoration for his person.” Thus

that which we see in Persia occurring with reference

to Ali is occurring all over the Moslem world in refer-

ence to Mohammed.

Besides all this, which seems so like an imitation

of Christianity, there is that other importation into

Islam, in an earlier age, of the doctrine of the uncre-

ated Koran, on the Eternal Tablets—an eternal Word

which was made a book and stayed among us,—a

doctrine which caused such fierce and bloody con-

tests and which finally became a criterion of ortho-

doxy. It is an innovation in Islam as strange as it

is embarrassing to the unitarian Moslem who

would find fault with the Logos doctrine of John’s

Gospel.

MOHAMMEDAN CLERGY

Another modification of Islam in the course of its

history is the development of a clergy—of various

ranks and classes. It is the claim that there are no

priests in Islam. This was true, as it was true also

of primitive Christianity.1

Islam was modelled on the synagogue as was the

Church. Islam has developed a clergy, with grada-

tions and ranks. These vary in different countries.

In Persia there are first the *talabas*, theological stu-

dents; then the mullahs, who, if assigned to be leaders

of prayers, are called *peesh-namaz*, or, if preachers,

*vaiz*. Many mullahs are connected with the local

mosque in the village or the ward of the city, and

act like pastors in performing marriages, funeral

services, as well as tending to matters of divorce and

inheritance. One lucrative portion of their work is

the writing of deeds and contracts. They also solve

questions of conscience for the people. Of higher

degree is the Kazi, who is a judge in matters coming

under the Canon Law. Still higher in rank is the

Mujtahid, who preaches in his special mosque, is pro-

fessor for the talabas, decides questions of the Canon

Law, and judges in civil and criminal suits which per-

tain to it. Over the Mujtahids of each city and prov-

ince are the Chief Mujtahids who reside at Kerbala

and Najef, the centres of the Shiahs, direct the re-

ligious affairs of the sect, issue binding fatvas or de-

crees, and train the mullahs in higher studies. The

Persian Mujtahid has more independent influence and

1 The word *hieros* is not once used of ministers of the Church

in the New Testament. The Christian presbyter is only a

“priest” in the way that the latter word is a contraction of the

former. The word used by Mohammed in Surah V, 85, for the

Christian clergy is *kassisin*, the equivalent of presbyter, elder,

Syriac Kashish-a,kasha, Persian Kashish. The word *kohen*,

priest, was used by the Arabs as the equivalent of sorcerer.

power than the Ulema of Turkey. The Shah has no

religious authority over him, and he is not dependent

on the state for authorization. He has more control

over property right, endowments, and tithes, and is

less accountable for religious funds than in Turkey.

In Turkey the grades of the Mohammedan clergy are

even more numerous. (See H. Dwight’s “Constanti-

nople,” pp. 213-14.) The *softas*, or students, are

trained in theology and Canon Law in many schools,

the chief of which are at Damascus, Aleppo, Brusa,

and Adrianople. Over all these are one at Constanti-

nople and the Al Azhar at Cairo. In Constantinople

the mosque schools have from ten thousand to twenty

thousand students, half of whom are studying Sacred

Law. Grades whose duties are almost wholly reli-

gious are the Imam, the leader of prayers, and the

Khatib or mudarris, the mosque preacher. Four de-

grees higher than the Khatib is the Mufti, who re-

sembles the lawyer among the Jews in New Testament

times. From this grade are appointed the Kadis;

seven ranks higher is the Grand Mufti, Chief Judge

according to Canon Law; and five grades higher yet

is the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the head of the religious clergy

and of the religio-civil judges. The Sheikh-ul-Islam

is ex-officio Minister of Public Worship and does not

change with the other ministers of the Sultan. He is

also official Interpreter of the Shariat. His decision

for the time is effective, even if it be a fatva deposing

a Sultan. But decisions by him have not binding

force on others of the Ulema. He continues to wear

a long white robe and a yellow turban with a grey

*aba*, cloak, though the viziers have changed to Euro-

pean dress. All these higher grades are called Ulema,

Doctors, the *alim* or learned. There is in Turkey no

ordination. The diploma is the authorization and pre-

pares one for appointment, but in Central Asia the

binding of the turban on the head is a sign of author-

ization. In Turkey the duties of many of the Ulema

are both religious and civil, but in Persia as well as

in countries like Russia, where their civil duties are

more restricted, it is more easily realized that their

prime function is religious. In the thought of the

people they are the clergy. Dr. Dwight facetiously

refers to them as “the Ulema who deny that they

are priests, yet act like them.” Palgrave, after stoutly

maintaining the non-priestly character of the Moham-

medan mullahs, says: “Still social fact recognizes

what dogmatic theory denies. Gradations and classi-

fications exist and the functions are intimately con-

nected with and even essential to the religion.” And

as regards India he regretfully admits (“Essays, etc.,”

p. 138) that “Sacerdotal superstition, so proper to

the Hindu, has re-arisen and afflicted Islam with its

taint, so that we see the Indo-Mohammedan investing

the Kazi with a semi-priestly character and function.”

Mr. S. Khuda Bakhsh of India says (quoted by Dr.

Zwemer in *Missionary Review*): “In its decadence

Islam is priest-begotten and priest-ridden.” Mr.

Simon says: “The Moslem has been delivered over

bound hand and foot to his priesthood in matters that

concern his welfare equally in this world and in the

next” (“Vital Forces,” p. 87). “They have an un-

holy power over the masses of the people. A quiet nod

from these masters of Islam is quite sufficient for an

outbreak of fanaticism in the name of God” (“Prog-

ress of Islam, etc.,” p. 164). Justice Amir Ali con-

tinually refers to the mullahs as clergy. He specially

refers to those of the Shiahs as the “Expounders of

the Law who have assumed the authority and position

of the clergy in Christendom.” Professor Becker of

the Hamburg Colonial Institute (“Christianity and

Islam,” pp. 50-51) says: “The force of Christian

influence produced a priestly class in Islam. …

This influence could not create an organized clergy,

but it produced a clerical class to guard religious

thought and to supervise thought of every kind.” In

Malaysia and Africa, and among the ignorant in many

Moslem lands, the custom is prevalent for the mullah

or mualim to write charms, talismans, and amulets,

use incantations, divination, astrology, and magical

arts, thus degenerating into the status of the *kohen*

or soothsayer of Mohammed’s times. Besides all this

the mullahs have in some countries added the last

resort of priestcraft, selling indulgences for cash. The

mualim of the East Indies (Simon, p. 82) has a list

of fees for the ransom of the souls of the dead. For

a fee of thirty dollars he will testify on the Day of

Judgment that the dead man has been to Mecca; for

another fee certify that he was a blameless Moslem;

for ten dollars all his sins will be blotted out; for the

“instruction fee” a certificate is given that the man

knew the entire Koran, though the fact be otherwise;

another fee will insure the dead man an animal to

ride on in the Day of Judgment; for five dollars re-

demption-money a son who died a heathen can be

received into Islam and paradise after his death. For

all these fees, amounting to about seventy-five dollars,

salvation is assured to the departed and protection to

the survivors from being tormented by his ghost. So

far has Islam changed in Indonesia. That the re-

wards of priesthood are enjoyed by some of them is

seen in the High Sherif of Mecca. It is said that

this functionary has a paltry income of $400,000 a

year with an added *mudakhil* or graft of $1,200,000,

and that his Vali has $800,000. Every guide must

pay them a fee of $250 a year. The drawers of the

water from Zem-Zem; the doorkeepers of the Kaaba,

the cameleers who transport the pilgrims,—each pays

his fee. Though most of this money must be passed

up to the coterie at Constantinople to secure the tenure

of their positions, yet when the Vali was arrested by

the Young Turks in October, 1908, and taken to Con-

stantinople, he had amassed a million in money and

an untold treasure in jewels (Simon, p. 121).

Besides the regular mullahs, Islam has a kind of

priest in the Sheikhs of the darvish orders, whom I

have described above. Palgrave confirms what I have

already said, that they “not infrequently arrogate to

themselves supernatural and mystical powers.” They

act as mediators of God’s blessings. They introduce

the *murid* or neophyte to communion with God,

taking, as it were, for a time the position of God to

him. The Shiahs have, in addition to these, a clerical

class called Marseyakhans, who are influential and

numerous. Their business is to tell stories of the

martyred Imams during Muharram, Ramazan, and at

funerals. Tears that are shed at the recital of these

lamentations are very meritorious, bringing forgive-

ness. These tears are sometimes caught in bot-

tles.

In all these we see large additions to original Mo-

hammedanism. They show how it has been greatly

modified. Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed and

Mohammedanism,” p. 211): “As instituted by Mo-

hammed it had no priest and no sacrifice. In orthodox

Islam there is no priestly caste, and therefore no fic-

tions of apostolic succession, inherent sanctity, indis-

soluble vows, or powers of absolution.” How

changed it is! We now have an apostolic succession

in the line of Imams, inherent sanctity in the Sayids,

or Sherifs, vows and absolutions connected with the

Pirs, offerings at the tombs to secure the mediation

of the living or of the dead saints, and even the sale

of indulgences in Islam. Kuenen says (quoted in

*Missionary Review*, 1889, p. 302): “The Moslem

seeks what his faith withholds from him, and seeks

it when the authority which he himself recognizes

forbids him to look for it.”

THE CANON LAW, OR SHARIAT

The Sacred Law was for a thousand years the re-

ligious, civil, and criminal code of Islam. It purports

to be founded on the Koran and the Traditions, which

are reports of the life, conduct, and words of Mo-

hammed,—what he said, what he did, and what he

allowed to be done without rebuke. Traditions are

regarded as authoritative by all sects of Islam, Sunnis,

Shiahs, and Wahabis, but they receive different collec-

tions of traditions as valid. Out of 500,000 traditions

from 4,000 to 6,000 are selected as true, and about

the authenticity of these, even Doctors of the same

sect differ. A third foundation of Law is the *ijma*,

the agreement or unanimous consent of the Mujtahids

in a decision or interpretation of what is Law. A

fourth foundation is *kiyas* or inference, reasoning

from analogy from what is in the accepted law.

A small portion of the Law is found in the Koran

itself. Only two hundred verses out of six thousand

are about legal matters. It has no elaborate system.

Stanley Lane-Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,”

pp. 152-58): “Mohammed never attempted to ar-

range a code of laws. His scattered decisions are few

and often vague. It is surprising how little definite

legislation there is in the Koran. Mohammed had no

desire to make a new code. He seldom appears to

have volunteered a legal decision, except when a dis-

tinct abuse had to be removed; and the legal verses

of the Koran are evidently answers to questions put

to him.”

It has been commonly supposed that the traditions

upon which the Mujtahids founded their codes were

at least of Arabic origin, however much or little may

have been founded on Mohammed’s instruction. But

as the result of scientific research and modern study of

the origin of Mohammedan Law, it is coming to be

clearly recognized that Roman Law lies at the basis

of and is the source of the Shariat. The learned Dr.

I. Goldziher, professor in Vienna University, whom

I had the privilege of hearing discuss Islam at the

Congress of Arts and Sciences at the St. Louis Ex-

position, has made a study and exposition of this

subject. The laws in the Koran and Arabia were

utterly insufficient for the new Arab theocratic em-

pire. In taking charge of the conquered provinces,

the Arabs adopted from and incorporated with their

ordinances the system in vogue among the people over

whom they were ruling. The substance of the Law

was from “alien sources—from contact with foreign

elements” (“The Historians’ History of the World,”

Vol. VIII, p. 296). “The first impulse to the crea-

tion of a Mohammedan system of law was given by

contact with the great spheres of civilization—the

Roman and the Persian. The influence of Roman

Law on the sources of a legal system in Islam is wit-

nessed by the very name given to jurisprudence in

Islam in the beginning (*fikh* equals *prudentia*; *fakih*

equals *prudens*, lawyer). The influence extended both

to the principle of legal deduction and to particular

legal provisions. In regard to property the new gov-

ernment had to take over many ordinances of Roman

Law, not only particular laws but principles of law.”

Among such principles, he instances that of legal de-

duction from analogies, *kiyas*, the opinion of the

jurists or *rai*, which is a literal translation of *opinio*,

and regard for public utility and interests or *istalah*,

the equivalent of *utilitas publico*. “The influence ex-

ercised by Roman legal method in the system of legal

deduction in Islam is more important than the direct

adoption of particular points of law” (Goldziher,

quoted in Khuda Bakhsh: “Essays Indian and Is-

lamic,” p. 393). Professor Macdonald, another inves-

tigator in this department, agrees with these opinions.

He says that the Moslems “learned willingly of the

people among whom they had come. Roman Law

made itself felt. It was the practical school of the court

that they attended. These courts were permitted to

continue in existence till Islam had learned from them

all that was needed. We can still recognize certain

principles which were so carried over. That the duty

of proof lies upon the plaintiff and the right of de-

fending himself with an oath upon the defendant; the

doctrine of invariable custom and that of the different

kinds of legal presumption. These as expressed in

Arabic are almost verbal renderings of the frequent

utterances of Latin Law” (“Development of Muslim

Theology, etc.,” p. 84). An eminent jurist writes

in the *Moslem World* (1912, p. 354): “The Law of

Justinian lies at the base of the Moslem shariat.” The

latter “resembles in a most striking manner the com-

mon principles and even the specific rules of Roman

Law.” Some of the words are almost translations of

it. The methods of judicial procedure were adopted

from it. “The more developed rules of intestate

succession resemble it; the inheritance is divided legally

into parts similar to the Roman;—in the developed

law of contract we find echoes of the Roman Law;

even *vakf*, endowment, contains much that resembles

it.” It is even shown that the foundations of the

Shariat to which we referred, namely the Ijma or

Consensus of the Mujtahids and *Kiyas*, or Deduction

by Analogy, had their counterpart in Roman Law.

Thus, says Professor Becker, of the Hamburg

Colonial Institute (“Christianity and Islam,” p. 34),

“In a few centuries Islam became a complex religious

structure, accurately regulating every department of

human life from the deepest problems of morality to

the daily use of the toothpick and the fashions of dress

and hair. It had high faculties of self-accommoda-

tion to environment, was able to enter upon the heri-

tage of the mixed Greco-Oriental civilization in the

East” (*ibid*., p. 98). Professor Becker discovers also

a large influence of Christian doctrine and ritual. He

says (p. 73): “The state, society, the individual

economics and morality, were thus collectively under

Christian influence during the early period of Moham-

medanism. Christian ideas came into circulation

among Mohammedans … as utterances given by

Mohammed himself.” “The development of ritual

was derived from pre-existent practices which were

for the most part Christian” (p. 83): such are the

ceremonies of marriage, funerals, preaching, and the

niche in the mosque wall. We have been long accus-

tomed to recognize that Islam received its philosophy

and science, medicine and art from the Greeks, Syrians,

and Persians, and was greatly influenced by Neo-

Platonism and by the dialectics of Aristotle, in its

theology. To these we must add this conviction also,

that its Canon Law, the Shariat, so holy and sanctified

in their eyes, is largely the result of borrowing from

the Romans and Persians.1 Laws and usages adopted

from them were made to appear a part of original Is-

lam. And traditions were invented to suit the circum-

1 Goldziher says further that “contact with the people and

religion of Persia had an influence which was very important in

the development of its legal system. It is hardly possible to over-

estimate the importance of the part played in the development

of Islam by Persia.” Von Kremer mentions Rabbinical Litera-

ture as an influence on Islam, besides the Roman-Byzantine Law

and daily intercourse with the subject nations.

stances and words put into the mouth of Mohammed

or an incident narrated as occurring in his life to give

the sanction of authority to them. After several cen-

turies this Shariat became crystallized and stereotyped

and came to be regarded by the Ulema and by

the whole Islamic world as the unalterable divine

law.

The nineteenth century witnessed remarkable action

regarding the Shariat. Several Moslem states broke

away from its observance, and introduced modern

civil and criminal codes. In Persia the common law,

called the *urfi*, has been determined by the Shah, his

ministers and custom, and administered by Hoikims,

the judge-governors of the provinces and the districts.

These have regard to the provisions of the Shari but

do not follow it. Indeed a condition of friction and

opposition has existed between the governors and the

Ulema, the Shah’s government trying more and more

to restrict the operation of the Shariat.

In Turkey the reforming Sultans, as they are called,

Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Abdul Mejid, largely set

aside the Shariat. Under the influence of European

civilization and chiefly through the “Great Ilchi,” the

British ambassador, Lord Strafford de Redcliffe, the

Hatti Sharif of Gulkhana was promulgated in 1839

and the Hatti Humayun in 1856. These decrees were

designed to turn the face of Turkey toward progress

and granted a large measure of civil and religious lib-

erty. These were followed by the promulgation of

codes, modelled on the Code Napoleon, and by the

establishment of civil courts. This inaugurated a sys-

tem foreign to Islam, and brought the administration

of law largely under direct control of the state. It

limited the courts of the Ulema, the Mahkama, to

such special subjects as are treated in the Koran, as

marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The Ulema were

greatly dissatisfied. But even when Sultan Abdul

Hamid, in his strong reaction, abolished the Constitu-

tion of 1876, he confirmed the secular Courts and

Codes. “The greater part of the new law,” says

Jurist, “is not in accordance with the Shari.” In re-

gard to penalties, the change is strikingly evident. The

old penalties are simply disregarded. Modern ideas

are conformed to. Instances of conflict between the

Kazis and the judges are not uncommon. For exam-

ple, a Moslem was found guilty of eating food during

the fast of Ramazan. The Kazi condemned him to

have melted hot lead poured down his throat. The

governor declined to inflict the penalty, and referred

the case to Constantinople, where it was pigeonholed

and forgotten. In another case the penalty decreed

was that the man’s tongue should be pulled out. Com-

pliance was refused by the Executive. The only re-

source of the Kazi was to say, “My duty is to decide

according to the law, yours is to execute. My responsi-

bility ends.” An example in the change of law is seen

in commercial transactions. The Shari forbids not

only usury, but all interest, profit on loans and de-

posits, insurance, annuities, conditional contracts, deal-

ing in futures and even a bona-fide sale of crops before

the harvest time or advanced payment on the same.

Even certain exchanges of one commodity for another

are illegal. In accordance with this I have known

Moslems to deposit money solely for safety and re-

fuse to take any interest on it. In Egypt in 1901

the postal deposit law was put into operation by Great

Britain. Of the depositors 3,195 refused to take in-

terest. Following this the Grand Mufti issued a

decree that it was permissible. The next year 30,000

Moslems, including 94 mullahs and Sheikhs, took ad-

vantage of the privilege (Gairdner’s “Reproach of

Islam,” p. 200). Though this antiquated law does

not fit into modern commercial life, yet the banking

business flourishes. The law is the cause of all kinds

of disguises and subterfuges and of fictitious transac-

tions having the appearance of the real. Even a

usurious rate of twenty-four or thirty-six per cent is

collected. Some person desired to sell a future crop

of wheat; a cat was brought in, around the neck of

which a stalk of wheat was tied. A bill of sale of

the cat was written out in due form and phrase, it

being understood that in the transfer of the cat, the

crop was made over to the purchaser. Not only in

Persia and Turkey but practically everywhere the

Shari is being set aside. Even in Afghanistan the

process has begun. A decree of Amir Habibullah

has been issued abolishing the punishment of cutting

off the hand. The reason assigned for this change

was that he had been in danger of the loss of his

hand from blood poison and it had been saved to

him by an English surgeon. In Egypt, between 1876

and 1883, the French Codes and Courts were estab-

lished. Throughout the whole of North Africa the

Shari is superseded. In India it is only applied in a

certain defined sphere. Such is the case in other

countries under European jurisdiction.

Aside from the action of governments there is a

tendency among the Ulema to accommodate the Shari

to existing conditions. By strict construction every

non-Moslem land or land under non-Moslem rule is a

Dar-ul-Harb, a land of war, and it is the duty of

Moslems to attack and fight against it. But in India

the Ulema have decreed that a country in which some

of the peculiar customs of Islam prevail can be con-

sidered a Dar-ul-Islam, and the Muftis of Mecca have

confirmed the principle. Regarding the jihad they

have decided that it is not to be entered upon “unless

it is likely to be successful.” When there is no proba-

bility of victory, proclamation of a jihad is unlawful.

Strictly the law forbids Moslems to have Christian

troops as their allies, but not only now but at other

times Moslems have fought “Holy Wars” against

Christians with the help of Christians. Even in By-

zantine times this was so, and Egyptian Moslems

helped the Crusaders in their invasion of Palestine

(Margoliouth’s “Mohammedanism,” p. 86). Strictly

the proclamation of the jihad was the prerogative of

the one caliph, but it has become a power attached to

each independent Moslem ruler in conjunction with

his Sheikh or Mujtahid. The law of the succession to

the caliphate is in abeyance. It was restricted to the

Arab tribe of the Koreish. But victory of the Osmanli

Sultanate has given to a Turk the name, prerogative,

and prestige of the caliphate—by the power of the

sword—as one of the spoils of war. So it has con-

tinued four hundred years, abrogating the Law and

Traditions in so fundamental a matter.

MODIFICATIONS IN RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS

There are a large number of modifications in Islam

which affect its religious customs among millions of

its adherents. These also show that Islam is not the

fixed, uniform, and inflexible thing it has been deemed.

I shall briefly indicate some of them. It was the law

of Islam that idolaters should be exterminated, while

peoples of a Book, as Jews, Christians, and possibly

Zoroastrians, might be tolerated as zimmis or rayats,

subjects. According to this law idolatry was extermi-

nated from Arabia. But in India, Moslem rulers finally

tolerated idolatry in their subjects, though after perse-

cutions. Moslems also marry Hindu women who have

not accepted Islam. Moslem Emperors married Hin-

du, Rajput, ladies. The Sunnis of the Turkish Empire

regard the people of the Book as pure and will buy

bread and meat from them, but the Sunnis of India,

following the Shiahs, regard Christians as unclean

ceremonially and contact with them and eating their

food as an abomination. The Law is changed accord-

ing to environment. In China Moslem women do not

wear the veil and do bind the feet; men wear the

queue. They include the old Chinese feasts in their

calendar.

In India Islam has taken up many elements of

Hinduism. Not only is this seen in the sects like the

Sufis, who mingle the fire-worship of the Persians

and the Pantheism of the Hindus with some tenets of

Islam, look upon AH and Mohammed as incarnations

of the Supreme Spirit, and acknowledge the Koran

only in a spiritualized sense (C. R. Haines: “Islam

as a Missionary Religion,” p. 93), but among the

more orthodox Moslems. Even the caste system has

affected them. Tribes of Hindus and other races have

accepted Islam, but retained their caste, with their cus-

toms, and do not intermarry with Moslems of other

castes. Moslems of a certain caste will draw water

from a well with Hindus of the same caste, but not

permit Moslems of a lower caste to use the well (Dr.

Wherry: “Christianity and Islam, etc.,” pp. 108-09).

There are Mohammedan castes which refuse to eat

beef, stick to certain trades, wear Hindu dress, rarely

go to the mosque, but take part in Hindu festivals

and openly worship idols and many gods. The Mo-

hammedan Rajput Hindus preserve unaltered the so-

cial customs of the clan (T. W. Arnold: “Interna-

tional Congress of History and Religion,” Vol. I, p.

314). The sayids of India are as strict to maintain

the purity of their blood as the Brahmans and exclude

intermarriage with other Moslems. In the Punjab,

the Shariat regarding marriage is a dead letter. There

is no dowry and no inheritance for daughters. One-

sixth of the Moslem widows remain widows through

the influence of Brahmanism (Arnold: *ibid*., p. 314).

Moslem villagers may be seen utilizing the Hindu

astrologer and even praying to the idol god to give

his wife a son. Not only the accustomed saint-worship

but demonology and witchcraft have corrupted the

original faith (*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, p. 435).

The sect of Pachpiriyas is a fusion of Islam and

animism, worshipping five local saints or gods. The

Egyptian fellahs celebrate the cult of Bubastis as if

honouring a Moslem saint. In Algeria the Moham-

medan law has failed to replace the old tribal customs.

Superstition, magic, and relics of paganism hold sway.

Circassians, too, retain much of the old heathen re-

ligion and worship gods many (“Encyclopedia of

Islam,” p. 835). In the East Indies, Islam has mixed

with animism to such an extent as to be thoroughly

corrupt and is called Javanism. Magic has become as

a divine institution. Spiritualism has been adopted

and ancestor worship and angels and prophets have

been substituted for their ancestors. The worship of

spirits is not abolished. The Shariat has become mixed

up with animism. Mr. Simon says: “The old and

new jurisprudence have been amalgamated. Malay

common law was given elbow-room, with unscrupulous

adaptation” (pp. 200 and 66). In some respects, as

in regard to slavery and the treatment of women,

Malay custom has improved Islam. The mode of

receiving new converts has been modified. As the

heathen tribes often have circumcision, it has no fur-

ther significance. The *kalima* is not even committed

to memory, though but a sentence in length. The

convert is asked, “Do you wish to become a Moslem?”

On his answering “Yes,” a lemon is squeezed over

his head as a rite of purification (Simon, p. 110). Re-

garding Islam in Annam, M. Doutte says (Margo-

liouth: “Mohammedanism,” p. 40): “In our colonial

empire we have a good example of Islam entirely

changed and brought back to quite primitive belief,

among the Chams.”

ISLAM DOES UNDERGO MODIFICATIONS

It is evident, therefore, that Islam has in the course

of its history undergone many modifications. These

changes have been of varying degrees of importance,

from simple accommodations to the customs and ways

of peoples to such beliefs and practices as compromise

the monotheism of the Faith. Of some things we

have been able to see the origin and the process by

which they obtained admission. Of others this is not

possible, only it is evident that they were not in primi-

tive Islam. Islam has shown power of adaptation.

And in order to get a true conception of it as a re-

ligion this needs to be emphasized. This fact has been

obscured, though students of Islam have not over-

looked it. T. W. Arnold calls attention (“The

Preaching of Islam,” p. 371) to “the power of the

religion to adapt itself to the peculiar characteristics

and the stages of development of the people whose

allegiance it seeks to win”; and Oscar Mann (“Great

Religions,” p. 58) speaks of it as showing a mar-

vellous adaptability in shaping its religious ordinances

to old customs. Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a

Mosque,” p. 169) makes the emphatic statement that

“the faith of Islam has passed through more phases

and experienced greater revolutions than perhaps any

other of the religions of the world.” Professor Gold-

ziher (“Historians’ History,” p. 298) says on this

theme: “The first step which Islam took on its vic-

torious career taught it to accommodate itself to an

alien spirit and to mould its intellectual heritage by

influences which seem absolutely heterogeneous to a

superficial observer. It was a borrower. That it

makes inflexible protest against the influence of for-

eign elements is an illusion.” Bosworth Smith (“Mo-

hammed and Mohammedanism,” p. 255) says: “It

may be safely said that there is nothing more extraor-

dinary in the whole history of Islam than the way

in which the theory of … the stereotyped and un-

alterable nature of its precepts, have by ingenuity, by

legal fictions, by the Sunna, and by *responsa pru-*

*dentum*, been accommodated to the changing circum-

stances and the various degrees of civilization. …

It is quite possible that where so much has been done

already, more may be done in the future and means

be found of reconciling the laws … with the re-

quirements of modern society.”

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

What are we to expect will be the process of

change in Islam? One possible method that lies open

is by Ijma, the consensus of opinion of the Ulema.

The Shiahs follow the interpretations of their Muj-

tahid, and there is no legal reason why this method

cannot be utilized among Sunnis, for tradition affirms

that Ijma cannot err. This is a legitimate way of

escape from the bonds of tradition and the Shariat.

Professor Macdonald, while believing that this may

be the solution, suggests that a more probable alter-

native is for Moslems to take refuge more fully in

the mystical way and follow Islam as an abstraction

but Sufiism as the reality to live by (“Aspects of

Islam,” p. 112). Some have suggested that Islam

may undergo change by revelations through Pirs,

Sheikhs, and Valis, since they profess to have this

power, and belief in them is increasing. Professor

Margoliouth finds a loophole for progress in the Mos-

lem simply allowing to pass into desuetude any unde-

sirable rites or injunctions; for to formally deny or

reject a law is regarded as infidelity, but simple dis-

obedience or neglect is pardonable (“Mohammedan-

ism,” p. 129). Judging by past history, the causes

of change will be varied. Some changes, as the as-

sumption of the caliphate by the Turks and the modi-

fication of the doctrine of the jihad in India, have

been the result of conquest. At other times they have

come through compromise with the conquered. Most

modifications, whether due to Greek philosophy, Ro-

man Law, Persian Sufiism, to Christianity or to the

Aliites, whether from internal or external influences,

have been received without formal action or decision.

It is possible that Islam may be changed by definite

revolts and reforms, which shall cause schisms from

the orthodox Sunnis. There are some indications of

this.

In the present age Islam is undergoing further

changes. There is movement. There is a condition

of unrest and dissatisfaction, of misgivings, fear, and

anxiety. New thoughts, ideals, and aspirations are

clashing with old tenets, prejudices, and superstitions.

It is a period of controversy. Doctrines and policies

are in debate. Many are moving from the old moor-

ings. Contentment with their condition, civilization,

and environment have passed away. Old-time arro-

gance and pride are gone. Self-assurance is weak-

ened. Many lament the conditions of the Moslem

world as one of decadence and of material, social, and

intellectual inferiority. They feel that Islam and

Moslem peoples are both at a low ebb. Different par-

ties assign diverse reasons for these conditions and

propose different remedies according to their various

attitudes toward the modern age.

Some cry out: Hold to the Old Faith! Observe

the Law and the Traditions and Almighty God will

bless our people and give our armies victory as of old.

Our weakness comes from ignoring the Shariat.

Others cry out: Back to Mohammed! Back to the

Koran! The Traditions have led us astray.

Others, with a free use of criticism and of rational-

ism, would interpret in accordance with the spirit of

Islam and reconstruct it in conformity with modern

ideas and twentieth-century conditions and culture.

Others again, counting themselves superior to creed

and law, and setting them aside by allegorical inter-

pretations, would have all to walk in the divine Path

by means of mystical communions and hypnotic ex-

ercises.

Others, feeling that only a new divine Guide and

a new revelation can solve the perplexities and right

the wrongs of the age, have fixed their faith and hope

on Mahdis, Imams, and so-called Lights.

Others would adopt Western political institutions

and learning as the framework for a reformed Moslem

state, subordinating affairs of Islam to national prog-

ress and civilization. With a secularistic spirit, they

would side-track religion, unless perchance it be to

use it for nationalistic purposes.

None of these parties are animated by a spirit of

friendliness to Christianity, though all of them are

willing to take advantage of Western military and

industrial science and some of them of all the Chris-

tian world can furnish, except the Gospel.

Lastly there are some, all too few, in the Moslem

world who are earnest inquirers and who are learning

to look to the Lord Jesus Christ as the panacea for

their ills. This day of unrest in Islam is a special

opportunity for Christian missions. It is a fit time to

bring the impress of the Gospel, the impact of Chris-

tian truth to bear on Islam. We cannot rely on our

civilization to Christianize it. Islam, be assured, will

find a way to adopt our civilization and remain Islam.

Special and mighty and immediate efforts are neces-

sary if we wish to draw them Christward. This day

of Movement is a crisis in their spiritual history.

I wish to present to your consideration Modern

Movements among Moslems. I will consider:

First, those movements which spring from and are

inspired by doctrines or aspirations within Islam itself,

as Wahabism, Pan-Islamism, and Moslem Missions,

especially as carried on from Mecca and by the Dar-

vish Orders.

Secondly, those connected with eschatalogical hopes,

as the Return of the Imam, or Mahdiism.

Thirdly, those movements inspired by or due to the

impact of Christian civilization, as Neo-Islam.

Fourthly, Political Movements in Moslem Lands.

**II**

**THE REVIVAL IN ISLAM**

I HAVE referred to the fact that Islam is being

moved by opposing currents of thought. Zealous

leaders have come forth, antagonistic to each

other, yet all professing the purpose to assist the

Faith and the Faithful. I will first of all describe a

vast conservative movement.

A remarkable phenomenon of the last century was

a revival in Islam. As a religion, Islam, at the end

of the eighteenth century, was like a palsied, decrepit

old man. It showed signs of disintegration and

decay. No less an authority than Palgrave (“Essays

on the Eastern Question,” pp. 114, 115), describing

its condition, writes: “Where the Caliph and the

Koran retained their apparent, they had lost their real

supremacy. Throughout the Turkish Empire, the

most distinctive precepts of the Book were publicly

set at naught, nowhere more than in Constantinople

itself. Nor were the sacred cities themselves, Mecca

and Medina, much better. The wine taverns of the

janisaries, the raki shops of the citizens, the prosti-

tutes of the Hejaz, the Bi-lillahs of Bagdad and Cairo

had become recognized institutions; opium-eating, too,

was next to universal; the mosque stood unfrequented

and ruinous, while the public schools and Colleges of

Mohammedan Law had fallen into dreary decay. An

eclipse, total it seemed, had spread over the crescent,

foreboding disaster and extinction.”

But this expectation was not fulfilled. On the con-

trary, there came about a renewal of religious loyalty

and zeal, manifested in a closer adherence to the

Shariat, the Sacred Law, a more strenuous mainte-

nance of its creed and observance of its rites, an ag-

gressive propaganda and a determined effort to renew

and strengthen the power of Islam, both religious and

political. The reasons for this awakening were partly

religious, arising from regret for the low condition

of the Faith; and partly political, from chagrin on

account of the weakness and inferiority of Moham-

medan peoples and determination to yield no further

to the influence or the pressure of Christian govern-

ments. The result was, writes Palgrave (*ibid*., p.

123), “that Mohammedan fervour has been thor-

oughly rekindled within the limits which its half-

extinguished ashes covered and the increased heat has

by natural law extended over whatever lies nearest

but beyond the former circumference.” Claude Field,

the author of “Mystics and Saints in Islam,” de-

scribes the movement as the “almost miraculous

renaissance in Islam which is now proceeding in Tur-

key and other Mohammedan lands.”

WAHABISM

The impetus co this awakening came from Wahab-

ism. The influence of this puritanic reformation has

been deep and widespread. It deserves study. It is

the judgment of Oscar Mann (“Great Religions of

the World,” p. 58) that “almost the whole of the

modern progressive movement of Mohammedans may

be traced directly or indirectly to it.”

Wahabism took its name from its founder, Mo-

hammed Ibn Abdul Wahab. He was the son of a

village Sheikh in Central Arabia and was thoroughly

educated in Islamic theology at Basra and Medina.

The divergence of Moslems from the primitive stand-

ards of rigid monotheism and simplicity of life had

deeply affected him. He started his career by a pro-

test against the cult of Sad, at Inayah, where saint-

worship prevailed. His cry was back to the Koran

and the primitive Law of the Sunna. He even re-

jected the interpretations of the orthodox schools of

the Sunnis. He stood for a literal interpretation of

the Koran and affirmed the right of interpreting it,

even contrary to the Imams. He abhorred Sufiism.

He demanded the strict observance of the prayer-rite,

fast, and tithes-giving. He denounced the reverence

paid to the saints, the Sheikhs, and even to Mohammed,

and all invoking of their mediation as well as making

pilgrimage or offerings to their shrines or perambulat-

ing their tombs and all the superstitions connected with

them, and the use of the rosary. He limited the festi-

vals and forbade the celebration of Mohammed’s birth-

day. He denounced luxury in dress and habits and

the use of silk, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and

strictly prohibited wine, tobacco, gambling, and Ori-

ental vice. In a word, he aimed to reform doctrines,

purify worship, and purge out innovations and cor-

ruptions. He protested against the liberty granted to

the infidels, that is, the Christians, whom he pro-

nounced unclean abominations. The ordinary Mos-

lems were no better, being *musrik*, polytheists, even as

the Christians. He thoroughly approved of and made

use of the primitive Islamic method of promoting re-

form, namely, by the power of the sword. All un-

believers, even Moslems, who did not reform were to

be killed. The jihad was indeed holy and the war-

rior, dying fighting for the faith, passed into Para-

dise; and to make firm the soldier’s assurance a written

order on the gate-keeper of the heavenly mansions

was put into his hand, with the injunction, “Kill and

strangle all infidels who give companions to God.”

The message of the reformer was at first rejected.

He was driven from place to place. But finally Ibn

Saud, the ruler of Daraiyah, believed. Ibn Abdul

Wahab gave promise to Ibn Saud that if he would

draw the sword in the cause of pure Islam, he would

make him sole ruler in Najd and the first potentate in

Arabia. Sheikh Saud accepted the terms, married the

reformer’s daughter, and became the commander of

the new jihad and the founder of a conquering dy-

nasty. He and his successors, from 1760 onward,

brought into subjection the neighbouring tribes, of-

fering conversion or extermination. Kerbala, the

shrine of the Shiahs, was despoiled of its treasures

and destroyed, with its relics and the golden dome over

the tomb of the Imam Husain. Mecca and Medina,

the sacred cities, were subdued, 1803-04, and compelled

to reform, the dome of Mohammed’s grave and all

the objects of veneration were destroyed, and cere-

monies which were innovations on primitive Islam

were prohibited.

The desecration of the holy cities and the inhibition

of pilgrimage to all who were not of his sect, aroused

the Sunni Caliph or Sultan. At his command, Me-

hemet Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, and Ibrahim Pasha

subjugated the Wahabis, and their Sheikh, Abdullah

II, was sent to Constantinople and beheaded in front

of St. Sophia (1819). Two small Wahabi states sur-

vived, one with a capital at Riyad, another at Haiel

in Najd, with a population of 1,500,000.

The influence of the Wahabi movement extended

beyond Arabia and was greater in its religious than

in its political aspect. It was introduced into India

by Sayid Ahmad of Oudh, who claimed to be the

Mahdi. His propaganda to purge out Hindu super-

stitions from Islam excited fierce fanaticism. He

raised a jihad against the Sikhs, captured Peshavur

in 1830, and maintained an insurrection for four

years. He declared that India was a Dar-il-Harb, a

land of warfare, and that jihad against the British

government was obligatory. The influence of Wa-

habis is still felt in India and the sect continues near

the northwest frontier. Another sect, called the

Faraisis, arose in India, animated with the same spirit.

In Sumatra a like movement was started about 1837

by a pilgrim returned from Mecca. He began the

correction of the errors and abuses of Moslems, es-

pecially striving to abolish the use of opium, tobacco,

and betel nut. From this propaganda grew up the

Padri sect. They proclaimed the jihad against the

heathen Bataks, destroyed their villages, outraged

their women, sold their children into slavery, and killed

every male who would not accept Islam.

Wahabism bore fruit in Africa. Osman Danfodio,

chief of the Fulahs, learned the doctrine at Mecca,

and on his return preached it. He succeeded in arous-

ing the people, founded Sokoto and the Fulah king-

dom, subdued several heathen states and forced them

to embrace Islam. Wahabism was also the inspira-

tion of the Sanusi, of whom I shall speak later (Ar-

nold: “Preaching of Islam,” pp. 230, 265, 299).

Wahabism greatly influenced the whole Islamic

body. Just as the Protestant Reformation was fol-

lowed by a counter-reformation in Roman Catholi-

cism, so Wahabism was the instrument for arousing

the Sunni Moslems. Its influence, true to its own

spirit, has been thoroughly reactionary. That return

to primitive Islam is the hope of the world’s regenera-

tion has been the inspiration of modern conservative

movements. Of it T. W. Arnold (*ibid*., pp. 345-46)

says: “It has given birth to numerous movements

which take rank among the most powerful influences

in the Islamic world. It is closely connected with

many of the modern Moslem missions; the fervid zeal

it has stirred up, the new life it has infused into ex-

isting religious institutions, the impetus it has given

to theological study and to the organization of devo-

tional exercises, have all served to awaken and keep

alive the innate proselyting spirit of Islam.” Sim-

ilarly Canon Sell says (*Missionary Review*, October,

1902, p. 732): “Its religious teaching, and still more

its narrow fanatical spirit, have spread into many

lands and influenced many peoples.” Palgrave, who

lived and travelled in Turkey and Arabia in close con-

tact with Moslems, writes: “The whole school of Is-

lamic teaching has been modified by it; not only the

common people but also many of the highest and best

educated classes, even the Sultan (Abdul Aziz) him-

self, are distinctly inclined to the stricter school, and

so are most of the principal Ulema.” He finds in it

a principal cause of the “Mohammedan revival—a

worldwide movement, an epochal phenomenon, before

which the lesser laws of race and locality are swept

away or absorbed in unity, which we can no more

check nor retard than we can hinder the tide from

swelling” (“Essays,” p. 140). He declares that in

the middle of the last century “the energy and breadth

of the revival embraced every class from the Sultan

Abdul Aziz down to the poorest hammal or porter

on the wharves and every Mohammedan race in the

Ottoman empire” (*ibid*., p. 123), “with the public

adhesion of all and the sincere adhesion of the

masses.” This was evidenced by a repair of the

mosques and *madressahs*, schools, a stricter observ-

ance of the fasts and prayers, a thronging of the

shrines, and increase of pilgrimage to Mecca. There

was also a reform of the habits of drunkenness among

the soldiers.

This spirit was also a reaction against the introduc-

tion of European laws and customs by the reforming

Sultans, Mahmud II and Abdul Aziz in his first years.

A strong feeling of opposition to these measures ex-

isted not only among the Ulema on account of the

Western code, but also among the beys and pro-

prietors, because they had been deprived of their lands

and feudal privileges by the new regulations. So

political conservatism and zeal for Islam went hand

in hand. Dissatisfaction with the new codes led to

a partial return to the jurisdiction of the Mahkamah

or Courts of the Sacred Law. Opposition to the

patronage given to the infidels led to the casting out

from employ of many Europeans who about 1850 had

overrun the Turkish service, and the employment in

their places of Moslem doctors, civil engineers, and

administrators. Rushdi schools which had been

started for the whole population, including Christians,

were transformed into strictly Mohammedan schools,

with teaching of Islam and Islamic languages. The

Sultan Abdul Aziz became sympathetic with the reac-

tionaries. The Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, said to a

British official: “What we want is an increase of

fanaticism rather than a diminution of it.” Notwith-

standing these symptoms, the political reformers re-

tained superior influence in the government till the

promulgation of the Constitution of 1876. After its

abrogation by Sultan Abdul Hamid, he openly became

the chief of the reactionaries, and made it his whole

aim to strengthen the Moslem element of his empire.

This aim soon assumed a wider scope and developed

into a movement to which is given the name Pan-

Islamism.

PAN-ISLAMISM

Pan-Islamism is a movement with the purpose and

endeavour to unite for defensive and aggressive ac-

tion. It aims to combine by the ties of the religion

Moslems of every race and country, in the work of

conserving and propagating the faith and of freeing

it by means of political and military force from alien

rule and thus making it again a triumphant world

power. It has a religious side and a political side.

On the religious side it is conservative and would

strenuously maintain Islam. Yet it would have a plat-

form broad enough to include all sects and parties.

On the political side it would weld into an alliance

all Moslem peoples and governments.

This scheme is in accordance with the nature of

Islam. Mohammed apparently designed that all be-

lievers should constitute one nation, not intending that

racial or national aspirations should assert themselves.

Great effort even was made to spread the Arabic and

make it a universal language. Islam has much to

draw it together in unity:—a simple creed formula—

La illah ill’ Allah, Mohammed rasul Allah—No God

save God; Mohammed is the Apostle of God—A com-

mon Koran, Kibla and Kaaba; a Capital, Mecca, the

centre of Pilgrimage, with its unifying influence; a

common language of worship, a common prayer

ritual, a common calendar—a sense of brotherhood

which excludes distinctions of race and colour.

By including military action in its programme, Is-

lam was acting entirely according to its nature. The

Crusades were contrary to the Gospel of Christ, but

an organized movement for warfare is harmonious

with the genius and history of Islam. Such a move-

ment is facilitated in this age by the very civilization

introduced by the infidels, for ease of communication

and transit bring the widely separated sections of

Islam into closer contact, and even the peace main-

tained by Christian governments in Asia and Africa

gives opportunity for the spread of ideas and plans.

Uniting Islam in a great final struggle is in accord-

ance with its alleged prophecies, and the ever-present

hope of its complete triumph. A Holy War is ex-

pected to precede the judgment and by means of it all

authority is to pass into the hands of Moslems. The

year a.h. 1300 (1882) was regarded from these

prophecies as a crisis destined to bring greater weak-

ness or renewed strength.

DIVISIONS OF ISLAM

One difficulty to be overcome was the condition of

division into sects and nationalities. Islam has not

been a unit since the twelfth year after the Prophet’s

death, nor since the second century of the Hegira has

it maintained outward unity. It has abounded in op-

posing sects whose hostility ofttimes unsheathed the

sword. There is an erroneous impression abroad

about the unity of Islam. Few people recognize the

multiplicity of sects there are in it. Mohammed is

reported by tradition to have said that the Jews have

71 sects, the Christians 72, and the Moslems would

have 73. It would excel even in the number of sects,

and in truth more than twice the above number have

been listed. The Mohammedans are no solid mass

of severe monotheists. Besides the sects of Aliites

or Shiahs, such as Ismieliyahs, Borahs, Zaidis, Fa-

timites, Sufis, Usulis, Akhbaris, Sheikhis, Nusairis,

Kuzil Bashis, etc.; Sunnis include Kurds who do not

keep the law; Arab tribes who worship jinns; Indians

who worship idols; Africans and Malays who are

still fetish-worshippers; Rationalists and free-thinkers;

Dunma Jews and Stavoirite Christians. Islam is a

heterogeneous mass whose divisions hold to their

differences as tenaciously as do any sects in Christen-

dom. New movements have led to new schisms. The

Wahabis, the Babis, the Sudan Mahdiists each in its

turn created antagonisms. The enthusiasm, courage,

and fanaticism of their followers, which urged them

on to war and conquest, were expended largely in hos-

tility to the governments of Islam, for each of them

regarded the authority of its leader as supreme and

called upon Sultan and Shah to submit to them.

Overcoming racial jealousies and hatred was also

a problem. These exist among Islamic peoples just

as between Christians. By race Moslems have been

divided into 80,000,000 Caucasians, 70,000,000 Mon-

gol-Turks, 44,000,000 Malay-Dravidians, and 36,-

000,000 Negros or Negroids. Arabs, Turks, and

Kurds have their racial and political antagonisms.

Iran and Turan did not forsake their age-long war-

fare by accepting Mohammed. The national ambi-

tions of the Albanians and Egyptians are in opposi-

tion to those of the Ottomans. Berbers and Arabs

fought through centuries and the Berbers twelve times

threw off the yoke of Islam. Even in Central Africa

Islam has not had influence enough to overcome the

national peculiarities of the races who have adopted

it. Professor Westermann declares (*International*

*Review of Missions*, October, 1912, p. 648) that “the

national consciousness of the Sudanese is stronger

than their religious attachment. The Hausa and

Fulah have lived together for centuries side by side,

but their relations continue to be entirely strained,

while the Tuareg are equally unfriendly to them

both.”

Pan-Islamism aimed by a spirit of accommodation

to smooth over differences. It was not reformatory,

it did not emphasize doctrinal unity, but rather con-

federation for action—a union for the defence, propa-

gation, and glory of the Faith.

These difficulties did not seem insuperable and the

task was entered upon with strong determination. The

leader of this movement was Abdul Hamid, Sultan

and Caliph. It is said that during the first years of

his reign he hesitated as to whether he should support

the liberal or the reactionary side. But soon it became

evident that he had determined to make his govern-

ment a Moslem administration, to magnify Islam and

repress Christians. The rebellion of Arabi Pasha in

Egypt and the claims of the Mahdi in the Sudan had

a tendency to accentuate Moslem desire for supremacy

and to lead them to deplore Christian prestige. Ab-

ul-Huda, the chief of the Rafai darvishes—the Sul-

tan’s astrologer,—gave advice to revive and strengthen

the influence of the caliphate. So around it the prop-

aganda was made to revolve so as to throw the shield

of religion over the political aims.

THE CALIPHATE

The office of Caliph, or supreme Head of the Mos-

lems, has pertained to the Osmanli Sultans for four

centuries. In 1517 Salim I conquered the Mamelukes

of Egypt. Living in subordination to the latter,

treated as underlings and at times almost as prisoners,

and used to further their political ends, were the suc-

cessors of the Abbaside Caliphs of Bagdad, who were

permitted religious authority only. The last of these

Mutavvakul ceded to Sultan Salim his rights and titles

as Caliph of the Prophet of God, Commander of the

Faithful, Imam of Moslems, Refuge of the world, and

Shadow of God, which the Sultan now bears in addi-

tion to King of kings, Arbiter of the world’s destinies,

Lord of the Two Continents and Two Seas, and Sov-

ereign of the East and West. The insignia of the

office, the possession of which has high significance,

were transferred to him, namely, the standard or cloak

of the Prophet, some hair of his beard, and the sword

of the Caliph Omar. At the same time the Sherif of

Mecca tendered his allegiance and brought to Salim

the keys of Mecca and Medina and transferred to him

the guardianship of the Sacred Cities.

Thus, by the power of the sword, the Osmanli Sul-

tans became caliphs, ignoring however two essential

requisites according to accepted Sunni tradition,

namely, that the Caliph should be of the Arab tribe of

Koreish, and, secondly, that he should be elected to

the office. The latter is fulfilled nominally at the ac-

cession of each Sultan, when the form of an election

is observed by the Ulema of Constantinople and the

Sultan is invested with the Caliphate. The other con-

dition is ignored, though a list, which named descent

from the Koreish as among the qualifications, re-

mained posted in all the great mosques, even of Con-

stantinople, until ordered removed by Abdul Hamid.

The Khavarij held that it was not necessary that the

caliph should be of the Koreish (“Spirit of Islam,”

Amir Ali, p. 525). By legists and scholars generally

the Sultans are regarded as usurpers, yet they are

acknowledged practically because they are the most

powerful defenders of the faith. Still considerable

bodies of Moslems have never acknowledged them, as

the Shiahs, and the subjects of the Sultans of Mo-

rocco, Zanzibar, and Oman, and of the Wahabi

Sheikhs of Arabia. Before the time of Abdul Ha-

mid, Chinese Moslems cared nothing for the Turkish

caliphate nor did they recognize the Sherif of Mecca.

Yet such distant rulers as the Amirs of Bokhara and

Khotan, the Sultans of Atchin and Panthay have sent

envoys during the last century. European govern-

ments with Moslem subjects have acknowledged him

as supreme, and the United States has seen fit to send

an envoy to consult about the Sulus of the Philippines.

The greatest strength of the caliphate is with the

ignorant populace. Some of them regard him as the

emperor of all Europe, holding in subjection to him-

self all Christian states, who acknowledge his sover-

eignty by sending him tribute and keeping delegates

at his Court. The kings of Europe cannot be crowned

without first obtaining his permission and sometimes

have to come in person to obtain it; not even the em-

perors of Russia and Great Britain are exempt from

this necessity. The Emperor of Germany came to do

obeisance to the Sultan and brought presents of horses

in token of his subjection. The Sultan will one of

these days overthrow these Christian governments

(Simon: “Progress of Islam, etc.,” p. 28; “Turkey

and Its People,” by Pears, pp. 75, 86; “Turkey and

the Armenian Atrocities,” E. M. Bliss, p. 75). A

Moslem, and he not a fellah but a mullah in St. Sophia,

told Sir Edwin Pears that Queen Victoria was a faith-

ful servant of their Padishah, but it was not plain

why he allowed the governor of England to be a

woman.1

Among the qualifications for the caliphate, char-

acter scarcely finds a place. He is to be a “just per-

son” and supposedly God-guided. Yet Abdul Hamid

had the astrologer Abul Huda as his constant ad-

viser. This astute magician is said to have worked

in collusion with Izzat Pasha, who showed him tele-

grams from various quarters before the Sultan had

seen them. He thus many times astonished his Pa-

dishah. Morality has not been required nor expected

as a qualification of the caliph. Of course, without

question, he has legally the privilege of having three

or four hundred concubines in his haram, and can

even count the massacring of tens of thousands of

Christian subjects as a holy work. But even Moslem

law cannot justify the horrible practice which many

Sultans successively followed of celebrating the bind-

ing on of the sword of Osman by putting to death all

the royal brothers. Mahmud II ordered his seventeen

brothers to be bowstrung. They were interred in St.

Sophia around the newly made grave of their father.

This practice was general (Pears: *ibid*., pp. 8-10) and

was continued without concealment until the middle

of the nineteenth century. How Moslems can look

upon such a line of assassins as their religious chiefs

can only be accounted for by their habit of divorcing

religion from morality. Justice Amir Ali says

1 This ignorance is equalled by that in Persia which attributes

to the Shah’s visit to Queen Victoria a matrimonial purpose, as

their traditions do to the coming of the Queen of Sheba to

Solomon.

(“Spirit of Islam,” p. 470) that the Sunnis do not

demand that the caliph be just, virtuous, or irreproach-

able; that neither vices nor tyranny justify his deposi-

tion. But some of them, as the Omayyad Walid and

the Abbaside Mutavakul, have been deposed by pop-

ular revolt against their iniquities. It had happened

among the Osmanlis several times before Abdul

Hamid.

Sunnis claim that there can only be one caliph at

a time, regarding as unlawful the existence of con-

temporary caliphs as the Omayyads at Granada, the

Abbasides at Bagdad, and the Fatimites at Cairo.

The claim of the Sultan, weak legally and his-

torically, was rendered more insecure and ineffective

at the beginning of his reign, by the fact that the

Sherif of Mecca and the Arabs were inclined to re-

pudiate him. After the Russo-Turkish war some of

the Arabs declared that the Sultan had forfeited his

claim through his defeats and that the caliphate should

return to the Koreish tribe (H. H. Jessup: “The Mo-

hammedan Missionary Problem,” p. 21). The Sherif

Sheikh Husni, an Anglophile, was ready to make good

his claim, and it was supposed that he was encouraged

to do so by the British. The Sherif was disposed of

in true Oriental style by means of an assassin, and a

supporter of the Sultan was put in his place. Hence-

forth the religious side of Pan-Islamism was pro-

moted from Mecca as a second centre (“Fall of Abdul

Hamid,” F. McCallagh, p. 23).

Abdul Hamid carried on his propaganda in no half-

hearted way. He put his untiring energy into it both

in his own dominions and in the whole Islamic world.

He called together in secret session many Sheikhs and

planned schemes. His agents were sent everywhere on

secret missions. They were liberally supplied with

funds. Generous presents were sent with them to the

heads of various sects, orders, shrines, and holy places;

pensions were given to mullahs, sayids, and influential

darvishes. It is asserted by Salib el Khalidi that the

Sultan spent half his revenues for Pan-Islamism. In-

fluencing and intriguing with the subjects of other

governments was no small part of the effort, which

included not only the preaching of union but the en-

couraging of fanaticism and rebellion. Hurgronje

says (“The Holy War, etc.,” p. 29): “It secretly

worked as a disturbing element; it often would oppose

the normal development of a mutually desirable rela-

tion between the governing and the governed.” The

agents used were at one time the able diplomat, at

another the learned mullah, or again the darvish

mendicant or the Khoja, dressed as a darvish. Turk-

ish consuls were established at many points, whose

manner of life, however, somewhat interfered with

the scheme, for it was often an offence against Mos-

lem morals. In Turkey the Ulema were urged to

engage yet more zealously in strengthening the faith

of the people, proclaiming the waxing of the Crescent

and the increasing glory of the caliphate. Above all

they were urged to be diligent in convincing the faith-

ful concerning the merit to be acquired before heaven

by robbing and killing the Christians. The *dallals* or

guides to the pilgrimage were made efficient agents.

Formerly they had been ignorant and untrained men

who came from Mecca, collected the dues for the

Kaaba, guided the pilgrim caravan to Mecca, and acted

as guides while there. At this time a different type of

men, ably trained propagandists, were assigned to this

service and went everywhere preaching.

The press was enlisted in the cause. Not a few

journals were its advocates. These papers and books

fostered disloyalty to other governments, proclaiming

the triumph of the Crescent. Abdul Hamid even went

so far as to have denunciations of Great Britain

printed in his palace and distributed in Afghanistan

and Arabia. A part of the propaganda consisted in

taking children of prominent families from India,

Java, and Sumatra to Constantinople to be trained in

loyalty to the Ottoman caliphate. This was forbidden

by the colonial governments. The result of “this skil-

fully planned agitation, carefully engineered from the

Palace (Sir William Ramsay: “Impressions of Tur-

key,” pp. 136-39) was all through Turkey a further

increase of Moslem power and fanaticism.” As Pal-

grave had noticed it in the previous reign, so Sir Wil-

liam Ramsay speaks of it under Abdul Hamid. Sir

Charles Elliot also says: “In this decade, 1880-90, a

tendency prevailed to accentuate the Sultan’s position

as caliph—to make it a vital reality. There was kept

before the minds of the Moslems the idea that the

Sultan was the head of all Islam on the one side as

opposed to all Christians on the other” (Sir Charles

Elliot: “Turkey in Europe”). Abdul Hamid made

his Moslem subjects believe that their misfortunes

were due to the interference of Europeans. Hur-

gronje testifies to the spread of this propaganda, say-

ing: “There is *certainly a very pronounced Pan*-

*Islamic tendency in all classes* of Mohammedan so-

ciety.”

COMBINATION OF SUNNIS AND SHIAHS

An important factor of the scheme was the bring-

ing of the Shiahs of Persia into co-operation. This

was the more important owing to the geographical

position of Persia, lying between the Moslems of

India and Afghanistan and those of the Turkish Em-

pire. For both political and military reasons Persia’s

co-operation was most desirable. The agents of Pan-

Islamism showed marked activity, and their presence

was continually reported in the bazaar rumours.

Their chief was a remarkable man named Sheikh

Jamal-ud-Din, whose life-story is a marvellous ex-

hibition of a powerful personality—a man who left

his mark on the political and religious life and history

of Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Turkey, and Persia.

He was a sayid born at Asadabad, near Hamadan.

At the age of ten he began his wanderings, studied

in various cities, and became erudite in almost the

whole range of Moslem learning. As a youth he

passed some time in Afghanistan and a year or two

in India, where he acquired some knowledge of Eng-

lish and Western science. After making the pilgrim-

age to Mecca, he returned to Afghanistan and, rising

to the surface in one of the civil wars, became Prime

Minister during the brief reign of Amir Mohammed

Azam. Fleeing thence, he led a life of varied experi-

ences, influential in many places among the literary

and official classes. Expelled from India as a precau-

tion against his political intrigues, and from Constan-

tinople through the jealousy of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, he

settled in Egypt and gave lectures on Mohammedan

theology, philosophy, law, and science, having great

influence and fame. He was driven thence by the

Khedive at the instigation of the orthodox mullahs

and of the British Consul, in 1879, who objected to

his activities in connection with the Egyptian Nation-

alists. After the defeat of Arabi Pasha, he was ex-

pelled from India, and came to America to obtain

naturalization, but did not remain to carry out this

plan. Next he became an editor in Paris, and carried

on controversy with Renan and also with the British

Government. After residing as a diplomat-at-large at

Petrograd, he accepted in 1886 the invitation of Nasr-

ud-Din Shah, came to Persia, and was made Minister

of War. Later he organized a reform movement and

preached much about it at the mosque of Shah Abdul

Azim. In this he offended the Shah, so he took refuge

at the sanctuary of this mosque. Dragged from there

by order of the Shah, he was expelled to Turkey.

After a visit to London and various negotiations with

its cabinet, he finally took up his residence in Constan-

tinople, where he was a guest and favourite of Abdul

Hamid and the active Apostle of Pan-Islamism. In

this, he did much, says Professor Browne (“Persian

Revolution,” p. 30), “to awaken the independent Mos-

lem States to the imminent peril and the urgent need

of combination to withstand the aggressions of the

great European Powers,” and “to create a sense of

brotherhood and community of interest among them.”

His Arabic biographer says of him: “The goal to-

wards which all his actions were directed and the

pivot on which all his hopes turned, was the unanimity

of Islam and the bringing together of all Moslems

in all parts of the world into one Islamic empire under

the protection of one supreme Khalifa. He raised up

a living spirit in the hearts of his friends and disciples.”

He founded at Mecca a Pan-Islamic Society, called

Umm ul Kura. It printed and circulated its rules and

constitution, but was suppressed by Abdul Hamid, be-

cause it suggested Kufa as an alternative seat of the

caliph (Browne: *ibid*., pp. 2-14). The plan was laid

to bring the Shiahs into harmony with the Sunni Ca-

liph. This was a bold and difficult scheme. The age-

long alienation and bitter enmity, the bloody wars be-

tween the adherents of the Imam Ali and those of the

four “rightly directly caliphs” made reconciliation

seem impossible. Yet the lessening of Shiah hatred

in latter years gave hope, and it was by smoothing

over of differences rather than by a change of con-

victions that they expected to bring about concord.

There was an example before them; for a union of

Sunnis and Shiahs had been accomplished in the

Muridism of Mullah Mohammed and Sheikh Schamyl

of Daghestan. Both Persia and Turkey felt the neces-

sity of doing something in the face of the aggressive

Christian Powers who were pressing in on both sec-

tions of Islam. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din corresponded

with the Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbela and Persia. He

also sent envoys to work secretly among the Persians,

especially among the officials of liberal tendency, upon

whom distinctive Shiahism sat lightly. His plea was

stated in these words: “If all the Mohammedan na-

tions would only unite, all the nations on earth could

not prevail against them.” One of these envoys was

Mirza Hasan Khan, with whom I had conversation in

Tabriz at the house of Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-i-

Doulah. Another promoter of Pan-Islamism was

Prince Haji Sheikh-ur-Rais, the author of “Ittahad-

ul-Islam” (“Union of Islam”).

The effects of these negotiations were evident.

Some of the influential Shiah Mujtahids of Kerbala

and Najef, as well as officials like Amin-i-Doulah and

Mustashar-i-Doulah, the Foreign Agent at Tabriz, be-

came advocates of the scheme, and of an arrangement

whereby the Persians should recognize the caliphate

of the Sultan and the Turks recognize the Shah as

head of all the Shiahs, and that both should work

in harmony. An account of these negotiations is given

in a poem by Mirza Aga Khan. Of the answer of

the Mujtahids, he writes (Browne: *ibid*., p. 412):

“From Persia and Irak they wrote: ‘We have washed from our

hearts the dust of dissension;

We will all sacrifice our lives for the Holy Law, we will all

swear allegiance to the King of Islam.’”

To allay antagonism and promote unity of feeling,

all customs which tended to perpetuate enmity should

be discontinued. In accordance with this, Shiahs were

to be no longer molested in their pilgrimages. They

in observing the mourning of Muharram and the Pas-

sion Play, though they might curse Yezid, would not

transfer the rancour to the modern Turks. They

would drop the festival of Omar and no longer dress

up an effigy to represent that caliph and heap indig-

nities upon it. They would no longer make any one

to represent this enemy of Ali and treat him with

contumely and maledictions, as *Omara laanat olsun*

(“Cursed be Omar”). The effect of these efforts

at reconciliation were plainly observable in Persia in

better relations between Sunnis and Shiahs and were

felt in Russia and India as well. But the Shah of

Persia did not take kindly to the scheme. It was

doubtless evident to him that the prominent negotiators

were Old Babis and that they and Jamal-ud-Din did

not wish him good. In passing it may be remarked

that the Sultans of Morocco and Zanzibar, too, re-

fused to listen to the envoys of Pan-Islamism.

HAJIS AS PROPAGANDISTS

Besides all this, the propaganda was carried on

from Mecca by the Sherif and the Ulema. Abdul

Hamid cultivated the friendship of the Arabs. As an

aid in binding them and the holy cities to the Osmanli

caliphate the Hajaz railway was planned and com-

pleted to Medina. It was made by the labour of 7,000

soldiers. The Khedive of Egypt and the Shah of

Persia joined in the enterprise. A Prince of India

spent $200,000 on the Medina Station. Popular in-

terest was aroused and personal subscriptions solicited.

Large contributions were received from India, Java,

and the whole Moslem world. Lucknow sent $140,000

and Rangoon and Madras $300,000. Peculations

from the fund were put at $3,000,000. Yet in spite

of this and the Beduin robbers, it was carried to com-

pletion. One specialty of its trains is the prayer-car

for the pilgrims. The idea of Pan-Islamism is one

congenial to the Arabs, for Mecca is a hotbed of

Islamic fanaticism and its atmosphere is surcharged

with hatred of Christianity and with assurance of the

final triumph of Islam over the Christians, even though

it is the present kismat that the infidels oppress the

faithful. The new High Sherif was in communion

of purpose and idea with the Sultan. The power

which lay in the schools of Mecca and of the mullahs

who went forth from them was more actively exerted

to revive Islam. Increasing effort was made to incite

the Hajis. These pilgrims come from all parts of the

Mohammedan world to be present at the annual feast

of sacrifice, and to perform the rites around the Kaaba

and other sacred places. Each race and language has

its special groupings and mosques, and are brought

under instruction with an aim to indoctrinate, inspire,

and excite them to stronger faith and fanaticism.

Every year one hundred thousand of these devoted

pilgrims kiss the black stone and, notwithstanding the

fact that they are fleeced unmercifully, swindled and

deceived at every turn, notwithstanding the fact that

exposure to the broiling sun, cholera, plague, and the

treachery of the Beduins prevent thirty-eight per cent

from returning to their homes (see Keane’s “Six

Months in Mecca”), yet the Haji is more than all

others a fanatic. Even among the Persians, though

they have suffered specially as Shiah heretics, the

most fanatical class of the population are the Hajis.

They are most ready to treat with scorn and con-

tumely the Armenians or Nestorians, to revile them as

infidels, and to gather their honourable robes about

them lest they be defiled by their touch. The Hajis

return to their Sunni communities, bound as never

before to Mecca, with a deep idea of the unity of Is-

lam and a determination to promote it and to defeat

and destroy the Christians. This is strikingly true

of the Malays, of whom Simon and Hurgronje testify,

saying that “every Haji is an agent of Moslem propa-

ganda; they return home inspired with the idea of

living and dying for the realization of that unity.”

They are permeated with the thought of the greatness

of Islam, of their position and blessedness in being

members of it. They are firm in their belief in its

power and its unparalleled influence in the world.

They have caused Pan-Islamic principles to penetrate

the Moslem millions of Java and Sumatra and even

the most remote mountain villages. They are assured

that the Supreme Caliph, the Rajah of Stamboul, will

one day deliver them. Christians are helped by the

devil, their science is of the devil, their machine-guns

are called the devil’s guns, and they will go to the

devil. Their destruction is at hand by the power of

the Prophet, for they are inferior in power as well

as cursed in their faith, being like unclean beasts. In

some such words is described to us (Rev. G. Simon

in “Islam and Missions,” p. 87) the attitude of

East-Indian Moslems. No wonder that its outcome

is disloyalty and insurrection.

In Russia Pan-Islamic influence is widespread. A

journal advocating it is published in Petrograd, called

“The World of Islam,” and another is issued by the

Academy of Kazan. Agents have travelled far and

wide among the Tartars along the Volga. Others

have gone through the Crimea, Caucasus, the Kirghiz

Steppes, and Turkestan, and inflamed the bigotry of

the Moslems, inculcating hatred of Christians and col-

lecting funds for the Sultan. In Bokhara the propa-

ganda is reported to have been very successful and the

Amir to have become a leader in the movement. The

twenty millions of Moslems in Russia are united and

desirous of attaining to the religious and political

ideals of Pan-Islamism. In India the propaganda has

been active. Abdul Hamid sent his emissaries. A

paper was printed in his palace, called Peik-Islam, for

circulation in India. The Sultan’s name was intro-

duced into the Khutbas, or prayer service, in some

provinces.

In Africa, the propaganda had wide ramifications.

Lord Cromer saw its activities and describes it in his

reports and in his “Modern Egypt.” The great dar-

vish orders to which I shall again refer, are active

advocates of its main principles, and have won the

people to adhesion to them. One of Sultan Abdul

Hamid’s special agents was Sheikh Jaffar, chief of the

Madaniyah darvishes in Tripoli and Algeria. He was

a strong supporter of Pan-Islamism and had his head-

quarters at Stamboul, whence he sent out his mes-

sengers (“Islam and Missions,” p. 66). The Sanusi

Sheikh at first denounced the Osmanli Sultans for

their friendliness to and imitation of Christians, but

later was reconciled and strove for the same pro-

gramme. Regarding North Africa, Canon Sell affirms

(*Missionary Review*, 1912, p. 739) that “the Pan-

Islamic movement is having a power such as has not

been seen since the early days of the Arab conquest.”

Dr. Washburn wrote in 1909: “There seems to be a

general movement in North Africa and all over Asia,

even in China, the full significance of which We cannot

understand. But one thing is clear … a determina-

tion to maintain their faith on the part of Moslems.”

PAN-ISLAMISM AN ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT

The Pan-Islamic movement aimed to oppose and

conquer Christianity. It strove not only to promote

things Moslem but abolish and destroy things Chris-

tian. Its policy of repression was evident in the Sul-

tan’s dominions. The condition there was well de-

scribed as “an increasing stringency directed against

Christian education, and increasing hostility to the use

of books by the Christians” in order to “cripple their

intellectual powers, … an increasing vigilance to

prevent Christians from exercising their religion …

and to restrain Christianity.” (Quoted in E. M.

Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” p. 367.)

The censorship of Christian books was made very

strict, not only on certain kinds of books but even on

words and ideas. The censor prohibited the use of

the word *rasul*, apostle, for Christ’s disciples, claiming

that the title should be used exclusively for Moham-

med; that the phrase “guidance of God” should not

be used in reference to Christians, for they had not that

blessing. Even books coming *in transitu* to Persia

were seized. Some volumes of the “Life of Henry

Martyn” in English were burnt at Trebizond by the

Turkish officials, who thus showed an oversight of

the interests of their Islamic neighbour. Books such

as Shakespeare, “Universal History,” and encyclo-

pedias were taken from our cases. But while zeal for

the law led to their confiscation, the higher law of

self-interest often led to their being sold in the bazaars

of Trebizond. In search for these unclean books, it

chanced that once a ham was discovered. What should

be done with this abomination? While officials were

deliberating on this, the question was settled by a dog

snatching it and running away with it. Once an agri-

cultural machine was landed at a certain port. Accom-

panying it was a description of it which fell into the

hands of a Turk who could read English. He was

struck with horror and rushed off to report to the

police that the machine was a terrible one guaranteed

to make “eighty revolutions a minute.” A panic fol-

lowed. Guards were posted and a telegram for in-

structions sent to Constantinople. The machine was

ordered out of the country instanter.

Interference with and repression of Christian work

in Turkey was reflected in Persia. Not seldom some

action of the Shah’s officials could be traced to a re-

port received of some anti-Christian action of the

Osmanli government.

Repression of the worship and education of Chris-

tians was not enough; Christian officials were dis-

missed by the Sultan. It is definitely stated that they

were offered continuance in their civil and diplomatic

posts on condition of accepting Islam; that those in

arrears of taxes were tendered remission on the same

condition. All this was a part of Abdul Hamid’s pro-

gramme to convert the Christian rayats.

Massacres of the Christians had a religious end.

They were inspired by religious fanaticism, as well

as designed to repress political and revolutionary ac-

tivity. The latter were not sufficient cause for gen-

eral massacre. Indeed the forcible conversion to Islam

of seventy or more villages of Yezidees or devil wor-

shippers of Kurdistan was carried out, though there

could not be any political danger from them. Sir

William Ramsay declares his belief that the Armenian

massacres were part of the plan of Pan-Islamism—a

deliberate plan to crush Christianity. In any case

they were promoted and carried out as an anti-

Christian campaign. Not only in Turkey but else-

where the whole spirit of the movement was against

the religion as well as against the governments of the

Christians. It may readily be admitted that there is

much in the political dealings of Christian Powers,

their aggressions and selfish diplomacy, to excite ha-

tred, but there is very little in their conduct towards

Islam as a religion to call for reprisal. They have

treated it impartially and justly, sometimes favoured

it. Nevertheless the Pan-Islamic propaganda increased

the hatred for Christians as well as the desire to over-

throw Christian domination everywhere. Sheikh

Abdul Hak of Bagdad but voices the feeling of the

multitude when he fulminates a defiance, saying:

“Christian peoples! The hatred of Islam is irrecon-

cilable! We abhor you more than we did in the early

period of history. Our most ardent desire is that the

day may soon dawn when we shall wipe out the last

traces of your supremacy.” The *Ijtihad*, a Moslem

journal, says (Dr. Howard Bliss in *International Re-*

*view of Missions*, 1913, p. 647) the Christian is “the

curse of the world. To reason with him, to lead him

back to salvation, and when that is impossible, *to re-*

*move his existence*, is the most sacred duty and the

holiest piety of the faithful. Oh, Christian nations!

We are now hating you. We want you to understand

that we hate the civilization and the extraordinary de-

velopment which has made you so wealthy and so

powerful.”1

TURKISH MASSACRES OF CHRISTIANS

The idea is said to prevail in England that “the

Turk always showed a contemptuous toleration for

his Christian subjects.” Of the contempt there can

be no doubt. Sir William Ramsay says (“Impres-

sions, etc.,” p. 206): “Armenians and Greeks were

regarded as dogs and pigs; their nature was to be

Christians, to be spat upon if their shadow darkened

a Turk, to be outraged, to be mats on which he wiped

the mud from his feet. The Turk then did not mind

what religion these dogs belonged to and he was as

far as possible from the wish to make them Moham-

medans.” But with this contempt was also persecu-

tion. Sir Edwin Pears says (“Turkey and Its Peo-

ple,” p. 350): “Until the nineteenth century the policy

was one of constant worry with occasional Bartholo-

mew massacres” (*ibid*., p. 42): “I doubt whether at

any time since Mohammed conquered Constantinople

a quarter of a century has passed without a big mas-

sacre.” In another place this close student of Turkish

history writes (*The Nineteenth Century*, 1913, p.

278): “I assert that ever since the Turk entered Eu-

1 This abhorrence is revealed in the incident that Sheikh

Othman of Batavia was severely criticised for praying for the

Queen of Holland at the time of her coronation. Another cele-

brated sayid, Salim ibn Ahmad of Arabia, defended him with

the remark that it was merely an external performance to con-

ciliate the infidels, but God knew what was in his heart.

rope, say five hundred years ago, the whole course of

Turkish history … was a period of Mohammedan

fanaticism, during which tens of thousands of Chris-

tians died for their faith. The persecutions under

which the Christians suffered after the capture of

Constantinople, in 1453, were so continuous and strik-

ing as to terrorize the sufferers. They were far

greater in each century before 1800 than during the

last century. Their history under Turkish rule was

a long and terrible persecution for their faith. On

three occasions every Christian in Constantinople was

threatened with death. In 1512 Salim I proposed to

kill them all unless they would accept the Mohammedan

faith. The Grand Vizier averted it. One-half of the

churches of Constantinople were left to the Christians

at the conquest, but before a century all but one were

taken from them.” Some were bought back with

money. Or if instead of the ones of which they were

dispossessed, they were permitted to build, they must

be of wood that they might quickly decay or be burnt

down.

A mere recapitulation of the massacres in the nine-

teenth century fills one with horror; such infernal

brutality and devilish lust, rapine, murder, and bar-

barity surpass description. In 1822 the Greeks of

Chios were almost exterminated. The Turkish rabble

hurried to the scene and enjoyed the slaughter as a

picnic. Thirty-two thousand boys and girls were sold

into slavery, 30,000 of the people were killed, and

30,000 fled into other lands; but 15,000 remained in

this most prosperous island. In 1844 10,000 Nes-

torians were massacred by the Kurds; in 1860

30,000 Christians of the Lebanon were slaughtered

by the Druses; in 1876 the massacre of 40,000 Bul-

garians aroused the indignation of Europe and brought

about the Russo-Turkish war; in 1894-96 200,000

Armenians perished either by slaughter or consequent

deprivations. In 1909, under the Constitution, oc-

curred the massacre of Armenians at Adana. “Every

man that could be found was shot, hacked to pieces,

or thrown into the flames of the burning houses and

shops. No Christian woman’s honour was spared.”

Churches were destroyed. In city and villages all

were hunted down. Twenty-eight thousand were

slain. Twenty-one out of twenty-five trained Protes-

tant pastors were massacred. It was more fiendish

than the preceding massacre.

MASSACRES CAUSED BY RELIGIOUS FANATICISM

Moslem fanaticism was the fundamental cause of

these massacres. They were ordered by the Sultan,

the Caliph of Islam, instigated by harangues of the

mullahs declaring the merit of killing and outraging

Christians. They were enjoined by proclamations in

the mosques. The Moslems robbed, desecrated, and

burnt the churches as well. When they made a holo-

caust of the Urfa Cathedral, within which were eight

thousand innocent victims, many of them women and

children, the Moslems “mockingly called on Christ to

prove himself a greater prophet than Mohammed.”

In the time of trial, tens of thousands were compelled

to choose between death and Islam. Tens of thou-

sands chose death. Thousands, alas, denied the faith

especially to save their wives and daughters from the

vile hands of the wretches who maltreated them in a

horrible manner or carried them off to their harams

or sold them as slaves and even compelled them to

become promiscuous concubines. In the midst of all

the slaughter and rapine, all that was required of a

man was to raise one finger as a sign of acceptance

of the Moslem creed and he was safe. At least forty

thousand under compulsion became Moslems in

1894-95.1

Such is a brief summary of Turkish atrocities

against the Christians; a record which well qualifies

him to be called the unspeakable Turk. Yet we are

assured, by one who knows, that the Turk shows im-

provement. Sir Edwin Pears, for forty years the

sterling representative of Great Britain in Constanti-

nople, after condemning the Sultan and these massa-

cres in burning words, assures us that there has been

a decrease in the fanaticism of the Turks. The bru-

tality, bloodthirsty savagery, monstrous cruelty, bestial

1 E. M. Bliss: “Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities,” chap,

xxvi. Dr. Bliss gives details. At Chunkush, in the province of

Diarbekr, there were 6,000 Christians; 880 were butchered, the

rest were compelled to become Moslems. At Senerek nearly all

the grown men, 750, were killed, and all the women and children

were distributed to the Moslem harams. At Urfa most of the

Christian men were compelled to become Moslems and to put up

a white flag as a sign of it. After a month, some houses were

found without the white flags and 1,500 were killed as apostates.

At Albislaw nearly all accepted Islam; at Adianam out of 800 all

were slain but 20 who denied the faith. At Arabkir, of 18,000

Christians, all were plundered and burned out of house, 4,000 were

killed, the rest accepted Islam. At Tadem, of 1,800, 250 were

killed, the rest became Moslems. In all, 100,000 to 200,000 per-

ished; 40,000 accepted Islam.

sensuality from which Christians suffered in our day

were exceeded in the atrocities of the sixteenth, sev-

enteenth, and eighteenth centuries. Even the mas-

sacres of the Greeks in the beginning of the nineteenth

century surpassed in inhumanity and horror the inde-

scribable massacres of the Armenians. This being so,

we might hope, at such a rate of progress, that after

several millenniums the lives of Christians, were any

left, would be safe under the Turks. Victor Hugo

has an expressive line which runs

“The Turks have passed here: All is ruin and mourning.”

These unpunished massacres of Armenian Christians

were exulted over as a victory for Islam. Even in

far-off Mandaling, the Moslems announced that they

would treat the Batak Christians in exactly the same

way (Simon, p. 39).

THE HOLY WAR

An instrument was ready at hand for Pan-Islamism.

This was the Jihad, or Holy War. Abdul Hamid

counted on making effective use of it. The Law of

Mohammed, both in the Koran and the Traditions,

commands fighting for the Faith. War is a religious

duty. Their prophet enjoins: “Kill those that join

other Gods with God wherever ye shall find them: but

if they shall convert, then let them go their way”

(Surah IX, 5). Some would interpret this to mean

only the heathen of Arabia, but this is untenable, for

verse 29 says: “Make war upon such of those to

whom the Scriptures have been given, i.e. Jews and

Christians … who profess not the profession of the

truth until they pay tribute out of hand and be hum-

bled.” Surah VIII, 40, commands: “Fight against

them until religion be all of it God’s.” Mohammed

declared: “Fighting in the way of God is a divine

duty. When your Imam orders you to go forth to

fight, then obey him.” By command of Mohammed,

says Bosworth Smith (“Mohammed and Moham-

medanism,” p. 177), “religion became warlike and

war became religious, with the whole world for a

battlefield.” Islam conquered and spread by the

sword. All Moslem historians affirm it. The Per-

sians call themselves “guluj mussalmani” (“Mussul-

mans by the sword”). It remained for European

apologists, like T. W. Arnold, to attempt, however

unsuccessfully, to show the contrary. In the jihad

the Moslem warrior gave the option of (1) Islam,

(2) Subjection, (3) Death. Under the second con-

dition Christians must live in abject submission, under

the lordship of the Moslem, inferior in legal status,

paying a special tax, regarded as *zimmis* or *rayats*

(cattle). If they assert themselves, seem desirous of

freedom, or are supposed to be planning release or to

be sympathizing with the enemy, they come under the

ban of the jihad and they and their families can be

killed and maltreated without mercy. Dr. G. Herrick,

a lover of the Turks as a race, condemns their jihad

in these words (“Christian and Mohammedan,” p.

119): “These orgies of carnage and arson, attended

by treachery and falsehood, by infernal cruelty and

beastly lust, are the natural fruit of Mohammed’s

ethical teachings and example at Medina.”

The Holy War is in force “till the resurrection,”

and only expediency limits it while non-Moslem gov-

ernments exist in the world. It is a permanent statute

of Islam for aggression and propagation as well as

defence. According to the Shari, it should always

exist against non-Moslem countries “until they sub-

mit,” and until every Dar-ul-Harb is converted into a

Dar-ul-Islam, an abode of Islam. Submission to Eu-

ropean rule is abnormal, unlawful, only a temporary

trial. The “Moslem Dictionary,” published in India

(quoted by Dr. Zwemer, *Missionary Review*, 1913,

p. 102), says: “This is an abode of Islam, although

it belongs to the accursed ones and authority belongs

externally to these Satans.” Only expediency holds

them in check. For a new interpretation has been

given to the law by the Ulema of North India, that

the jihad is lawful only when there is “a probability

of victory to the armies of Islam.” This accords with

the saying of the Koran: “Ye are in no wise bound

to rush upon your destruction.” Fear and not loyalty

prevents the jihad, for, as Professor Petrie says of

Egypt (“Ten Years in Egypt,” p. 180), “the fellah

looks upon the unbeliever as a miserable minority; and

it is the unpleasant fact that they cannot be crushed at

present which prevents his crushing them and assert-

ing the supremacy of Islam.”

The jihad is invoked not only against non-Moslems

but also against heretics, as the Shiahs and the Wa-

habis. The Shiahs claim that there can only be a

true jihad when the Imam appears to issue the call:

Sunnis ascribe the authority to the caliph. In prac-

tice, the Shiah Mujtahids proclaim it and even mullahs

in Africa and Indonesia declare local jihads. It has

been invoked in the Atchin and other insurrections and

in frequent fanatical uprisings; in the rebellions in

China; in the Wahabi campaigns in India; by Sheikh

Abdul Kadir and Schamyl in their stubborn defences

in Algeria and the Caucasus; by the Sudan Mahdi; in

every important war of Turkey, except possibly the

Balkan War. The Sheikh Sanusi issued a call to the

jihad against Italy in Tripoli, 1912. In it salvation

and blessing are promised to all “who extend the

dominion of the Faith with the sword’s sharpness, as

the Koran has commanded, ‘Battle with unbelievers.’

For Paradise lies under the shadow of swords; the

martyr feels death only as the light pressure of the

finger when he is filled with the hot desire for it. By

God’s grace, it is the last step to the presence of God.

The breath of Paradise fans him and the houris seek

to draw his gaze on themselves when he lies wound-

covered. Up then, worshipper of God! pour wealth

and blood into the fight! God has commanded the

jihad! Endurance! Endurance! God is near to

help” (*Missionary Review*, 1912, p. 790).1

The effect of such proclamations is to excite reli-

gious fanaticism in a superlative degree, filling the

soldier with fiery zeal to slay as God’s service, for

has not the Prophet said “the fire of hell shall not

touch the legs of him who shall be covered with the

dust of battle in the way of God”? Indifference to

death and dauntless courage are engendered. The

1 Mr. Simon (p. 141) tells of a Javanese, bent on suicide,

who rushed in and wounded several Dutch soldiers and shot

the sentry. Suicide would have been accounted a great sin

for him, but killing Christians was a merit, deserving a heavenly

reward, so he committed this act of holy warfare to enter

Paradise.

jihad is a tremendously effective weapon, as in days

of old.

With such a propaganda, such principles, such a

following, and such a weapon, Pan-Islamism loomed

large. The ideal of the Caliph Abdul Hamid seemed

to have borne fruitage. The successful campaign

against Greece in 1897 sent a thrill of joy through

the vast body of Moslems to the farthest extremity.

Every mosque was illuminated throughout India, even

to the smallest village in the Deccan (Aga Khan:

*Edinburgh Review*, 1914, p. 3). It was one cause

of the Tirah rising. The Greeks were conquered; the

Armenians decimated; the Arabs brought into order

and conciliated; the Sanusiyahs working in harmony;

the Shiahs friendly; the Moslem leagues fanatically

active; the Christian Powers flouted; the Colossus of

the North humbled by Japan; the Sultan’s prestige

among Moslems was at its zenith. Pan-Islamic ideals

seemed to them about to be realized. Even European

writers did not regard their military aspirations as

impossible. Edward Dicey viewed as reasonable

(“The Egypt of the Future,” quoted in C. R. Watson’s

“In the Valley of the Nile,” p. 218) the “widespread

Moslem belief that the time is at hand when Islam

might resume her career of conquest and might fulfil

her mission of exterminating all unbelievers, no matter

what creed they may profess.” Oscar Mann wrote

(“Great Religions of the World,” p. 58): “We see

a fermentation going on in Islam from one end to the

other. What is not possible if some gifted man suc-

ceeds in inspiring these tremendous masses!” Some,

on the other hand, called it a “rope of sand” (Dr.

G. Herrick), a “chimera” (Dr. W. S. Nelson), an

“impossibility” (Prof. E. G. Browne), “with no

prospects of realization” (J. Simon). These esti-

mates seem undoubtedly true from a military point of

view. But its possibilities could not be accurately de-

termined and Christian Powers cautiously watched

developments.

Events which followed revealed its failure as a po-

litical power but its reality as a religious conviction,

and intensifies its anti-Christian bitterness. The ap-

parent purpose of Russia and Great Britain to divide

Persia, the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, the declaration of independence by Bul-

garia, the Italian war and the loss of Tripoli, the

Balkan War and its direful consequences, the seizure

of Morocco,—all together impressed Moslems with

the thought that Christian governments had formed a

plot to destroy all Moslem governments. In conse-

quence Turk and Arab emissaries were sent through

India and Russia. Intense feeling was created. Sym-

pathy with Turkey was profound, for, as the London

*Times* said (April 19, 1913), “the Moslem looks upon

Turkey as the embodiment of the temporal power of

Islam and does not desire to see Islam reduced to the

position of Israel, a religion without temporal status.”

A Mohammedan graduate of an English University

was so affected by the news of the battle of Lulu

Burgas that he felt like committing suicide. In India

inflammatory speeches were made, bombs were pur-

chased, fatvas for boycott were issued, large sums were

subscribed to help Turkey. Popular meetings passed

indignant resolutions. Protests and petitions were sent

from the London Colony and from the Transvaal

Moslems. The Indian Moslem press denounced the

conspiracy to overthrow Islam, the British policy in

Persia, the aggressions of Russia, Italy, and France.

Egypt seemed a hotbed of sedition. Moslem Leagues

were multiplied. A thrill of sympathy and excite-

ment went even to the remotest corner of Zanzibar

(“Vital Forces,” p. 197). Agitation and discontent

were manifested everywhere. Pan-Islamic feeling was

tense and aggressive. Remembering the Crusades,

who can tell but some spark might set on fire the

Islamic world? We soberly and rightly calculate that

the devotees of Islam cannot prevail in warfare against

the armouries of Europe. Without our science, Islam

is hopelessly outclassed as a fighting power. But Is-

lam might find her opportunity in a divided Christen-

dom. Even some great Dreibund might equip and

finance Pan-Islam. Besides this, the point is not as

to where the final victory would be. It is rather as

to the purpose and possible attempt of the Moslem

world. They await the time to strike. God is great!

Victory is His! “A consciousness of victory,” says

Mr. Simon (p. 223), “pervades the whole Moham-

medan world. Islam’s unfavourable position politically

has not affected it, because the feeling has its origin

in the religious conceptions of Islam, more especially

in the doctrine of the holy wars which are to usher in

the Last Day. It has a feeling of invincibility.” Not-

withstanding its collapse, at present, it is Julius

Richter’s judgment that “the deep and strong convic-

tion that has grown up into the very fabric of Moham-

medanism, through thirteen centuries of victory and

success, of a call to world-wide dominion, cannot be

uprooted by the reverses” it has met. *The Comrade*,

the Moslem journal of Calcutta, voices their sense of

unity and strength when it says (quoted by Dr.

Zwemer, *Missionary Review*, 1914, p. 176): “Mus-

sulmans have just begun to perceive that Islam is a

living source of spiritual and social cohesion, binding

all Moslems in an indissoluble unity of hope, purpose,

duty, and endeavour. Moslems have never felt its

vital strength as keenly as they feel it to-day. The

sufferings of the parts have revived in the whole its

sense of organic unity.” Palgrave (“Essays,” p. 125)

writes: “So strong indeed is the bond of union that in

the presence of the infidel the deep clefts which divide

Sunni and Shiah are for a time and purpose oblit-

erated,” and it is “roughly welded into one formidable

weapon of attack on the common foe, the uncircum-

cised foe, governed and governing.” Aga Khan, who

is loyal to Great Britain, writes (*Edinburgh Review*,

1914, p. 4): “All sections of the Moslem world are

moved. There is between them and their fellow-

believers in other lands an essential unity which breaks

through differences of sect and country.” The *Tanin*

of Constantinople, even after the failure of the call

to the jihad, expresses its belief in the reality of Pan-

Islamism as follows:

“The wish to abolish existing misunderstandings

between the various Mohammedan elements and to

establish as between them a defensive force that will

permit them to give reciprocal protection to each

other, is not anywise the result of vast and chimerical

schemes, but rather the outcome of most natural neces-

sity and most convincing logic. The movement among

the Moslems toward union and solidarity, which had

as its object the respect of the political and national

rights of others, the respecting of the national fron-

tiers, and a united effort against common enemies, has

taken during these late years as a result of events a

form so serious as to make it most illogical for cer-

tain indifferent individuals to shrug their shoulders

over it. The spread of ideas of this sort among

elements that have for centuries looked askance at

each other, has proved that a new and very powerful

movement is manifesting itself in Islam.

“Thus it happens that Turkey, who in the campaign

of 1877-78 was compelled to guard her Persian fron-

tier, on this occasion beheld the whole of Persia, as

soon as the jihad was proclaimed, rise to her feet with

her Ulemas, khans, and tribes. The Moslems have for

a long time been awake, but the movement will have

to be progressive, for the time necessary for them

to prepare to move in common at a given moment,

has not yet passed by. Everybody in the Moslem

world has been awaiting a time that should strengthen

this current and hasten its development. This chance,

which we were hoping for in heaven, we have at last

found on this earth.”

**III**

**ISLAMIC MISSIONS**

ANOTHER aspect of the Islamic revival is a re-

newal of zeal in propagating the Faith. Islam

has always been a missionary religion, and it

retains this characteristic in a marked degree and both

by the sword and by the word it continues to increase

its numbers. True its opportunity to use force has

largely passed from its hand. The restraint of Chris-

tian governments prevents it. But numerous exam-

ples have occurred in modern times. Some thousands

of Greeks in Chios and of Armenians in Turkey were

made Moslems under threat of death. The Kaffirs

were forced into Islam by the Afghans. The jihad

against the Battaks in 1821-28 became “a bloody and

savage war of conquest” in which they tried to impose

their faith on the heathen (Arnold, *ibid*., p. 300).

But in Achin and Sumatra some regions were kept for

centuries from becoming Moslems that they might

continue to be legitimate fields for slave trade, for it

was considered that they had a God-given right to make

plundering raids on the defenceless heathen and sell

them into slavery (Simon, p. 206). Osman Dan-

fodio, to whom I have already referred, led his army

(1830-40) against the heathen Hausas, the tribes

around Sokoto, Yoruba, and Senegambia, compelling

them all to embrace Islam. He carried the faith to

the Gulf of Guinea and to the West as far as the At-

lantic. Four powerful Mohammedan kingdoms of

the present day owe their religion to his sword (Ar-

nold, pp. 265-67). The Tijaniyah Darvishes, a militant

order founded by Sidi Ahmad of Tijani, Algeria, have

forced Islam by the sword upon tribes from Nigeria

to the Gold Coast. A number of pagan states were

converted by their jihads. The Tijaniyah appear now

to be reconciled with France. The Sheikh receives a

salary and wears the badge of the Legion of Honour.

The Sheikh of the Tabbiyah order, the Sherif of

Wassan, is the son of an Englishwoman and was

educated in a French school. Yet Professor Wester-

mann declares that “Even now among the ruling races

of the Sudan, the Holy War—that is, force—is re-

garded as the natural and normal means of conver-

sion and as more effective than preaching (*Interna-*

*tional Review of Missions*, 1912, p. 285). Mungo

Park narrates (Arnold, p. 285) that the following

message was sent by the Moslem king of Futa Toro

to his pagan neighbour: “With this knife Abd-ul-

Kadir will condescend to shave the head of Damel, if

Damel will embrace the Mohammedan faith; and with

this other knife Abdul Kadir will cut the throat of

Damel, if Damel refuses to embrace it.” A young

Arab said to Captain Burton at Abeokuta: “Give guns

and powder to us, and we will soon Islamize those

dogs.” The Mohammedan ruler in Bambara sent out

teachers with an armed force to convert the heathen

to Islam and, in case they did not receive it, to lay

waste their villages. On receiving it, a fifth of the

spoils was to be paid to the ruler.

But now, for the most part, Moslem propaganda

is carried on by persuasion. The two movements men-

tioned, Wahabism and Pan-Islamism, have stirred up

a fervent missionary spirit, the former by renewing

primitive faith; the latter by strengthening the solidar-

ity of believers, giving them a sense of their unity and

so inspiring them with boldness in witnessing for their

religion. The geographical situation now favours the

spread of Islam more than Christianity. The latter

has converted all the races in contact with it in Europe

and in contact with its colonies in America and Aus-

tralia. Now separating us from the African pagans

and the heathen nations of Asia stretches the great

mass of Mohammedanism. Only in South Africa does

Christianity have the advantage of close contact. The

advantage of peaceful penetration and gradual assimi-

lation through proximity lies with Islam. Influence

across the seas is not so intimate and effective.

The most striking and, from a Christian point of

view, critical progress of Islam has been made in

Africa. I have described the warlike advance. Much

also has been accomplished in a peaceable way. Mos-

lem traders and shepherds are in the habit of settling

down in new locations, marrying among the people,

and gradually acquiring an influence among the ne-

groes. Their somewhat higher culture and the social

standing and dignity which come from the possession

of property, create admiration. Marabouts or teach-

ers go about, write charms, use magic, work faith

cures, and adapt themselves to the superstitions and

habits of the tribe. They ingratiate themselves with

the chief, acquire a standing with him, marry his

daughter; or, if not, on the contrary, if he is obdurate,

they instigate rebellion against him and supplant him.

Merchant and marabout alike enter into relationship

with the different families by marriage and soon a

community is established. If there is a European

sovereignty, they sympathize with the black man

against this new oppressor and tax-collector, counting

themselves fellow-sufferers, and the negro, soon for-

getful of the rapacity and cruelty of the slave-traders,

feels grateful. Above all, the Arab or North African

adopts the newly converted negro into the brother-

hood of Islam, in which there is no colour line.

Then, too, the Christian missionary, if there is one,

is of the same race and religion as the foreign sub-

jugator. If the Moslem were the ruler, he would take

advantage of it to further his religion, but the Euro-

pean administration is neutral in principle, and so

upright at times that he leans backwards. Or per-

chance he thinks Islam a better faith for the black

man or is simply careless and indifferent. He is sur-

rounded by Moslem secretaries, clerks, interpreters,

and agents. They have some education and more

clothing than other natives. Through them all gov-

ernment business is transacted. The subaltern army

officers are Moslems, and new recruits are circumcised

to make them acceptable to the older ones. If a

school is established, it teaches Arabic and the books

of Islam. So in court, in camp, in school, the heathen

sees the Moslem preferred and the Christian ignored.

He finds it to his advantage to become a Moslem. Be-

sides all this the Moslem appears to a better advan-

tage under Christian rule than usually, for he is re-

strained from showing his bad qualities, such as op-

pression, violence, slave-trading. To some provinces

the Christian missionary is prohibited entrance, but

the Moslem goes everywhere and has the roads and

safety of Christian administration to assist him. In

the Sudan for many years missionaries were prohib-

ited, but Gordon College at Khartum, the memorial

of that Christian saint, is a Moslem institution, in

which Islam is taught by Sheikhs from Al Azhar.

The Koran is a text-book, and Friday, not Sunday,

the school holiday. Professor Westermann says:

“The College exerts a powerful influence in favour

of Islam.”

The strongest influence in Africa for Moslem

propaganda is wielded by the orders of darvishes. I

have already told of their origin. As an offshoot of

Persian Sufiism, they should be latitudinarian and

friendly to Christians. So were the Kadiriyah, and

they continue somewhat so in Africa. The Bektashi

of Turkey are Alivis, and were very tolerant, teach-

ing that “the paths leading to God are as numerous

as the breaths of His creatures.” Sir Edwin Pears

tells of one of their Sheikhs who said he regarded the

Christians as brothers, and removed his turban and

showed the sign of a cross embroidered upon it. Yet

even Bektashi joined in massacring the Armenians.

Another darvish Sheikh was a member of a Masonic

lodge in Constantinople. Yet the new orders of dar-

vishes are actively hostile to everything Christian and

European. Some of them are fighting orders, as the

Tijaniah and the Mahdiists of the Sudan; some hold

to non-intercourse and opposition to foreign influ-

ences. Among these are the Sanusiyah, who adhere to

puritanic practices like the Wahabis. Of them Canon

Sell says: “The object of the founder was to erect

an impassable barrier to the progress of Western civil-

ization and to the influence of Christian Powers in

Moslem lands” (*Church Missionary Intelligencer*,

January, 1899). They are ardent adherents of Pan-

Islamic principles and are notable as the most zealous

and powerful propagators of Islam, by peaceable

means, that the world has ever seen. The future of

their large and influential organization may yet show

more wonderful development.

The founder of the order of Sanusiyah was Sidi

Mohammed Ibn Ali as Sanusi, an Arab of Morocco.

He studied theology at Fez and other madressas. He

was initiated into many orders,—“finally acquiring

the degree of Master Sufi and passing through the

ordeal of fire” (Achmad Abdullah, a Sanusiyah,

*Forum*, 1914, p. 679). He lectured at various places

in North Africa and latterly at Cairo. Here his

teachings offended the Ulema by their mystical and

puritanical tendencies. He was anathematized and

narrowly escaped death by poison. Proceeding to

Mecca, he received instructions from the Mufti and

had as his Murshid or Guide the Grand Sheikh of the

Kadiriyah, Al Fussi. On the latter’s death, Sanusi

was disappointed in not succeeding to the headship,

so he founded a school and order of his own and

taught in Mecca till 1843. Forced to leave there by

theological disputes, he returned to Africa and propa-

gated the order called after him Sanusiyah.

Sheikh Sanusi strove for a return to primitive Is-

lam. Following Ibn Abdul Wahab, his great aim was

to purify and revive Islam and correct abuses. He

denounced prayers to the Valis or saints, pilgrimages

to their shrines and undue honour to Mohammed.

He rejected the use of tobacco, coffee, and music, rich

clothing and ornaments, but his conscience found no

offence in tea and perfumes. Yet he held on to

Sufiism and to worship by means of the zikr. His

formula for producing the hypnotic trance is by the

repetition first of “Allah” 100 times; secondly, the

kalima or creed, with additions, 300 times; and

thirdly, the prayer, “O God! Bless our Lord Mo-

hammed, his family and friends,” 1,000 times. Their

oath is “By the Truth Sidi-es Sanusi.” The book of

the Sheikh is described as a frenzied writing, recount-

ing the stages of ecstasy which lead to oneness with

God. “In the first stage the adept will see 7,000,000

green stars of surpassing loveliness; in each succeed-

ing stage there will be different-coloured stars, until

in the bliss of oblivion he beholds constellations of a

glory beyond words” (Salib ul Khalili, in *Spectator*).

The Sanusiyah are classed by Goldziher as a fifth

school, distinct from the four orthodox schools of the

Sunnis.

The centre of the order was established at Jagbub,

where the Sheikh procured large estates and had as

many as 2,000 slaves to work them. There also was

at one time a college, with 750 students preparing

for religious work, under Sheikh Mohammed ash

Sherif. Settlements or colonies of the darvishes were

made in many places in those semi-civilized Moslem

countries, the lands were cultivated, and schools for

boys and even girls established. The chief of each

*zawiya*, or lodge, became governor of the district

round about, combining temporal and spiritual au-

thority, receiving tribute and offerings to such an

extent that large funds were accumulated. The order

has increased greatly. Zawiyas exist in all countries

from Morocco to Egypt, in the Sudan, around Lake

Chad, and, it is said, even in Turkey, Arabia, and

Malaysia. The entrance of Sultan Ali of Wadai and

Sultan Say id Baldas of Krej into the order has added

to its influence. The populace about the zawiyas is

initiated as adherents, so that six million are estimated

to be affiliated. To call these zawiyas monasteries

gives a wrong impression, for though they may prac-

tise austerities, yet celibacy is not commanded. They

are bound by a secret oath and have passwords and

signs.

Mohammed-as-Sanusi first married a woman named

Manna, whom he received as a present at Mesaad and

soon afterwards divorced. Another wife was Fatima.

Their son was called Mahdi, and he had this sign at

least that he was the son of Mohammed and Fatima,

as tradition says the Mahdi should be. He was also

credited with the physical marks which were requisite.

He refused to accept appointment from the Sudanese

Mahdi as one of his Khalifas. He died without ful-

filling a mission, but rumour says that he is in con-

cealment and will appear to fulfil his work as Mahdi.

Another son was a diplomat, but a debauchee. After

the death of the founder in 1859, the seat of the order

was moved farther into the interior, to Gouro or

Borku, beyond Wadai. The present Sheikh is re-

ported to have made arrangement with the Italian

Government, whereby he will have autonomy within

his sphere, paying tribute to Italy, and having the

title and emoluments of Governor-General and at the

same time be the Sultan’s religious representative.

The influence of the Sanusiyah has been very great

in strengthening the faith and arousing the zeal of the

Moslems of North Africa, awakening within them a

spirit of intense loyalty and devotion. All through

that vast region many Moslems were ignorant of their

religion, steeped in superstition, and addicted to prac-

tices contrary to Islam. Many had retained their

heathen practices and beliefs mixed with Moham-

medan rites and conceptions. These they have in-

structed and confirmed and developed into strong

Moslems. Among these were many tribes or parts of

tribes that had remained heathen. Sanusiyah preach-

ers and schools have converted them. In some in-

stances they have bought slaves, educated and Islam-

ized them and sent them back to their own tribes. At

a single time they purchased from the Moslem slave-

dealers two thousand persons. Thus their influence

as a proselyting agency has been very effective

through a wide stretch of territory. The results of

their labours and of the Kadiriyah order and similar

peaceful orders, as well as the militant ones, coupled

with the influence of traders, teachers, and soldiers,

penetrating from the North, from Egypt, from the

Arabian seacoast and Zanzibar, and even in Cape

Colony itself, have been to give Islam such victories in

Africa—such progress in numbers and in power as

to startle the Christian Church. The campaign has

been aggressive, rapid, successful. Thousands of

square miles, numerous and powerful tribes as well

as millions of the weak and unorganized masses, have

been brought under the banner of Mohammed. Vast

regions which for centuries lay beyond Arab influence

have lately been brought under it, and this has come

about owing to the peace and security which Euro-

pean domination is maintaining. This Mohammedan

awakening and advance in Africa has created a verita-

ble crisis which calls loudly to the Christian world to

be up and doing. For though Islam in Africa is an

inferior and degraded system, adapting itself to the

passions and superstitions of the heathen, yet it fills

them with zeal, bigotry, and pride and makes the task

of the Christian Church in accomplishing their evan-

gelization a herculean one. Hear what Achmad Ab-

dullah writes (*Sunset Magazine*, 1915, p. 99): “Now-

adays when Christian missionaries discover a new

and very pagan tribe in Central Africa, and return

after a year or two with money collected at home to

distribute the blessings of Christianity and a sam-

ple line of cheap gin, they discover that the Mos-

lem has been there ahead of them and the pagans

greet them with the resounding shout of La ilia ill’

Allah.”

Another principle taught by Sheikh Sanusi was in-

tense hostility to everything foreign to Islam. He

inveighed against the innovations brought in from

Christian civilization. He forbade all intercourse

with Christians and Jews. Because Sultan Abdul

Aziz was friendly to Christians and was adopting

Western ways he rejected his caliphate and denounced

him and the Turks as bad Moslems. He is said to

have affirmed that he would crush out the Christians

and Turks in one common destruction (Pears: “Tur-

key, etc.,” p. 300). But when Abdul Hamid took up

a fanatical policy, the Sanusiyahs united with him in

the Pan-Islamic propaganda. In 1886 the Sultan was

received into the order and in 1898 was acknowledged

as caliph by the Sheikh, who sent his official repre-

sentative to Constantinople (A. R. Colquhoun: *North*

*American Review*, 1906, p. 910).

The Sanusiyahs do not make converts by the sword,

but they undoubtedly have as one of their objects to

use the sword, if opportunity offers, to deliver Mo-

hammedan lands from the infidels. The Sheikh is

ready for the jihad when victory seems assured. He

is striving to unite Africa against the white man’s

supremacy. His zawiyas are storehouses of ammuni-

tion. Supplies of rifles and some cannon have been

received from some unknown European sources. He

has large funds, the offerings of his followers, which

are used for the purchase of arms. The Sanusiyahs

are encouraged to enlist in colonial regiments and

secure European drill. Much intrigue is carried on

among Mohammedan regiments of European Powers

in Algeria, Egypt, Tripoli, and the Sudan, to make

them disloyal. Youths are sent to Europe for edu-

cation in military art. Reports even say that there

are manufactories of arms in the oases in charge of

graduates of European technical schools. The Sheikh

has a devoted intelligence department in his strolling

fakirs. (Compare “The Moslem Menace,” *Nine-*

*teenth Century*, September, 1907, by Capt. H. A.

Wilson of the British army.) The centre of African

Pan-Islamism, Wadai, was taken by the French in

191 o and can no longer be used as a base for prepara-

tion against European rule. They may not listen to

the call to the jihad by the caliph in Constantinople,

but they will listen when the call goes forth from

their own Mahdi. M. Hanataux, former French

Minister of the Interior (Zwemer’s “Islam, etc.,” p.

170), says: “The religious orders of Islam are yet

keeping their powder dry for the day of the great

slaughter and the great victory.” Achmad Abdullah

(*Sunset Magazine*, 1915, p. 99) says on this point;

“Another invisible force at work is the incredible

number of Mohammedan lodges with which Asia,

North and Central Africa are honeycombed. Call

them darvishes, call them Sanusiyah or gentle dream-

ing Sufis, they all work towards the same object.

Some of them experiment in practical magic, some of

them are mystics, some of them are literati, poets,

grammarians; some of them are beginning to make

powder, bullets, and guns.”

The Mohammedan awakening is showing itself in

the propagation of the Faith in other countries. In

Russia the mullahs are carrying on a widespread and

continuous itinerary, confirming those who need it

and drawing in new converts, to whom pecuniary as-

sistance is given ungrudgingly. Not only heathen

Votiaks, Voguls, and Tsheremis on the west of the

Ural Mountains are being converted, but even some

Christians. At Atomva ninety-one families of the

Orthodox have embraced Islam and fifty thousand

who had joined the Russian Church have returned to

Islam since the proclamation of religious liberty.

New mosques and schools are being built (“Islam and

Missions,” p. 257). A great mosque has been erected

at Petrograd, the Moslem press is active, Moslems

sit as members of the Duma; new rights and privileges

are being petitioned for and received.

In China, agents from the West have been visiting

all the Moslem communities, preaching in the mosques

and trying to revive Islamic faith and enthusiasm.

There has been much stir. Training schools for prop-

agandists have been organized, and the one at Peking

has as its head a graduate of Al Azhar. An impetus

has been given to the study of Arabic. The relation-

ship with Western Asia is drawing closer. A Turkish

missionary has gone to China to reside and preach

Islam, but the effort to establish Turkish consulates

failed. Yet success is not altogether unalloyed. Sev-

eral mullahs some years ago returned from Mecca

and began a revival. But the movement was opposed.

The mullahs organized a New Sect. Strife and bit-

terness arose. The conservatives made complaint

against the New Sect and the Viceroy put them under

the ban. When China was at war with Japan, 1896,

the Old Moslems took advantage of the confusion

to proclaim a Holy War against the Chinese. Then

the New Sect took their revenge and were instru-

mental in bringing about the execution of thousands

of the others. Yet the slaughter was small compared

with that meted out to the Moslem rebels in 1862-74.

Despite these rebellions, the usual attitude of the Mos-

lem Chinese is to practise conformity, and to worship

in the Confucian temples and to take part in the

service to the idols. Now under the Republican gov-

ernment they have cut off their queues (H. H. Rid-

ley: *Moslem World*, 1913, pp. 386-90; *Missionary Re-*

*view*, 1912, p. 722 ff.).

In India a striking fact is the awakening of the

Moslem community to its own backward condition.

They are showing a feverish desire to make up for

their past neglect of privileges of modern civilization,

and to regain a status superior to the Hindus. They

are gaining in numbers much faster than any religion

except the Christians, partly because they are more

prolific than the Hindus, and also by the remarriage

of their widows. They are gaining converts from the

Hindus, to win whom they are showing much zeal.

However, many of the conversions of Hindus to Islam

are what are named by Mr. Takle (“Islam and Mis-

sions,” p. 213) “love episodes—either elopements of

Hindu girls or the taking of Hindu widows into Mos-

lem harams.” Moslems are also beginning to work

among the low-caste people, not without success.

This is not the work of individuals only, but societies

or *anjumans* have been formed who work through

paid agents. The Moslem League promotes religious

and political interests alike, supporting schools and

preachers, and publishing literature. They have spe-

cially requested collectors to inform them of any Mos-

lem orphans, that they may not allow them to fall

into other hands. In Lahore a Society for the Assist-

ance of Islam was formed in 1885. It maintains

schools, orphanages, and the Islamic College, repairs

mosques, strengthens the wavering, strives to win

back converts to other faiths, and interferes in every

possible way with the work of missions. It is also

directed against Hinduism, which in the form of the

Arya Samaj has been receiving some converts from

Islam. This society, as well as those at Lucknow,

1894, at Cawnpore, and at other points, is making

special efforts to educate the mullahs and to prepare

them for the controversy and to propagate the Faith.

The apologetic of Islam,1 including the history of

Christianity, are added to the curriculum, with Eng-

lish and the sciences. At Lahore there is also the

Mohammedan Book and Tract Depot to distribute

publications in defence of the Faith and the Koran

in cheap popular editions. English books in favour

of Islam or which lend themselves to Moslem propa-

ganda, as Carlyle’s “Hero as Prophet,” are published

and sold. Magazines are issued by different societies.

Some journals have made a business of publishing all

the evil reports about Christians which are to be

culled from the press (Farquhar’s “Modern Reli-

gious Movements in India,” pp. 347-52). In a word,

the Moslems in India are alert for defence and ag-

gression. They are active in the use of modern meth-

ods for the propagation of their religion.

In Malaysia, the conversion of the heathen to Islam

goes forward continuously. It has been marvellously

successful in point of numbers, though lacking in

transforming or elevating influence. The modern

roads open up the way. Darvishes and traders pene-

trate on them to the heathen interior heretofore un-

1 In a new program of study for softas in Stamboul the

“Szhar-ul-Hak,” a criticism of the Bible and apologetic for

Islam, is included.

approachable. One method of the Moslem is to adopt

an overbearing and lordly air, despising and scorning

the heathen, so the latter becomes a Moslem to rise to

the level of him, considering it a favour to be re-

ceived. The heathen also sees that Islam is the one

thing with which the Dutch Government does not

interfere. He interprets this fact to mean that the

Christian is afraid of Islam. The Moslem assures

him that this is true and that the Sultan is greater

than six kings. The converted pagan is full of pride,

fanaticism, and craftiness. However, the Dutch mis-

sions have given Islam a check and converted thirty

thousand Mohammedans. Islam has, I believe, never

converted any considerable body of Christians except

those who were subject to its government. But curi-

ously enough, at the present time, such conversions

are occurring to a limited extent. I refer not to the

Wofing, England, movement, which is almost negligi-

ble. But in Abyssinia some Christian tribes have

partly gone over to Islam and are in danger of being

won over entirely. In South Africa, too, Malay and

Indian Moslems through marriages with white women

by the Moslem rite, which in law is regarded as con-

cubinage, and through the adoption by them of Chris-

tian children and orphans, are making a noticeable

increase to the Moslem community. These half-breed

children are all raised as Moslems. Again East-

Indian coolies who have come to British Guiana and

Jamaica have become a danger to the Christian and

heathen coolies in these places and attentive efforts are

necessary to prevent Islam from propagating itself in

the New World. Already these immigrant Moslems

number 158,000. Most of them are in Brazil. They

have seven Arabic newspapers.

Another sign of the times is the organization among

Moslems of foreign missionary societies. In Egypt

the “Society for Invitation and Instruction” has

opened schools for the training of missionaries to go

to heathen and Christian lands to invite to Islam. A

similar attempt in Constantinople, called “The So-

ciety for Knowledge and Instruction,” failed because

the founder wished the language of the school to be

Arabic, but the government decided it should be Turk-

ish. Islamic congresses to consider the advancement

of Islam have been held in Mecca, Egypt, Russia, and

India. The Mecca congress was wise enough to con-

sider the ailments of the religion. Fifty-seven reasons

are said to have been mentioned for its decay, with

the object of finding remedies for them. That in

Cairo, 1907, was called by Dr. Gasprinski to “promote

the moral, social, and spiritual regeneration of Is-

lam” by a non-political, non-military movement. In

India, with delegates from Turkey and Egypt present,

1910, the congress approved of missions in China and

Japan. Missionaries were located in these lands. A

deputation was sent to Japan headed by a professor of

Lahore Government College. The first Japanese con-

verts were Baron Hiki, his wife and daughter, who

took the names Ali and Fatima. A Japanese officer,

Jama-Oka, has been converted through his admira-

tion of the warlike spirit of Mohammed. He made

the pilgrimage to Mecca and a prolonged stay in Con-

stantinople (*Missionary Review*, October, 1910, p.

722). Another convert started a monthly journal,

*Al Islam*. Professor Barakat Ullah started the *Is-*

*lamic Fraternity*, published by Chinese Moslem stu-

dents in Tokyo. Both were soon discontinued (*Mos-*

*lem World*, 1914, p. 312). The press in all Moslem

countries has a wide and strong influence. A number

of weekly journals have been started for the propa-

ganda; two important ones are in Constantinople.

“The Spirit of Islam,” by Sayid Amir Ali, is being

translated into Japanese. The latest sceptical and

liberal literature is being distributed to show that

Christianity is undermined. The Taarifi Moslemin

has sent a delegation around the world to report on

what will further the interests of Islam. It has a

world-wide vision as never before.

What a powerful aggressive opponent Islam is! It

is the greatest anti-Christian force in the world to-

day. It is vigorous, active, determined. It is making

progress, winning victories, planning other victories.

No easy work lies before the Church if it would stem

the tide of Mohammedanism and convert these masses

to Christ. Christians should appreciate the greatness

of the task. It is indeed a challenge to faith and only

a faith which overcomes will undertake it. Such a

faith will not falter.

The aggressiveness of Islam and its increase are

calls to us to immediate and all-embracing efforts. A

revived Islam, newly incited by the spirit of Moham-

med, must be met by a revived Church inspired by

the Spirit of Christ. Who can doubt the issue!

**IV**

**MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS**

THE coming of the Mahdi is a living hope in Is-

lam. Mohammed foretold the advent of one

who would “fill the earth with equity and jus-

tice, even as it has been filled with tyranny and op-

pression.” This Mahdi, “a guided or directed one,”

and therefore able to be the Guide of men, “will

reign over the earth seven years” (“Dictionary of

Islam”). All Moslems await his coming. The

Sunnis hold that he has never yet appeared. But

Shiahs believe that he has appeared once and his re-

turn is imminent. All believe that Jesus will accom-

pany him. The Tradition runs that Mohammed said:

“The Mahdi will descend from me … a man of

my tribe and of my name.” The followers of Imam

Ali, the fourth caliph, believe that he was by right

the first caliph and that the office was hereditary in

his line. His descendants in succession were recog-

nized as Imams or caliphs by the Shiahs until the

twelfth, but some recognized these only until the sev-

enth, Jaffar-i-Sadik, and followed his son Ismiel, hence

were called Ismieliyah. The Ismieliyahs expected the

return of Ismiel as the Imam Mahdi and the Fatimides

of Egypt regarded Obeidullah as that return. The

former, who now prevail in Persia, are called the Sect

of the Twelve. Under the oppressive caliphs of Bag-

dad the doctrine of the Mahdi developed among the

Aliites. The first one who was acclaimed Mahdi

was Mohammed, son of Ali by the Hanifite

wife, and his Khalifa was Mukhtar. His fol-

lowers, accounting that he had not died but

simply disappeared, remained at Radwa near Me-

dina, and awaited his return until their death.

Husain, the grandson of Zaid, raised a standard as

Mahdi, but the caliph had him hanged on a gibbet.

The Abbasides came into power as caliphs with the

aid of Ali Muslim and the Aliites, who believed they

were aiding the Mahdi. Caliph Mansur named his

son Mahdi either to engage the loyalty of the Mahdi-

ists, or possibly to deride their claims. Each of the

twelve Imams was hailed with expectation by his se-

cret followers, till poison carried them off one by one.

The last one, Mohammed Abul Kasim (a.h. 329,

a.d. 940), at Suraman Ra near Kufa disappeared into

a grotto, departing to a land called Jubulsa or Jabulka.

Expecting his immediate return, his faithful followers

day by day went forth from their villages, armed and

on horseback, to meet him. At midday prayer one

hundred horsemen led forth a horse saddled and

bridled to the shrine at Hillah, with trumpets and

drums sounding. At the door they cried out: “In

the name of God, come forth, O Lord of the Age!”

Till the time of evening prayers they voiced their ap-

peal,—but returned disappointed (Darmesteter: “The

Mahdi,” p. 42).

So have they waited. The Sarbedarian kings of

Khorasan in the fourteenth century, the Safavian

Shahs at Ispahan, the Kajars at Teheran, have kept

two horses in the royal stables, splendidly caparisoned

and in readiness for the appearing of the Mahdi and

his lieutenant Jesus the son of Mary, who is to de-

stroy Dajjal the Anti-Christ. The new Constitution

of Persia was established to last only till the appear-

ing of the Imam Mahdi. At the mention of his name

the pious Shiah adds a prayer: “May God hasten his

glad advent.” The dynamic of these movements is

hope,—hope that springs eternal in the human breast,

—a hope of amelioration, of material good, bound to

a coming deliverer.

Through the Moslem centuries, this hope has

caused the appearance of many claimants, followed by

numerous wars, the downfall and rising of kingdoms,

and the establishment of various sects. Conceived in

the religious enthusiasm or maybe the ambition of the

leader, born of the traditional expectation, nurtured

in the discontent and unhappiness of the people, de-

veloping soon into a military struggle, characterized

by fierce fanatical warfare, they have ended either in

subjugation through fiery persecution or in a triumph,

bringing political supremacy to the Mahdi or his suc-

cessor, who continued the same old tyrannical oppres-

sion with no social amelioration. The Ismieliyahs, the

Karmatians, the Druses, the Assassins, and the Nu-

sairiyahs reaped their crop of fanaticism from the soil

of Mahdiism. The dynasties of the Fatimides and

of the Almohayes were founded by Mahdis. After a

claimant by lack of success had proved himself an im-

postor the hope revived again in a succeeding genera-

tion; though some, as the followers of Sayid Moham-

med of Jeypore (“Dictionary of Islam,” Art.:

“Ghair-i-Mahdi”), may declare that the Imam Mahdi

has come and gone in the person of their leader and

no other is to be expected.

Our own age has seen Mahdis not a few. Such a

one was Sayid Ahmad of Punjab, who fought against

the Sikhs in 1826. Another was Sayid Mohammed

Husain of Persia, who appeared among the Ali Al-

lahis. I had an appointment to receive him as a

visitor. My tea-urn was boiling and I awaited him

four hours before sundown. It reached the third hour

and passed on towards sundown. Still no heavenly

visitant deigned to take off his sandals in my hallway.

On the morrow I was informed that the Governor-

General had the intention to seize this divinity and he

had escaped. His followers fought against the Shah’s

forces in Mezanderan, believing themselves invulnera-

ble till cold lead convinced them. Another such divine

leader was Sheikh Kadir Agha of Maragha. A Mahdi

lately rose in Somaliland; the Sheikh of the Sanusi-

yahs was regarded as another. Mahdis or their fore-

runners are constantly rising in Malaysia, making at-

tempts against Christian rule. In 1882 the people of

Borneo expected the Imam and cut in pieces all the

Christians and heathen. Schamyl of Daghestan had

much the same character. In Syria, living in restraint

at Acca, is Sheikh Ali Nur-i-Din, called Insan-i-Kamil

(“the perfect man”), who is regarded as a manifesta-

tion of Mohammed and his essence as divine. Intox-

icated by Sufiism, he led his followers into Pan-

Theism, saying: “There is nothing but God.” He

claimed to possess all the divine attributes and was

honoured as a Vali by Moslems (*Missionary Review*

*of the World*, 1914, p. 200). These and other at-

tempts to move the Islamic world by the fulfilment

of its hopes need not detain us, for they failed to

have a conspicuous and lasting influence. Leaders

of rebellions are fond of taking this title and giving

a religious aspect to their political schemes. But sev-

eral of these movements have been remarkable in

themselves and have made or are making a place in

the religious and political life of Islam.

THE BABI MOVEMENT

The first of these is the Babi movement. The

Sheikhis (of whom I shall speak, p. 155) had aroused

keen expectation of the manifestation of Imam

Mahdi. Haji Sayid Kazim of Resht, successor

of Sheikh Ahmad Ahsai, is said to have discoursed

much of the promised appearing, the signs which

would precede it, and his characteristics. Announcing

the “True One,” he said: “I see him as the rising

sun” (“Trav. Narrative,” p. 239; “New History,”

pp. 31-32, 341). Shortly afterwards Mirza Ali Mo-

hammed announced himself as the Expected One.

Born at Shiraz, the son of a cloth-seller, he served

his apprenticeship in a shop at Bushire. After receiv-

ing an ordinary primary training, he afterwards at-

tended the lectures of Haji Kazim at Najef and Ker-

bala. He did not acquire the correct use of the Arabic.

He was of dreamy and devout disposition. His first

book, the “Ziyaret-Nama” (“Pilgrim-Guide”),

shows no consciousness of a mission, but deep venera-

tion for the Imams and longing for the Return (Pro-

fessor Browne, in *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*,

1899, p. 901). From such longings and contempla-

tions developed the idea that he had communion and

communication with the Imam. In the “Best of

Stories,” a homily on the Surah-i-Yusuf, he definitely

announces himself, at the age of twenty-four, as the

Bab, the Door of communication. This was in 1844,

a.h. 1260, about one thousand years from the disap-

pearance of the Imam. Though he did not then break

with Islam nor declare the Koran abrogated, he af-

firmed that God would accept no one except he came

to the Bab by the Bab; and he called himself “This

well-favoured Arabian youth in whose grasp God has

placed the kingdoms of heaven and earth” (*ibid*., p.

907).

In announcing himself as the Bab, Ali Mohammed

was using a term familiar to Shiahs. It had been

applied to several representatives of the absent Imam,

after his occultation or disappearance. Abu Jafar

Mohammed, who had assumed the title Bab, was put

to death in the reign of Caliph Razi. In the numerous

trinities of the Nusairiyah, the third person is called

the Bab; as Maana, meaning; Ism, name; Bab, door.

One of the trinities is Ali, Mohammed, and Salman

Farsee (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 57, 111, 131). It was

a term applied to Ali, also, in the Traditions as in the

one cited by the Bab himself at his examination sub-

sequently at Tabriz. He was asked, “What is the

meaning of the name Bab?” He answered, “The

same as in the holy tradition, (in which Mohammed

said) ‘I am the city of knowledge and Ali is the gate

thereof.’” From this name the followers were called

Babi. The first disciples, full of zeal and devotion,

spread the message of the advent far and wide through

Persia. Their assurance of faith and enthusiasm kin-

dled responsive fire in many hearts. Soon the Bab

made more exalted claim for himself and at the

shrine of Mecca announced himself as the Mahdi or

Kaim, the long-absent Imam, and finally as the Nukta,

the Point of Divinity, in some sense a Manifestation

of God. The number of his disciples grew apace.

Some were dreamers, mystics, religious enthusiasts

who had lived in expectation of the Advent; others

were the discontented in whose hearts the oppressions

and injustices of the rulers and the clergy had caused

a longing for that reign of righteousness in which

iniquities would be righted. These were reinforced

by those who hoped in some change to serve their

own interests. (See Mirza Kazim in *Journal of Asia*,

1866.) By the time the Bab had returned from

Mecca to Bushire the news had been carried to the

bounds of Persia. In Shiraz even the call to prayer,

azan, had been made in the Bab’s name. The gov-

ernment was alarmed. The Bab’s apostles, sent from

Bushire, August, 1845, were forbidden to preach.

The tendons of their feet were cut. The Bab was

brought to Shiraz in chains. Thence he escaped to

Ispahan, where the Governor, Minuchihr Khan, be-

lieved on him and befriended him. The Shah’s Gov-

ernment was supremely interested in these develop-

ments. If the claim of the Bab were admitted, the

Shah had nothing to do but to lead forth the waiting

steed from the royal stables, mount Ali Mohammed on

it, resign his throne to the Imam, and enlist under his

banner. Instead of this the Shah and his government

determined to treat him as a self -deceived and dan-

gerous enthusiast. He was conveyed under guard to

the extreme northwest of Persia and confined in the

fortress of Maku and afterwards at Chirik in Salmas,

1847-50, but during the greater part of the time per-

mitted to write his books of Revelation, called the

“Bayan,” and to correspond with his followers. (See

writer’s article, “The Bayan of the Bab,” *Prince-*

*ton Theological Review*, 1915, pp. 633-55.)

The death of Mohammed Shah was a signal for

revolts and disturbances in many parts of Persia, on

the part of claimants for the throne and dissatisfied

noblemen. In this confusion the Babis, incited by

persecutions and anxious to take immediate advantage

of disturbed conditions to bring about the triumph of

their cause, collected in armed bands. Collisions soon

occurred with the Persian authorities, which devel-

oped into insurrections at Sheikh, Tabarsi in Me-

zanderan, at Zen j an, and at Niriz in Fars. The Babis

fought with fierce courage, undaunted by the over-

whelming odds and superior arms of the troops who

attacked them. They threw up fortifications and,

aided by their women, endured sieges for some

months. Savage brutalities were enacted by both

parties, the cruelties and barbarities of the Shiahs sur-

passing those of the Babis only from the fact that vic-

tory gave opportunity to the Shah’s forces. The

Babis massacred the captive soldiers and unarmed vil-

lagers at Dih-i-Nazar Khan (“New History,” p.

362). They cut off the heads of the slain enemies

and placed them on posts around the rampart of their

fortress, by order of their leader, Janab-i-Kuddus

(*ibid*., p. 73). Prisoners of war were put to death

by them at Zen j an, the Shah’s officer being skinned

alive and then roasted (*ibid*., p. 155).

Meanwhile the government, thinking to bring the

contest to a close by removing the cause, determined

on the execution of the Bab. He was brought to

Tabriz, and condemned to death by the clergy and

government. In the Jabbar-khana, when he and one

of his disciples were bound and placed for execution,

a marvel occurred. After the soldiers had fired and

the smoke had cleared away, the dead body of the

disciple was seen but not that of the Bab. His fol-

lowers were ready to shout, “A miracle! A miracle!”

and the populace to acclaim him. But unfortunately

for the cause, though the shots had freed him from

the ropes, the shop into which he fled had no outlet.

He was discovered, led back, and executed. The in-

surrection continued for a time, with fierce reprisals

and barbaric cruelties on both sides. Finally the

Babis were overcome and slain, many of them after

they had surrendered. Later a plot by some Babis

and an attempt to assassinate the Shah led to the ex-

ecution of several score Babis in most cruel ways.

Each one was separately allotted to a guild or class

of the population of Teheran that all collectively might

be liable to any revenge the Babis might see fit to de-

vise. The repression and persecution failed to oblit-

erate the sect. Some fled into exile. Many adopted

the practice of dissimulation, which, under the name

of *tagiya*, deems legitimate the denial of one’s faith

and conforming to the dominant religion for safety.

Babism as fully developed was intended to be a

substitute for Islam. The Bab superseded Moham-

med; and the Bayan, the Koran. The new law abro-

gated the old, and the Bab was rightful king entitled

to supplant the Shah. As to his personality the Bab

declared himself to be the manifestation and revela-

tion of God—the Primal Will, the first and eternally

created, the mirror of God, the Mukta or Point of

Divinity. This Primal Will had been manifested in all

the great prophets in an ascending scale of perfection

and excellence. This manifestation said of himself:

“I am God, and there is no other God than me, the

Master of the Universe.” In this theology the Babis

resembled the Batinis or Ismielis. In teaching the

eternity of matter, the emanation of the Primal Rea-

son, giving esoteric meanings to the precepts of the

Koran, declaring the resurrection to mean the Advent

of a new Imam, they but followed Abdullah Ibn

Maimun, the leader of the Batinis (“Spirit of Islam,”

pp. 489-92).

The Bab has been called a reformer, and he has,

maybe, a slight claim to that title. In social matters

he made scarcely an improvement, for while he taught,

with the Sunnis and Sheikhis, that men of other re-

ligions could be associated with and were ceremonially

clean, yet he ordained that no unbelievers should dwell

in the five chief provinces of Persia, and this prohi-

bition excluded Moslems as well as Armenians and

Jews. He was illiberal, discouraging the acquire-

ment of sciences and foreign or ancient languages, and

prohibiting the study of grammar, philosophy, law,

and logic, and ordering the destruction of books on

these subjects. He looked with some favour on the

elevation of women and maintained Kurrat-ul-Ayn,

his celebrated disciple, when she at times threw aside

the veil and instructed men in the religion. He en-

joined marriage as obligatory, favoured monogamy,

yet allowed bigamy. In practice the Babis continued

polygamy. He allowed divorce for any cause, such

as a quarrel; but the divorced should wait a year

before seeking another partner. But a man should

not divorce and marry more than nineteen times. A

woman may go unveiled before the members of the

family in which she grows up; she may even talk

with a man outside of her own household, if neces-

sary; but if the conversation is limited “to twenty-

eight words it is better for the woman and the man.”

He prohibited alcohol, tobacco, opium, and begging,

and enjoined the golden rule, with kindness to chil-

dren and animals. It is remarkable how little he has

to say about morals, yet how much about dress, baths,

and burial. Moslem rites, as the prayer postures, fast

and pilgrimage, are modified as to time and place but

with no essential difference. The zikrs or vain repe-

titions of the name of God are continued. The sym-

bolism of numbers and letters was greatly elaborated,

and many doctrines were explained away by alle-

gorical interpretations. Politically the Bab proposed

no reform. Supposedly the substitution of himself

and disciples or “Letters,” as he called them, for the

old Persian rulers would bring about a reign of

righteousness. He had assigned governorships to dif-

ferent ones of his followers. That of Constantinople

was promised to the Governor of Ispahan when he

pretended to be a Babi. The value of the Babi move-

ment for Persia lay not in its ideas, for neither the-

ologically nor socially did it afford any panacea. But

it shook and shattered the power of the Shiah Muj-

tahids. It helped to awaken modern Persia, to bring

about independence of thought. It prepared some to

break the bonds of traditions who were far from ac-

cepting Babism.

BAHAISM

The one outstanding result of Babism is Bahaism,1

which sprang from it and won over almost the entire

Babi community. The Bab taught that no revelation

is final and that another dispensation was to be

founded by “Him whom God would manifest.” It

is quite certain that the Bab expected an interval to

elapse between himself and the next dispensation sim-

ilar in extent to that which had passed between former

dispensations. This interval is understood by Pro-

fessor Browne to be either 1,511 or 2,001 years. It

is irrational to suppose that the Bab delivered a revela-

tion of several volumes and a detailed ritual to last

only 19 years.

The Bab appointed, as his successor and head of

the sect, Mirza Yahya, called Subh-i-Azal, the Dawn

of the Eternal. At this time a number of the Babis

laid claim to be “incarnations.” A sort of hysteria

or mania seized these men and led them to assert their

deity and the divine inspiration of their words.

Finally Azal, who had fled to Bagdad, was acknowl-

edged as caliph of the religion. He had a half-brother,

1 See writer’s “Bahaism and Its Claims,” Fleming H. Revell Co.

Mirza Husain Ali, called Baha Ullah. Both were

sons of Mirza Buzurk, steward of the household of

a vizier of the Shah. They were born in Nur, Me-

zanderan. Azal was son of the wife and Baha of the

concubine. Baha Ullah acted as Azal’s assistant for

a time, but later repudiated his supremacy and an-

nounced that he himself was in reality “He whom

God should manifest,” and that by a secret arrange-

ment with the Bab, they had put forward Azal to act

as chief for a time that the risk and danger might

come upon his brother, and he himself escape the per-

secution of the enemies. This rival claim resulted in

a quarrel between the brothers which waxed hot at

Bagdad, then at Adrianople, whither they were trans-

ferred at the request of the Persian Government to

remove them from the frontier and from the pilgrim

highway. At Adrianople the quarrel reached a climax.

They even plotted to assassinate each other. So Azal

was sent to Cyprus, and Baha Ullah and his party to

Acca, Syria. Baha waxed stronger and his preten-

sions were accepted by the great majority of the

Babis. A score of the leading Azalis who refused to

follow him were assassinated. Azal became a negligi-

ble quantity, though his few followers in Persia have

been rather conspicuous. Baha worked over the ma-

terials of Babism and evolved a system which he set

forth as a new religion and universal dispensation.

This is Bahaism. The two religions are essentially

the same in theology, eschatology, hermeneutics, as

well as in rites and ceremonies. They differ in some

social and political principles and of course in substi-

tuting Baha for the Bab.

Bahaism is a dogmatic religion, imposed by au-

thority as a “revelation” to be received uncondition-

ally and without question. It claims to be rational, but

has as much mystery as any religion, with elements of

pantheism and mysticism. Baha Ullah is regarded as

a manifestation of the Deity—a higher one than the

Bab, possibly of the Divine Essence itself. As God,

he is the former of the Universe from eternal matter

and rules over it. He is worshipped as the supreme

God, the Father, a dignity and degree which he him-

self assumed and which is granted him by his fol-

lowers. The doctrine of incarnations is an old one

among Persians. They regarded their ancient kings

as divine and expected such an one in their deliverer,

Saoshyant. They transferred their hopes and ideas

to the line of Ali and the Imams. According to

Makrisi, even in the lifetime of Ali there were those

who exalted him to the divine rank. Afterwards Ab-

dullah Ibn Wahab taught that “Ali was not dead but

living, and that in him was a particle of the divinity”

(“Asian Mystery,” by Lyde, p. 31). The doctrine of

*hulul* prevailed, that God descends into human form

without ceasing to be a unity. Shahristani describes

it as “a descent of God’s essence or of the whole

Deity, or of a partial descent or of a portion, accord-

ing to the degree of preparedness of the person.”

This doctrine appeared all through Mohammedan his-

tory, among the Ismieliyahs, Fatimides, Druses, As-

sassins, and others called in general Ghulats or ex-

ceeders. One representative of these sects is the Ali

Alahis of Persia, the same as the Alivi or Kuzul-

Bashi of Asia Minor and the Nusairiyahs of Syria,

who altogether number some two millions. The

Catechism and Manual of the latter says: “Who cre-

ated us?” “Ali, son of Abu Talib.” “Is not Ali

your God?” “He is the creator of heaven and earth.

Besides him there is no God, the living, the self-

existent” (“Asian Mystery,” pp. 234-52). To Ali

ascription is made as follows:

“Mysterious Being! None can tell

The attributes that in thee dwell;

None can thine essence comprehend;

To thee should every mortal bend.”

The persistence and wide acceptance of this doctrine

is interesting as showing that the cold Moslem creed

which puts God at a distance as an inaccessible ruler

did not suffice for the human heart. This doctrine,

and that of the Trinity, counted among the Christian

mysteries, are not foreign to the thought of Moslem

races nor uncongenial to their minds. These sects,

in some measure perhaps remnants of Christian peo-

ples, are found not only in Persia and Turkey, but

among the Kurds, Syrians, Arabs, and Egyptians.

This doctrine is again emphasized in Bahaism. It

teaches that divinity was manifested in Moses, Jesus,

Mohammed, Zoroaster, and others, but in greater ful-

ness in Baha Ullah, who is set forth to the Jews as

the fulfilment of the prophecies of the Messiah; to

the Christians as the Second Coming of Christ; to

the Moslems as the Mahdi or Husain; to the Parsees

as Shah Bahram; to Brahmans as the Avatar. He is

“It” with a capital letter, as I have seen printed in

their books.

Another doctrine emphasized by Bahais is “Rijat,”

the Return of the prominent believers of the former

dispensation. It is akin to metempsychosis, but is ex-

plained to mean rather a reappearance in the spirit

and power of the former Imam or apostle. Another

aspect is allegorical interpretation. This method is

said to have been first applied to Islam by Mohammed

son of Ismiel, son of Imam Jafar-i-Sadik. It is called

*tavil* or *elm-i-batin*, and its adepts were called Batinis.

By setting forth the inner meaning they explain away

the precepts and doctrines of Islam. In accordance

with this, Baha, following closely the Bab and his

predecessors, explained the general resurrection as the

rising and appearance of a new manifestation, the

judgment as condemnation or acquittal by the mani-

festation, and receiving spiritual life from him. The

“Questioning by the angels in the tomb” is the sum-

moning by the messengers of the manifestation to

those in the tomb of ignorance to believe; and the

return of the angels to God is the report of the mis-

sionaries; the “bridge of Sirat” is the testing at the

call of faith; paradise is the condition of belief and

hell is unbelief.

Bahaism makes much of the symbolism of num-

bers. It takes over the sacredness of 19 from Babism

and establishes a new calendar of 19 months of 19

days each, abolishing the week. Baha also sanctifies

the number 9 because the letters in Baha add to 9 in

*abjad* counting. Much is made of the name Baha

as a charm and talisman; it is inscribed on rings and

breastpins.

The “Revelation” is contained in the “Ikan,”

“Kitab-ul-Akdas,” and numerous other writings

which surpass, it is claimed, all previous scriptures.

Faith in Baha is now the supreme duty and the means

of salvation. Baha condemned Sufiism and darvishes,

yet his book, “The Seven Valleys,” shows how to

follow the Sufi Path; he commends the zikr or repe-

titions of the divine name and his messengers travel

as darvishes in their rounds. The chief rites are the

same as in Islam, with variations; prayer has similar

ablutions, postures, and genuflections, with prescribed

words, but is made with face towards Acca and ad-

dressed to Baha Ullah; the fast is for a month of

nineteen days, with total abstinence from food during

daylight; the pilgrimage to Acca includes bowing be-

fore Baha’s image and kissing the shrines. There are

imitations of baptism and of the Lord’s Supper; ablu-

tions of the dead are minutely prescribed. There is an

effort to be different from Islam, but Bahaism has

nothing new nor superior to it in regard to worship.

Baha also attempted to lay down laws, criminal,

civil, and social. Among the punishments prescribed

are execution for murder, branding on the face for

theft, small fines for adultery, and burning alive for

arson. Mohammed never prescribed punishment by

fire, saying it was God’s instrument. As to woman,

she should be educated and more social freedom al-

lowed her. Marriage is enjoined, monogamy recom-

mended, bigamy allowed. Baha himself took two

wives and a concubine, all of whom bore him children

and survived him. Loose divorce is allowed. War,

the jihad, slavery, wine, and opium are condemned.

Baha’s contact with the West at Adrianople and in

Syria somewhat modified the theories he had learned

in Babism. He revoked the condemnation of learning

and travel, commended intercourse with all men, gen-

eral education, and a universal language. The agita-

tion connected with the great peace-movements of the

first half of the nineteenth century influenced him to

advocate peace and arbitration. He bound up the

Bahai theocracy to a system of constitutional mon-

archy substituting local and national councils for one-

man power. But he declared that all members of

these councils should be Bahais and taxes collected

and distributed according to Bahai law. It is quite

evident that in such a newly constituted state Chris-

tians and Moslems alike would have few rights.

As a pensioner of the Turkish Government and

restricted in residence to the neighbourhood of Acca,

Baha spent the last twenty years of his life in a fine

house and beautiful garden, surrounded by his dis-

ciples, receiving the pilgrims and their gifts and freely

carrying on his propaganda by letters and messengers.

His efforts at reconciliation with the Persian Govern-

ment brought relief to his disciples, and their condi-

tion was rendered more secure by Baha’s permission

to practise *tagiya*, concealment or conformity to the

Shiah religion.

Baha Ullah died in 1892. After his death a bitter

quarrel occurred between his sons and wives regard-

ing the succession. It was full of cursings and male-

dictions, anathemas and lawsuits. It resulted in a

second schism and in both leaders being put under

renewed restrictions by the Turkish Government.

Finally Abbas, the oldest brother, became chief of the

sect, with the title of Abdul Baha, the Servant of

Baha. He claimed to be the Centre of the covenant,

the Interpreter and Expounder of the Faith and Lord

of the New Dispensation. Under him Bahaism has

begun a wide propaganda, and aspires to be the uni-

versal religion. The zeal of a Christian convert to

Bahaism, a Syrian named Khairalla, who had come

to America on business, gave an impetus to this idea.

He was able in 1894-98 to make some eight hundred

converts to Bahaism in Chicago and its neighbour-

hood. The credulity of Americans inspired great

hopes of success. These American converts began

to make pilgrimages to Acca, recognizing, in Abdul

Baha, Christ Jesus in his Second Coming and worship-

ping and adoring him as Lord and Master. This is

described by one of the pilgrims, Mrs. Getsinger, in

the following words (Isaac Adams: “Persia by a

Persian,” p. 479): “I was waiting for the king to

come. I reached Him first and knelt down before

Him, kissing the hem of His robe. He helped me to

my feet and keeping my hand walked with me into

the house. He led me into the room where lies the

most brilliant jewel that ever shone on the earth,

Baha Ullah. … He led me down a flight of stairs

and I pressed His hand to my lips.” In another letter

she describes the meeting with Abdul Baha: “My heart

gave a great throb and I held out my arms, crying,

‘My Lord! my Lord!’ and rushed to Him, kneeling

at His blessed feet, sobbing like a child. I sat down

at His blessed feet, while He took my hand. … He

allowed me to kiss His blessed hand.” An English-

woman, Mrs. Khairalla, of the same party wrote, “I

threw myself on my knees before Him and sobbed

aloud from the emotion that filled my soul. He gave

me His dear hands to kiss, such fine delicate hands

they are, and patted me tenderly on my cheeks and

shoulders.” But this party of pilgrims became af-

fected by the schism. Khairalla became the leader of

the sect of the younger brother, Mohammed Ali, in

America. Though retarded by this, Bahaism has

gained 2,000 or 3,000 converts in 17 States, compris-

ing 27 congregations. It has a publication society,

has issued Baha’s “Revelations” in English, and has

a monthly paper—i.e. published every 19 days. It has

a missionary society called the Orient-Occident Unity,

which sends missionaries to Persia and aids Bahai

schools there.

In 1908 Abdul Baha was freed by the Turkish revo-

lution from all restriction as to residence and spent

several years in Egypt. Afterwards he made mission-

ary journeys to Europe and America, being received

to the pulpits and platforms of the United States with

friendly cordiality as an honoured guest. His visit

of eight months showed no special results. The prop-

agandists have extended their journeys to India,

Burma, South Africa, and Hawaii. They have

gained small groups of believers in England and Ger-

many. Though its success is very limited, and even

in Persia its numbers have not reached beyond

one or two hundred thousand, yet the fact that such

a revolt from Islam has been able to establish itself

among a Moslem people and to start a partially suc-

cessful propaganda among Christian people consti-

tutes it one of the interesting movements in the Mos-

lem world of to-day. Its failure in Persia to co-

operate with and assist the Constitutional movement

and the struggle for the liberties of the people shows

that expediency rather than the good of mankind

guides its policy. In relation to Christian missions

it is a hindrance. One aid that it has incidentally ren-

dered is in breaking the solidarity of Persian Islam,

and thus by its struggle to gain religious freedom for

itself it has promoted freedom for converts to Chris-

tianity.

THE AHMADIYAS

A new religion, similar to Bahaism, was promul-

gated in India in the last quarter of the nineteenth

century. Its founder was Mirza Gulam Ahmad, a

moghul by lineage. He was chief of the village of

Qadian in the Punjab. From him the sect is called

Ahmadiya.1 He was a man of some property and

respectable family. His father was a physician of the

old Greek school and Mirza Ahmad professed to be

proficient in the same art. In religion they inclined

to Sufiism. In his earlier years he was brought into

contact and controversy with Christian preachers, and

was perplexed by his inability to answer their argu-

ments. He became a recluse and cogitated on reli-

1 It has been investigated and described by Dr. H. D. Gris-

wold, in a tract named “Mirza Gulam Ahmad.” I have con-

sulted also his article, “The Ahmadiya Movement” (*Moslem*

*World*, 1912, pp. 373-79); Professor Siraf-ud-Din, “Mirza Gulam

Ahmad” (*Missionary Review*, 1907, pp. 749-56); Dr. J. Murray

Mitchell, “A New Sect in India” (*Missionary Review*, 1904, pp.

97-100); J. N. Farquhar, “Modern Religious Movements in

India,” pp. 137-48; Dr. E. M. Wherry, “Christianity and Islam,

etc.,” pp. 178-82.

gious themes, till he at last reached the conclusion

that he himself was a “revelator.” When about forty

years of age Ahmad laid claim to being the Mahdi,

according to Sunni traditions, and at the same time

Jesus Christ who should accompany the Mahdi. In

1880 he issued his “Barahin-i-Ahmadiya,” the Argu-

ments of the Ahmadiya. Among his works is “The

Teachings of Islam” in English. He seems to have

identified the Mahdi with Mohammed, and thus he

was the “return” of both Jesus and Mohammed, not

literally, but exactly as has been explained in the

teachings of Baha Ullah. He thus claimed to be the

fulfilment of the hopes of these religions, professing

to reform and unite them. He also claimed to be a

manifestation of God in a certain sense. This he

states thus: “The mantle of divinity is cast upon the

person who is thus favoured of God, and he becomes

a mirror for the image of the Divine Being. This is

the secret of the words spoken by the holy prophet,

‘He that hath seen me hath seen God.’ … I shall be

guilty of a great injustice if I hide the fact that I

have been raised to this spiritual pre-eminence.”

(Quoted from “Teachings of Islam,” *Moslem World*,

1912, p. 319.) As such he is the Lord of the Age,

Mediator, Intercessor, Revealer, and Reformer.

Regarding Christ he taught that he was born of a

virgin, that his miracles were not real but spiritual.

He held to the swoon theory of Christ’s death, de-

claring that he was crucified, seemed to be dead, was

buried in a state of unconsciousness. He cited as

proof of this the Gospel of Barnabas. The wounds of

Jesus were quickly healed by a salve called the

Marham-i-Isa, the ointment of Jesus whose wondrous

powers, he asserts, are extolled in a thousand medical

books, Christian, Moslem, Jewish, and Persian.

After coming out of the tomb and appearing to his

disciples, Jesus went to Afghanistan and Kashmir.

This departure is the ascension. The inhabitants of

these lands were the lost ten tribes to whom Jesus

preached. Finally he died a natural death and was

buried in Srinagar, Kashmir. The tomb and shrine

of a certain Yus Asaf is pointed out as that of Jesus.

In reality it is the tomb of some obscure Moslem Pir

of several centuries ago. In proof of his assertion he

cites the fictitious story of the “Unknown Life of

Christ,” by N. Notovich, in which an imaginary ac-

count is given, ostensibly from a Buddhist manuscript,

of a journey of Jesus to India before his ministry in

Judea. Mirza Ahmad adds another imaginary jour-

ney after the crucifixion, and on it, as a basis, refutes

the Christian religion. He is specially desirous to get

rid of the doctrines of the atonement and the resur-

rection. In other ways he condemns Jesus, as for

associating with evildoers. He denied his “power,

wisdom, and moral perfection.” He was extremely

hostile to Christianity, and it was the progress of mis-

sion work that incited him. He declared Christianity

to be corrupted. Its great errors were the deification

of Christ and belief in his expiatory death and literal

second coming; its corrupting practices are drunken-

ness, prostitution, and gambling. God has sent Gulam

Ahmad to rebuke them and call them to a new faith.

His message to Islam was that they receive him as

a peaceful Mahdi. The traditions about a warrior

Mahdi are pronounced forgeries; he, the Mahdi-

Messiah, had come to bring peace among nations and

to reconcile religions. The jihad he abolished and de-

clared it to have been a curse to Islam. His followers

should be peace lovers and submit to British rule.

One of the sect, writing in the *Review of Religions*,

says: “I do not wish for any Islamic government or

empire. What I do long for is this, that whoever be

the ruler, the whole world may turn Moslem.” He

denounced the tomb-worship and immoralities of Is-

lam; discountenanced polygamy, yet practised it him-

self. He excused Mohammed for allowing polygamy,

divorce, and the seclusion of women, as a preventive

of greater evils such as appear in Christendom. He

explained the pleasures of Paradise figuratively. He

claimed to be the exponent of true Islam and to propa-

gate it. It is the true religion, as wide in its con-

ception as humanity itself. It embraces all the in-

spired religions, and prompts us to love and reverence

not only for Mohammed, Moses, and Jesus, but for

Rama Chandra, Krishna, and Buddha. He appealed

to the Hindus to accept him as an Avatar. Needless

to say Moslems denounce him as a heretic and im-

postor.

The proofs of his mission submitted by Gulam

Ahmad were from the former scriptures, from mira-

cles, and from his own prophecies. For example from

the analogy of John the Baptist being Elijah, from

the teaching about the Second Adam, from the

apocalyptic signs of the Millennium, and from the

prophecy of the paraclete (John xvi, 7), which the

Koran refers to in the words (Surah LXI): “Jesus

the son of Mary said ‘I … announce an apostle to

come after me whose name is Ahmad.’” Gulam

Ahmad’s predictions frequently took the form of fore-

telling the death of the individual with whom he was

displeased. When some of these died a violent death,

suspicion was aroused. His followers were supposed

to have helped to bring about the fulfilment. One

of the men thus threatened, a prominent Christian,

named Abdullah Atham, took precautions to have

bodyguards, and the prophecy in his case failed.

When these predictions of calamity had reached the

number of one hundred and over, they merited the

attention of the government and the Mahdi-Messiah

gave his pledge to refrain from such imprecations.

In view of these vindictive predictions, the Moslems

composed a couplet, which I may paraphrase as fol-

lows:

The true Christ’s power was such

He made the dead revive;

The false Christ’s fatal touch

Brings death to those alive.

Ahmad had correspondence with Dowie, the Elijah of

Zion City, Illinois, and challenged him to a discussion.

He also proposed a test of the truth of their respective

dispensations, namely, that whichever one of them

died first should be proved a false prophet. Dowie,

whether because he was much the senior in years or

mistrusted Oriental providence, declined the test as

irrelevant. In some cases where Ahmad predicted a

son for his devoted follower, the advent of a daughter

taxed his ingenuity for an explanation. One of his

prophecies was that his village would be immune from

plague without inoculation. He also prepared the

marham-i-Isa “solely under the influence of divine

inspiration” and set it forth in a pamphlet as “the

Revealed Cure for Bubonic Plague.” Neither proph-

ecy nor ointment exempted his people from the

scourge. The government also thought best to inter-

fere with this divine quack-medicine. This latest Mes-

siah was cut off in 1908 by the cholera.

Mirza Gulam Ahmad’s method of propaganda was

vigorous. He was well acquainted with Arabic, Per-

sian, and Urdu. In words he was an aggressive dis-

putant. He favoured education and established mid-

dle and high schools at Qadian. He made much use

of the press, issuing more than fifty tracts, books, and

memorials, and two magazines, one in Urdu called

*‘Al Hakam* and one in English called *The Review of*

*Religions*. He organized his congregations with

weekly meetings and conferences and with the chief

society at Qadian. The membership has increased in

the last decade. The *Imperial Gazetteer* of India,

which calls it “the wildest development of recent sec-

tarianism,” reported 10,000 in the Bombay Presi-

dency in 1911; in the Punjab the census gave 18,695

as against 1,113 m 1901. There is a branch in the

Deccan. Dr. Griswold of Lahore, a special authority

on the sect, estimates the total at 50,000. Some of

the members are men of respectability and intelli-

gence, even university graduates. Nearly all are from

the Moslems, and they regard it as a reform of Islam.

It certainly works towards the disintegration of ortho-

dox Islam. Some disciples are reported to be in

Afghanistan, Persia, Arabia, and Egypt. An inter-

esting phase of the movement is its propaganda in

England. Mr. Khoja Kamal-ud-Din, an advocate, has

established himself at Woking at the mosque erected

by Dr. Leitner. By lectures and through a magazine

called *The Islamic Review*, the doctrines are promul-

gated. A new translation of the Koran is being is-

sued. Free literature is distributed. The mission has

been encouraged by the conversion of Lord Headley

to its faith.

In this effort to propagate itself in Christendom, it

is like Bahaism. In not a few points there is a strik-

ing resemblance between these offshoots from Moham-

medanism. Some of these may be accounted for by

their springing up in a similar soil, a Mohammedan

soil impregnated with Sufiism and Mahdiism, and in

which some elements of nineteenth-century Christian

thought had found lodgment. Both claim that a new

revelation is needed because Christianity is dead and

Islam needs reforming. Both claim to be in some

sense divine manifestations, in another sense the “re-

turn” of Jesus, of Mohammed, and of Krishna. Both

propose to unite all religions. Both do away with the

jihad and advocate peace principles. Both, after the

example of Mohammed, sent letters to kings announc-

ing their coming and inviting them to faith. Both

practised polygamy and praised Mohammed and the

Koran. Both belittled Jesus Christ, denying his mira-

cles, his resurrection, his ascension and literal Second

Coming. Both have some followers in foreign lands

even among Christians. Both failed to bring about

moral reformation in the conduct of their disciples,

who have divided into sects on the death of the found-

ers. Both claimed as signs of their mission their

eloquence in the Arabic tongue, the writing of spon-

taneous verses, fulfilled predictions, their success in

winning converts, and the good effects as seen in the

conduct of their followers. Both made large use of

the press; Baha Ullah sent his books to Bombay to

be published owing to lack of liberty in Turkey and

Persia; Gulam Ahmad had a press of his own at

Qadian. The teachings of Ahmad are free from some

extravagances and inanities of Bahaism. Neither

sect appears to have any great future before it. Their

chief usefulness has been to help towards the break-

ing down of scholastic Islam—the one among the

Shiahs, the other among the Sunnis of India. Baha-

ism has definitely broken with Islam, while the Ah-

madiya movement continues within its fold.

THE MAHDI OF THE SUDAN

Exceedingly interesting is the Mahdiist movement

of the Sudan. It has been a present-day example

before our eyes of what has occurred many times in

the centuries of Islam. It would undoubtedly have

issued in success and triumph but for the terrible

machine-gun of the Christians which turned the tide.

Mohammed Ahmad of Dongola, in 1878, pro-

claimed himself the long-expected Mahdi. He was

descended from Mohammed through Husain and was

of a family of successful boat-makers and worked at

this trade in his youth. He received religious educa-

tion at Khartum and at twelve is said to have been a

*hafiz*, able to say the Koran from memory. He be-

came a hermit at Abba, an island in the White Nile,

and acquired a reputation for austerity and asceticism

and was venerated as a saint. Moving about among

tke people, he described to them with thrilling elo-

quence their oppressions and their wrongs and re-

called to them the promise of a deliverer who should

bring in the reign of righteousness. This guide was

at hand, he declared, right would triumph, and the

accursed Turks and Egyptians be driven from the

land; their cruelties would be brought to an end. His

magnetic appeal to the people, giving hope of release

from injustice, had a powerful effect. It is said

(Colonel Wingate: “Mahdism,” pp. 13-14) that

“men wept and beat their breasts at his moving

words; even his brother fakirs could not conceal their

admiration. With rapid, earnest words he stirred

their hearts and swayed their heads like corn beneath

a storm. … In every hut and thicket echoed the

longing for the coming saviour. At last a band said

to him, ‘You are the promised leader,’ and in solemn

secrecy he said, ‘I am the Mahdi.’”

The time was ripe. Conditions facilitated the ac-

ceptance of such a claim. Half a century before,

Mohammed Ali, Khedive of Egypt, after establishing

his power in semi-independence of the Sultan, turned

covetous eyes on the great south land of the Blacks—

called the Sudan. He was urged on partly by greed

of power, partly by the desire to extend the bounds

of civilization. But instead of gold mines, the revenue

to enrich him and his successors was from inhuman

trade in human beings, and the grinding cruelties of

unjust and oppressive taxgatherers. The rapacity and

inhumanity of the slave-dealers cried out to God and

became a stench in the nostrils of Europe. The Khe-

dive Ismiel saw that to retain a reputation as a civil-

ized ruler he must suppress the slave trade. Hence

Colonel Baker and General Gordon and others were

commissioned for this work. Their service, ham-

pered while it lasted, was cut short, then the Sudan

lapsed into a condition of oppression, corruption,

rapacity, cruelty, and inhumanity,—creating in the

hearts of the people a soil fit for the springing up of

Mahdiism.

The suspicions and fears of the Egyptian governors

were aroused by the claims of the new Mahdi. They

made several unsuccessful attempts to seize him, but

their forces were defeated. He retired to the Nuba

mountains, Kordofan. This was called his *hegira* or

flight. Here he enlisted the powerful Sheikhs of the

Baggaras. The religious enthusiast declared to them:

“God himself came near to me and said, ‘Go, reform

the Moslems and found a kingdom which shall be

followed by everlasting peace.’ The Prophet came to

me, laid his sword in my hand, and said, ‘With this

sword conquer; for Azrael will go before thee and

terror shall fall upon thy foes.’” The warlike Bag-

gara professed their allegiance largely to secure power

for themselves and the gain of the slave trade. They

provided the Mahdi with wives and concubines from

among their daughters. Abdullah of their tribe be-

came his Khalifa. People flocked to his standard.

The Mahdi subdued the forces of the Egyptians,

bringing into subjection province after province. The

defeat of Hicks Pasha and the annihilation of his ten

thousand men carried conviction to all the land that

this was the True Guide. Gordon was sent to with-

draw the garrisons. He was entrapped in Khartum.

Too late his rescue was attempted. The Mahdi did

not wish the death of Gordon. He seems to have

wished him to occupy the place of Jesus, who, accord-

ing to tradition, should reign with him side by side.

He sent Gordon the costume of a believer, and a com-

mand to accept the faith. But Gordon was formed

in a more heroic mould and had a finer fibre to his

character than Lupton Pasha, commander of Bahr-il-

Ghazal, and Slatin Pasha, who denied their faith to

save their lives. Gordon knew that he that loseth his

life for the Truth’s sake shall find it unto life eternal.

So that peerless Christian knight, saint, and soldier

of immortal fame fell in the final assault of Khartum.

Victory had certified the Mahdi. The predicted

marks, the V-shaped space between the teeth, the pos-

session of Abdullah for a father and Fatima for a

mother, were not fortuitous; Mohammed Ahmad ruled

over nearly a million square miles. Before him lay

the assured conquest of the Turks, the Christians, all

the world.

As a religious movement Mahdiism professed to

be a reform. It was a pitiable attempt. The Mahdi

gave revelations and laws of his own. The Koran

was also retained. Belief in the Mahdi was the first

duty; unbelief the greatest sin. He ruled with a rod

of iron. A terrible inquisition held sway. Criticism

of his administration was punishable with mutilation

or death. Special emphasis was laid on asceticism in

food and raiment. A costume was prescribed. All

must wear this *jubba* or coat to avoid distinction be-

tween rich and poor. Feasts at funerals or weddings,

and riding a horse, except in war, if able to walk, were

not allowed. When riding a donkey, attendants must

not walk in company. Wearing long hair, wailing for

the dead, writing with cursive letters were prohibited.

Three vices were to be avoided—envy, pride, and neg-

lect of prayer: two virtues to be practised—poverty

and the Holy War. Of ten commandments, five were

specifically about women, that they should cover their

heads and faces, should not go to the graves at

funerals, not have a dowry above ten dollars, and

that men should oblige them to pray. The old Is-

lamic laws of mutilation for theft and beating for

wine-drinking were retained, but the use of tobacco

was punishable with a hundred lashes while the wine-

bibber escaped with eighty. The two most remarkable

aspects of the régime were a sort of communism of

property and an abnormal indulgence of sensual pas-

sions. The property of all men had to be placed in the

Bet-ul-Mal, the Community House, to be distributed

by the Mahdi. To accomplish this the inquisition

worked barbarously. Of this Colonel Wingate says:

“The last Khali fate has been under European ob-

servation, its propaganda has been studied most care-

fully, and the whole may be summed up in the phrase,

‘Your money or your life.’ At Khartum the Mahdi

changed into a sensuous voluptuary, luxurious and

uxurious. He ate of all dainties, wore the finest ma-

terials, was profusely perfumed. Instead of the

straw mat on which he had hitherto sat and slept, he

had the finest Persian rugs and an imported bedstead.

He changed to his former uncouth costume to appear

in public as the leader of prayers, where seventy thou-

sand men bowed before him on the grass and even

stooped to kiss the dust he trod upon, and gathering

it up kept it as a treasure. His bath water was car-

ried away as a means of grace. Yet so great was his

hypocrisy that, as Slatin says (“Fire and Sword in

the Sudan”), “No man is more irreligious. I have

never seen him say a prayer in his own house—only

in public.” Making a show of piety before the peo-

ple, he was guilty of the wildest excesses in private.

His haram consisted of four hundred wives and con-

cubines. By divorce he changed his four legal wives

as often as his fancy suggested. His concubines were

booty captured in war, mostly from the tribes which

at the point of the sword had been forced to acknowl-

edge him as Mahdi. As the result of his voluptuous

life, he became debauched and effeminate, and at last

met the reward of his prodigal excesses. A girl who

had lost family, property, and all in the siege, “sub-

mitted to outrage and obtained a terrible revenge.

She gave the Mahdi a deadly poison, and after linger-

ing in great agony, he died in 1885, but six months

after the capture of Khartum. … The people stood

round as though stunned. He could not die; he was

immortal” (“Mahdism,” p. 228). Thus perished

this contemporaneous example of a Mohammedan

prophet. The Khalifa Abdullah succeeded to power

and crushed the people beneath a heavier yoke. If

the Mahdi had beaten them with whips, the Khalifa

chastised them with scorpions. They were reduced

to such a degree of ruin that they might well long for

the oppressions of the Egyptians. Their deliverance

came by means of the Anglo-Egyptian force under

Kitchener, at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. The

bravery of the darvishes won the admiration and pity

of their foes. Intrepid and undaunted, they charged

again and again in the face of machine-guns, only to

fall. Eleven thousand were killed, and 16,000 fell

wounded out of 40,000 engaged in the battle. Sir

Garnet Wolseley says: “I am sure our men would

prefer to fight the best European troops rather than

the same number of warriors who were under the

influence of Mohammedan fanaticism.” (Quoted from

*Public Opinion*, Vol. VII, p. 210, in Atterbury’s “Is-

lam in Africa,” p. 101.) In view of the devotion of

these darvishes, Dr. C. R. Watson exclaims: “What

magnificent Christians these men might have made!

Why should they not be given the True Guide who

will lead them not to death but to life?” The Mahdi’s

tomb had become a shrine as sacred as that at Mecca.

It was said to be indestructible—a place of pilgrimage

to last forever. The body was treasured as that of

a deity. The tomb was destroyed, the body burnt,

and the ashes cast into the Nile (Shoemaker: “Islam

Lands”).

The result of the Mahdi’s rule was calamitous.

The aspirations of the people for economic betterment

were sadly disappointed. War, famine, and disease

had wrought terrible havoc. Countless towns had

been devastated, myriads of men and women had

perished. Of a population of 8,500,000, three and a

half millions were destroyed by famine and disease

and three and a quarter millions by the wars. The

country had diminished seventy-five per cent (“En-

cyclopedia Britannica,” Article: “Mohammed Ah-

mad”). The battle of Omdurman is an important

event in the history of Africa. Great Britain’s defeat

and withdrawal would have meant the throwing back

of civilization in a large section of the Dark Con-

tinent. Gordon’s death has been made fruitful in

good for humanity in bringing the Sudan under the

influence of European civilization, and the opening of

the way sooner or later for the inculcation of Gor-

don’s faith, even though at present the Memorial Gor-

don College has been perverted from that holy pur-

pose.

CAUSES OF THESE MAHDIIST MOVEMENTS

What are the reasons for these Mahdiist develop-

ments in Islam? One reason is the condition of de-

generacy, corruption, injustice, and weakness. The

Bab inveighed against the corruptions: the Sudanese

Mahdi against the injustice. One sign of the Mahdi’s

coming was decadence in Islam. Decline is not to

them a proof of its falsehood, for traditions clearly

state that this is to be expected before the coming of

the Imam Mahdi. Thus the Bahar-ul-anvar of Maj-

lisi (quoted in “Crusades of the Twentieth Century,”

W. A. Rice, p. 424) has a tradition that Mohammed

said: “A time will come upon my people when noth-

ing will remain of Islam except its name and naught

of the Koran except its writing,” and “the mosques

of Mussulmans will be destitute of knowledge and

worship and the Ulema will be the worst people under

the heavens, and contention and strife will issue from

them and return upon them.” This will precede the

triumph of the Mahdi and Islam will be revived and

strengthened. To read “The Bahai Proofs” and its

description of the mullahs one would suppose that

such a time had come upon Islam. There is no doubt

that Islam feels its weakness even more than it ap-

pears to us, for the decline of political power and

the prosperity of the Christians weigh on their hearts.

A writer in the Mo ay ad of Cairo (*Missionary Review*,

1914, p. 163) says: “Where are our Ulema? Where

are our leaders? Where are those who are able to

donate funds for us to follow the example of the

Christians? Things are in a bad condition. Oh God!

send us some one to collect together our scattered

forces!” This cry for a Mahdi was noticed by

Keane, who under the name of Haj Haji Mohammed

Amin made the pilgrimage to Mecca. He says (“Six

Months in Mecca,” p. 33): “The old ideas of the

near approach of the end of the world are very preva-

lent in the East just now, which all in all is about

as ready for the reception of some darvish Peter the

Hermit as it well could be.”

SIGNIFICANCE OF MAHDIISM

Some have asked: “What is the dynamic of these

movements?” It is the belief that these hopes are

about to be fulfilled and that the glorious results which

have been promised and long anticipated are now to

be realized under the present Leader. But they come

and go—the Mahdi of the Sudan,—the Mahdi-Mes-

siah of India,—the Bab,—Baha Ullah—and still the

Moslem world awakes to disappointment and hope

deferred. These all show the sense of need, the un-

satisfied longings of heart in the Moslem world. Is

it not significant that two or three of these latest

prophets have proclaimed themselves the advent of

Christ, and preached “peace on earth” and not the

jihad? These new religions have failed, the hopes

of reform and world regeneration through them have

not reached fruition. The high aspirations and en-

thusiasms of our fellow-men have fed on husks. The

Church must make known to them Him who is the

Desire of all nations, the True Guide.

**V**

**MODERNISM IN ISLAM**

MODERNISM in Islam is a tendency and a

movement to bring the thought and life of

Moslem peoples into harmony with the pres-

ent age. Its object, in the words of one of its advo-

cates, is “to dispel the illusory traditions of the past,

which have hindered our progress, to reconcile Orien-

tal learning with Western literature and science, to

preach the gospel of free inquiry, of large-hearted

toleration, and of pure morality.” The movement

affects not only the religion but the life and customs

as well. Though some new influences have undoubt-

edly originated in Islam itself or been resuscitated

from its past, yet the chief cause is the impact of the

West on the East. It is the effect of Western civiliza-

tion and Christian thought and life on Islam. This

impact has been continuous and strong during the last

century. Contact with Europe has been through vari-

ous channels. Governments, diplomacy, jurispru-

dence, commerce, travel, education, languages, science,

arts, industries, literature, missions have each made

its impression. A chief influence has been education.

The going of young men to France and the prevalence

of French language and literature have been large

factors. Wider and deeper has been the effect of

British thought because brought to bear more directly

and on the greater number in India and Egypt. The

influence of America, through its missionaries and

their schools and the atmosphere they create, has

not been small. The “spirit of the age” has affected

Moslem peoples, and philosophical and scientific prin-

ciples, social and economic truths have awakened a

response in their minds and consciences. Modernism

as an intellectual system or a manifestation of open

protest or aspiration is not fully in evidence in litera-

ture and the press. But extensive modification in

thought and desires is evident to one who has lived

among Moslems for some years. He recognizes that

there is a great, a wondrous change in mental atti-

tudes, in social ideals, in prejudices regarding theo-

logical conceptions. The reality cannot be set forth

by statistics, nor by the examination of public or

printed utterances of Moslems, for on matters per-

taining to religion and the Sacred Law expediency

often prevents expression of views, even if there is

no actual repression. My conviction is that there is

a marvellous change in the intellectual attitude and

conceptions of intelligent Moslems. Islam for a

thousand years has been traditional and under dog-

matic authority. Reason had its place, which was to

expound and enforce that which was accepted on

authority. Logic and metaphysics were highly valued,

but nothing contrary to the Traditions must be set

forth. Now thought is being liberalized, moral con-

ceptions and customs are being modified, and this is

coming to pass through the infiltration, penetration,

the direct impact and impress of Western or Chris-

tian civilization. This trend is toward Christian

ideals and away from traditional Moslem conceptions.

Islam is in ferment. I do not believe there are signs

of religious disintegration, but there is demand for

large modifications. There is a definite trend, partly

conscious, largely unconscious, to adapt itself to the

modern age. The reason is the conviction which has

sunk into the minds of many that they are behind-

hand, retrograde, non-progressive. This conscious-

ness of inferiority has aroused a desire for improve-

ment, a spirit of emulation. It is accompanied at

times with a feeling of inability to proceed without

guidance from those who are known to be in a supe-

rior status, in spite of a prejudice which wishes to

deny such superiority. The full effects of the leaven

of modern ideas in Islam are not yet evident, and only

the initial stage of the movement can be described.

I shall present Neo-Islam in relation to religious

thought, to the intellectual revival, and to social ame-

lioration,—in other words, to theology, education, and

the family.

NEO-ISLAM IN TURKEY

In regard to theological thought, if I begin at the

seat of the caliphate, it is evident that new interpreta-

tions of doctrine could not be made the subject of

public discussion in Turkey, in the time of Abdul

Hamid. There was no liberty of the press. There

was expressed some sympathy with the reactionary

doctrines of Wahabism; Pan-Islamism was main-

tained, but liberalism in theology had no opportunity

to find expression. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din’s book re-

garding the caliphate was suppressed. Yet it is plain

that Western thought was continuing to permeate the

minds of the educated classes of Constantinople and

of the port-cities such as Smyrna, Beirut, and Sa-

lonica. Those who received the modern education,

whether at home or abroad, became tinged with

liberalism in theology. They have broken in many

points with the old creed and ceased the observance

of the fast of Ramazan and such rites. Secularism

and scepticism often have taken the place of faith.

Some of the Young Turks, in exile, even drifted

away from all religion and became scoffers. Re-

ligion with many persons is but an outward cloak,

kept on for the sake of popular opinion. They have

zeal for Islam traditionally as against any other creed,

partly from pride, partly from race prejudice, or as

the embodiment of national aspirations because it is

a bond of popular unity. These modifications in prac-

tice and in mental attitude are evident to all. The

report on the “Preparation of Missionaries to the

Near East” (p. 14) emphasizes the fact that the

Mohammedanism of Constantinople differs materially

from that of other regions, due to Europeanizing in-

fluences and the “inroads of Western scientific,

philosophical, and religious teachings.” These in-

fluences have been felt, though in a less degree, in

smaller cities and in Anatolia and Irak, but even

there they have found deep lodgment and borne fruit.

Even the wilds of Kurdistan have been penetrated by

the modern ideas.

Since the establishment of the Constitution, liberty

has increased and reforms in Islamic social life have

been advocated, but the stormy years have not in-

vited men to the discussion of theological themes.

The Sheikh-ul-Islam, the State Minister of Religion

in Turkey, has made many decisions which do not

coincide with traditional views and has expressed

many liberal and modern opinions. In them he has

followed the habit of attributing to Mohammed

traditional sayings or finding in the Koran the basis

for modern political and social reforms. The Sheikh-

ul-Islam declared to Sir Edwin Pears that it was in

accordance with the teaching of Mohammed and his

example that Christians be treated as the equals of

Mohammedans (“Turkey, etc.,” p. 330), that Moham-

med had proclaimed unity and equality and that all

who accepted the Unity of God were to be treated as

brothers. Some Turkish Ulema have come to the

point of admitting the right to examine and investi-

gate matters of religion and to criticise and investi-

gate the Koran and the Law. New explanations and

new expositions are made possible by emphasizing a

verse or tradition which may have been passed over

previously but is now seized hold of because it suits

the new purpose. The further consideration of mod-

ern influences in Turkey I defer till the discussion of

political movements, as they are closely associated.

MODERNISM IN PERSIA

In Persia liberty of thought and writing has been

much restricted. The assumption by Babism of a po-

litical and revolutionary attitude probably increased

the restrictions. The publication of criticisms of the

faith has not been permitted. A pamphlet describing

the mullahs, their faults and opposition to progress,

was published in Baku, Russia. When copies of it

were distributed through the book-room of the school

of Mirza Husain Kamal in Tabriz, the antagonism to

him was so fierce as to close the school and drive him

from the city. The illustrated weekly *Mullah Nasr-*

*ud Din*, published at Tiflis, which cleverly criticised,

often with striking cartoons, the foibles of the clergy

and state in Persia, was excluded from distribution

through the mail. Even after Constitutional govern-

ment was established, Sayid Hasan, editor of the

*Hablul Matin*, who with his brother, the editor of the

prominent paper of the same name in Calcutta, had

given strong support to the Constitution, was ad-

judged guilty of a serious offence because he referred

with pride and regret to the condition of Persia before

Islam and spoke of the Arabs as “lizard-eaters,” us-

ing this expression of the poet Fardusi. For this of-

fence he was brought to trial and sentenced to prison

(Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” pp. 244, 234). In

Tabriz, at the same time, Mirza Husain Khan, an

editor, referred to the tradition of Mohammed in

which he said that “Woman was made out of a

crooked rib of Adam. If you try to straighten it, it

will break; if you leave it alone, it will remain

crooked.” He semi-humorously advocated freedom

for woman and the amelioration of her condition,

even an attempt to straighten the crooked rib. So

much excitement was caused by the article that the

editor was in danger, and was called to Teheran os-

tensibly to answer for his offence, really for his pro-

tection.

Modernism among the Shiahs may be said to have

its rise with Mullah Sadra of Shiraz, Mohammed bin

Ibrahim, an eminent theologian of the time of Shah

Abbas the second. He revived the study of philoso-

phy and science. He maintained liberal principles of

the interpretation of the Koran and of judging tradi-

tions rationally. His system strove to reconcile phi-

losophy, Sufiism, and the Shariat. He and Abdu

Razzak revived the study of Avicenna and his philoso-

phy and set in motion currents of liberal thought. He

no doubt had influence on Sheikh Ahmad of Ahsa, the

founder of Sheikhism—which is an example of mod-

ernism among the Shiahs. He was the source of the

influence which led on to Babism and Bahaism, but

while the latter both broke with Islam, the Sheikhis

remained within the fold and strenuously opposed the

Babis as anti-Islamite. The Sheikhis themselves suf-

fered from the suspicion and hatred of the more ortho-

dox Mutasharis. Their views have the virtue or taint

of Neo-Islam. Sheikh Ahmad explained away the

miracles of Mohammed. The two mentioned in the

Koran,—namely, the cleaving of the moon and the

miraj or ascent to heaven,—he did not deem super-

natural. The latter he regarded as a dream or vision

of the night, not a real journey. He denied the resur-

rection of the body, teaching that man has an astral

or spiritual body which accompanies the soul into the

other world, and this is the resurrection. He directed

his disciples to regard Christians as clean and not as

a contamination ceremonially. He taught that there

is always in the world a “perfect Shiah,” the repre-

sentative of the Imam and his medium of communi-

cation. Through him is given the opportunity for

the modification of interpretations. This overcomes

the chief difficulty to the renovation of the creed in

accordance with modern ideas and needs. The lib-

erality of the Sheikhis is noticeable in their relation

to Christians. The Sheikhi Mujtahids of Azerbaijan

maintained social relations with the missionaries, and

even sent their children to Europe and to the schools

of the mission for education. One of these was the

Sigat-ul-Islam. He would visit us, drink tea with us,

discuss questions of science with us. He had a

library of considerable size, received magazines from

various countries, and was engaged in preparing an

historical chronology. He did not express himself

freely on religious themes and rather avoided discus-

sion. I remember on one occasion when, seated in

my parlour, I was discussing certain points with one

of the mullahs who accompanied him, the Sigat-ul-

Islam finally said: “Won’t you two stop trying to

convert one another?” He was an open and sincere

friend of the Constitution and did much to further

the cause of popular liberties. He tried to bring about

peaceful settlement with Mohammed Ali Shah, hold-

ing telephonic conversations with him at Teheran to

settle Tabriz troubles. Those were indeed troublous

times. He fell under the suspicion of instigating and

abetting the riot in Tabriz against the Russian gar-

rison, and was hanged on the tenth of Muharram, by

order of the court-martial, in the *mashk-madan*—

the drill grounds. His last words were: “I have

done my duty. I have tried to serve my country.

Long live the Constitution.”

Another modernist Mujtahid of Persia was Haji

Sheikh Hadi, Nazmabadi (Browne’s “Persian Revo-

lution,” p. 406). Pie was of first rank among the

Ulema of Teheran, learned, incorruptible, a counsellor

and instructor of all. He was somewhat of a recluse

and ascetic, sat on the ground outside of his house,

and was visited by high and low. Viziers and princes

were received by him without ostentation. He rose

to receive no one save Nasr-ud-Din Shah. Sheikh

Hadi’s influence was very great. He, a liberal-minded

thinker, was branded as a heretic, but his influence

was rather increased by this. He opposed popular

superstitions, denounced prevailing abuses, led the

minds of his hearers away from old beliefs. He had

some of Tolstoi’s conviction of the dignity and neces-

sity of manual labour and insisted on his sons and

disciples working at a trade. His influence was very

great in bringing about what is called the awakening

of Persia. Men of all classes and creeds were helped

to break with the traditional past through his criticism

and instruction.

Though many mullahs were held in high repute and

honour both for their learning and their faithfulness

to their religion, yet it may be said that one character-

istic of the age in Persia has been the contempt and

obloquy heaped upon the mullahs. Dissatisfaction

with the condition of religion has been great and has

voiced itself in denunciation of the mullahs as the

cause of the degeneracy of the times and of religious

life. One cause of this was that many of them op-

posed progress. Another and greater cause was that

many of the Mujtahids are large landlords and were

supposed to look kindly upon if not to assist in cor-

nering wheat.

MODERNISM IN EGYPT

In Egypt, modernism has come in as a result of

Western education as well as from the influence of cer-

tain progressive mullahs. Among these was Sheikh

Jamal-ud-Din, who has been described in the chapter

on “The Revival in Islam.” He had much influence

on the Egyptians by applying philosophy to theo-

logical discussions. From 1871 to 1879 he was lec-

turer-extraordinary with a salary from the govern-

ment. He influenced young writers who became emi-

nent in the presentation of modern thought in new

literary style. His most conspicuous pupil was Sheikh

Mohammed Abdu, afterwards Grand Mufti (1875-

1905). The latter is called the founder of Neo-Islam

in Egypt (Browne, *ibid*., pp. 3, 7, and Cromer’s

“Modern Egypt,” pp. 174-77). He steered a middle

course between the Europeanized Egyptians and the

conservatives. He wrote books such as the “Amud-

ul-Muslimin,”in which he protested against vari-

ous laws and usages of Islam. He tried to reform

divorce laws and the corrupt practices of the courts as

well as the system of education. His freedom in deal-

ing with traditional theology and law left him under

the ban of the orthodox. His opposition to the ex-

travagances of the Court of the Khedive and his sym-

pathy with the aspirations of his own people made

him at times unacceptable to the authorities. Lord

Cromer describes another of these modern Sheikhs,

El Bakri, who “boasted of his acquaintance with

Gladstone and Salisbury, quoted Rousseau on the

Rights of Man in excellent French; indulged in plati-

tudes about the blessings of parliamentary govern-

ment, and borrowed books to study the French Revo-

lution,—a compound of Mecca and the Paris Boule-

vard, the latest development of Islam” (“Modern

Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 177).

With the Grand Mufti and the reformers who have

succeeded him the cry is “Back to the Koran.” This

cry, says Rev. F. Wurz, “is heard in addresses, read

in books, pamphlets, and daily papers, and has be-

come rather universal” (“Islam and Missions,” p.

58). With some “Back to the Koran” and “Back to

Mohammed” mean the same thing, namely, a desire

to get away from the traditional law. S. H. Leeder

(“Veiled Mysteries of Egypt”), a friend of Islam,

expresses Sheikh Mohammed Abdu’s position as fol-

lows: “Back to the Koran and the simple godliness

of the Prophet; away from the superstitious inven-

tions and fables of later men; let Islam be true to the

spirit of its great founder and his friends.” Some

who are saying “Back to Mohammed” are mean-

ing rather to an idealized Mohammed, a prophet

with the incarnated divine Light—not the prophet of

history. Some there are who make a distinction, re-

jecting Mohammed as an example and simply accept-

ing him as the revealer of the Koran. A young re-

former said to Mr. Gairdner (“Vital Forces,” p.

23): “The important thing is to accept the Koran;

it is no part of the mission of the Prophet to give a

moral ideal. Accept the Koran and then let Jesus,

if you like, be better than Mohammed.” These

quote the Ulema as saying, “The Koran contains all

that is necessary to salvation.” In this movement the

Koran is being made more use of for ethical study.

It is also being examined and commented on as litera-

ture and its finest selections published separately for

devotional uses (“Vital Forces,” p. 136).

This modernist call to go back to primitive Islam

means a different thing from what it did as the cry

of the Wahabis. The latter wished a puritanical

reformation, rejecting all foreign influences. With

the New Moslems it is a method of discarding anti-

quated customs and laws and bringing Islam into har-

mony with Western thought. They feel the necessity

of appearing to be good Moslems and have a desire

to maintain such a position with their own people.

By a loose exegesis they hope to hold what they wish

and discard what is unacceptable to them. They think

thus to revitalize Islam and inspire it with a spirit of

progress. They nominally stand in the orthodox posi-

tion and cannot be classed as Mutazalites, as the New

Moslems in India can. Lately some actual reforms

have been brought about in Egypt, through the ef-

forts of Sayid Ahmad Al Bakri and the heads of the

darvish orders. They have regulated and limited the

zikrs of the darvishes, their extreme gesticulations,

hypnotic rites, and excitement. The ceremony, called

Dozeh, at Cairo, in which the Sheikh of the Saadiyah

on horseback rode over the prostrate bodies of the

devotees, has been abolished. The attributing of su-

pernatural powers to the tombs of the Sheikhs is

being discouraged. (See Dr. J. Giffin: “Islam and

Missions,” p. 295; Dr. C. R. Watson: “In the Val-

ley of the Nile,” p. 219; Professor Macdonald: *Inter-*

*national Review of Missions*, 1913, p. 596.)

IN MALAYSIA

In Malaysia the influence of New Islam has been

felt. Moslems in Java, conscious of their backward-

ness, have inaugurated a movement looking towards

progress and education. The “Society of Islam,”

sympathetic with modernism, held a congress in

Java attended by thirty thousand people. Among the

questions discussed were the education of women, the

freedom of the press, and self-government. A resi-

dent reports that “Within the past year greater

changes have come into the minds of the Javanese

than in the past twenty-five years.” (Quoted by Dr.

Zwemer: *Missionary Review*, 1914, p. 182.)

NEW ISLAM IN RUSSIA

Modernism is represented among the forty-two

races of Moslems in Russia. This may be noted in

external things. Men and women, too, are adopting

Christian modes of dress, living in the Christian quar-

ters of the cities, and conforming to their customs.

Some of the women no longer live in seclusion nor

wear the veil. Mullahs complain that the people are

lax in their religious duties, even increasing their use

of alcoholic drinks. Boys and even girls are attend-

ing Russian government schools. The young Mos-

lems enter the army and civil service as officers. In

the Caucasus the movement is advanced. In Tiflis,

*Mullah Nasr-ud-Din*, the journal already referred to,

makes sport of the foibles of the mullahs, holds up

to ridicule old notions and customs and does ef-

fective work by its bright cartoons. There is a weekly

journal for Moslem women, edited by a Moslem

woman. Besides these there are two dailies, the

*Hakikat* and the *Shariat*, and a monthly called the

*Maktab*. In Baku, Tagief, a petroleum millionaire

has built a large school for girls. A society carries on

other schools. Tracts and books have been published

advocating reforms, and especially inveighing against

the mullahs. Liberal education is progressing in

Kazan and the interior of Russia. A prominent

leader in Neo-Islam is Ismiel Bey Gasparinski. His

organ, the *Tarjuman*, circulates through Russia and

Central Asia. At Tomsk in Siberia a Moslem society

for reform and progress has been organized (*Mis-*

*sionary Review*, 1910, p. 738). In 1904 Mohammed

Fatah Gilmani published a book in the Tartar lan-

guage (Professor Vambery: *Nineteenth Century*,

February, 1905), called “A Travel to the Crimea,”

in which he commends to the Tartars the acquisition

of European science, laments their backwardness,

blames it on the mullahs and the old education, de-

mands a vernacular version of the Koran, and that

polygamy and divorce be discouraged, that women be

allowed freedom, permitted to attend school, become

teachers, preachers, and authors, and participate in

public life. He declares that this desire for awaken-

ing is a national feeling, born and fostered by their

societies. Professor Vambery affirms that the move-

ment has extended its influence to Eastern Turkistan

and to many of the nomadic tribes of Central Asia,

and that it has a political and revolutionary side as

well as literary and religious. It is certainly a notable

fact that Tartars have developed their language, are

preparing a modern scientific and general literature,

and giving a corresponding education. A congress

of Moslems met at Petrograd in 1914 with forty-two

delegates, representing all parts of the Russian empire,

even Tartary and Central Asia. They discussed the

care of schools, the maintenance of high schools and

colleges for Moslems, the need of women doctors,

and general amelioration of moral and economic con-

ditions of their co-religionists in Russia. They also

formulated demands for equal rights with Christians.

Concerning this, the Moslem members of the Duma

are also alert to seek action.

NEO-ISLAM IN INDIA

It remains to consider Moslems in India with refer-

ence to the influence of modernism among them.

Here the movement has been more open and more

widely extended, and from there has influenced other

lands.

Neo-Islam in India received its great impulse from

Sayid Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, 1818-98. He was

distinguished in the Indian civil service, served the

Crown well in the mutiny, was received in royal audi-

ence in 1870 on his visit to England and knighted.

His aim was to bring his co-religionists into harmony

in doctrine and life with the modern age. To this

end he encouraged English education, especially by

founding Aligarh College, edited a magazine called

*The Reform of Morals*, wrote a Commentary on the

Bible, admitting its truth and authenticity and trying

to reconcile it with the Koran. He interpreted Islam

according to rationalism and denied miracles. He

recognized a human element in the Koran and ad-

mitted the fallibility of both it and Mohammed. He

declared that Islam in its traditional and exclusive

mould had no future and strove to bring it into con-

formity with the times and so strengthen it. Because

he wrote much in regard to natural religion his fol-

lowers were called Naturis. He started conferences

among Moslems and was the founder of the Moslem

League, which had for its aim social, economic, edu-

cational, and religious reforms.

His influence was increased still further by his

successors, who developed the same policy. One of

these is Sayid Amir Ali, a graduate-in-law in London

and a Justice in the Indian Courts. He is the author

of “The Life of Mohammed,” “Mohammedan Law,”

“The Legal Position of Woman in Islam,” “The

Spirit of Islam,” etc. His attitude is that of a

special pleader. He would explain away and gloss

over the defects of Mohammed’s character and by

strained interpretations show that the Sacred Law is

in conformity with twentieth-century ideals. His

teaching in regard to inspiration is evident from his

saying (“Life of Mohammed,” 1873, p. 25) that

Mohammed’s knowledge of Jesus was received from

floating traditions in Arabia, prevalent in his time,

part of the folklore of the country, and that the law

regarding spoils in war was promulgated by Moham-

med and incorporated in the Koran. He knows noth-

ing of revelation from eternal tablets preserved in

heaven. The Koran comes by a lower form of in-

spiration. He suppresses the supernatural and mi-

raculous in the *miraj*, in the flight to Medina, or an-

gelic action at Bedr (p. 83), rejects a personal devil

and the jinns (p. 86). As to the facts of Moham-

med’s history, he utterly disregards all that the ancient

Moslem historians tell against his character, so that

Dr. W. St. C. Tisdall is led to say: “A great modern

discovery of the Neo-Mohammedan is that no reliance

is to be placed on the earliest and most celebrated Mus-

lim historians, traditionalists, and commentators,

when they relate anything which a modern apologist

deems discreditable to Mohammed, but that the very

same writers are thoroughly reliable when they state

anything in his favour” (*Moslem World*, 1913,

p. 408).

As to the Shariat, Amir Ali states his far-reaching

principle in the following words: “Commands and

prohibitions have invariably been in consonance with

the progress of humanity, and the law has always

grown with the growth of the human mind” (“Mo-

hammedan Law,” p. 13). “The elasticity of laws is

their great test, and this test is pre-eminently possessed

by those of Islam. Their compatibility with every

stage of progress shows their founder’s wisdom. In-

quiry will evince the temporary character of such

rules as appear scarcely consonant with the require-

ments or prejudices of modern times” (“Life of Mo-

hammed,” pp. 227, 157). Many sumptuary regulations,

precepts, and prohibitions of Mohammed were called

forth by temporary circumstances. With the disap-

pearance of the circumstances, the need for those laws

has also disappeared. The people, whether Moslem

or not, who suppose that every Islamic precept is

necessarily immutable do injustice (p. 194). With

such views he relegates to a secondary position verses

and passages of the Koran and Traditions which have

held the field, and gives emphasis to other verses. He

claims the right to ignore verses and to change inter-

pretations, as he says the Christians have done. And

further, as Bosworth Smith says (“Mohammed

and Mohammedanism,” p. 257), “There are some

among the New Moslems who see now, and there will

be more who will soon see, that there will soon be an

appeal to the Mohammed of Mecca from the Moham-

med of Medina.” Amir Ali affirms the right of pri-

vate judgment and, with special interpretations, re-

jects from the Koran all that does not accord with

his own ideas. He shows, to his own satisfaction at

least, that Mohammedan “law itself may be consid-

ered a prohibition of the plurality of wives,” and that

slavery, intolerance, and war for the propagation of

the Faith are not parts of Islam. It is at least a grati-

fication to find an expounder of Islam who repudiates

such practices. He does not accept the decisions of

the Imams on traditional law as unchangeable nor

exempt them from criticism. The Imams have in-

jured Islam by making it fixed, reactionary, and un-

able to adapt itself. Their decisions must be disre-

garded. The fatvas of the Ulema, too, are without

authority. Even the Koran can be criticised. All

provisions of the Shariat not suited to the present age

can be discarded. Reason is to be the judge and con-

temporary sense of fitness the criterion. The Imams

have rejected five hundred thousand traditions and

only found eight thousand authentic. Let us throw

all overboard that do not suit us. Such is the atti-

tude of this representative reformer.

Another writer of Neo-Islam is Maulvie Chiragh

Ali, an officer of the Nizam’s government. He has

published “Reform Under Moslem Rule” and

“Critical Exposition of the Jihad.” Another of the

group, Ali Hasan, has published a life of Mohammed,

“The Last Prophet,” in which he discards the miracu-

lous. The Light of Mohammed is simply the light of

conscience with inspiration; the miraj or midnight

journey was in vision only, jinns are but bad men,

jihad is only to be in self-defence. Mohammed’s in-

tercession, sinlessness, and miracle-working are not

mentioned. The example of the Prophet has not the

binding force of law on his followers.

Controversy has occurred among the Hanifites over

the use of the vernacular in prayer and of translations

of the Koran. The modern party take the ground

that worship should be in a language understood by

the participants. Besides the arguments of reason,

they appeal to the tradition that Mohammed allowed

his Persian converts to make their prayers in their

own tongue (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 522).

Another New Moslem is S. Khuda Bakhsh. In his

“Essays Indian and Islamic” he quotes with approval

the teachings of Von Kremer and Goldziher regard-

ing the relation of Roman law to the Shariat. He

cites Nawaur as saying: “By far the greatest por-

tion of the Muslim law is the outcome of true inquiry,

for the actual passages of the Koran and Sunna

have not contributed a hundredth part of it. The

Board of Nazar-ul-Mazalim had to decide not ac-

cording to the letter of the law, but according to the

principles of equity.” “Islam, stripped of its

theology, is a perfectly simple religion. The Koran

is a spiritual guide, not a body of civil laws. It was

never the intention of the Prophet to lay down immu-

table rules or to set up a system of laws which was to

be binding apart from changed conditions.” He laid

down rules of marriage, etc., intended to meet the

then existing conditions. Muslim jurisprudence grew

by the adoption of foreign rules (“Essays Indian

and Islamic,” pp. 284-86). These principles give

scope for a complete modernizing of Islam.

Another Indian reformer is Mulvi Abdullah of

Chakrel, somewhat of an ascetic and a voluminous

writer. His teachings are described by Canon Sell

as a wide departure from orthodox Islam. He would

return to the Koran, rejecting all traditions. Polyg-

amy and the jihad are declared to be against the

Koran, the *azan* or call to prayer and the rosary are

rejected, as well as all pilgrimages except the one to

Mecca, which must be limited to simple ceremonies

and be without the kissing of the black stone. Neither

Mohammed nor any other man can be mediator at

the Day of Judgment. The intermediate state is one

of unconsciousness.

Another new sect is the Ahli Koran, the People

of the Koran, who have some following in the Pun-

jab. They reject traditions entirely, denounce polyg-

amy, and affirm that neither Mohammed nor any

other of the prophets had more than one wife

(“Vital Forces,” p. 173).1 In general it may be said

of these Indian Moslem reformers, in the pertinent

words of Mr. Gairdner (“Reproach of Islam,” p.

206;: “They read into the Koran almost everything

they have come to like, and out of it almost every-

thing they have come to dislike.”

Such are the principles of Neo-Islam. Have its

expounders forsaken the Faith? By no means.

They are strenuous Moslems. They proclaim the

greatness and glory of Mohammed, whitewash his

record, expurgate from Islam all blemishes, and make

it the possessor of every excellency demanded by

public opinion of the twentieth century. Justice Amir

Ali2 is bitterly and scornfully anti-Christian and

scours the history of Christendom from age to age

to find crimes to set against those of Mohammed and

1 It is curious how the reformers of Islam cling to some of the

old Oriental ideas. This is noticeable in regard to assassination.

Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din said in an interview with Professor Browne

(“Persian Revol.,” p. 45): “No reform can be hoped for until

six or seven heads are cut off,” and specified Nasr-ud-Din and

Amin-i-Sultan. Both these were afterwards assassinated. Jamal-

ud-Din also proposed that Khedive Ismiel should be assassinated

and Sheikh Mohammed Abdu says (quoted by Lord Cromer, Vol.

Ill, p. 181, from W. S. Blunt’s “Secret History,” p. 489): “I

strongly approved of it, but we lacked a person capable of tak-

ing lead in the affair.” We are reminded of the assassination of

the Azali Babis by the Bahais. The attempts to assassinate the

new Sultan of Egypt are also instigated and applauded by high

religious authorities of Constantinople. See Chapter V.

2 The historical attitude of this learned representative of New

Islam may be seen in his lament over three things (p. 342):

1. The failure of the Persians to conquer Greece. 2. The failure

of the Arabs to conquer Constantinople in the eighth century.

3. The unfortunate results of the battle of Tours. “Each of

these has prevented the growth and progress of civilization.”

primitive Islam. (See “Life of Mohammed,” last

chapter.) Principal Morrison of Aligarh College

says: “They believe that in their Faith are enshrined

the great truths of religion and morality; but that in

the past they have misread the word of God, and

that the narrow-minded mullahs have expounded it

amiss.” (Quoted in “Crusaders of the Twentieth

Century,” p. 49.)

It must be borne in mind that this rationalistic

method of interpreting Islam is not new. This In-

dian school of thought is a revival of the Mutazalis,

who existed under the Abbaside caliphate of Bagdad.

Then Persian thought and influence were prevalent

and exercised a strong tendency to free Islam from

the fetters which were fast being bound upon it. Vic-

tory was apparently with this party of free thought.

Orthodoxy seemed to have lost the adhesion of the

learned. But Al Askari, using as his weapon the dia-

lectics of Aristotle and teaching Greek logic to the

orthodox, gave them the victory and established rigid

legalism and traditionalism in Islam (Stanley Lane-

Poole: “Studies in a Mosque,” pp. 171-74; Geden’s

“Studies in the Religions of the East,” p. 831).

Again the disciples of free thought take the same

name. Amir Ali says (preface to “Mohammedan

Law,” p. x): “Belonging myself to the little known

but not unimportant philosophical and legal school

of the Mutazalis, and thus occupying a vantage ground

of observation, I cannot but observe the movement

that has been going on for some time among them.

The advancement of culture and the growth of new

ideas have begun to exercise the same influence on

them as on other races and peoples. The young gen-

eration is tending unconsciously to Mutazalite doc-

trines. It must not be supposed, however, that this

movement results from a weakening of the Islamic

faith. It originates more from the desire to revert to

the pristine purity of Islam and to cast off the excres-

cences which have marred its glory in later times.

To me it appears that great changes are imminent in

the social institutions and personal laws of Indian

Mussulmans.” But we need not expect much to re-

sult in the way of uplift to Islam from rationalizing

and intellectual defence and pruning. No Erasmus

can set on fire a genuine reform. Still as Persian in-

fluence had great results in the old time, the foreign

civilization in India will show effects on Islamic

thought and conscience.

**VI**

**THE NEW EDUCATION IN ISLAM**

MOSLEMS, especially in the Near East, have

had considerable intellectual life. But educa-

tion long ago became stereotyped. For cen-

turies it has been clerical. Its centre was the mosque,

its teacher the mullah or mudarris. Generally there

is a mullah in each village and a mud-walled, adobe

mosque, unceiled and unfloored, without furniture

save the *membar* or pulpit and a bastinado in the

corner for refractory boys. The father on bringing

his boy into view of this instrument of torture, would

say to the mullah, “The bones are mine, the skin and

flesh are yours, only teach him letters.” The pupils

gave fees and presents to the mullah. These were not

large nor abundant, as is evidenced by the story of

a father who brought his boy to the mullah and said:

“Ay, mullah, what will you take to teach my boy to

read?” “I want ten tomans,” answered the mullah.

“That’s too much,” exclaimed the father; “I can buy

a donkey for that sum.” “Buy,” retorted the mullah,

“and then you will have two.” (See author’s “Per-

sia; Western Missions.”) The income of the mullah

was supplemented by writing deeds, contracts, letters,

and charms for the people. The pupils sit on reed

matting without desks. They are unclassified, and

when one recites alone the rest of the pupils learn

their lessons aloud in a singsong tone. In cities these

schools are in different wards, and some of them in

the bazaars, separate from the mosques.

The basis of the curriculum is learning to read the

Koran. In countries in which Arabic is not the ver-

nacular, this is injurious to the pupils. Many of

them spend all of the few years which it is their lot

to attend school learning to read Arabic by rote and

often very imperfectly. This schooling is of no prac-

tical use to them. Many who read fluently do not

understand its meaning, yet they have their reward

in the great merit of simply reading the holy words.

This has been a great hindrance to popular education

even in Persia and Turkey. In less civilized lands it

has been nothing short of a calamity. In Sierra

Leone and Central Africa, Moslem education is de-

scribed as an unintelligible learning by rote of the

Koran and committing to memory of a few prayers,

to which is added a course in witchcraft, making

charms and fetishes. In Malaysia the instruction has

a stupefying rather than an enlightening effect. It

is mechanical and parrot-like. They learn neither the

tribal language nor the Malay. Mr. Simon says:

“They acquire a number of Arabic formulae and

facility in rattling off a few Malay phrases of which

they practically do not understand a word.” For-

tunately common sense and race pride asserted them-

selves in Persia. So after some time spent in reading

Arabic, the pupil is permitted to learn his vernacular,

and a course in Saadi, Hafiz, and other poets has

developed many Persians of good literary ability.

Private instruction at home has been a sub-

stitute for good schooling for the nobles and the

scribes. Even in Arabic-speaking lands the old sys-

tem hampers education by confining education to

the dialect of the Koran and not using the modern

dialect.

Higher education, under the old system, was con-

fined to training for the Ulema. The course of in-

struction included theology and law, the Koran and

the Traditions and their exposition, with grammar,

rhetoric, and logic, and possibly some mathematics.

It excludes modern sciences and languages. These

madressas are supported by tithes and *vakf*, endow-

ments. They develop acute and well-trained faculties,

and have served their purpose through the medieval

period of Islam. But a spirit of narrowness and big-

otry rules in them. Many of them are hotbeds of

fanaticism. They train up their talabas or softas to

be reactionary, not only hard-bound to traditionalism

in the sphere of religion, but adverse to the progress

which modern science brings to mankind.

THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS

The theological-law schools of Islam have continued

on the ancient basis. Shiah madressas at Kerbala and

Najef, Sunni ones at Mecca and chief cities of Turkey

and Central Asia, have changed but little. One of

the most celebrated of these is Al Azhar at Cairo.

Time was when a Christian was not even permitted

to enter its precincts, but fortunately for the members

of the Cairo Missionary Conference that rule no

longer holds. I was greatly interested in walking

through its crowded cloisters, and seeing its multitude

of students, sitting on the floor, in circles around their

Sheikhs and Muftis. As we passed from group to

group I kept imagining what ones might be from

Kazan or Bukhara, what ones from Morocco or Java,

from Cape Town or Peking, and where they will be

scattered after years of training in the lore of Islam.

This famous theological school was founded by the

Fatimide Jowhar, vizier of Sultan Muiz, a.d. 969,

at the time Cairo was laid out. It has as high

as 325 professors and 11,095 students from many

lands. Each nation has its section or dormitory. The

Italian Government lately established a hostel with

150 students from Erithrea and Tripoli “to train

students to teach the coming generation in Tripoli the

Islamic doctrine, the Arabic tongue, and love of

Italy.” Al Azhar has large endowment from which

a daily dole of bread is given to the students. It is

noted specially for instruction in theology and Arabic.

Rev. F. Wurz points out that it is a mistake to refer

to Al Azhar as a great foreign missionary centre, for

it does not send out missionaries to non-Moslem lands.

It is rather an international theological seminary. It

is intensely conservative. The Grand Mufti, Moham-

med Abdu, tried to modernize its curriculum by intro-

ducing some secular learning into the preparation—for

example, geography and history. The necessity for

this may be seen from an incident related by Dr. Wat-

son (“Egypt and the Christian Crusade,” p. 48). A

graduate of Al Azhar was teaching Arabic to a mis-

sionary and came upon the word Asia. He asked,

“Where is Asia? Is it a part of Europe?” The

Mufti’s plan was not accepted by the professors,

caused difficulty, and the Khedive secured his resig-

nation. Al Azhar continued to illustrate the stagna-

tion of Moslem conservatism. The Khedive tried his

hand at reforming it, and as an inducement increased

its revenues from forty to two hundred thousand

pounds. But owing to dissatisfaction with its spirit

and management, he ceased to patronize it. A ninth

attempt to modernize it failed in 1910. A new regula-

tion was that all students who had been in the uni-

versity more than seventeen years should leave if they

failed in the coming examinations. I believe that it

still teaches the Copernican system. A similar school

in Constantinople, used, until a few years ago, a text-

book for physical science which was a thousand years

old. There is much dissatisfaction with such institu-

tions. This is voiced by a Moslem, Mushir Husain

Kidwal, who wrote in the *Hindustan Review*: “Even

the educational institutions stink of the old decaying

smell.”

The old system of education reached only a small

proportion even of the boys. Illiteracy prevailed in all

Moslem lands. For example, take the Persians—a

people with a literary classic tongue and masterpieces

which have merited the admiration of the world.

Travellers who report about the proportion of the

population who can read fail to consider the village

and nomad people. In many villages scarcely one in

a hundred can read. Probably the estimate made

about Moslem lands for the Cairo Conference is ap-

proximately correct,—namely, that ten to fifteen per

cent are literate, though in India, where the census

gives the correct figure, not more than five in a hun-

dred of the men can read and only four in a thousand

of the women.

Discontent with these conditions has led to a move-

ment for modern education. The desire is to do away

with this antiquated system, and to substitute modern

methods and curricula. This is one of the significant

movements—one that is having large influence on

their lives and religious conceptions. The new educa-

tion is Western and carries with it a large element of

Christian truth.

In the Near East the modern ferment of ideas

began at the time of Napoleon. After his invasion of

Egypt and Syria, those lands continued in closer and

more constant contact with Europe. After that time

European influence is continually evident. It was at

the same time that ambassadors from France, Britain,

and Russia began special efforts to influence the Shah

of Persia; and the people of Persia began to know

something definite about Christian civilization. A

powerful influence was exerted by Europe on the Near

East during the nineteenth century by the coming of

young men in considerable number from Turkey,

Syria, Egypt, and Persia for education. They re-

turned much changed in religious belief and practice

and with ideas and purposes out of harmony with the

old conditions. They especially felt the need for their

own people of the literary and scientific culture which

they had seen in Europe. This need was made more

prominent and a general impulse was given to new

education among Moslems by the mission schools and

by those of the Oriental churches among their own

people as well as in some countries, as India, by the

government schools.

NEW EDUCATION IN PERSIA

I shall begin a review of this educational movement

with Persia. The first Persian students who returned

from Europe to Persia about the middle of the nine-

teenth century were not well received and were viewed

with suspicion (Markham’s “History,” p. 19). But

in the subsequent period, many of the most enlight-

ened men have had the benefit of European training.

Such was Hasan Ali Khan, Amir-i-Nizam, the able

though unscrupulous governor of Azerbaijan, who did

so much to overthrow the tobacco monopoly. The

late regent Abul Kasim Khan, Nasir-ul-Mulk, a grad-

uate of Oxford, and different members of the family

of Riza Kuli Khan, Lala Bashi, were prepared by it

to take a prominent part in organizing the Constitu-

tional government. Many members of the medical

profession were of the modern school, and not a few

of them received the foreign training. What is true

of Persia is more the case with reference to other

countries of the Near East. The visit of the Shah

Nasr-ud-Din to Europe led him to encourage Western

learning. He founded the Shah’s College, with a cur-

riculum on European models. When I visited it in

1881 it was doing fairly good work, but it did not

develop rapidly in standard and efficiency. A few

other schools were established in the chief cities of

the country. The teachers and graduates of these

schools were, for the most part, liberal-minded and

progressive, with a lighter sense of the obligation of

the Shariat and a less bigoted attitude towards Chris-

tians. There was a tendency towards secularism and

scepticism which seemed to endanger religious char-

acter, and threatened to bring about a condition where

young men of culture would be freed from the re-

straints of Islam and have no faith in Christ to take

its place. A term, *Frangi mahab*, was applied to a class

of men who were imitators of foreign ways and often

without substantial character back of it. Spasmodic

but for the most part unsuccessful efforts were made

to establish schools. The Constitutional movement

gave a vigorous impetus to new effort, but no systems

could be organized owing to disturbed conditions.

Within a year twenty schools were opened in Tabriz

and a correspondingly larger number in Teheran,

where the education of girls took a good start. But

all these schools only accommodated a few hundreds

in the smaller cities and a few thousands in the larger

places. The reactionaries under Mohammed Ali Shah

showed their attitude towards the new education by

looting and burning the schools, the libraries, and

breaking in pieces the printing-presses. A remarka-

ble opportunity came to the Missions to educate the

Moslem youth. They came by the hundreds to their

schools, taking the religious lessons because of their

desire for the science and languages. Impetus was

given to plans for higher education and projects were

initiated to develop colleges for Moslem students in

Teheran, Tabriz, and Ispahan.

EDUCATION IN TURKEY

On Turkey the influence of Western education has

been marvellous. Many young men have gone to

France and some to England and Germany. French

to a great extent became in the nineteenth century the

language of diplomacy and business. It became also

a means of literary culture. A European movement

set in strongly, especially from 1850 to 1870. Lit-

erature took on new life and developed under the

stimulus. The literary style and taste of Osmanli

scholars were transformed. Of Turkish poetry previ-

ous to that time Gibbs says (“Turkish Poetry,” Vol.

V, pp. 1-21): “It was Persian in its inception, Per-

sian in substance it remained.” Thereafter the litera-

ture of Turkey no longer followed the Persian models

but those of France. The intellectual life of the edu-

cated was changed as were their political ideals. Re-

markable modifications are noticeable in their ideals

and forms. The language itself was remodelled and a

new prose created by Shanasi Effendi, Namik Kamal

Bey, and Ziya Effendi. Abd ul Hak Hamid Bey

acquired fame as a vernacular poet, though the Sultan

prohibited his works from circulation. Literature

ceased to be an adjunct of the work of the clergy.

The drama was introduced. French drama and

Shakespeare were translated. Ideas of patriotism and

liberty permeated literature.

The reforming Sultans favoured popular education

as a means of bringing Turkey into accord with Eu-

ropean life. About the middle of the nineteenth cen-

tury schools were established in which children of all

races were to be educated without distinction. These

were elementary, middle or *rushdiya*, and lyceums or

colleges, including normal, agricultural, technical,

medical, law, military, and naval schools. The pri-

mary schools were fairly numerous in the provinces,

and high schools in the cities. Some few were for

girls. The School of Commerce did not prosper, be-

cause the Turks do not take to business life. After

a score of years it has only a handful of stu-

dents.

The Christian population did not take kindly to these

mixed schools, preferring to have schools distinctive

for their own language, literature, and religion. Nor

were they acceptable to the Moslems. They were

changed in 1870 to schools for Moslems only, in which

their religion was specially taught and foreign lan-

guages abandoned. Of this period Charles Dudley

Warner wrote: “Signs enough are visible in the

Levant of a transition period, extraordinary but hope-

ful; with the existence of poverty, oppression, super-

stition, and ignorance, are mingled Occidental and

Christian influences, the faint beginnings of a revival

of learning and the strong pulsations of awaking com-

mercial and industrial life.” Later Abdul Hamid re-

stricted the schools, for he would have kept the people

in ignorance, and especially would have prevented the

spread of liberal ideas. But he knew the necessity

of education for officers, so he supported some good

military and medical schools. He even let some

students go to Europe to learn military science, but

prevented all others even from travel, as much as he

could. He allowed more freedom for the education

of girls, not apparently dreading their influence on

politics or perhaps despising it as of no account. Yet

many young men escaped to Europe, and were edu-

cated there and the Young Turks are largely men of

this class. Since the Constitution was established,

Turkey has talked much about promoting education.

Indeed, some of them attributed their defeat by the

Balkan states to their lack of education. The *Ikdam*

(quoted in *The Orient*) says: “Why have we been

beaten? Because our adversaries have even in their

villages primary schools.” They have given liberty

to scientific, and philosophic study. They have

planned much, but accomplished little. One reason is

that the prosecution of or preparation for war has

exhausted their funds. The appropriation for public

instruction is 65,000,000 piastres, about $3,000,000,

while that for war, navy, and pensions is 1,400,-

000,000 piastres (more than $60,000,000) in time of

peace. Even the schools with a religious endowment,

or *avkaf*, are in a pitiable condition and have been

decreased from 325 to 250. Another difficulty has

arisen from mixing politics with the educational plans,

and pursuing the policy of Turkifying the subject

races, and compelling the Albanians, Arabs, and others

to learn the Turkish. In spite of all, some progress is

being made. Female education is being encouraged.

Girls are being prepared as teachers; some have been

placed by the government in the normal course of the

(American) Constantinople College and others sent

to Europe. A significant incident occurred at Nico-

media in February, 1914. Moslem boys and girls took

part in school exercises together. Girls of twelve and

thirteen made recitations and addresses before an

audience of two thousand people. The governor made

a stirring appeal for general education and especially

for the culture of the future mothers. Another sig-

nificant event was the inception by the Sheikh-ul-

Islam, Hairi Bey, of a new “Theological Madressa of

the Great Khali fate,” at Constantinople,—to be a

training-place for the Ulema of the whole Islamic

world, to rival and eclipse Al Azhar. Its distinctive

feature is that it will give instruction in all modern

science and philosophy, and turn out Ulema who shall

be progressive leaders in intellectual life (*The Orient*,

October 7, 1914). A Moslem university has been

started at Medina. The cornerstone was laid No-

vember 29, 1913. An address was made by Sheikh

Abdul Aziz Shawish. The *irade* of the Sultan de-

clares that its object is the teaching and spread of the

eminent truths of Islam; all Christian influence is to

be excluded. It will also teach agriculture and en-

gineering. Its central committee will be in Constan-

tinople, but superintendence in the hands of a com-

mittee at Medina.

At Jerusalem, the Madressa-i-Kulliyah has been

founded to prepare religious leaders in theology, with

scientific and sociological training. It is under the

direction of Sheikh Shawish, who says it is a restora-

tion of an institution founded by Salah-ud-Din, but

which became a Roman Catholic school, but now re-

verts to the Turkish Government. Its programme is

broad. It starts with one hundred boarders, free in-

struction, and government endowment. Secular uni-

versities are announced for Bagdad and Damascus.

The Committee of Union and Progress is at least in

some respects true to its name.

Since the increase of liberty, Moslems showed a

desire to attend the mission colleges. The largest

representation has been at the Syrian Protestant Col-

lege at Beirut, but there has been a disposition to shirk

the religious instruction.

A curious development has been the organization of

Turkish Boy Scouts. It was initiated at the War

Office, with Enver Pasha as Chief Scout. It has a

definite military object, to draw the wealthy Turks into

military life, and secondly to promote a Neo-Turanian

spirit,—to develop Turkish nationalism, to use the

Turkish language by discarding Persian and Arabic

words. For example, in the oath Allah is not used,

but Tengri, not Sultan or Padishah, but Khakan. It

is an attempt to link themselves with the great Turk-

ish race which extends to the border of China.

Maybe it is prophetic of the fact that Byzantine and

Arabian connections are about to cease.

IN EGYPT

In Egypt the influence of Europeanized Moslems

has been specially felt. Even Khedives and the present

Sultan of Egypt were educated in Europe. The Khe-

dives opened schools, normal, polytechnic, medical

and military, and for girls. They had in 1880, before

British occupation, 5,000 schools with 111,800 pupils.

Under British superintendence the system has been

enlarged on European methods. The traditional re-

ligious teaching is given to the classes. Some Mos-

lems are held firm by it, others tend to scepticism.

Some Coptic pupils under the influence of the lessons

have accepted Islam (Gairdner: “Methods, etc.,” pp.

62-63). To crown the system the National Uni-

versity has been founded on Western models. It has

considerable grants of land and endowments from

Princess Fatima Khanum. The cornerstone was laid

April 10, 1914. It is without a religious foundation.

Schools of engineering and agriculture have been

opened at Giza. At Tanta success seems to have been

attained in modernizing the Sheikh’s Mosque School.

There 3,400 students have the benefit of a course of

study including geography, history, physics, drawing,

and hygiene (S. A. Leeder, in “Veiled Mysteries of

Egypt”). Young men seem to care little for higher

education except as a means to official appointment.

Six hundred youths are in Europe for education at

their own expense, the majority of them in England.

They do not seem to attend to study, and a committee

has been appointed to have oversight of them.

Striking progress has been made in female educa-

tion. Lord Kitchener wrote in 1912: “There is noth-

ing more remarkable than the growth of public opinion

among all classes of Egyptians in favour of the edu-

cation of their daughters. The girls’ schools are

crowded, and fresh schools are to be constructed. In

1900 there were 1,640 girls in Kutabs (common

schools); in 1910, 22,000.” (Quoted by Dr. Sailer

in *Woman’s Work*.) In 1899 no girl presented her-

self for the primary certificate, in 1911 there were 43.

A Woman’s Educational Union was founded under

the patronage of the Khedive’s mother and with the co-

operation of the ladies of Cairo, with the aim of

developing education among married women. Special

lectures for them were given in the University. In

1907, in order to start a certain school, the govern-

ment enjoined its employees to send their daughters.

Now the attendance is over three hundred, and six

women teach unveiled in the presence of the male

principal (Sailer: *ibid*.). But all this is only a begin-

ning, for as yet only three Moslem women in a thou-

sand can read in Egypt.

NORTH AFRICA

In the French possessions in Africa primary schools

have been opened in which French and Arabic are

taught, with the usual course of European schools. A

Frenchwoman conducts a school largely attended by

wealthy Moslem girls, in which nothing is said of

religion. A significant incident was a strike of the

students of the Mosque of the Olive Tree at Tunis

against lazy professors and a demand for a scientific

course with geography, physics, chemistry, and like

studies. Regarding the education of Moslems in

Russia I have spoken in a former section.

IN INDIA

Moslems under these Christian governments have

come more directly and without their own initiative

under the influence of the new education. This is

especially so in India. But there the Moslems for a

long period failed to take advantage of government

schools and consequently fell behind in culture and

preparation for life. They clung to the Arabic and

Persian learning and were distanced by the Hindus.

Now they have awakened and acknowledge the value

of Western science and learning, but they are trying

to obtain the benefits without departing from Islam.

They would separate the civilization of the Christians

from their religion, take the former and repudiate

the latter. They are entering into the educational

competition with some eagerness with regard to boys,

but with luke warmness with regard to girls. Female

education is advocated by them in conferences, but no

efficient system has been organized by them, while

they still hesitate to patronize government or mission-

ary schools “as not fit places for the training of Mos-

lem girls” (*The Comrade*, quoted in the *Moslem*

*World*, 1914, p. 310). Among the schools opened for

girls is one at Lucknow in charge of a Canadian

woman, a convert to Islam. The Anjuman at Lahore

has nine girls’ schools and shows some zeal for female

education. The Moslem Educational Conference for

Southern India passed a resolution requesting the gov-

ernment to start schools “with *purdah* or curtained

conveyances for pupils.” In India but four women

in a thousand can read. Ninety-five per cent of In-

dian Mohammedans are illiterate. What a commen-

tary on a “Religion of a Book” that sixty million

Indian believers cannot read the Koran!

ANGLO-MOHAMMEDAN COLLEGE

I have already referred to the one notable attempt

of Moslems in India to promote modern learning,

the Anglo-Mohammedan College at Aligarh. It was

founded by Sayid Ahmad Khan, the promoter of

Neo-Islam, with the avowed object of “reconciling

Oriental with Western literature and science and to

make the Mussulmans of India worthy and useful

subjects of the British Crown.” Lord Lytton, viceroy,

laid the foundation in 1877 and the government aided

it. Its principal and some of its teachers are English-

men, its courses in Western sciences and languages

are standard. It gives instruction in both Sunni and

Shiah law and theology. The attendance is eight hun-

dred. Its influence on the students is liberalizing.

Dr. Murray Mitchell says (“The Great Religions of

India,” p. 240): “Under the instructions they receive,

the pupils cannot long retain their intense bigotry and

narrowness. If the college continues to prosper an

immense change must gradually take place in the Mo-

hammedans of India.” The college has been success-

ful in having a succession of intelligent and forceful

men who have elevated its position. With headquar-

ters here, there has been organized the All-India Mos-

lem Students’ Brotherhood. A project was set on

foot to develop the college into a great Moslem uni-

versity with affiliated colleges in other provinces.

Much enthusiasm was manifested. Generous sub-

scriptions were made towards the fifty *lakhs* of rupees

desired, of which Agha Khan of Bombay gave one

lakh. Some dissensions arose as to the place religious

instruction should have. Some claimed that “the

function of a Mohammedan university should be to

make a Mohammedan a genuine one, well grounded

in the doctrine and principles of Islam.” Others

claimed that “the comparative study of other reli-

gions could be safely introduced into the university.”

While they disputed and planned, the British Govern-

ment vetoed the scheme as likely to aid Pan-Islamism

without benefiting education. Subscriptions were in

part sent to the Turkish war fund. Among other

advances made by Moslems is a scientific college at

Karachi, to give technical and industrial training.

The attempt has also been made to modernize the-

ological education. A Mohammedan Educational

Conference aims to promote the cause of learning.

Of Indian Mohammedans, Professor Siraj-ud-Din

says (“Vital Forces,” p. 160) that “through their

political and educational condition, they have been

more thoroughly leavened by Western civilization

than the Mohammedans of any other community in

the world, not excepting even Turkey in Europe.”

Of Afghanistan it may be noticed that the Habibiya

or Chiefs’ College has been established in spite of

the opposition of the mullahs, and a modern hospital

opened, following the introduction of the telegraph

and telephone.

MODERN MOSLEM PRESS

Islam had and continues to have considerable intel-

lectual life of its own kind. Its old presses issue many

books by the lithographic process. Bookstores are in

all large cities, with general literature, but with a

special output of theological books. The Mujtahids

have good-sized libraries and considerable general in-

telligence. All over the Moslem world the press is

taking on new life. In Persia after the Constitution

was established, newspapers sprang up like mush-

rooms. A similar manifestation occurred in Turkey,

where 747 newspapers were started after the new ré-

gime. In Constantinople there still exist eleven dailies.

The circulation of the chief ones is the *Sabah* (Morn-

ing), 20,000; the *Tanin* (Echo), 15,000; the *Ikdam*

(Progress), 13,000; the *Yani* (New Gazette),

10,000. In India Moslem newspapers abound and

many of them have a strong reform tendency.

Monthly magazines, literary and religious reviews,

and even novels are widely circulated. Egypt has 39

dailies in Arabic, 17 literary reviews, 3 law magazines,

3 of medicine, 2 for women, 11 for religion specially.

Yearly 2,500,000 Moslem newspapers were posted

from Egypt to other Moslem lands (Zwemer). In

Russia, Moslems have journals in their various dia-

lects as they have in Algeria. Even Tunis has its

daily and an organ for the Young Tunis or National-

ist party. In South Africa and in South America like-

wise they have their journals. The press of Islam has

a powerful influence,—anti-Christian of course, often

anti-government, so that even India and Egypt have

their regulative press laws. But on the whole the

papers are instrumental in spreading new modern ideas

of life, of civilization, of science, of social and po-

litical reform. They have a great deal of fanaticism,

but they carry to all Islam convincing news of Mos-

lem defeats and increasing weakness; their accusa-

tions against their enemies and their laments telling

the tale.

TRANSLATIONS OF THE KORAN

Of some significance is the desire of the New Mos-

lems to have the Koran in the language of the people.

Mr. Farquhar says (“Modern Religious Movements

in India,” p. 439): “The Christian contention that

sacred books can be of no value unless understood

by the people has led all the movements, Jain, Sikh,

Parsee, and Moslem, as well as Hindu, to produce

translations of the sacred books they use and to write

all fresh books in the vernacular.” It is true that the

Koran has been translated in the past by Moslems

into their own tongues, though objected to by the

Hanafi School. These are interlinear translations of

a literal, non-idiomatic kind, in Persian, Urdu,

Pushto, Javanese, Malayan, Turkish, and other

tongues. Now the effort is being made to have freer

popular vernacular translations. One of these has

been made in Urdu by a well-known novelist, Mulvi

Nazir Ahmad (Canon Weitbrecht: “*Moslem World*

of To-day,” p. 197). A new version in Turkish was

in part published in Constantinople lately, but it was

quickly suppressed, as likely to lead to unbelief. A

similar fate overtook the Turkish translation forty

years ago.

Regarding this educational and literary movement,

several things are worthy of attention. It is caused

by the example of the Christian world. The stimulus

is the knowledge of the benefits accruing to Christian

lands and even to the Christian subjects of Moslem

rulers. Not a little of the latter is due to missionary

institutions. Another fact is that the new education

is out of the hands of the mullahs and ignores their

dicta. As to method, it grounds primary training

on the plain vernacular,—on the modern Persian, not

on that of Saadi and Hafiz, on the Turkish of the

people, Osmanli, Azerbaijani, Tekki as the region may

require. It teaches the colloquial Arabic, using even

the readers of the Beirut Mission Press. It strives to

reform the chirography and make correspondence and

business easy. It teaches European languages, disre-

garding the old saying of the mullahs that “he who

learns the language of the Frank is an infidel.” It

gives the enlightening benefit of physical science. It

quotes approvingly a tradition attributed to Moham-

med: “Go forth in search of learning, even if you

have to go as far as China.” It is founded on the

belief that knowledge is power and that they should

share with the Christians the secret of this power.

Their eagerness makes them apt pupils. The effect on

their condition and religious attitude is marked. It

results in discontent with their social and political en-

vironment and almost as certainly in a modification in

their religious thought. Young Moslems are liberal-

ized. The bonds of religious tradition are loosened.

Yet some Moslems scorn the possibility of any injuri-

ous effect as far as their faith is concerned. M. T.

Kadirbhoy writes: “It is possible that religious en-

thusiasts may cry that science, and especially Western

science, may exercise a sceptic influence on the Moslem

mind. The possibility is too remote to cause any ap-

prehension. So fast does the Moslem hold to the word

of the Prophet and the Koran that no amount of

sceptical influence will ever serve to lessen his devo-

tion to his religion and to his God. Youths may

put the new wine of the West into the old bottles of

the East, keeping the colour and quality of the bottle

unimpaired” (*Moslem World*, 1912, p. 304). Of

more weight is the opinion of Lord Cromer (“Mod-

ern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 230), who declares that the

Europeanized Moslem loses his Islamism, cuts adrift

from his creed while retaining its lax morality, does

not approach Christianity, is intolerant, hates Chris-

tians as rivals and because those who are in contact

with him deserve to be hated. “European civilization

destroys one religion without substituting another.”

What a strong argument this is that the Church should

give them the truth of Christ along with our civiliza-

tion. Dr. J. A. Oldham, in a review of the condition

of the Islamic world (*International Review of Mis-*

*sions*, 1914, p. 46), says: “The disintegration of Is-

lam and the growth of unbelief among the educated

classes are proceeding at an accelerated rate and

are likely to increase with the growth of foreign

influence.”

**VII**

**NEO-ISLAM AND SOCIETY**

BY general agreement Islam is a failure as a

social system. Those familiar with the con-

ditions it has brought about, and especially

with the low position of woman and the estimate put

upon her, are frankly hopeless of any true reform

unless these conditions are changed. Stanley Lane-

Poole says (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 101): “As a

social system Islam is a complete failure. The degra-

dation of woman is a canker which has eaten into the

whole system; it has misunderstood the relation of the

sexes, and by degrading woman has degraded each

successive generation of their children down an in-

creasing scale of infamy and corruption.” Lord

Cromer asks: “Can any one conceive of the existence

of true European civilization, on the assumption that

the position which woman occupies in Europe be de-

ducted from the general plan? As well can a man

blind from his birth be made to conceive the exist-

ence of colour. The position of woman in Moham-

medan countries is therefore a fatal obstacle to the

attainment of that elevation of thought and charac-

ter.” Intelligent Moslems have arrived at the same

judgment. An educated Turk said to Sir Edwin

Pears (“Turkey and Its People,” p. 57): “No re-

form is possible, because we have no family life. You

may believe in the possibility of Turkish reforms

when you see Turkish husbands and wives, arm in

arm, on Galata bridge,—that is, when we Turks re-

spect and trust our women.”

The hopelessness of the case lies in this, that this

dark blot has been indelibly stamped on Islam by the

Koran and the example of the Prophet. He has

fixed the standard. It is a man-made religion for

man.

WOMAN’S POSITION BEFORE ISLAM

There is much to show that Islam brought woman

into a more degraded and debased condition. Her

social status under the Arabs in the “time of igno-

rance” was higher than after Mohammed. Prof.

Robertson Smith says (“Kinship and Marriage

in Ancient Arabia,” p. 100): “It is very remarkable

that the place of woman in the family and in society

has steadily declined under his [Mohammed’s] law.

… The Arabs themselves recognize that the posi-

tion of woman has fallen.” Similarly Stanley Lane-

Poole testifies (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 23): “In

the desert woman was regarded as she has never since

been viewed by Moslems. The modern haram sys-

tem was undreamt of; the maid of the desert was un-

fettered by the ruinous restrictions of modern life

in the East. She was free to choose her husband and

to bind him to have no other wife than herself. She

might receive male visitors, even strangers, without

suspicion.” Dr. Zwemer corroborates this, saying

(“Islam, etc.,” p. 6): “The use of the veil was almost

unknown in Arabia before Islam, nor did the haram

system prevail.” At the present time the same fact

is seen. In the East Indies and some parts of Africa

the advent of Islam brings further degradation to

woman. Professor Westermann says: “The posi-

tion of woman among the Shilluks [heathen of the

Sudan] is no doubt a higher one than with most

Mohammedan people of the Sudan. She is shown re-

markable respect. Women sometimes take part in

public assemblies with the men, discuss affairs, share

in the dances and religious ceremonies.” In these the

young men and girls meet each other face to face

and eye to eye, dancing in harmony. Dr. C. R. Wat-

son testifies that the position of woman seems in-

variably to be lowered (“The Sorrow and Hope of

the Sudan,” p. 189): “In pagan communities a

woman, especially an unmarried woman, may go about

and be quite safe from all molestation. Not so after

the introduction of Islam … her person is safer

under paganism than under Islam.” In the Dutch East

Indies woman was held in higher esteem in pre-

Islamic days. This is evident among the recent con-

verts. It has lowered the privileges of women and

disintegrated family life. Where tribal customs

punished adultery, frowned on divorce, and confined

polygamy to the higher classes, Islam has relaxed

these beneficial customs. Especially loose divorce

has injured the position of woman. “Contempt for

woman has fallen to a point even below the zero of

moral esteem for woman in heathenism” (Simon,

p. 184). Another witness is Sir William Ramsay.

He says (“Impressions of Turkey, etc.,” p. 49):

“The Turkish tribes originally did not practise the

seclusion of women. They learned the custom from

the Arabs and the Koran.”

POLYGAMY AND DIVORCE UNDER ISLAM

What is the position of woman under orthodox

Islam? What is the attitude of the New Moslems?

The orthodox claim superiority for their law in this

as in all matters. The *Muslim Review* asserts that

Islam “sets a purer and more divine standard of do-

mestic life” than any other. Specifically it is claimed

that Mohammed limited polygamy, prohibited mar-

riages within certain degrees, made women heirs, pro-

hibited widows from being regarded as part of the

estate to be disposed of as chattels, gave them power

over their own property brought at the time of mar-

riage, provided for the maintenance of children and

abolished infanticide.1 Allowing due credit for what-

ever good it wrought, the facts are that Islam per-

petuated and sanctioned the degradation of women

and increased it. It allows a man four wives and as

many concubines and slave women as he can obtain.

The wives can be divorced at the whim or caprice of

the man on condition of paying over a dowry, usually

small. According to his desire he may take the di-

vorced wife back twice without condition, but after

the third divorce he cannot take her back until she

has been married and divorced by another man.

Loose divorce works more evil than polygamy. In

the street near me in Tabriz lived two men, one rich,

1 Stanley Lane-Poole (“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 24) says,

“Infanticide, which is commonly attributed to the whole Arab

race, before Islam was exceedingly rare in the desert.”

the other poor. The former, a sayid, was in the habit

of marrying pretty young girls and sending them

away with their dowry, when his fancy tired of them.

He had reached the thirtieth when I left Persia. The

poor young man astonished us more by the facility

with which he yearly took and divorced a new wife.

He only kept one at a time and apparently most of

the time had to go in debt to pay the dowry. Of

this feature of Islam, Lane in his “Modern Egyp-

tians” says (chap, vi): “While no more than one hus-

band in twenty has two wives at the same time, there

are many men who in the course of ten years have

married as many as twenty, thirty, or more wives;

and women not far advanced in age who have been

wives of a dozen or more men successively.” A Mos-

lem of prominence has affirmed that ninety-five per

cent, of Mohammedan wives in Egypt are sooner or

later divorced; in other words, only five women in a

hundred remain with their first husband. In that

same country there is one divorce to three marriages,

even though a man may keep the wife and take three

others. There is a Moslem saying that “a woman is

like an old pair of shoes; a man throws her away

and buys another as long as his money lasts.” One

youth divorced his twenty-eighth wife. He justified

himself by saying, “Why not? My father divorced

thirty-eight.”

A disgrace of Shiahism is the temporary marriage,

*mutaa*. Under the sanction of religion and with the

blessing of the mullah the contract wife is taken for

a day or for a year. (See author’s “Persian Life and

Customs,” p. 263.) Mrs. Major Sykes, who lived at

Meshed, brings new testimony to the prevalence of

this abomination at the Holy Shrine of the Imam

Reza, where many temporary wives are kept for the

pilgrims. She adds: “This is common throughout

the country and is a potent factor in the degradation

of the womanhood of Persia.”

This disgrace of Shiahism is surpassed by the black

stain of forcible concubinage which lies against the

Sunnis.1 Hear these vigorous words of Lane-Poole

(“Studies in a Mosque,” p. 105): “One cannot for-

get the unutterable brutalities inflicted on the con-

quered nations in the taking of slaves. The Moslem

soldier was allowed to do as he pleased with any ‘in-

fidel’ woman he might meet in his victorious march.

When one thinks of the thousands of women,

mothers, and daughters who must have suffered un-

told shame and dishonour by this license, he cannot

find words to express his horror.” Such, sanctioned

by the example of Mohammed, has been the record

since the conquest of Persia, when slave girls were a

drug in the markets of Arabia, till the days of the

Armenian Massacres and the Holy War of 1915.

THE SECLUSION OF WOMEN

Another element in the degraded condition of the

Moslem woman is her seclusion. She is confined in

the haram, behind walls and lattices, and, if means

permit, in a separate court-yard. She is veiled when

she appears on the street. This veiling is in varying

1 The disgraceful conduct of Persian Shiahs in Urumia in ab-

ducting Christian women in January, 1915, makes it necessary to

include them in this condemnation also.

degrees, reaching its extreme in Persia, where the

whole person is absolutely covered, and neither the

hands, head, nor even the flash of the eye can be

seen. The jealousy of Mohammed caused the com-

mand of the Koran which requires the seclusion of

women and his example enforced it (Surah XXXIII,

55). Dr. Watson writes: “Where faith in chastity

ended, the seclusion of women began.” Mohammed’s

order for veiling is sometimes attributed to the Zaid-

Zainab incident. Persians say that one day Moham-

med was seated with Ayesha, when a passing Arab,

admiring her beauty, offered Mohammed a camel

in exchange for her, and this produced the order for

veiling. He formed into law customs which pertained

previously to kings and grandees, so that they became

as the will of God. Only Kurds, Beduins, and wild

tribes among Moslems have disregarded the law. In

India many women never leaves their harams. One

caliph in Egypt even prohibited the making of shoes

for women, that they might not be able to go out of

doors. A man does not allude to his wife in conver-

sation nor inquire for yours. If under some neces-

sity to mention her, he uses a euphemism as “the

mother of Zaid” or “the children.” The effect of

this seclusion is to limit the mental development of

women, to cramp and crush their lives. The inviola-

bility of the haram is even made a plea to prevent

proper sanitation and quarantine in case of cholera

and plague. It has an injurious effect on the children

and is answerable for the lower intelligence and slow

progress of the men. The mothers are incapable of

the best training of the children. Sir William Ram-

say (“Impressions, etc., p. 41) says: “In the condi-

tion of the Turkish women lies the reason for the

steady degeneration of the Turkish people. They are

poorer both in physique and mind than the Christians,

—a stunted and impoverished motherhood produces a

poor and diminishing people.”

Some Moslems maintain that the seclusion of their

women is an advantage—that it conduces to their hap-

piness, the continuance of the marriage union, re-

moves causes of jealousy, and protects females from

insult. One of them said in jocose vein, “No Mos-

lem sees any woman save his own wife, so he thinks

her the prettiest one that lives.”

NEO-ISLAM ON WOMAN

What is the attitude of New Moslems to woman

and her position in the family and in society? It is

truly remarkable and is a radical departure from

traditional Islam. The movement advocates freedom

for women. I will first notice modern interpreta-

tions and opinions with reference to woman and then

some changes which are evident in her condition in

Moslem lands.

The position of Neo-Islam in India is strongly

stated by Sayid Amir Ali in his books, “Mohamme-

dan Law” (Preface, and pp. 21, 159, 226) and the

“Legal Position of Woman in Islam.” He declares

that polygamy is not a part of Islam, that “the law

forbids a second union during the subsistence of the

former contract.” He argues that since the Koran

requires that the husband should deal justly and

equally with his several wives, and since fulfilment of

this requirement is an impossibility, it amounts to a

prohibition. He pronounces polygamy an unendur-

able and unmitigated evil, which must necessarily

cease to exist. He says (“Spirit of Islam,” p. 365):

“I look upon polygamy in the present day as an adul-

terous connection and contrary to the spirit of Islam

—an opinion which is shared by a large number of

Moslems.” He and other modernists deny the law of

divorce or repudiation as held and practised by Mos-

lems, and argue that Mohammed meant that divorce

should be founded on the charge of adultery and

should be carried out only by granting a regular bill

of divorcement and also that the seclusion of women

was a recommendation, not a law obligatory and per-

petual. A modified view is taken by Sheikh Abdul

Kadir, who says: “The Koran recommends the man

to restrict himself to one wife and imposes on the

polygamous the obligation of treating his alike and

equitably. By these difficulties which the law

throws in his way very rarely can a man venture to

do it, unless he is drawn to it by extreme necessity

such as barrenness or sickness of his wife, or his ab-

sence from home or unless he is a voluptuary or, like

the holy patriarch, through a desire to multiply the

human species. Another learned Mohammedan

leader put on the title-page of his book the words,

“Listen to me, if your ears are not deaf; on no ac-

count marry two wives, for a man has not two hearts

in his breast” (“Vital Forces,” p. 173).

A Moslem writer in the *Journal of Reformed*

*Islam* strenuously combats the use of the veil and pre-

sents many reasons for its abolition (Margoliouth’s

“Mohammedanism,” p. 136). In the female educa-

tional section of the Moslem League in India, Maulvi

Shibli maintained from an Islamic point of view

equality of rights and opportunity for woman; and

others agreed with him. Some held that seclusion in

the haram is a custom, not a command of religion;

that the Koran commanded the Prophet’s wives only

should be veiled and secluded. Though the Koran

says (Surah IV, 8): “Men are superior to women

on account of the qualities with which God has gifted

the one above the other,” yet Justice Abdur Rahim

of India says: “God has endowed women with intel-

lectual gifts as much as men. Islamic laws accord

the same status to women as men,” and that Moslems

“are proud of the liberal spirit of their religion and

laws.”

These modernist interpretations do not change our

conception of what real Islamic law is. Their casuis-

try does not alter the historic Shariat nor convince us

contrary to facts. But it is deeply significant that this

effort is made to reconcile the Shariat with modern

ideas. It indicates progress of thought in Islam.

MOSLEM WOMEN’S POSITION IMPROVING

Significant also is the modification in practice with

regard to woman. Her day of emancipation is per-

ceptibly nearer. Regarding polygamy, testimony is

practically unanimous that it is declining. Combined

with the growing feeling that it is unlawful or inex-

pedient, many extraneous circumstances are tending

to root it out from among Moslems. “Large num-

bers place in the marriage contract a formal renuncia-

tion on the part of the husband of any right to con-

tract a second contemporaneous marriage.”

In India not more than three per cent of the Mos-

lems are polygamous. In Egypt monogamy has been

gaining ground (Cromer: “Modern Egypt;” Gif-

fen: “Islam and Missions,” p. 297). Ismiel Khedive

had many wives and concubines. His successor Tew-

fik had but one. The last Khedive had but one for

many years, but later took a second, a Christian

woman whom he turned into a Moslem. The Khe-

dive Tewfik said to De Guerville: “The custom of

having several wives is rapidly disappearing. The

principal reasons are the abolition of slavery and the

increased cost of living.” Of Turkey Sir Edwin

Pears declares (p. 68): “The habit of having more

wives than one is decreasing. The influence of the

West is having its effect.” The Young Turks are

almost all monogamists. In Persia no doubt the same

tendency is at work, though I can hardly endorse the

opinion of Mrs. Major Sykes (“Persia and Its Peo-

ple,” p. 75), that “polygamy is becoming rare in

Iran. Persians speak of it as unfashionable.” This

is to be attributed partly to poverty and partly to the

worry of rival wives; according to the proverb, “Two

tigresses in a house are better than two mistresses.”

Woman is also being released from her seclusion,

slowly but surely. Fortunately in certain outlying

countries of Islam, it has not yet succeeded in shutting

up woman in the haram. This is true in Malaysia.

There primitive customs continue and woman is per-

mitted to go about freely and unveiled, and to con-

verse with men who are not relatives. In China, too,

women do not live in seclusion nor wear the veil.

Yet they do not go to the mosque. They bind their

feet like the Chinese heathen women. In Russia Mos-

lem women have greater freedom than under their

own rulers. Some have adopted certain Christian so-

cial customs, like receiving men visitors, riding about

and travelling with their husbands. They are trained

in the Russian gymnasia and normal schools and

universities, teach school, practise medicine, are ad-

mitted to the bar, hold conventions, and have the te-

merity to request the ballot in the Communes. This

movement is widely extended, on the Volga, in the

Crimea and Caucasus, and even among the Kirghiz

(*International Review of Missions*, 1915, p. 39; *Mos-*

*lem World*, 1914, p. 264). In India a society of

young men has been organized with the object of do-

ing away with the veil. They are making a propa-

ganda to this end. A bride and groom lately drove

off in a vehicle together, the bride with her face un-

covered. Freedom, which has become common

among Hindu and Parsee women, is scarcely allowed

among Moslems, who have been largely responsible

for much of the seclusion which has existed among

the others. Yet a Conference of Moslem ladies has

met at the same time and place as the men’s Educa-

tional Conference, to promote the education of girls.

In Egypt agitation for the freedom of woman is

active. A leader in this movement was the late

Kasim Bey Amin, whose books, “The Emancipation

of Woman,” “The New Woman,” and “The Veil,”

have been eagerly read by men and women alike. In

these writings twentieth-century ideas of woman are

advocated and the evil effects of Moslem customs are

set forth. A society for the abolition of the veil is

working. The debate in the press, pro and con, is

active and full of vim. The old and the new are clash-

ing in discussion. But as yet even those women who

have been educated in Europe must conform to cus-

tom and live in seclusion. An exception was the Prin-

cess Nazli Fazil Khanum, a descendant of Moham-

med Ali Pasha, who refused to be bound by the re-

strictions of the haram and mixed freely in the so-

ciety of men and women, yet retained the respect of

the devotees of Islam. She was very proficient in

Arabic, Turkish, English, and French. She resided

in Paris and other European capitals as wife of the

Turkish Ambassador Khallil Pasha Sherif. After

his death her house in Cairo became a celebrated

salon, where many great men and ladies were received

with honour. Her conversational powers were of a

high order and her influence on politics elevating.

She was an ardent advocate of freedom and her words

had power in Turkey as well as in Egypt.

In Persia discussion prevails, but with little change

as yet. A woman who, some years ago in Tabriz,

ventured in the street with the semi-veil of Constanti-

nople, was promptly warned by the Mujtahid that if

she did so again, she would be beaten. The girls’

schools, either native or mission, are scarcely securely

established outside of the Capital. Girls do not at-

tend with boys as in Turkey. For a girl to appear on

the platform of the Mission School, even thickly

veiled, to receive her diploma, was a great innovation

in Teheran. The contrast with the Christian girls

caused some comment in the Persian newspapers

showing that they had aspirations for freedom for

their girls. During the Revolution, Persian women

organized patriotic clubs and secret societies, a dozen

or more of them, in the Capital, and watched keenly,

even with veiled eyes, the course of events. They

were ardent supporters of liberty, acting as inform-

ants for Mr. Morgan Shuster, intriguing for the Con-

stitutional party. At the final crisis the veiled women

invaded the House of Parliament, daggers in hand,

and threatened the deputies if they yielded the liber-

ties of their country.

In Turkey the movement for the emancipation of

woman has made definite progress. Sultan Abdul

Hamid did not repress female education, evidently

thinking woman a negligible factor. In Constanti-

nople and the coast cities, the education of girls made

considerable progress. Until they are eight or ten

years of age they are allowed to go with the boys.

Some families have had European governesses from

whom the girls learned European languages and im-

bibed European ideals. For some this was a means

of excellent culture, for others the result was a mim-

icry of French styles in dress and a taste for reading

of romances. One of these governesses afterwards

opened up a private school for Moslem girls in Beirut.

It was patronized by the well-to-do of the city. The

result of the Christian spirit in the school was so

great upon the girls and their training so effective in

character, that during the period of several score

years, in which many of the girls became wives of

Moslems, not one of them was divorced and not one

of them had the humiliation of having a companion

wife brought to vex her. Constantinople (American)

College was not permitted to receive Moslem girls in

Abdul Hamid’s time. One, however, Halidah Salih,

daughter of the Sultan’s treasurer, finished her course

of study. She is proficient in French and English,

and has become a writer of distinction and the “lead-

ing woman in Turkey in popularity and influence.”

For her first book, a translation of “The Mother in

the Home,” she was decorated by the Sultan. Her

articles frequently appear in the press. She wears a

veil in public, but is unveiled before men in her own

house. She is a member of the Young Turk Com-

mittee of Union and Progress, and was marked as a

victim in the counter-revolution, but was not found

by the assassins. Another advanced Turkish woman

is Balkis Shevket Khanum, up-to-date editor of the

*Kadinlar Dunyasi* (The Woman’s World) of Con-

stantinople. To be up with man in everything, she

took a flight in an aeroplane with Fathi Bey. The

paper had in one issue a front-page illustration of a

group of unveiled Moslem women. Later the paper

was suppressed. The educated Turkish women took

a special part in the Revolution. Their reading had

led them to deep sympathy with liberty and progress.

Being largely exempted from the espionage from

which men suffered so much, they were able to aid

the cause greatly. After the downfall of despotism,

the women had a taste of freedom. Some appeared

unveiled, rode with open face in carriages and walked

about at the watering places and parks, made speeches

in the hall of the University, formed clubs and circles

for discussion and enlightenment, corresponded with

the newspapers, and even organized two feminist

journals. Yet, according to the best testimony (Sir

Edwin Pears, p. 66), they acted with modesty and

discretion and their speech showed remarkable cul-

ture and wisdom. Yet the shock to the conservatism

of Islam was too great, and a handle was given the

reactionaries to work against Constitutionalism. An

order was therefore issued by the Commandant of

the city: “Whereas women are forbidden to go in

public places in costumes unbecoming with reference

to national customs and Moslem morals, those who

infringe this regulation will be arrested by detective

agents and severely punished, according to the laws.”

So restraint was put upon the women but not success-

fully, as appears from the journal *Tasfiri Efkiar*

(Orient), September 6, 1914. It says: “Certain

of our women, not appreciating the situation, and in

spite of reiterated orders from the military authori-

ties, dress themselves in an unsuitable way and one

calculated to seriously offend the religious sentiments

and national customs. In the name of the well-being

of the country we call upon the military authorities

to make a few exemplary punishments.” Professor

Cheyne (“Reconciliation of Races and Religions,” p.

116) mentions that forty of the boldest women were

arrested and exiled to Acca. I have seen no confir-

mation of this report. When telephones were intro-

duced, of one hundred or more operators, seven

were Moslem girls. It is said they became clerks, not

because of necessity, for they were daughters of of-

ficials, but to open the way for Moslem women to en-

gage in honest labour. They do not wear the *char-*

*shab*. During the Balkan war the women held and

addressed large mass-meetings, and acted as nurses

of the Red Crescent. The establishment of homes on

Christian or Western models is set before them as a

desideratum. The old haram life is no longer con-

sidered praiseworthy nor commendable. In Syria,

too, much the same condition prevails. Men are no

longer willing to marry a bride unseen. It has be-

come the habit to advocate the elevation of women

and to strive for the amelioration of social life. The

injunction of the Koran to scourge refractory wives,

interpreted by the Shariat to mean that he shall not

give her less than three nor more than thirty lashes,

is one of which the modern Moslem is somewhat

ashamed. Already the switch has replaced the bas-

tinado—the switch itself has dry rot. Effort is also

being made in Turkey to put down the white-slave

traffic. A Turkish newspaper says (*The Moslem*

*World*, 1914, p. 268): “The East will not be elevated

until woman is elevated and restored to the position

she once occupied. The fall of Moslem womanhood

has been the great reason for the fall of the whole na-

tion, and her education and uplift are necessary if the

nation is to regain its lost position.”

THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AMONG MOSLEMS

The Koran and the Shariat definitely ordain and

regulate slavery, yet the abolition of slavery and the

slave trade is going steadily forward in Islam. This

is largely due to the influence of Christian govern-

ments. But the effort commends itself to the con-

science of modern Moslems. In those lands directly

under Christian rule the abolition has been accom-

plished. An act of the Indian Legislature abolished

slavery in 1843. In 1877 Lord Vivian entered into

a convention with the Egyptian Government forbid-

ding the slave trade or the sale of slaves from family

to family, providing for the gradual manumission

of slaves and for the right of the slave to claim his

liberty through the government. Slave-trade in the

Egyptian Sudan was suppressed after many years of

effort; slavery is being superseded by paid service. It

was ended in Zanzibar in 1897 and nominally in Af-

ghanistan in 1895 by treaty. Persia has entered into

treaty for its abolition. Russia has accomplished the

same among her Moslem subjects and, by treaty, in

Khiva and Bukhara. The Osmanlis enslaved many

from the Christian races of the Balkans, of the Greeks

and Armenians. Less than two hundred years ago

they carried off one hundred thousand German and

Magyar woman in a single campaign. By the Consti-

tution of 1876 slavery was abolished in Turkey. In

1890 the Sultan signed the declaration of the Anti-

slavery Conference, held at Brussels, by seventeen na-

tions, “of a firm intention to put an end to the crimes

and devastation engendered by traffic in African

slaves.” Renewal of the Constitution in 1908

brought the abolition again into effect. Though slav-

ery still exists, both of concubines and eunuchs, it is

gradually being brought to an end. The auction of

slaves still continues in the public square of Mecca

and existed in Morocco till French occupation. To

supply these marts and the secret traffic the trade still

goes on in Central Africa (Professor Westermann,

*International Review of Missions*, 1913, p. 481).

In 1909, pilgrim caravans via Molfi, Western Sudan,

carried through nearly three thousand women and

children to be sold as slaves. It appears, however,

that slavery will be brought to a close in Islam. There

will be no modification of the Shariat, but the expense,

the cessation of war captives, the force of moral sen-

timent are all working with the influence of Christian

governments to accomplish its complete abolition.

MODERNISM AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Neo-Islam professes to stand for religious liberty

and it is no doubt more liberal than the orthodox

party. But the words of its expounders are far from

the ideal. Justice Amir Ali, after a long defence of

Mohammedanism in an historical view, concludes:

“We deny altogether that Islam ever grasped the

sword for the purpose of proselyting. Islam never

persecuted” (“Life of Mohammed,” pp. 212-15).

If such is the decision of an enlightened, anglicized

High Justice of British India—a reformer—we may

well despair of any appeal to history in reasoning with

a Moslem. Yet notwithstanding this, there is un-

doubtedly among the New Moslems a modification

of the fanatical spirit. Practically they do have a

more friendly feeling to Christians. Not only in In-

dia, but in Teheran, in Beirut, in Constantinople, in

Cairo, there are tens of thousands who do not believe

in injuring the Moslem converted to Christianity, who

would not lift a finger to execute the law which de-

crees death to the apostate. There is a wide preva-

lence of the spirit of toleration. There has been a

marked change, a change encouraging to Christian

missions. The mental attitude of intelligent Mos-

lems has been modified. This change may be due

partly to indifference, partly to the relaxing of his

own faith, partly to his enlightenment and a real ap-

preciation of the right of the individual conscience

to decide its belief. Many Young Turks and Persian

Nationalists have personally clear conceptions of and

belief in liberty of conscience, did not questions of

politics and national aspirations get inextricably

mixed up with religion. Persian Sufis are natural

friends of religious liberty. There are many forces

working in Islam bringing about freedom of con-

science. Even the Ulema of Turkey, says Sir Edwin

Pears (p. 395), “are beginning to be under the in-

fluence of Western ideas, and the day is coming when

even the ignorant Moslem will not consider it meri-

torious to kill a Christian. … There is promise of

continued though slow improvement.”

THE FUTURE OF NEO-ISLAM

I have considered Neo-Islam in detail,—a move-

ment which aims to adopt Western science and educa-

tion, change the status of woman, and bring Moslem

law into conformity to Western civilization. What

will be the effect of this movement? Will Islam be

changed? Will it be freed from the shackles of tra-

dition and brought into conformity to modern

thought? It is impossible to reach an absolute con-

clusion. Undoubtedly there is a trend towards trans-

formation. Regarding many Islamic peoples, this

opinion rests upon impressions made upon observers.

Even in India, where there is much more public dis-

cussion and publication of views, competent witnesses

differ as to the conditions. Rev. W. A. Wilson de-

clares (“Islam and Missions,” p. 149), that the

New Islam largely moulds Mohammedan thought.

On the other hand, Canon Sell thinks that the in-

fluence of the movement is waning and conservatism

is reviving.

Lord Cromer expresses strong doubts of the pos-

sibility of Islam reforming. The difficulty of bring-

ing Islam and its ways into harmony with modern

society is comparable to squaring the circle, in his

judgment. He says (“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p.

184): “Let no practical politician think that he has

a plan capable of resuscitating a body which is not in-

deed dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries,

but which is nevertheless politically and socially mori-

bund, and whose decay cannot be arrested by any

modern palliatives however skilfully they may be ap-

plied.” “One could not make the Egyptian horse

drink of the waters of civilization, albeit the most

limpid streams of reform were turned into the trough

before him. It has yet to be proved that Islam can

assimilate civilization without succumbing in the

process. It is not improbable that in its passage

through the European crucible, many of the distinc-

tive features of Islam, the good and the bad alike,

may be volatilized, and that it will eventually issue

forth in a form scarcely capable of recognition.”

Thus after wavering, he reaches the conclusion that

Islam will probably change, but he adds: “It should

never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed,

that is to say, that Islam reformed is Islam no longer.

It is something else, and we cannot tell yet what it

eventually will be” (pp. 175, 161). Professor Mac-

Donald expects modifications in Islam, and says (*In-*

*ternational Review of Missions*, 1913, p. 597): “It

is never well to underestimate the strange power that

a religion has of transforming itself in adaptation to

new situations.” Similarly Professor Margoliouth

says (“Mohammedanism,” p. 224): “What is to be

expected is not the supersession nor the abolition of

Islam, but its accommodation to the conditions im-

posed upon the world by European science.” May

we not suppose that a reformed Islam will bear such

a relation to the Koran and the Traditions as Re-

formed Judaism bears to the Torah and the Talmud?

It will bear the name and heritage of Islam, acknowl-

edge its creed and book, and have an anti-Christian

spirit, whatever may be its change of methods and

weapons. Christianity can expect no spiritual vic-

tory by the forces of civilization. As Islam opened

its doors to take in and take on Greco-Syrian and

Persian civilizations and showed itself capable of

adapting itself to the higher condition in Bagdad and

Spain and bearing fruit by this grafted culture, so it

may do again. Whether Islam is being changed or

not, it is certain that Moslems are changing. Num-

bers of them have broken away from the old tradi-

tions and practices. They stoutly maintain that they

are Moslems, and will likely continue to do so. But

their old adherence to Islam as a body of laws for the

state, as a hard-and-fast rule for social life, is pass-

ing. The universal sway of fanaticism, the belief in

the obligation to persecute, is going. There are few

signs of the rejection of Islam as an outward profes-

sion. But more and more a condition is being reached

in which the community will divide into religious, in-

different, and irreligious—a condition in which those

who wish to, can openly neglect the rites of religion

and be unmolested, when those who allegorize or ra-

tionalize the Koran and its system shall be held ac-

countable to no court or judge and physical penalties

shall not be inflicted for unbelief nor a new belief.

There will be open toleration within Islam, to be fol-

lowed by open acquiescence in apostasy from Islam.

Popular opinion has accepted this in many places un-

der Christian rule, and is not far from accepting it

in some communities under Moslem rule. New Islam

in practice has wider acceptance than as a system of

doctrines. Dr. Young of Aden takes a most hope-

ful view (“Islam and Missions,” p. 126): “The

time has come,” he says, “for a general advance, and

when that advance begins, the cleavage in Islam will

widen and a new form of Islam will arise with subtler

doctrines and purer life,” but, he adds with mission-

ary vision, “even that must finally give way before

the higher life of true Christianity.” Expecting this

consummation, we must sow the seed of Christian

truth. It is a critical time for Islamic peoples. The

call is for strenuous effort to direct the thought and

conscience of Moslems to the Source of true reform.

**VIII**

**POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AMONG**

**MOSLEMS**

IN the political world of Islam the most striking

fact is the subjection of Moslem lands to Chris-

tian rule. The phrase “the disintegration of

Islam” is sometimes used, but whether Islam is dis-

integrating may be questioned, yet of the disintegra-

tion of the empire of Islam there is no doubt. This

movement had begun before the last century in the

freeing of Spain, Hungary, and Russia from Moslem

dominion, yet this was rather an escape of Christian

countries from subjection. This latter period has

been characterized not only by further liberation of

Christian peoples, but by the conquest and subjection

of Moslem peoples (see table on p. 219) by Christian

governments. Moslem lands in Africa have passed

under Christian sway; its vast territory is divided.

Its European empire has decreased to a small strip,

and the present war will likely result in pulling down

the Star and the Crescent from the last stronghold of

Islam in Europe—the beautiful, the unique city of

Constantinople. Even Persia is but semi-independent,

being divided into spheres of influence between

Russia and Great Britain. The rapidity of this de-

cline may be seen in the striking contrast between the

present condition and that existing when I went to

Persia. At that time Rev. Dr. H. H. Jessup stated

before the General Assembly that 50 millions out of

the 175 millions of Moslems, or twenty-nine per cent,

were under Christian rule. Now there are 170 mil-

lions, or eighty-five per cent, under Christian rule,

and only seventeen per cent under Moslem rule. Rus-

sia, France, and Holland each rule over many more

Moslems than does the Sultan of Turkey, and Great

Britain over five times as many. Islamic rulers hold

sway over but one twenty-second part of the earth’s

surface, while Christian Powers rule over nineteen

twenty-seconds. The sword-arm of Islam is withered,

its mighty empire has faded away. Pan-Islamism

cannot save it; the jihad cannot save it; the old battle-

cry, “Allah Akbar” (“God is Great”), cannot save

it, for God wills that its intolerant, despotic sway

should cease.

ADJUSTMENT OF MOSLEMS TO CHRISTIAN RULE

How has this condition been brought about? By

fierce and bloody wars of conquest. In this we cannot

see the spirit of Christ. Moslems have made heroic

resistance under such leaders as Sheikh Abdul Kadir

in Algeria and Schamyl in Daghestan, or of mad mul-

lahs and Mahdis. But they meet in vain the modern

armour of the European Powers. Everywhere ma-

chine-guns have been victorious against the poorly

equipped troops of Islam. Their courageous leaders,

undaunted by defeat, have either fallen in vain attack

or languished in exile as pensioners of the conquerors.

Sometimes these conquests have been made in ruth-

less disregard of the rights of humanity and with too

TABLE OF TERRITORY FREED FROM ISLAMIC RULE

SINCE 1800

DATE COUNTRY OR PROVINCE To WHOM CEDED

I. Caucasus and Transcaucasus

1800 Georgia from Persia Russia

1813 Darband, Shirwan, Baku, Karadagh from Persia   
 Russia

1813 Sovereignty of Caspian Sea from Persia Russia

1828 Erivan, Nakhejevan, etc., from Persia Russia

1829 Poti, Anapa, and Circassian coast from Turkey Russia

1878 Batum, Kars, Ardahan from Turkey Russia

II. Central Asia

1844 Kirghiz Russia

1864 Samarcand Russia

1868 Khohand and Bukhara Russia

1873 Khiva Russia

1881 Merv Russia

1891 Part of Khorassan from Persia Russia

III. Southern Asia

1799 Nizam's Dominions, India Great Britain

1803 Mogul Empire, India Great Britain

1824 Straits Settlements Great Britain

1830 Dutch Rule consolidated

Holland

1839 Aden and Arabian Coast Great Britain

1843 Sinde, India Great Britain

1849 Punjab and Kashmere Great Britain

1856 Oudh Great Britain

1876 Baluchistan Protectorate Great Britain

IV. Europe

1829 Greece and Servia granted independence

1858 Wallachia and Moldavia from Turkey Rumania

1878 Bessarabia from Turkey Russia

1878 Cyprus Great Britain

1878 Bosnia and Herzegovina (annexed 1908) Austria

1878 Greece, Servia, Montenegro, and Rumania en-

larged.

1878 Bulgaria formed from Turkey Bulgaria

1885 East Rumelia from Turkey Bulgaria

1898 Crete autonomous from Turkey

1912 Crete annexed Greece

1912 Ægean Islands from Turkey Italy

1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Islands Greece

1913 Parts of Macedonia, and Albania Servia

1913 Parts of Macedonia, Albania, and Thrace Bulgaria

1913 Part of Albania Montenegro

1913 Albania made independent

V. Africa

1830 Algeria France

1882 Tunis France

1882 Egypt (annexed 1914) Great Britain

1884-89 British East Africa Great Britain

1884-89 German East Africa Germany

1880-90 Eritrea, Somali coast Italy

1884-98 Sahara and Western Sudan France

1898 Eastern Sudan Great Britain

1909 Zanzibar Great Britain

1910 Wadai France

1912 Morocco France

1912 Morocco part to Spain

1912 Tripoli and Cyrenaica Italy

much imitation of the barbarous warfare of the Mos-

lems themselves. Neither the motives nor the meth-

ods of the conquests nor the morals of the diplomacy

which preceded, nor the frequent disregard of plighted

word given at the time of occupation or annexation,

have commended the religion of the Christians. Some

of the wars, as those against the Turks for the libera-

tion of the oppressed Christian races; of Italy in

Tripoli, blessed by the Pope; of the Balkan allies pro-

claimed by King Ferdinand as one of the Cross

against the Crescent; or when accompanied by the

destruction of a Mahdi’s tomb or the bombardment

of the shrine of an Imam, have seemed like religious

crusades, and the results have made the impression

of a triumph of Christianity over Islam rather than

that of Bulgaria or Italy or other European Power

over the Osmanlis. The result has been the increase

of century-long hatred and bitterness and of zeal and

fanaticism among Moslem races. It is a significant

fact that under Moslem rulers, Sultan and Shah, Khe-

dive and Amir, large sections of the population are

dissatisfied with the government and hostile to the

mullahs, who are oftentimes bribe-taking and un-

scrupulous administrators of the Shariat. The people

denounce them and are apparently ready to renounce

them. But when political power passes into the hands

of the Christian, taxation and policing become the

function of the foreign infidels, the powers of judging,

bastinadoing, and fleecing pass from the hands of the

mullahs; then people and priest are soon reconciled,

there is a drawing together in the common dislike of

the Frangis, religion becomes a bond of union, and,

reinforced by a nascent patriotism, issues in a strong

and zealous Islamic spirit. This was strikingly seen

in the contrast between the Caucasus and Persia be-

fore the late change. Under the rule of the Shah

and the Shari, the people were cursing king and

mullahs alike; whereas in the Caucasus the relation

between the mullahs and the Moslem people was

cordial.

Dislike to living under Christian rule has led to

the expatriation of large populations who, forsaking

land and property even in the winter’s cold, have

voluntarily exiled themselves rather than continue to

live comfortably under the rule of the Christian.

Thousands of Circassians, Abkhasians, Bosnians, and

Macedonians have thus followed the trail to Turkey.

Not a few Say ids have abandoned their North African

homes for Syria and Arabia.

The adjustment of Moslems to Christian rule has

legal difficulties. For Islam never anticipated such

a condition. It was to be a triumphant empire, always

to rule, and extending its sway further and further

till it became universal. All lands which had not

submitted to its law were Dar-ul-Harb, lands of war-

fare, against which the jihad was not only lawful but

obligatory. Its attitude towards Christian govern-

ments ought always to be one of hostility. But the

laws of Islam have yielded to major force. Moslems

have learned to live under Christian rule, either se-

cretly biding their time, though still rebellious in heart

or satisfying their consciences by bringing in new legal

definitions to justify their loyalty to infidel govern-

ments. With this purpose, explanation is made that

India is still a “land of Islam” because the rites and

laws of Islam can still be fulfilled with liberty; and that

the jihad is unlawful because there is not a reasonable

assurance of success. Even where part of the law

cannot be obeyed, necessity becomes a higher law, as

under the Austrian regulations for Bosnia and Herze-

govina, which forbid polygamy and slavery. But un-

doubtedly the spirit and law of Islam demand that the

sole allegiance of the Moslem should be to a ruler of

his own faith, and only expediency or necessity makes

him submissive to any other rule. To him race is

secondary; the Cretan who has become a Moslem is

no longer a Greek, the Pomak Bulgar is not a lover

of Bulgaria.

PARTIALITY OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS TO ISLAM

The utmost care is taken by the governments not

to offend the religious sensibilities nor to contravene

the customs and laws of Moslems—in vain as far as

winning their loyalty. Indeed, the steps of the colonial

governors have been so carefully ordered that they

have assisted Islam both in Asia and in Africa. Ka-

firistan (Abode of Infidels) resisted all the efforts of

the Afghans to bring them to Islam, till a political

agreement with Great Britain consigned them to the

tender mercies of their old enemies and they were

forced to accept the yoke of Mohammed. Similarly

in Russia, Father Macary went to Altai to begin a

mission among the Kirghiz. He was turned away

by Russian officials on the plea that they were too

wild and savage to be accessible to the Gospel. Mos-

lem mullahs were not forbidden to approach them and

were able to convert them to Islam. The care taken

not to offend Moslem susceptibilities has been inter-

preted by Africans and Malays as a sign of fear on

the part of Europeans and led them to believe in the

great power of Islam. This partiality was made the

subject of a special report and remonstrance in the

Edinburgh Conference. The attitude of colonial of-

ficials may be shown by some examples. Lord Curzon

voiced the mind of some in his advice to the students

of Aligarh College: “Adhere to your own religion.”

A British resident officer in the Sudan said: “My

influence is exerted to make the region Mohamme-

dan” (Dr. A. P. Sterritt, of Sudan Interior Mission).

Pagan chiefs are installed by putting on a turban, a

part of the Moslem dress, and this gives the impression

that the government wishes the pagans to become

Moslems. At times the heathen soldiers are circum-

cised, contrary to their desires, to make them accepta-

ble to their Moslem comrades. Assistants and sub-

alterns are allowed free privilege of converting the

people to Islam, while the commander or governor

from a Christian land preserves neutrality supposedly.

At Lagos, at the dedication of an expensive mosque,

the headmaster of the government school expressed

the satisfaction of the Moslems in these words: “The

British is the star in the heavens which guided Islam

to the shores of liberty. … By British protection

Islam has increased in numbers by thousands and

thousands with miraculous rapidity” (*International*

*Review of Missions*, 1914, p. 54). Another Mos-

lem has said: “God raised up the British Government

for the progress of Islam.” Heathen tribes which

withstood Islam and refused to admit its propaganda

have been overcome by European Powers and so

opened up to Moslem inroads. In Egypt government

offices and schools are open on Sunday and closed on

Friday. In Turkey, at Constantinople and Smyrna,

Christians are excused from work on Sunday; they

are kept at work in Egypt. More Moslems are heads

of villages under British rule than were under Turk-

ish rule and more Christians were in the civil service

under the old régime (C. R. Watson, “Egypt, etc.,”

pp. 92-93). A Moslem magazine, *Arafate*, says (C.

R. Watson, “The Valley of the Nile,” p. 208):

“Moslems will not wish to be under other than this

government which has shown itself determined to put

the law of the Koran into force. Who knows? It

will perhaps be the glory of Lord Cromer … to

resurrect the Moslem Law, which the majority of our

leaders declare without blinking to be utterly out of

date.” A journal in Constantinople notes the fact

that the “French have established nine hundred Koran

schools in which reading and recitation of passages

from the Koran are the only occupation of the pupils,

and negro fetish worshippers are being converted in

great numbers.” Islam is bolstered up and its intoler-

ance in Egypt and its pride throughout Africa is in-

creased by the partiality shown by the European con-

querors to Moslems over heathen and Christians.

Let me quote the finding of the great Edinburgh Mis-

sionary Conference (Vol. I, p. 209): “The lamentable

fact is that the tendency in the local representatives

of these foreign governments, not excepting the Brit-

ish Government (all of them professedly Christian),

is to facilitate and encourage the acceptance of the

Mohammedan religion, and to restrict and in some

cases to prevent the propagation of Christianity.”

In the Dutch East Indies there has been a change

of policy in late years. Formerly the spread of Islam

was aided greatly by the officials, whose clerks, inter-

preters, policemen, and other assistants were Malay

Moslems. Through the influence of this corps, and

the government schools, and the exclusive use of the

Malay language, Islam made great strides and most of

the forty millions who were heathen when the Dutch

took possession are now Moslems. A report says

(*Missionary Review* of the World, 1898, p. 360):

“The Mohammedans of Sumatra themselves believe

that Allah has given the rule to the Dutch in order

that all heathen tribes may become Mohammedan.”

No government official in Java was allowed to become

a Christian. The government built magnificent

mosques in Sumatra and Borneo, and allows rest-day

for Moslems on Friday but refuses it for Christians

on Sunday. Now, however, fair opportunity is being

given to the Christian propaganda. Graf von

Lunberg-Sturm told the Dutch officials that “for

years the policy of the Dutch Government had been

influenced by the fear that the spread of Christianity

might arouse the fanaticism of the Mohammedans,

but that short-sighted fear is gradually vanishing in

influential circles and is being more and more replaced

by the very opposite opinion, that for purely political

reasons no obstacle should be placed in the path of

missions” (Simon: “Progress, etc.,” p. 286).

There seems, moreover, to be an awakening among

governments to the danger of the Moslem advance in

Africa. The German Colonial Conference warned

of the danger and Emperor William spoke strongly

of the necessity of promoting Christianity and of

hindering the spread of Islam in Africa. It is to be

hoped that after this war and the humbling of Turkey

and the death of political Pan-Islamism, the fear of

Moslems will pass away, the attitude of truckling to

them disappear, and an open door and real neutrality

to Christian missions prevail.

DISLOYALTY OF MOSLEM SUBJECTS

Notwithstanding the care exercised not to give of-

fence, it is impossible for European governments to

win the Moslems, their confidence, and their heart

loyalty. I do not mean that individuals may not be

sincerely loyal and devoted. The ignorant populace

still believes that Islam is invincible and irresistible.

God in His own good time will put to naught the

power of its enemies. The fellahs of Turkey and

Persia are not convinced to the contrary. The

Javanese believe that the Sultan is all-powerful and

that the Christian rulers are under his sovereignty.

This accounts in the eyes of the negro heathen for

the way the European honours the Moslem. Edu-

cated Moslems are opposed to Christian governments,

for their education has brought in its train other as-

pirations. Even though weaned from their bigotry,

they have ideas of independence and self-government,

with an increased jealousy of the rulers both as for-

eigners and as anti-Moslem. There is a tendency

among Africans and Malays to look upon Islam as

the religion of the black and the brown men, and to

put hope in it as the power which in its future develop-

ment may free them from the dominion of the white

men. The Moslems in Africa are fellow-subjects with

the heathen, and both are now drawing near each

other in sympathy. The old-time enmities are passing

away. They intermarry and are bound together so-

cially. Mr. Simon says (“Progress, etc.,” pp. 39,

44-45): “There is an idea of far-reaching signifi-

cance in the modern Moslem movement. It means

the organization in the face of the European nations

—the rallying of the oppressed proletariat among the

nations in the face of the ruling Christian Powers.

… Islam parades before the people as the power

that can turn against the Europeans: it embodies the

hope of the brown race for freedom from European

supremacy.” He says that anti-European feeling is

so strong that the Malay fears to become a Christian

lest he be a Dutchman in the next world.

NATIONALISM AMONG MOSLEMS

Among the more cultured Moslem races there has

developed recently a spirit of Nationalism. The

genius of Islam, maybe, would merge all races in one

great people under one caliph, but that dream has

long since passed. It was natural that the spirit of

Nationalism which has shown itself so markedly in

Europe and has led to the renaissance of the Italians,

Greeks, and Balkan peoples should communicate itself

to Asiatics. The national aspirations of these subject

Christian races have deserved our sympathy and en-

couragement. We can sympathize with the aspira-

tions of subject Moslem races as soon as they learn

to treat other religions on an equality. The Christian

can sincerely wish well to all rightly directed efforts

for liberty. Patriotism, too, the love of country and

people as distinct from love of Islam, is a growing

feeling fostered by the new education and the per-

meation of Western ideas. The awakening of Asia

is a marked characteristic of the age. The movement

which has so marvellously affected Japan and which

has aroused China is evident among Moslem peoples.

The victory of Japan over Russia had a far-reaching

and marked effect on Asiatic peoples. Its demonstra-

tion of the fact that the Orient could face the Occi-

dent and win, sank deep into their consciousness, in-

spired them with hope, and roused them with deter-

mination to throw off the domination of Europe. The

impression on Moslem peoples was specially marked,

for they have regarded Russia as their inveterate and

irresistible enemy. The press and pulpits of Islam

took up an anti-Christian, anti-foreign propaganda

with new hopefulness. The modernists emphasized

the fact that Western science, military skill, and po-

litical institutions could be acquired and utilized en-

tirely apart from the Christian religion. “What

heathen Japan had done, could they not do with the

help of Allah?” This interest was universal. Battak

Moslems discussed how they could now expel the

Dutch. Those of India addressed the Emperor of

Japan and asked him to take the headship of Asia and

expel the Europeans. It may be remembered in this

connection that Japan, when it began to seek modern

civilization, sent a commission of investigation around

the world. They travelled through Persia and Tur-

key, but saw nothing in the Moslem capitals of

Teheran and Constantinople which they need tarry to

learn. On the other hand, Japan has given a startling

lesson to the Moslem world.

MOSLEM NATIONALISM IN INDIA

In passing in review political movements among

Moslems in the present day I will begin with the people

under the rule of Christian governments. In India

Moslems continued for a long while in sullen and

inactive subjection to the British crown. They re-

fused, as I have already indicated, to take advantage

of the modern education, by means of which the

Hindus forged ahead. Jealousy of the Hindus and

their predominance led the Moslems to give steady

support to the British Government, that by its aid they

might be able to hold their own against the encroach-

ments of the Hindus. The first Mohammedan leaders

adhered to a programme of loyalty to the British and

development under their ægis. The leaders following

Sayid Ahmad Khan were Justice Amir Ali, president

of the London-All India Moslem League; Ali Khan,

president of the Central League; His Highness Aga

Khan, chief of the Bohrah sect of Ismieliyahs of

Bombay; and the Prince of Arcot in Southern India.

This All-India Moslem League, intended to include

all sects, has provincial leagues and a council in Lon-

don designed to act upon the Imperial Government.

It has developed ardour and enthusiasm and mani-

fested considerable activity. It wishes to make a

common language for all Indian Moslems, possibly the

Urdu. The government, in a reform scheme, gave

representation to the people in the Legislative Council

and in other official bodies. Moslems took advantage

of these privileges and became members of the High

Councils. In order to be prepared for their new

status, they are seriously seeking modern education

and making progress. Of late many influences have

combined to arouse the political aspirations of the

Moslem people. The Pan-Islamic influences of the

Sultan, hajis and darvishes, the active press, the

critical condition of the Moslem world, and the rapid

influx of new political ideas have caused a sudden

change. A new party has been formed which is

strongly nationalistic. It is composed, for the most

part, of lawyers, editors, and teachers of the younger

generation. They have forced the adoption by the

Moslem Leagues of a programme calling for “po-

litical and religious unity with Turkey and the outer

Islamic world,” and for the freedom of Islamic races

and countries from the rule of alien and Christian

governments. This thesis is one upon which theo-

retically modernists and Pan-Islamists, politicians and

darvishes, editors and Ulema can agree. But later

the Nationalists, undeterred by the resignation of

their old leaders, and by the anarchistic tendencies and

outbreaks of the Hindus, reached an understanding

with the Hindu National Congress, sinking their re-

ligious differences and giving adhesion to the motto,

4 India for the Indians” (*International Review of*

*Missions*, 1914, p. 34). The newly organized League

passed resolutions severely disapproving of the course

of the British Government concerning Turkey and

Persia in 1910. The state of feeling was becoming

more embittered. Everything was critically regarded.

An example of this was seen just before the war. In

order to open a new street, a fountain which was used

for ablutions was removed. This was declared to be

an insult to Islam and was made the occasion of riot

and loss of life. The fountain was rebuilt by the gov-

ernment on a new level. The *rapprochement* of Mos-

lems and Hindus and adjustment of their programmes

does not indicate any widening of religious outlook,

but simply a temporary sinking of them for political

purposes. Indeed, the attitude of both races is reac-

tionary, rejecting the idea of the superiority of Chris-

tian civilization, except in physical science and its ap-

plications, and exalting the worth of all things Indian.

It opposes the movement of Neo-Islam to graft Euro-

pean law and ideas on Islam, but rather would renew

confidence in the old religion as in all things of their

own. At present all expression of criticism is under

the ban of the censor and the police, and what amounts

to martial law.

NATIONALISM IN EGYPT

Among those who withstood Napoleon in Egypt

was Mehemet Ali Bey, an Albanian. He became

Pasha of Egypt, subdued and massacred the Mame-

lukes, and established a hereditary vice-royalty, called

the Khedivate. His fourth successor, Ismiel, 1863,

followed his example in favouring the introduction of

European civilization. He established public utilities,

railways, telegraphs, manufactories, developed re-

sources, adorned the capital with parks and palaces,

and inaugurated a new system of education, including

medical institutions. His was the good fortune to

open the Suez Canal. With these externals of civ-

ilization, there was no real reform. All the splendour

caused enormous debts, so that he was not a real

blessing to his country. For the bondholders a com-

mission of investigation was ordered. Finances fell

under the control of French and British adminis-

trators. Economies were enforced. The notables

were restrained. Jealousy and dissatisfaction became

prevalent. A nationalist party began to form to op-

pose foreign control. The Khedive dismissed the

Controllers, and was himself deposed. Tewfik Khe-

dive, his successor, was unable to maintain political

equilibrium. The Nationalist movement increased in

power, taking in various classes. Its cry was “Egypt

for the Egyptians,” directed against Turkish officers

as well as against Europeans, for the army was under

Circassian or Osmanli officers who were as distasteful

as the European tax-collectors, who represented for-

eign bondholders. The movement culminated in a

revolt led by Ahmad Arabi Pasha, who stirred up

popular fanaticism to make demonstrations against the

British and French. He became a popular hero and

Minister of War. Riots took place in Alexandria.

The French and English fleets were fired on, and in

return bombarded the forts. Mob violence massacred

two thousand people, including Europeans. Great

Britain retaliated by bombarding the city, and quelled

the revolt at Tel-el-Kebir, July, 1882. Arabi Pasha

was exiled to Ceylon. Great Britain occupied Egypt

as temporary administrator. The British Government

strove, as Lord Cromer, its able representative, says

(“Modern Egypt,” Vol. II, p. 197), “to let the rays

of true civilization lighten with their sunshine even the

mud hut of the Egyptian fellah; to deliver them from

the thraldom of their oppressors; teach them that they

might be treated like human beings and have opened

to them the path that leads to moral progress and ele-

vation of thought.” British officials succeeded in free-

ing the Egyptians from the three C-s, courbash,

corvée, and corruption, which may be paraphrased

as the three F-s, flogging, forcing, and fleecing.

Great material prosperity and vast internal improve-

ments followed the Occupation. Egypt was fortunate

to have justice, security, and light taxation. I no-

ticed when I visited Cairo after leaving Constanti-

nople the difference between the conditions of the

people. Constantinople, under the repression of Abdul

Hamid, was gloomy in spirit, silent, fearful, requiring

a caution of speech which made it difficult for one

accustomed to the freedom of speech of Persia.

Cairo, in contrast with the Sultan’s capital, was light,

gay, and free. The people moved about, spoke, and

acted without restraint or fear. Popular amusements,

assemblies, literary activities, political theorizings were

freely indulged in. During the threatened invasion

of the Mahdi and the efforts for the reconquest of

the Sudan, agitation was in abeyance. But Britain’s

sincere efforts to be fair, even to the point of partiality

to the Moslem, did not succeed in winning their loy-

alty. The Nationalist movement broke out again after

a time. For the Moslem prefers oppression from one

of his own faith and race to justice and progress under

the infidel foreigner. Pan-Islamic agitation from

Turkey helped to revive Nationalism in Egypt and the

new spirit moving upon Asiatic peoples was felt there

also. Discontent and dissatisfaction grew apace;

partly from the agitation of those shut out from

former emoluments; partly from the exclusion of

Egyptians from high civil and military offices; partly

from the injustice of the capitulations which favoured

foreigners even when criminals; partly from hostility

to Christianity itself. This hostility was kept alive

not only by the Ulema, but by the Europeanized Egyp-

tians, who, often sceptical themselves, regarded Islam

as the rallying cry for nationalism. The demand was,

“Cessation of British occupation and Home-Rule.”

Khedive Abbas Hilmi was anti-English and the Coun-

cil was manipulated by the Nationalists. The Sardar,

Sir Eldon Gorst, tried a policy of accommodation and

conciliation.

Two parties, at least, existed among the National-

ists. The first and oldest was led by Ali Pasha Yusuf.

They advocated reforms and the gradual withdrawal

of Great Britain. Their newspaper was *Al Moayad*.

The other party was led by Kamil Pasha. He had

been educated in France, loudly denounced everything

British, and strenuously advocated immediate with-

drawal, saying, “Rather an unreformed Egypt than

one reformed by the British; rather the Turks, for

they at least are Moslems.” He was supported by the

Sultan of Turkey. Their organ was the *Lcwa*. The

newspapers had great influence in exciting patriotic

feeling, for while few of the people can read, story-

tellers in the villages read and re-read the papers to

groups. The movement was directly encouraged by

the Minister of Education. Anglophobia was ram-

pant in the schools, especially the School of Law.

The Club of High Schools, founded for educational

purposes, was turned into an organization of the Na-

tionalist party. Students were continually involved in

criminal investigations. Of the graduate Nationalist,

W. N. Willis gives the following description (quoted

in *The Near East*, from “Anti-Christ in Egypt”):

“He is half-educated and wholly superficial. He is

a nuisance to himself and a worry to everybody else.

Many of the foreign consuls play upon his vanity by

sympathizing with him—with their tongues well

planted in their cheeks. They simply make a tool of

him in order to breed trouble and discontent.”

Nationalist agitation reached a climax when, in

February, 1910, Boudros Pasha, the Prime Minister

and a Copt, an able supporter of British administra-

tion, was assassinated by Wardani. The power of

Moslem fanaticism appears in the fatva or decree of

the Grand Mufti, that Wardani should not be ex-

ecuted—(1) because he killed with a revolver, and

Moslem law has said nothing about such a murder,

(2) because the government entered process, and by

Moslem law it should have been done by the rela-

tives, (3) because it is not a capital crime for a

Moslem to kill a Christian. Wide sympathy for the

assassin existed among the Egyptians. It was at this

time that Former President Roosevelt passed through

Egypt on returning from Central Africa. In an ad-

dress at the University in Cairo he strongly con-

demned the murder. The Nationalists were greatly

enraged, and hundreds of them made a demonstration

against him, shouting, “Down with Roosevelt!”

“Down with the Occupation!” The Copts have

been alienated from the Nationalist party, whose cry,

“Egypt for the Egyptians,” is more truly, Egypt for

the Moslems. The Nationalism attaches itself to Islam

and does not include in its scope the real Egyptians,

the Copts, who are six hundred thousand, or one-

tenth of the people, and proportionately the more in-

telligent. Indeed, it is said that a large proportion of

the Nationalists were of Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian,

and Syrian extraction. Moslem fanaticism has even

awakened in the Christians a fear for their personal

safety. The British Government awoke to the neces-

sity of action and sent Lord Kitchener to be Sardar

with an iron policy. A press law was enforced with

severe penalties. Offending editors were dealt with.

Among these was Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish. He

was a graduate of Al Azhar, lecturer on Arabic at

Oxford, Inspector in the Egyptian Ministry of Edu-

cation, an able writer and editor and a contributor to

Nationalist journals. He was fiercely anti-English,

and was for a while imprisoned for libel and sedition.

Some editors fled to Geneva and Paris. There they

published a paper called *El Kisas* (“The Punish-

ment”). Its spirit is shown in its exalting the as-

sassin of Boudros Pasha to the rank of hero and

patriot.

The Turkish Revolution of 1908 strengthened Na-

tionalism in Egypt. The Young Turks actively pro-

moted it, and the Ottoman High Commissioner, who

represented the Sultan, had no occupation but to carry

on intrigues and to try to inflame the spirit. Though

Egypt was neutral in the war in Tripoli, yet Egyptians

helped the Turks. A significance incident showed that

Nationalism is not love for the Turks. Among those

who assisted Turkey in Cyrenaica was the Egyptian

Aziz Ali Bey. After the war he was court-martialled

in Constantinople through the jealousy of Enver

Pasha and Sheikh Shawish and condemned to death.

The unjust sentence was protested against by the united

voice of the Egyptian press and people, seconding the

efforts of the two governments, and was accompanied

by a vehement outburst of anger against the Turks

until he was freed. Lord Kitchener, with severity,

combined efforts to satisfy the people. He specially

strove to relieve the condition of the fellahs by just

laws, by supervision and restraint of the landlords,

and by postal savings banks freeing them from

usurers. A delegation of Egyptians presented in Lon-

don a petition for increase of rights. Shortly after-

wards the powers of self-government were enlarged.

In lieu of the Legislative Council, established in 1883,

a Legislative Assembly was inaugurated in 1914. It

consisted of 66 members elected by the people and 23

nominated by the government, including 6 ministers

and representatives of the Beduins, Copts, Jews, and

special classes. It has power of initiating legislation.

When the present war began, opinion was divided.

Some feared that they might fall into the hands of

Germany if England were defeated. When Turkey

proclaimed a Holy War a wave of sympathy passed

over the people. The Khedive Abbas Hilmi was in

Constantinople. He had been anti-British. He had

even refused to preside at cabinet meetings, and

through his intrigues had involved many princes, so

that they exiled themselves. His attempt to sell the

Mariut Railway to foreigners had almost brought

about his deposition. He remained in Constantinople

and accepted appointment to go with the Turkish army

against the British. In consequence of all this, Great

Britain, on December 18, 1914, declared Egypt a

British protectorate, repudiating Turkish sovereignty.

Prince Husain Kamil, second son of Ismiel Pasha,

was proclaimed ruler of Egypt, with the title of

Sultan. Martial law was declared, and the arrival

of British armies made further Nationalist manifesta-

tions inopportune. Only the students of the High

School have dared to show their spirit by “cutting”

attendance when Sultan Husain visited their institu-

tion, and some anarchists by twice attempting his as-

sassination.

ARABS AND ALBANIANS

Concerning the spirit of Nationalism in other coun-

tries of North Africa or in Russia and Central Asia,

all that is necessary has been said under the Pan-

Islamic movement. Political agitation has not been

permitted to show itself so openly in those countries.

Even Moslem countries under Moslem rulers of a dif-

ferent race have strongly manifested Nationalism.

The Arabs have been in a continual ferment against

Turkish domination and have made many revolts.

The Kurds, under Sheikh Obeidullah, in 1880, formu-

lated a programme of independence. The Albanians

have shown a strenuous resistance to Ottomanization,

even the Moslem Albanians (1,500,000) appearing to

put race before religion. It is possible some of them

are secret Christians, both men and women, and that

they maintain Christian practices secretly (Pears:

“Turkey and Its People,” p. 173). They say that

they were made Mohammedans by compulsion and

have no loyalty to Mohammed. Rev. C. T. Erickson

says (*Missionary Review*, 1913, p. 322): “I am con-

vinced, having it from the people themselves, that

once they are free from the Turkish yoke, off goes the

Moslem yoke also.” Dr. J. L. Barton testifies to the

same effect: “When an Albanian chief was asked if

he was not a Mohammedan, he denied the fact with

great emphasis. He said Albanians had no love for

the Turks nor for Mohammedanism, and that no rea-

son exists why they should not accept Christianity.”

But it seems doubtful whether the national spirit will

unite the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Moslem

Albanians in political solidarity.

HOW CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION AFFECTS MOSLEM

LANDS

I turn now to consider Moslem lands which are po-

litically independent. It is remarkable how they are

under the influence of Christian civilization. Their

economic dependence has been a prelude to their ab-

sorption of social and political ideas. Just a para-

graph about this economic relation. Turkey and

Persia look to Europe for public utilities, as railways,

tramways, telephones, telegraphs; for internal devel-

opment, as mining, irrigation, and engineering; for

weapons for the jihads—cannon, muskets, cruisers,

and aeroplanes; for gold and silver for their money,

for machines to mint it, safes to hold it,

purses to carry it, loans to replenish it; for

window glass, lamps and matches to light their

mosques, compasses to show the kibla of prayer, and

watches to tell their times of worship, and for paper

on which their Korans and prayers and charms are

written, and for stamps to send their letters; for their

spectacles and teeth and drugs and hardware and

dishes and knives and forks and an indefinite supply

of their needs. For much the Islamic world is

indebted to the Christian. It is even adopting the

style of dress, the shoes, the brushes, the kaloshes,

the umbrellas of the Christian, and the Sherif of

Mecca rides on the day of pilgrimage on a saddle,

made in Europe, of pig-skin (Keane: “Six Months

in Mecca”).

In all departments of science the Moslems are bor-

rowers from the Christian world, and very profitably

in medicine. But more remarkable is their readiness

to learn in politics, law, and statecraft, in which they

have a Koran, a Shariat, and a Khalifa to guide them.

Nothing has more surprised the world than the Con-

stitutional movements in Persia and Turkey. Even

Afghanistan is undergoing remarkable changes in

thought and “Young Afghans” are ambitious for a

liberal government. Amir Habib Ullah is inclined to

reforms in the administration. His visit to India in-

creased his desire for progress.

POLITICAL REFORMS IN PERSIA

Political reforms in modern Persia were first at-

tempted by Mirza Taki Khan, the celebrated vizier of

Nasr-ud-Din Shah (1848-52). This man, sprung

from the common people, was of sterling integrity,

scorning bribes and flattery. He succeeded for a time

in bringing about a reform of abuses and of the cor-

ruption of official life. The sale of offices was abol-

ished, the absurd civil pension roll cut down, oppres-

sion of the peasants restrained, the use of bombastic

titles discountenanced, the sea slave trade prohibited,

the interference of foreign legations in the internal

affairs of Persia was discountenanced. The power of

the mullahs in political affairs was restrained, the right

of asylum was taken away from the Mujtahids, pop-

ular fanaticism was frowned upon, especially as ex-

hibited and incited by the Muharram ceremonies. But

the jealousy and opposition of the reactionaries was

too much for him. He was dismissed and executed.

Yet the indignation caused by his death brought about

at least this reform that the custom of executing ex-

viziers ceased. Though he had no thought of con-

sulting the people and continued the old method of

autocratic rule, yet “the short period of his adminis-

tration is now looked back upon as having been the

golden age of modern Persia” and he is regarded as

the “only man who possessed the ability, the patri-

otism, the energy, and the integrity” to regenerate the

country (Watson’s “History of Persia,” pp. 366-

404).

Next in time comes the advocacy of reform by

Prince Malcom Khan, Minister to Great Britain. I

had the pleasure of calling on this intelligent and pro-

gressive man in Tabriz. When Minister and after-

wards when under the ban of the Shah, he set forth

a programme of reforms and Constitutional govern-

ment for Persia. He established a magazine, called

*Kanun* (Rule), which, published in London, circu-

lated in Persia, and set forth liberal ideas of govern-

ment and discoursed on the faults of the administra-

tion, especially of the Vizier Ali Askar Khan, Amin-i-

Sultan. He organized a society called the “World of

Humanity” and also, from its secrecy, “Faramush

Khana,” through which liberalism was propagated.

Other preachers of reform in Persia were Sheikh

Hadi of Teheran and Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, of whom

I have spoken. The latter, before his work for Pan-

Islamism, associated himself with Malcom Khan in

advocating a Constitution for Persia. He expressed

regret that he had spent so much of his effort in trying

to influence sovereigns. “Would that I had sown all

the seeds of my ideas in the receptive ground of the

people’s thoughts. The sword of unrighteousness has

not suffered me to see awakening of the peoples of the

East and the hand of ignorance has not granted me

the opportunity to hear the call of freedom. The

stream of renovation flows quickly towards the East.

The edifice of despotic government totters to its fall.

Strive as far as you can to destroy the foundations of

despotism, not to pluck up and cast out its individual

members” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 29).

These agitations were a preparation for the crisis

which came in 1891, on the occasion of the Shah

granting a monopoly of the tobacco trade to a British

company. Abetted by Russia, the liberals, the mul-

lahs, and the governors who had been overlooked in

the distribution of bribes combined to overthrow this

concession. (See writer’s “Persian Life and Cus-

toms,” pp. 290-96.) The *Akhtar*, the Persian journal

at Constantinople, denounced it and was suppressed.

Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, who had been acting as a Min-

ister, was arrested and expelled. Malcom Khan tele-

graphed his disapproval. He was dismissed and re-

mained in exile. Thus he escaped the fate of his

friend, M. Yusuf Khan, Mustashar-ud-Doulah, For-

eign Agent—my next-door neighbour at Tabriz. His

correspondence was inspected. He was called to Te-

heran, but at Kasvin was met by a royal cup of coffee

which terminated his journey. Tracts were circu-

lated through the country demanding the suppression

of the monopoly, reform of the finances, religious free-

dom, and a representative government. Finally a

fatva of the chief Mujtahids of Kerbala and Najef

interdicted the use of tobacco. The people ceased to

use the weed. Strikes and riots threatened; the

monopoly was rescinded. The royal power by this

defeat received a great check. Priests and people had

learned their power when united. Of those who took

an active part in these riots was one Mirza Riza, a

disciple of Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din. He was imprisoned

and maltreated. He wreaked his vengeance by assassi-

nating the Shah in 1896, no doubt instigated thereto

by the Sheikh,1 and possibly by the Babis (Azalis).

1 See chapter on Neo-Islam. The assassin in his examination

said: “Those who share my view are many, but no one, save

Agitation was kept up during the reign of Muzaffar-

ud-Din Shah. In 1901 pamphlets, placards, and pro-

tests were distributed and even delivered on the table

of the Shah himself, directed against him and the

Amin-i-Sultan and the new loans and mortgages which

were being made for the Shah’s journeys to Europe.

Some of these agitators were arrested, imprisoned, and

exiled. Discontent grew apace during the following

years. The people felt that their situation was des-

perate. They were suffering grievously from injustice

and oppression. Their ancient country was weak, its

government corrupt, its independence threatened. The

people, rich and poor alike, were groaning on account

of their pitiable lot. Their Kismat was ill-fortune.

Bribes weighed down the scales of justice. Security

of property was at the caprice of venal judges, both

civil and religious. Men cursed their rulers with a

myself and Sayid Jamal-ud-Din, was aware of the idea of mine

to kill the Shah” (Browne’s “Persian Revolution,” p. 67). He

also said: “A tree,—meaning the Shah,—whereof the fruits

after all these years are such low-down rogues and scoun-

drels … who are the plagues of the lives of the Moslem

community, such a tree, bearing such fruits, ought to be cut

down.” Some suspected that the Babis had part in the crime,

for the two men who visited Mirza Riza at Shah Abdul Azim,

the scene of the murder, were Babis, i.e. Azalis, and the two

men whom he visited in the prison at Trebizond, en route for

Teheran, were of the same sect. These two were extradited and

executed at Tabriz on the charge of complicity. One of them,

M. Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul-Mulk, I had conversed with at the

Mustashar-ud-Doulah’s in Tabriz. Another of these Babis was

an editor of the *Akhtar* and a son-in-law of Subh-i-Azal (*ibid*.,

pp. 78, 92-95, 405, 415). The reform movement was not, how-

ever, a Babi movement. Those who took part did so with other

Persians of all sects desiring the good of the country.

vim and a vindictiveness which were startling. For

several decades the city people had lived on the verge

of famine, though the crops were fairly good. They

exclaimed: “Allah gives us our daily bread, but

greedy men starve us.” Princes and nobles, mullahs

and other capitalists, had their hands on the throat of

the people as effectively as if they had been a land-

lords’ trust. They doubled and trebled the price of

bread in the cities. The labourer was obliged to work

ten days for a bushel of wheat. This high price

scarcely benefited the farmer, for he had little wheat

or barley to sell after feeding his family. The rent

and taxes he paid in kind, by measure not by value.

The Crown Prince, Mohammed Ali Mirza, was the

most avaricious grain merchant. The people bitterly

resented it, saying: “Our Prince should be our Pro-

tector and Shepherd; he devours us like a hungry

wolf.” It cost him his crown. The officials, the

farmers of taxes, and the mullahs whose stipends

were collected by them from the villages in produce,

were waxing richer and the mass of the people grew

poorer and poorer. The Mujtahids are among the

greatest landlords, and wealthy because recipients of

the tithes and because in their capacity as judges they

have been corrupt. Bitterness against them was in-

tensified because, while as representatives of religion

they were expected to manifest justice and mercy, they

have so often shown avarice and hardheartedness.

Men with fair earnings were under the necessity of

pawning their household goods. Bread riots of men

and even of women failed to bring relief. With heart

and lip they cursed both priest and prince.

The corruption of the government was causing in-

tense dissatisfaction. Ministers were quarrelling, pos-

sibly poisoning one another. Loans had been con-

tracted from Russia, making possible royal jaunts in

Europe and lining the pockets of viziers and court

favourites, but with no result in public utilities. For

these loans the customs duties were hypothecated.

Foreign (Belgian) controllers were put in charge of

customs, post, and passports. Road concessions gave

control of highways into the hand of foreigners.

Bridges which from time immemorial had been public

property became toll-bridges through the connivance

of bribe-taking officials. Patriotic anger was aroused

by these circumstances and by the threatened danger

to the independent regulation of religion should for-

eign control increase. The conviction that the coun-

try, and with it the religion, was endangered by con-

cessions, loans, and the foreigners, had the deepest

influence. Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din wrote to the prin-

cipal Ulema, “By God’s life, folly and greed are

allied to destroy religion, abrogate the Holy Law,

and to hand over the home of Islam to foreigners!”

Under these conditions the outcome of the Russo-

Japanese war made a profound impression. The in-

vincible Russians were humbled. Persians began to

hope. The Constitutional struggle in Russia had a

great influence, especially in its effect on the Persians

and Shiahs of the Caucasus, who imbibed Constitu-

tional and socialistic ideas and were initiated into revo-

lutionary methods. Other Persians were influenced in

Turkey. In Persia secret agitators were working and

planning. The relation between the mullahs and the

government became more and more strained. Pru-

dence seemed to have forsaken the officials. Sayids,

mullahs, and even Mujtahids were bastinadoed. The

killing of a Sayid finally inflamed the embers of dis-

content. A great popular demonstration occurred.

People to the number of twelve thousand took refuge

at the British Legation. There the demand for a

Constitution was formulated as the panacea for their

ills. Muzaffar-ud-Din bowed to the will of the people

and granted a Constitution August 5, 1906. His suc-

cessor Mohammed Ali Shah abrogated it and dispersed

parliament at the cannon’s mouth, hanging the editors,

June, 1908. Civil war ensued, and he was forced to

abdicate, by the Nationalists, July, 1909. Ahmad

Sultan Shah succeeded him at the age of thirteen.

Mr. Morgan Shuster was called in to regulate the

finances as Treasurer-General, but his plans were in-

compatible with the purposes of Russia, which forced

his retirement and continued to hold parts of Northern

Persia with the army of occupation. The Constitu-

tion continues nominally in force; the new Shah was

crowned before the reassembled second parliament,

and the third one assembled in December, 1914.1

1 Outline of the Constitutional Movement in Persia.

(1) Merchants and mullahs protest against oppression, take

refuge at Shah Abdul Azim, force Ayn-ud-Doulah’s resignation,

1905.

(2) Petition for reforms, leaders exiled, April, 1906.

(3) Killing of Sayid and fifteen others by soldiers. Mullahs

and people take refuge at Kum, June 21, 1906.

(4) Great political demonstration. Twelve thousand people

take refuge at British Legation, July 19-August 5.

(5) Constitution granted by Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah August 5,

1906.

PERSIAN CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION

The adoption of a Constitution did not put much

of a strain on the relation of Persians to their reli-

gion because they had long been under the *urfi* or

civil law, which was largely the decisions of the Shah

and his Ministers. This urfi had often crossed the

will of the mullahs. Between them and the civil

authorities there had been much rivalry and jealousy.

This accounts in a measure for the fact that the mul-

lahs had such a conspicuous part in the Persian revo-

lution. Whereas in Turkey the movement was carried

on largely by young scholars, educated in Europe,

(6) First National Assembly inaugurated, Teheran, October

7, 19o6.

(7) Shah died, Mohammed Ali crowned, January 19, 1907.

(8) Vizier Amin-i-Sultan (Atabeg) assassinated August 13.

(9) Russian-British agreement, dividing Persia into spheres of

influence, published September, 1907.

(10) Coup-d’état June 23, 1908.

(11) Civil war. First siege of Tabriz, June-October. Royal

troops withdrew, vanquished.

(12) Second siege of Tabriz, January-April, 1909. Relieved by

Russian troops.

(13) Nationalist troops occupy Teheran, July 6th. Shah ab-

dicated. Ahmad Sultan made Shah.

(14) Second National Assembly convened November, 1909.

(15) Mr. Morgan Shuster made Treasurer-General May 12,

1911.

(16) Ex-Shah’s raid and defeat, summer of 1911.

(17) Dissolution of Parliament. Shuster dismissed on demand

of Russia.

(18) Third siege of Tabriz ends, December 25, 1911. Shuja-

ud-Doulah begins reign of terror in Tabriz.

(19) Ahmad Shah crowned, 1914. Third parliament

assembles, December, 1914. Neutrality of Persia proclaimed in

the Great War.

often irreligious and with reliance on the army, in

Persia the mullahs were the force that broke the gov-

ernment in the first place, though they were influ-

enced more than they knew by men who had drunk

from the streams of liberal and revolutionary

thought. Another class which was strong and influ-

ential were the Sayids, the descendants of Mohammed,

who are supposed to be a fanatical class. From first

to last they were prominent in the liberal ranks and

many of them suffered death for the cause of lib-

erty and progress. They demonstrated that the reli-

gious class of Islam contains a good proportion of

liberal-minded men. Because of this, the Nationalists

were constrained to allow the mullahs large influence

in drafting the written Constitution, especially as

without their aid the Shah could not be forced to

accept and sign it. Some provisions favour clerical

domination and provide for the continuance of their

power. Article I establishes Islam according to the

Shiah sect of the twelve Imams as the religion of

Persia, to which the Shah must belong and to the

spread of which he must contribute. Article II de-

clares that the National Assembly has been founded

by the help of the Twelfth Imam, and it must never

to all ages pass laws contrary to the Shariat; and a

commission of five Mujtahids shall have power to

reject all bills which their judgment decides to be

contrary to the Law. Articles LXXI and LXXXVI

seem to limit the power of the Mujtahids’ courts by

giving the final decision to a tribunal established by

the government. There is no doubt that the prin-

ciples of the Nationalist party really tended to under-

mine the Islamic courts and the traditions. It was

not long before most of their strict religionists turned

to the reactionary side. When the contest of arms

came on, mullahs and Mujtahids were generally

against the Nationalists. In Tabriz they organized a

society called the Islamia, which used all the weapons

of bigotry and religious hate in their efforts to over-

throw the cause of freedom. They branded the sup-

porters of the Constitution as Babis or heretics, dis-

loyal to Islam and worthy of extermination in a jihad.

To convince the royal army of besiegers that they

were good Shiahs, a unique demonstration was made

—one that will never fade from memory. Mounting

the flat roofs of Tabriz, the people repeated with the

mighty sound of ten thousand voices the creed, call-

ing out: “Allah akbar! Allah akbar! God is great!

There is no God but God; Mohammed is the Apostle

of God; Ali is the vicegerent of God.” Times with-

out number this creed rang out, testifying to the be-

sieging army that the city were true Shiahs. There

arose an intense feeling of bitterness against the mul-

lahs, who were denounced with hatred and contempt.

Among the few houses looted and destroyed by the

Nationalist mob were those of the Mujtahids, and

they did not venture to return to Tabriz even when

it was under guard of the Russian troops. For the

time the power of the mullahs was broken and free-

dom of speech and action regarding religion was

increased.

PERSIAN REFORMS AND LIBERTY

The provisions of the new law are a series of com-

promises. People shall enjoy equal rights except

where it contravenes the Shari. The study and teach-

ing of arts, letters, and science are free except as for-

bidden by the Shari. Publications are permitted ex-

cept when harmful to the religion of Islam. Other

articles disqualify from voting or being a candidate

any apostates from the Shiah faith and those living

in open sin, and declare that only a Mohammedan

Persian can be a Minister of State. While the banner

“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice” was

widely displayed, the question of giving real equality

to Christians and Jews was scarcely mooted. The

smallness of their number precludes the question be-

coming one of active politics, but for this reason the

Moslems could without endangering their supremacy

in any particular have applied the principles of liberty.

Non-Moslems were not regarded as regular citizens.

As exceptional populations, the Armenians, Nes-

torians, Zoroastrians, and Jews were each allowed

one representative in parliament, and these must be

sound in their respective faiths.

Civil rights were guaranteed, reforms projected,

popular education advocated, the adoption of Western

civilization decided upon, under a Constitutional

régime. But many difficulties hindered the carrying

out of these purposes. First there were the schemes

of the reactionaries, including several insurrections

by the ex-Shah and Kajar Princes. These were sue-

cessfully put down. Two difficulties proved insur-

mountable, one internal, the other external.

CAUSES OF FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

What was the internal cause of the failure of the

new régime? An Oriental story seems apropos. The

wise man said that three things were necessary for

the progress of the kingdom: an army, money, and

the trust of the people. He was asked which could

be most easily dispensed with. “The army,” he said,

“for with the other two, prosperity could still exist.”

“Which of these two?” “Money,” he replied, “for

the trust and confidence of the people would give

success.” But what shall we say of a country where

the army is untrained and divided under tribal leaders

and factional chiefs, united by no common patriotic

purpose nor aspiration; where money is lacking and

financial administration inadequate; in which distrust

of the leaders is keenly felt and that righteousness

which exalteth a nation is absent? Why did the

Constitutional movement fail? It failed for lack of

men, men of character and integrity. The old royalist

officials were corrupt and venal; the new men, the

would-be reformers, for the most part proved deficient

in the same way. Let me call some independent wit-

nesses. Mr. Arthur Moore came to Persia as a

representative of the Persian Committee of the British

Parliament. He sympathized with and aided the Con-

stitutionalists, even drilling their troops, and joined in

the sortie in which the devoted Mr. Baskerville was

sacrificed. After much experience, Mr. Moore said

to me: “This movement must fail. The men lack

moral stamina.” Take, for example, the hero of Ta-

briz, Sattar Khan. When Mohammed Ali Shah abol-

ished the Constitution, he sent an army of freebooters

against Tabriz to punish it for its stubborn advocacy

of liberty. These mountaineers began to loot, burn,

and destroy the homes and bazaars of the defenceless

inhabitants. Then up rose an unknown man, mounted

his horse, gathered some comrades, and rode through

the streets calling on the citizens to arm and resist.

They seized the armoury, organized the butchers and

bakers and candlestick-makers, endured two sieges,

and caused the final triumph of the Constitution.

Sattar Khan was the hero of this fight for freedom.

Shall we honour his name as a Washington or a

Garibaldi? No! He was conquered by greed and

graft, wine and women. His name became a by-word

and a reproach.

How was it when Mr. Shuster tried to put Persia’s

finances to rights? He dealt with the cabinet ministers

of the Constitutional government. What kind of men

did he find them to be? He describes them as selfish,

self-seeking, greedy, looking out for their own inter-

ests and not for those of their country (Shuster’s

“Strangling of Persia,” pp. 239, 200). A member

of the British Boundary Commission voiced the same

verdict: “We have lost hope of Persia on account of

the lack of men of character and ability to lead it.”

The external factor which controls the situation in

Persia is Russia. For many years its influence has

been gradually on the increase. It received legal

sanction when the Shah solicited loans and hypothe-

cated the custom duties as security. Its position was

rendered impregnable when the agreement with Great

Britain acknowledged its sphere of influence as ex-

tending over the largest and best part of Persia, as

far south as Ispahan and Yezd inclusive. The British

sphere extends over a much smaller section, including

Kerman and Bandar Abbas. Between these spheres

a considerable area is left as a buffer. By this ar-

rangement the Lion and the Bear lay down together,

and the Persian lamb within them. Later Russia’s

position was strengthened by stationing troops and

consular guards at various points. In the present war

the invasion of Azerbaijan by Turks and Kurds has

brought dire calamity upon the Christian population,

adding another full chapter of untold horrors to the

story of Moslem cruelty, savagery, and lust. Russia

later drove them from Persian soil, which, though

neutral territory, has suffered terribly.

**IX**

**POLITICAL REFORMS IN THE TURKISH**

**EMPIRE**

I HAVE already referred to the gradual weaken-

ing and dismemberment of the Turkish empire.

This disintegration impressed upon the govern-

ment and people the necessity of finding a remedy.

European civilization had gone forward by leaps and

bounds; the Turks were distanced in the race. The

consciousness of this condition aroused the Sultans,

who began to act partly on their own initiative, and

partly at the instigation of Europeans like the British

Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and not

at all in response to any popular demand or agitation.

Mahmud II, Abdul Mejid, and Abdul Aziz are called

the Reforming Sultans. Mahmud II paved the way

for reforms by abolishing the Janissaries, who, on

mutinying, were destroyed at the cannon’s mouth.

He strove to placate European States by bringing

Turkey into the line of progress. Some of his

projects were external and did not touch the root of

the matter. He discarded long robes and the turban,

donned the European dress, and adopted the fez as a

national headdress—an article which had previously

been used by some Greeks in Turkey. His assistant in

organizing the new administration was Raif Mahmud

Effendi, who as secretary to the Ottoman Embassy in

England had imbibed some principles of free govern-

ment. Some of the changes affected in this and the

following reigns were as follows: A new Sultan

should not on his accession, openly at least, slaughter

all his brothers, nor cut off the head of a Grand

Vizier on his deposition, nor imprison ambassadors

in case of war. The Vizier thereafter deigned to

rise to a foreign ambassador; even the Sultan might

grasp the hand of such an infidel or become his guest.

One Sultan, Abdul Aziz, even visited European capi-

tals, 1875. Politeness to foreigners became the cus-

tom. Torture of criminals was prohibited, slavery-

was mitigated, the slave-trade and public slave-mar-

kets were abolished, the poll-tax on *zimmis* or Chris-

tian *rayats* was for a time removed and the evidence

of Christians was to be admitted in court. Though

done, for the most part, under the pressure of Chris-

tian governments, yet all this was encouraging. Re-

forms were summed up in two celebrated decrees is-

sued by Abdul Mejid. One in 1839 was the Hatti

Sherif of Gulkhana, called the Magna Charta of

Turkey, which systematized taxation and military

service, and guaranteed security of life, honour, and

property to all subjects, irrespective of race or religion.

The other, in 1856, called the Hatti Humayun, guar-

anteed religious freedom and abolished the death pen-

alty for apostasy from Islam. This was issued at the

demand of the Christian ambassadors, following the

public and shameful execution of an Armenian youth

who through fear and in intoxication had professed

Islam and had afterwards recanted. The decree

caused great rejoicing in Christian lands, but this in-

terpretation was subsequently repudiated by the

Porte (William Goodell: “Forty Years in the Turk-

ish Empire,” pp. 240, 292, 385, 481, 48C). It stated

that “every distinction and designation tending to

make any class whatever of the subjects of my empire

inferior to another class on account of their religion,

language, and race shall be forever effaced. … No

subject shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion

he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on that

account. No one shall be compelled to change his

religion.”

About the same time, following the Crimean War

(1855), the Turkish army was reorganized and the

Sultan was able to confirm his rule in the borders of

Kurdistan, Syria and Arak Arabi, and to a certain

extent over Nejd and the Persian Gulf littoral. Euro-

pean codes of law were introduced. The laws of

landed property were changed. At the conquest one-

third of the land had been assigned to the Ulema.

Donations and endowments, *vakf*, had increased these

properties greatly. The darvish orders also held large

endowments. The State took over the administra-

tion of these vakfs. The privileges of the nobles and

beys as landlords were revoked. These measures

caused great discontent. These powerful elements

were alienated and the salaries assigned in lieu of the

former incomes did not satisfy them. Their spirit

is seen in the act of a darvish who came before Rashid

Pasha at a public audience, reviled him, called him

dog and infidel, and invoked the vengeance of heaven

and the dagger of the Moslem upon him for introduc-

ing reforms. Because of such a spirit, an eminent

Turk remarked: “Our Ministers labour in vain, for

civilization will never enter Turkey so long as the

*turbeh*, shrines, of the darvishes are in existence.”

Mr. Ubicini (quoted in Browne’s “Dervishes,” p.

349) says: “The two bodies of which religious so-

ciety is composed, the Ulema and the darvishes, are

the enemies of all reform. There is conservatism in

the Ulema, who speaks in the name of Law, saying,

‘Touch nothing that is established, borrow nothing

from the infidels, because the Law forbids it.’ The

darvish Sheikh says: ‘I am the Law; all is good that

I commend, all is evil that I forbid. My sentence is

the sentence of God.’ The government may hope

from the Ulema, but not from the darvishes.”

Towards the end of his reign, Abdul Aziz became

reactionary, and persecuted, and exiled the reform-

ers. The Palace and the Porte contended. The

reformers, led by Midhat Pasha, prevailed. Abdul

Aziz was deposed and murdered. Murad V became

insane. Abdul Hamid was made Sultan, 1876.

Shortly afterwards he proclaimed a Constitution and

assembled a Parliament. Maybe he did this with no

serious purpose, but to throw dust in the eyes of

Europe. At any rate, in the midst of the war with

Russia, 1878, he suspended the Constitution.

Crushed and humiliated as the result of the war, by

the loss of large territories in the Balkans, Abdul

Hamid entered upon a career of autocratic oppres-

sion and tyrannic repression, with firm purpose to

thwart reforms among Moslems and with a fierce

fanaticism against Christians. He threw himself

heart and soul in with the reactionaries, ruled as a

despot through the Palace junta, suppressing the

Viziers at the Sublime Porte. By means of the tele-

graph he kept in personal touch with every corner of

his empire. His system of espionage was most ter-

rible; forty thousand spies, maintained at an expense

of ten million dollars a year, made life a horror for

his subjects. No one was safe. Private conversa-

tion became a dangerous pastime. In passing through

Constantinople, I was struck with the hushed serious-

ness of the whole community. Laughter and gaiety

were absent. The residents would warn me at every

turn not to talk in public. They had learned to live

in an atmosphere where free speech was denied every

one. The contrast to Persia was striking. I at-

tended the celebrated salaamlukh to see the Sultan

come in state to Friday prayers. It is a function

which can only be attended by special permission, and

tickets and places were reserved for us in the pavilion.

How near we came to falling under the suspicion of

the ever-present spies, I can never know. But just

as the Sultan passed in his carriage, our three-year-

old child piped up in a clear voice: “Papa, the

king is a great killer.” When I said “Hush,” she re-

peated the words: “Papa, the king is a great killer.”

I quickly whispered to her: “The king loves his own

little boys and girls.” This satisfied and quieted her.

She was evidently applying her knowledge of King

Herod to the first king she saw. And out of the

mouth of a babe the truth was spoken as truly as by

Gladstone when he pronounced Abdul Hamid “the

Great Assassin.” At another time, when leaving

Constantinople, our baggage was taken out and most

minutely examined. When we had come down to

breakfast in the hotel that morning we had noticed

that all the waiters were missing. We now under-

stood that they had been imprisoned on suspicion of

a plot. The police thought maybe bombs had been

concealed in our baggage to escape their inspection.

Through the reports of these spies, twenty-five

thousand of the flower of Turkish manhood suffered

death or exile, or fled, leaving their property to be

confiscated. Many were exiled to distant parts of

the empire. Many were dropped into the Bosphorus.

Apropos of this a story goes that some foreign sailors

had need to dive down near a vessel at Seraglio Point.

They found themselves among a multitude of human

corpses, whose heads were weighted down and their

legs were moving to and fro by the force of the cur-

rents (McCallagh: “Abdul Hamid,” p. 119). The

press was strictly censored. Public discussion was

prohibited. Liberal ideas were crushed. Schools for

Moslems were repressed, except primary education of

a poor quality. Foreign governesses were spied upon

as well as their pupils and their fathers. Higher edu-

cation was grudgingly allowed to officers because it

was essential and medicine was carefully taught. It

and sanitation were two things Abdul Hamid cher-

ished. But electric lights and telephones were ex-

cluded. When Dr. Jessup wrote “The Mohammedan

Missionary Problem,” just after the Treaty of Berlin

was signed, he thanked God for the bright prospects

for Turkey, because Christian England had under-

taken to see that reforms were carried out—having

taken Cyprus as a vantage ground. Alas that it was

otherwise ordered by Abdul Hamid. He became the

enemy of England, and the Armenians became the

victims of unspeakable and terrible massacres. It

seemed as if the plan was to exterminate the Chris-

tians. The liberal Turks suffered much, but there

was no general massacre of them. The number of

them killed was as hundreds to tens of thousands of

Christians.

THE YOUNG TURKS

The political reformers who had fled to Europe,

and especially to London and Paris, and had agitated

for reforms in the time of Abdul Aziz had been

dubbed “The Young Turks.” They published a

paper, called “*Hurriat*” (Liberty). When Abdul

Hamid abolished the Constitution of 1876, thousands

of them again fled into exile. There their eager souls

grew in longing for the freedom of their country.

Among them was Hairedin Pasha, a Circassian. He

had been governor of Tunis and Grand Vizier in the

first year of Abdul Hamid. He believed that under

Islam they could attain to the high standard of

European civilization. He dismissed the corrupt of-

ficials and started out to do justice to Moslems and

Christians alike. Unable to carry out his project he

went again into exile and became one of the reorgan-

izers of the Young Turk party. This was a secret

organization, formed to work for liberty and reform.

They published literature in Europe which they

smuggled into and distributed in Turkey. In spite of

repression many minds were permeated with modern

ideas. They became impressed with their inferiority

to Western nations and even to their subject Chris-

tian races in education and science. For years

the ferment worked actively, especially among the

younger men. Students abroad and in the govern-

ment schools imbibed liberal ideas. The officers and

surgeons in the military college were inspired with

the spirit of reform. Many of the bolder propagan-

dists suffered death, betrayed. Exiling to distant

provinces spread the reform movement in those out-

posts. The espionage system was disgusting to the

officers of the army, and the rank and file, too, be-

came disaffected by continual neglect, poor pay, and

hard service in Arabia and the fortresses.

In 1891 a committee of reformers was organized

in Geneva. Later they perfected organization in

Paris and other capitals and took the name of “The

Committee of Union and Progress.” Their policy

was to liberalize and reform Turkey by (1) preserv-

ing its integrity, (2) avoiding European or any out-

side interference in its affairs, (3) giving equality to

all races, (4) introducing parliamentary government

and if necessary deposing the Sultan.

The movement was distinctly secular in its nature.

It was a reflection of European political life. Its

moving influences, its modes of thought came from

Christian civilization. Islam was not paramount in

its aims, but the nation, the people, independence, self-

defence. The Young Turks explained away the tra-

ditions of Islam; discouraged fanaticism. They

wished to bring religion into conformity with modern

progress. They repudiated Pan-Islamism, which

even the Egyptian Nationalists encouraged. One of

their leaders said: “We Ottomans understand that

the pursuit of Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries

would be contrary to our dearest interests” (Knight’s

“Turkey,” p. 658). Therefore membership included

Christians and Jews, who were to join Moslems in

political action as friends and brothers. The Arme-

nian and Jewish committees were persuaded to unite

with them, and later unity of action was negotiated

with the Macedonian committees of the Bulgarians,

Greeks, and Serbs. Salonica was made headquarters

of the Committee. This city had not been controlled

by the spy-system as much as some others. Besides,

according to Knight (“Turkey,” p. 101), Free-

masonry flourished there, though the name and

nature of their meeting were always secret, for to be

found to be a Mason was to incur the penalty of death.

The Committee of Union and Progress was, he tells

us, “to a large extent modelled on Freemasonry and

a considerable portion of the early associates, Mos-

lems, and some Jews, were of Masonic lodges of

Salonica.” In Macedonia the army corps and officers

were won over. There were altogether fifteen thou-

sand members enrolled in Macedonia. The soldiers

of Asia Minor were brought into harmony with the

movement. Propagandists were successful every-

where throughout the empire. The leaders were men

of education, in professional and official life, averag-

ing but thirty-two years of age.

THE REVOLUTION

The time was ripe. The plot was perfected, though

European diplomacy knew it not. On July 23, 1908,

the leaders, among whom were Niazi Bey, Enver

Bey, and Mahmud Shevket Pasha, openly revolted

and proclaimed a Constitution. From Salonica the

demands of the revolutionists were presented by tele-

gram straight to the Palace. The Sultan awoke to

find himself without resource or subterfuge. In

solemn conclave, where all the viziers knew and none

dared to say the word, the astrologer Abul Huda was

put forward and pronounced the talisman, “A Con-

stitution.” The next day Abdul Hamid issued a de-

cree re-establishing the Constitution of 1876. The

Young Turks became the rulers of Turkey. The

Macedonian Corps became the royal guard. The

Palace camarilla disappeared, the spies were dismissed,

the prisoners of liberty were released, the exiles re-

turned, separated families were united, a whole peo-

ple breathed the first free breath in thirty years. The

jubilee of liberty was sounded. Enthusiasm knew

no bounds. The entire populace went wild with a

delirium and frenzy of rejoicing. Transports of joy

thrilled all hearts. Paeans of praise and gratitude

burst spontaneously from all lips. Barriers of race

and religion were broken down. Moslems and Chris-

tians and Jews sincerely fraternized, in an ecstasy of

delight. Mullahs and priests embraced and kissed

each other in the streets; they met in mass-meetings,

speaking on a common platform and electrifying a

united people with approval and exemplification of the

motto, “Hurriyat, Musavat, Agviyat, Adalat”

(Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Justice). Demonstra-

tions of various kinds were held. Conspicuous among

them was the memorial service of the Armenians,

killed in the massacres. The exiled Armenian Patri-

arch had returned. Ulema and Moslem people ac-

companied Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian priests

and bishops to the Armenian cemetery and prayed

and held services for the victims of fanaticism and

hate which seemed to have passed away. At the City

Hall a mullah offered prayer for brotherhood,

and Christians and Moslems joined together in the

“Amin.” At the time of the parliamentary election

the ballot box was treated as a symbol of liberty. It

was adorned with the flag, borne on camel-back in

procession, surrounded by little girls dressed in white.

Carriages followed, in which were seated Turkish

mullahs, Greek and Armenian priests, and Jewish

rabbis sitting side by side. At the voting table a mul-

lah sat with a Greek priest on one side and an Arme-

nian on the other. All over the empire, in Asia

Minor, Syria, and Armenia, the people received the

news of freedom with boundless joy and enthusiasm.

The world read the reports with gratitude and some-

thing akin to awe.

Most wonderful of all, the veiled women of the

harams issued forth from behind the pardas and the

latticed windows, threw aside the veils, appeared in

carriages with men, attended the theatre and the

parks, wrote for the press, held public meetings and

receptions, made addresses, demanded new rights,

talked politics with men, stood in the street awaiting

election returns—open-faced and without shame.

It was decided by the government to admit women

into the University, and to have special courses in

hygiene and domestic economy. It seemed the day

of woman’s emancipation.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SHARIAT

The provisions of the Constitution were, in brief:

the participation of the people in their government

through representatives in parliament, thus limiting

the autocratic power of the Sultan; the right of se-

cure domicile and personal liberty; Islam to be the

established religion, but all religions and races to have

equality before the civil law; all subjects to be con-

sidered Ottomans and to serve in the army; popular

education to be promoted. Adhered to and put into

practice these principles would have made a really

new political system in Moslem lands.

There were supreme difficulties in the way of ac-

complishing all this, even after the army had been

won over and the despotic caliph cowed. On the re-

ligious side there were two great difficulties: (1) To

show the Ulema and their party that the Constitution

in general was in accordance with the Shariat; (2)

To justify the provision that non-Moslems were to

be on an equality with Moslems. The general ques-

tion was settled in a way by the decrees of the Caliph

and of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Sheikh proclaimed

the legality of Constitutional government, holding

that Islam was essentially democratic, that the first

four “rightly guided” caliphs had been elected by the

people, that the principles of liberty, equality, frater-

nity, and justice were compatible with the Koran and

Islam. It was shown from the traditions that it is

in accord with the Law to limit the power of the ruler

by that of the people. For example, the Prophet has

said: “Consult with them [the people] on every af-

fair”; “Take counsel”; “Any obnoxious measure

taken after consultation is preferable to a salutary

measure taken arbitrarily”; “If any one should give

you a good commandment in my name, even though

I have not given it, do it”; “I am only a man. When

I order you anything respecting religion, receive it;

when I order you anything regarding the affairs of

the world, I am only a man.” It was cited also that

the “rightly guided caliphs” and their commanders

mentioned important events in the assemblies of the

people on Fridays; that the Imam Ali even appeared

before a tribunal, like any ordinary man, in a suit

against a Christian. In an interview with some promi-

nent Englishmen (C. R. Buxton: “Turkey in Revo-

lution,” pp. 172-74), the Sheikh-ul-Islam was asked:

“Is a real Constitutional government permitted by

the law of Islam?” He replied: “Permitted! It is

more than permitted; the law of Islam is more liberal

than the Constitution itself. … Our law, rightly in-

terpreted, is in accordance with the principles of

representative government. The wisest men, chosen

by the people, are to direct the ruler, and if he rules

without their consent he is going beyond his power.

Now that this principle has been embodied in the

law of the Constitution, that law itself is included in

the law of Islam (!). Our Ulema are bound to help

actively in carrying out the Constitution. … The

law of Islam enjoins equality—not that the people

can regard a Moslem as in every way the same as a

Christian; but political equality, equality before the

law, they are bound to grant.”

The crux of the matter lies in this provision—the

equality of civil rights of Christians and Jews with

Moslems. Is this possible under Islam? As an ideal

this had been propounded in the Ottoman empire as

early as the seventeenth century by the Koprulu fam-

ily of viziers. The Christian governments had

laboured to this end in the nineteenth century, espe-

cially for equal taxation, military service, and the

right to testify. This equality of rights had been pro-

claimed in the Hatti Sherif: adopted in the Constitu-

tion of 1876, and now readopted. It said: “All sub-

jects of the Ottoman empire are called Ottomans,

whatever religion they profess.” “All Ottomans are

equal before the law. They have the same rights and

the same duties in reference to the State.” Of this

provision Jurist says (*Moslem World*, 1913, p. 360):

“The signing of the Constitution of 1876 was the

death-warrant of Moslem law. … The two basic

principles are essentially Christian—responsibility and

equality.” To bring the Moslem people into recon-

ciliation with this provision the Committee sent

Ulema through the land to instruct in the mosques

and harmonize constitutional equality with Moslem

ideas. After hearing the doctrine propounded, two

old mullahs rose up in a mosque and protested; and

one in Bagdad said: “Then this is the end of Islam.”

He was right as regards one of the working postulates

of Islam, that the Moslems are the ruling class, and

Christians and Jews subject races, suffered to live

only so long as they continue in subjection. The Mos-

lem regards himself as superior—not because of

wealth, intellect, education, morals, or even conquest,

but because of his religion. It is a revolutionary

change of Moslem conceptions and of the customs of

thirteen hundred years to put the Christian on an

equality. To count the Christian’s life and honour

as equal to those of a true believer, to grant him

equality before the courts in giving testimony and

receiving punishment, in taxation, in the army as pri-

vates and as officers, in the elections, and in official

life—this is a condition which the Moslem cannot

contemplate with equanimity. The Young Turks

might idealize, in the environs of Geneva or Paris,

such a consummation, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam theo-

rize about it in interviews with liberal statesmen, but

to bring it into practical working was a superhuman

task. Yet the Young Turks were sincere in their pur-

pose and the Constitution was re-established on this

ideal. They would have grafted on the Moslem state

the best results of Christian civilization. They would

have substituted patriotism for religious fanaticism.

Yet this new fundamental law guards the law of Is-

lam and leaves an opening for persecution and pun-

ishment of the apostate. For after declaring that

Islam is the religion of the State, it is further de-

clared in Article X that “individual liberty is invio-

lable. *Except* according to the forms and for the

causes determined by the *Canon Law of Islam* (Shar-

iat) and the civil code, no one can be arrested or suf-

fer penalties.”

The parliament assembled December 17, 1908. It

was a striking assemblage, with deputies from Turks

and Albanians, Kurds and Arabs, Greeks and Arme-

nians, Syrians and Jews. It met in the historic St.

Sophia. The Ulema of Islam, the Christian Patri-

archs, the Ottoman princes, the ambassadors of Mos-

lem and Christian States all gave dignity to the scene,

while Sultan Abdul Hamid in person inaugurated the

National Assembly. It was an occasion of supreme

interest.

THE REACTION

Kaimal Pasha was made Grand Vizier. Around

him was organized a party called the Ahrar, the Lib-

eral Union. With them was Prince Sabah-ud-Din, a

son of the Sultan, who had lived in exile. These

favoured decentralization, giving to the Arabs and

Albanians and such races large powers of local self-

government. They were backed by the Sultan and

the reactionaries for their own purpose. And with

this party were British diplomacy and press, sowing

the seeds they are now reaping. All were working

against the Committee of Union and Progress.

The reactionaries organized an association called

the Moslem League. Its organ was the *Volcan*, whose

editor was a darvish. The League had more than

five hundred agitators, of whom seventeen were jour-

nalists and a number were connected with the Palace,

with Nadir Aga, one of the Sultan’s eunuchs, as

leader. The Sultan and his treasure-chest was back

of it all. The cry of the League was, “The Sacred

Law is in jeopardy! The Shariat! The Shariat is in

danger! The Faith is fallen!” They were not lack-

ing in pretexts for this party-cry. It was not difficult

to find cause against the Young Turks. Mahmud

Mukhtar Pasha had issued an order that military drill

and discipline should not be interrupted by prayer

times. Some of the officers had refused to join in

the prayers and had mocked the soldiers for beliefs

which they said were exploded. They had shown

contempt for the ceremonial rites. The sentiment of

one was quoted as: “Now, glory to God, every one is

free to believe as he likes.” When the League was

discovered to be working among the soldiers the lat-

ter were forbidden to associate with the Hodjas and

the Hodjas from entering the barracks. Officers even

directed the soldiers to be ready to bayonet the Hod-

jas. They retorted by calling the Young Turks in-

fidels, Freemasons, Jews, wine-bibbers, seducers of

Moslem wives and destroyers of harams, who de-

lighted to decorate their lodgings with pictures of

naked infidel women. By such influences, aided by

powerful bribes, the soldiers were weaned from their

allegiance, even the Salonica regiment, which, as sup-

porters of the Constitution, had been placed as guards

of the Sultan’s palace. On April 14, 1909, the sol-

diers rose in mutiny; in the Palace, the barracks, in

the cavalry, the marines and the regulars, all officers

who did not manage to escape were slain. The offi-

cers of the Committee and their journal, the *Tanin*,

were wrecked. The night following Constantinople

was terrorized and shuddered in wakeful, fearful an-

ticipation, while the soldiers shot off more than a mil-

lion cartridges. The next day in front of St. Sophia,

the mutineers and the Ulema celebrated the restora-

tion of the Shariat. Cries rent the air,—“Yashasun

Shariat-i-Paghambar!” (“Long live the Law of the

Prophet!”). With sounding of trumpets and chant-

ing of hymns, they rejoiced. On all sides and from

every lip went up the shout, “Shariat!” “Shariat!”

In the name of religion they had dared and won. The

next Friday the Sultan held his salaamlukh, with a

strange sight of soldiers on guard and officers con-

spicuous by their absence. The Sultan seemed again

triumphant and absolute.

DEPOSITION OF ABDUL HAMID

But that was the Red Sultan’s last salaamlukh.

Like an avenging fury, the Constitutional army swept

down from Macedonia upon the Capital, General

Husain Husni Pasha sending a proclamation that

“There exists not and cannot exist any law or power

above our Constitution.” Swift and sure was their

victory. Parliament reassembled. It put to the

Sheikh-ul-Islam this momentous question (April 22,

1909):

“What becomes of an Imam who has destroyed

certain holy writings; who has seized property in con-

travention of the Shariat; who has committed cruel-

ties in ordering the assassination and imprisonment of

exiles without any justification under the Shariat;

who has squandered the public money; who having

sworn to govern according to the Shariat has violated

his oath; who by gifts of money has provoked blood-

shed and civil war and who is no longer recognized in

the provinces?” The judgment of the Sheikh-ul-Is-

lam, the highest tribunal in Turkey, was in few

words: “He must abdicate or be deposed.”

A Committee of Parliament—chosen by lot—

waited on the Sultan, and by the mouth of a Salonica

Jew this mighty despot, this Caliph-Sultan, heard the

decree of deposition. His haram of several hundred

concubines were scattered to the homes of their child-

hood, in the mountains of Albania, the huts of the Cir-

cassians, or the palaces of favourites. The Sultan,

still well supplied with a retinue of three Sultanas,

four inferior concubines, five female slaves, four

eunuchs, and nine domestics, was exiled and confined

in a Salonica palace. The last picture we have of

the great assassin is, gathering his womenfolks about

him and casting the lot, which proves unfortunate,

for he exclaims “Bosh sheh!” (“Vanity, Vanity!”)

and breaks out into an oath—“Laanat Olsun!”

(“Cursed be it!”) (Francis McCallagh: “Fall of

Abdul Hamid”).

CONSTITUTIONAL RÉGIME; SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Mahmud V Rashad was chosen Sultan and Caliph

and bound on the sword of Othman as a Constitu-

tional monarch. The Young Turks took up the task

of government with considerable hopefulness. The

press was active, newspapers multiplied; new books

were issued; modern text-books were adopted; schools

were established; a reformed writing and spelling was

introduced to facilitate the study of Turkish; recruits

were ordered to be taught to read, as well as to use

knives and forks; men of age began attending night

school, and could be seen reading on the street cor-

ners. Several hundred youths were sent to Europe

to study law, finance, politics, and industry; a ma-

ternity hospital was opened; lectures were delivered

on religious liberty; much freedom of speech and

travel was allowed. The white-slave traffic with

Egypt was abolished, encouragement was given to the

liberation of slaves, ladies-in-waiting were substituted

as far as possible for eunuchs in the palace. Tram-

ways were increased; telephones came into use; elec-

tric lights were no longer prohibited, but appeared

in the mosques and on their domes. The dogs were

cleaned out of the streets of Constantinople in spite

of the prophecy that their leaving would be a sign

that the city would be no longer Mohammedan.

In carrying out the provisions of the Constitution,

the Young Turks found circumstances too much

for them. Neither equality of the religions nor Otto-

manization of the races was possible practically.

Equality was violated in the arrangements for the new

parliament, for the representation was so manipulated

that out of 240 deputies, the Christians had only 37.

The enlistment of Christian soldiers met with diffi-

culties. The Turks were utterly unwilling to treat

them as themselves. They limited the number in each

regiment to twenty per cent. They did not ac-

cept them as officers; they did not desire that they

should receive military training, but rather that they

should be hewers of wood and drawers of water and

makers of roads. The Christians began to flee the

country to avoid the conscription. The Christian

soldiers were in danger of demoralization and of los-

ing their faith. The Patriarch of the Greeks and the

Exarch of the Bulgarians tried to arrange that Chris-

tian soldiers should have their own worship and chap-

lains, should keep Sunday, and should not be per-

mitted to become Moslems during their term of serv-

ice. They insisted that they should be received into

the military schools to be trained as officers. Civil

offices, too, were not given to the Christians in pro-

portion to their numbers, though they are very capa-

ble. In some places fifteen per cent of the police were

allowed to be Christians.

Unwillingness of the Moslems to allow Christians

to assume equality was one cause of the Adana mas-

sacres, though these were no doubt instigated by Ab-

dul Hamid and the reactionaries. The peasantry were

wrought upon by tales of how the Armenians were go-

ing to rise and rule over them. This massacre, 1909,

in which twenty-five thousand Christians lost their

lives, was more dastardly, cruel, and lustful than those

that preceded it. However inadequate the punishment

meted out may be considered, it was at least a sign

of progress and a new thing in history that a Moslem

government hanged for the murder of Christians

more than a score of Moslems, some of whom were

wealthy and some religious leaders. The Young

Turks in their sane moments have tried to teach Mos-

lems that they cannot kill Christians with impunity in

times of peace. A Moslem was executed at Jerusa-

lem for murdering an Armenian abbot. An Arab,

looking on, said: “It is a black day for us, for a Mos-

lem has been killed for killing a Christian.” But

these punishments were exceptional. The truth is that

neither in the army, in the courts, in the government,

nor in ordinary life, did the Christians receive lib-

erty, equality, fraternity, or justice. Islam and the

Constitution did not work together. It is doubtful

whether even a long period of peaceful progress would

have accomplished it. Rather it was demonstrated

that only power exerted from without can make the

life and property of Christians safe under Moslem

rule.

ATTEMPTS AT OTTOMANIZATION

Attempts were made in Arabia and Syria to bring

the Arabs nearer to Turkish methods. These were

met by hostility. The project was initiated of impos-

ing on the Albanians the language, alphabet, customs,

and military discipline of the Turks. A census was

ordered and new taxes imposed. The Albanians re-

sisted and rose in insurrection. Harassed by inter-

nal troubles and before it had time to put its house in

order, Turkey became a prey to its neighbours. Aus-

tria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria de-

clared her independence. Italy proclaimed war and

annexed Tripoli and some islands. The Balkan States,

Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, formed an

alliance, conquered their ancient foe and rent from her

Macedonia, much of Thrace, Albania, Crete, and

other islands. The seizure of Morocco by France

added to the feeling of dismay and hatred. With

thousands of Macedonian refugees to provide for,

tension with Greece through boycotts and oppressions

of her Greek subjects, with danger of Kurdish raids

and Arab plots, with factional fights within and its

revenues diminished and its expenditures for war

preparations enormous, Turkey’s plight was sorry in-

deed. Its one consolation was the deep sympathy

which the Moslem world showed it in its misfortunes,

sympathy shown in lamentations and tears, in curses

on the Christians and in generous contributions.

These attacks of the Christian governments had by

this time driven from the minds of the Young Turks

all thought of treating the Christians of the empire

as equals; indeed, little remained that they should

treat them all as enemies. They found it necessary

to show a loyalty to Islam which they did not possess,

and to foster and strengthen the fanaticism of the

Moslems in order to utilize it.

Though bent on carrying out the policy of Otto-

manization of everything, yet necessity made the

Young Turks dependent on the brain and experience

of Christians. So after the Balkan War foreign ad-

visers were called in. German officers took charge of

the army and Gen. Liman von Sanders became com-

mander of the corps at Constantinople. To the Brit-

ish was signed the navy; to the French, finance and the

gendarmerie. Others were to assist in reforms in

Armenia and Kurdistan. With all this it appears that

Pan-Islamic agitation was taken up from Constan-

tinople. Agents and tracts were sent out. *The Near*

*East* says (April, 1914): “The publication of Pan-

Islamic, anti-Christian, anti-European literature has

increased markedly of late.” The European name for

the capital, Constantinia, was erased from the coinage

and Dar-ul-Khalifate ul Aliyah (the abode of the High

Caliph) substituted, corresponding to the official title

of the city, Dar-i-Saadat, the Seat of Prosperity. The

change has one advantage, in that the coins can be

used in the new capital without recoining. Stamps

were ordered to be printed in Turkish alone, the French

being deleted. Signboards, which were often in three

languages, must be only in Turkish. Turkish names

must be given to the schools and other institutions of

the non-Moslems. The street-sweepers of Pera had

badges with number and title in both French and

Turkish. They went on strike, complaining that the

Frangi letters on their necks interfered with their

prayers. Their petition was granted. Efforts were

begun to curtail and even abolish the privileges of the

Christian races and to annul the status granted to them

by Mohammed the Conqueror, and even to change the

privileges conferred by the Caliph Omar. These privi-

leges were granted to regulate the condition of those

subjects who were denied the rights of full citizenship

enjoyed only by Moslems under their law. Each race

or religion has had an organization (millat) with a

large measure of self-government. The Patriarch was

considered the head of the race as well as of the re-

ligion and administered many matters ordinarily in

charge of the civil magistrate. The abrogation of these

privileges must depend upon the establishment of real

equality in law and practice which has not yet been

attained.

ABOLITION OF THE CAPITULATIONS

Another step towards Ottomanization was the aboli-

tion of the Capitulations, which was put into effect

September 9, 1914. These capitulations are treaties

which the Sublime Porte has made with reference to

foreign subjects living within its borders. They are

named from the capitula or sections into which the

treaties are divided. In Byzantine times the emperors

had made such arrangements with regard to resident

Europeans. These regulations were confirmed by Mo-

hammed II. They were founded on an ancient prin-

ciple of law that the State would not extend rights

and privileges under its laws to foreigners and that

their own State must take the trouble of governing

them. Moslem rule made special regulations more

necessary, for it would not grant the privileges under

the Sacred Law to any except Moslems and could not

expect subjects of independent Christian States to take

the inferior position of the rayats or subjugated Chris-

tians. Hence a special arrangement, mutually agree-

able, was entered into which allowed each nationality

to be judged by its own consul and laws. Each group

formed a separate colony, enjoying what have been

called extra-territorial rights. These were extended

under the favourite nation clause to all who made

treaties. At first the powerful Sultans entered into

this arrangement somewhat as a matter of grace and

accommodation. They were relieved of the trouble of

governing the Genoese, Venetians, and other colonies,

and the power of the Sultans was not limited by this

in any way in which they cared to exercise it. But

when Turkish power declined, these privileges became

extended and acted as a restraint on Turkish authority.

These capitulations granted freedom of religious wor-

ship, freedom from the jurisdiction of the Turkish

courts, with right of trial by one’s own consul, pro-

tection from molestation from natives or from the

police, exemption from taxes or arrest, inviolability of

domicile. They arranged the rate of custom-duties,

which could not be changed without the consent of the

foreign governments. They permitted foreign post-

offices in connection with the consulates.

These privileges were at times greatly abused. By

selling or granting the right of citizenship or by re-

ceiving many into nominal service at the embassies,

the number enjoying these privileges was wrongfully

increased. One French ambassador received $80,000

for passport privileges. The Austrians and Russians

enrolled several hundred thousand subjects in Wal-

lachia and Moldavia. Governments which charged

enormous duties at their own ports, limited Turkey

to an eight- or eleven-per cent duty. There was no

doubt of the gross injustice of the conditions. Besides

it was galling to the pride and self-respect of the Turks

and a sign of their inferiority. Efforts were made to

annul them in 1856 and 1862, after the adoption of

the Code Napoléon. Especially since the adoption of

a Constitution declaring equal rights to all races and

religions, the Turks felt that the time had come to

abolish such restrictions. On the face of it their con-

tention is right. But some considerations make it evi-

dent that the fulness of time had not come for their

abolition. For the equality of Christians with Mos-

lems before the courts is not yet put into practice; the

judges are all Moslems, and the testimony of a Chris-

tian does not yet count for much as against that of a

Moslem; the courts are notoriously corrupt, and have

not yet been reformed. The *Tanin* declares that the

judges continue to oppose the reform of the judiciary

and that when a European adviser was employed to

purge and regulate the courts he was stoutly resisted.

Reform, it says, “is a fight against the whole force of

the magistrates, their methods, their ignorance, their

inability, their mental state.” This difficulty is not in-

superable, for if Greece and Japan can judge all for-

eigners, and if Great Britain can have Moslem jus-

tices in India who are worthy of confidence, such may

be at length developed among the Turks. Indeed,

there is testimony to assure us that in the Shari courts

upright judges are not wanting.

The abolition of the Capitulations was celebrated

in Turkey as an Independence Day,—as “the dawn

of a new era.” Flags were flying for three days, amid

great rejoicings and congratulations. It was regarded

as a great and glorious event—as a fact accomplished

—in spite of the unanimous protest of the Legations.

Following this, new laws have been issued. Duties

have been raised from fifteen to one hundred per

cent; an income tax (Temettu) has been fixed on

foreigners and their occupations, exception being

made for certain classes as teachers and clergy. Most

disquieting is the new law regarding schools, which

directly affects those of the missions. All schools

must be formally authorized, must state the name of

their responsible director, of the text-books and cur-

riculum, must teach Turkish equally with the chief

language of the school, and the history and geography

of Turkey in the Turkish language. Think of it!

The history of Turkey must be taught, and according

to the Turkish representation of the facts. But fur-

ther the law declares “that religious knowledge and

history and the teaching of the creed of the denomina-

tion to which the school belongs *shall not be given to*

*pupils who do not profess that religion*.” Nor must

such pupils be made to attend prayers. This strikes

at the foundation of educational mission work, the

largest branch of the American work in Turkey.

This has already been specifically applied, as at

Beirut College.

At another point the Ottomanization programme

shows itself. After the massacre of the Christians

by the Druses in 1860, the Lebanon district was placed

under a special administration. Its privileges have

been declared null. An army of seventeen thousand

was sent in and all administration was taken over by

the Turks. The Christian governor’s authority was

reduced to a shadow. The patriarch of the Maron-

ites was stripped of his privileges.

The aim of this movement and of these new laws

is to reduce the whole empire to a uniform basis

under Ottoman law, to abolish all special laws and

privileges. The non-success of the attempt in Al-

bania does not argue well for its wisdom.

TURKEY AND THE PRESENT WAR

On the opening of the present European war Tur-

key began general mobilization, calling to arms

Christians and Jews as well as Moslems. Many non-

Moslems were excused on the payment of fifty pounds.

After three months, on November 7, 1914, Turkey

entered the conflict on the side of Germany, and pro-

claimed the jihad.

Why did the Turks enter the war? According to

their own word, they believed that the day of deliv-

erance for Islam had come, “the day of vengeance

against the oppressors,” the day of triumph over those

who had despoiled their heritage. “We are fighting,”

says the editor of the Turkish *Yourdou*, “for the

freedom of the Turkish race and of Islam.” The

*Tarjuman* says: “The Turkish expeditionary army

on the West and on the East carries the message of

salvation and life to the Moslems living there.” Hali-

dah Khanum, the famous writer, graduate of the

American College, says: “This war is an absolute

necessity; how eagerly our brethren in Russia await

the army of the caliphate!” (*Orient*, January 25,

1915). Sir Edwin Pears, a high authority, confirms

this opinion, saying that popular sentiment was with

the war party because they hoped to get back some

of the territory they had lost.

ENGLAND OR GERMANY! WHICH?

Why did the Turks enter the war on the German

side? From a conviction of self-interest. It appears

to them that Russia, Great Britain, and France are

the countries that are holding Moslems in subjection,

while Germany has been content with financial ad-

vantages. It need not be counted strange that they

believed Germany to be their friend. The German

emperor had assumed that position, had supported the

Red Sultan at the time of the Armenian massacres,

had twice visited him in 1889 and 1898, had stood

by the grave of Saladin at Damascus and announced

that, “The three hundred millions of Mohammedans

that are scattered through the world may rest assured

that the German emperor will eternally be their

friend.”1

When the star of Abdul Hamid was setting, the

Germans won the friendship of the Young Turks,

which the British lost by inexplicable diplomacy.

After the Balkan War, the German ambassador pub-

licly declared: “The time has come when the Father-

land may attach to the Asiatic provinces the warning,

‘Touch me not!’” So when the present war was

declared, it is no wonder that the crowds made a

great demonstration in front of the German embassy.

The Ambassador spoke to them of the struggle as one

for the real welfare of Islam before which there was

victory and a glorious future. In this connection we

may recall the telegram which a great mass-meeting

of Persians and their sympathizers sent from Stam-

boul to the Kaiser, beseeching his help against Eng-

land and Russia on behalf of Persia. Germany had

played its game of diplomacy so as to impress the

Moslems, of Turkey and Persia at least, with her

friendship. Of small importance, and intended only

to inspire the populace, were the reports that the

Kaiser had become a Mohammedan and had adopted

the name Haji Mohammed Wilhelm, and was wearing

a fez, as the photograph showed, and that his haram

was coming to visit the Sultan in the captured dread-

naughts of the British; that the Germans had become

true believers and in proof of their anti-Christian

feelings had sent views of the ruined churches of

1 When I saw the glaring metal tablet at Baalbek, placed to

commemorate the Kaiser’s visit, I thought it exceedingly incon-

gruous in those sublime ruins.

Belgium; that they had appointed a Mohammedan

governor of Belgium, and the Belgians themselves

were desirous of becoming Moslems. Even a con-

sular agent of Germany in Persia is said to have pro-

fessed to be a Mohammedan in order to win the Per-

sians to the jihad.

Lest you be too much astonished at these things,

behold the other great Protestant Power of Europe

vying with Germany in being the friend and assister

of Islam. Sardar Wingate of the Sudan said in his

proclamation on behalf of the British Government

(*Near East*, January 1, 1915): “From the religious

aspect also we [Great Britain] have brought the holy

places within a few days’ journey of Khartum. We

have subsidized and assisted the men of religion. We

have built and given assistance to the building of new

mosques all over the country. The Kadis and others

have received free and thorough education in the

Koran and in the tenets of the Mohammedan religion.

… Great Britain will continue to improve in every

possible manner the facilities for the practice of the

Mohammedan religion.” The High Commissioner in

Egypt, representing King George, in the formal ad-

dress to the new Sultan Husain Kamal, declares that

“The strengthening and progress of Mohammedan

institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which

his Majesty’s government takes the deepest interest.”

Lieut.-Col. A. C. Yate, member of Parliament, at a

session of the Central Asian Society, presided over

by Sir Mortimer Durand, said: “If ever a great

Mussulman confederacy was to be formed, it must

be done with the fullest sympathy and support of the

British Empire. The day might come when Great

Britain might stand forth *as the champion of Islam*,

of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan in alliance with

the Mussulmans of India.”

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE HOLY WAR

The Jihad, or Holy War, was proclaimed with due

ceremony, before an immense crowd at the Mosque

of Mohammed the Conqueror at Constantinople. By

legal custom, questions were asked and formally an-

swered by the Fatva-amini, this constituting a lawful

declaration. In this the call is made to all Moslems,

“old and young, living in all parts of the world,” in-

cluding those living under the governments of Russia,

England, and France, to join battle against the enemy,

with their persons and their property; otherwise their

conduct is “a great revolt against the Omnipotent

and liable to celestial punishment, and if they fight

against the Sultan they are to be punished with hell-

fire.” The proclamation was repeated all over the

country and with special ceremony at Jerusalem.

The concourse gathered at the Dome of the Rock, the

rock-top of Mt. Moriah, the altar of Abraham. The

Kazi of Medina was brought to add impressiveness to

the occasion. Just as he rose to read, a thunder-

storm interrupted him. In a lull he began again,

when a fierce wind tossed the flag from its staff at

his feet. The Kazi was alarmed at these evil omens

and tremblingly read the proclamation, after which

he fell into a fit, and died within three days (*Near*

*East*, 1914, p. 384). Far and wide throughout all

Islam the proclamation of the Jihad was sent.

Through the press, through tracts, and travelling

agents the Holy War was urged upon the faithful.

Bulletins were scattered by aeroplanes over the armies

of the Allies in Belgium and France to call the Mos-

lem soldiers of Algeria, Senegal, and India to al-

legiance to Islam. Let me give some extracts from

a proclamation of the Jihad: “To the millions of

Islam! ‘God will punish them in your hand; ye

will overcome them!’ (Koran). Oh, ye faithful, what

do ye wait for? How often have the savage Rus-

sians, the traitorous English, the Frenchmen born of

impure parentage, planted their unclean flags upon

your holy mountains. Oh, ye helpless people of India,

of the Oxus, of Tunis and of the orphan isles, and

you wretched tribes of Turkey. Ye have become

slaves of the people of the Cross. If you desire

honour and glory, houris and damsels, behold all are

in the grasp of your sword. Attack your enemies

from every side. Whenever you meet them, kill them.

Quicken the failing proclamation of the Unity. Listen

to the will of God, the desire of your prophet, the

command of the Caliph that you give no rest to the

enemy. If you have no arms, *tear his throat with your*

*teeth*. Jihad! Jihad! Oh, Moslems! The Great

God is ordering you to fight everywhere. God will

give you the victory. He gives you the houris and

the damsels of heaven.”

Turks and Germans expected great things from the

Jihad. Ali Fahmi Mohammed (in *The Near East*)

declared: “Egypt would revolt against England in

a world-wide conflict or any serious rising in India.”

Hafiz Bey Ramazan, an Egyptian Nationalist, had

been assured that the Kaiser expected to plan his at-

tack in connection with an uprising in India and

Egypt. Grothe (quoted by Hurgronge: “The Holy

War,” p. 36) anticipated that on Turkey’s proclaim-

ing the Holy War, the Moslems would attack their

masters “here with secrecy and ruse, there with

fanatical courage,” and especially to the undoing of

England. Mr. Carl Peters, the African traveller,

voiced this expectation (quoted from Professor Vam-

bery in “Islam: A Challenge,” p. 239): “There is

one factor which might fall on our side of the balance

and in case of a world-war might be made useful to

us: That factor is Islam. As Pan-Islamism it could

be played against Great Britain as well as against the

French Republic; and if German policy is bold enough,

it can fashion the dynamite to blow into the air the

rule of the Western Powers from Cape Nun, Mo-

rocco, to Calcutta.”

The ambitious scheme had in some minds this con-

summation, that there should be in the world two

great empires; the Caliph should be ruler of all Islam

and the Kaiser of all Christendom.

It is not strange that many persons with a knowl-

edge of the intense disloyalty and hatred that prevails

among Moslem subjects of Christian Powers and of

the propaganda that had been carried on through so

many years, should have anticipated great results from

the call to the Jihad. They miscalculated indeed, but

did not misjudge Moslem feelings. The Moslem peo-

ple did not make a general uprising. We need not,

however, give too much value to the proclamations

of loyalty issued in Egypt, India, Zanzibar, Algeria,

and Central Asia. These might be diplomatic utter-

ances accompanied even by secret disloyal plottings.

But two reasons account for the failure of the call

to the Jihad. The first and greatest was the convic-

tion that the Jihad did not promise success. The

Moslem leaders of Asia and Africa could not believe

that the united force of Great Britain, France, and

Russia could go down in defeat. These are the great

and conquering empires whose power they have felt.

They looked upon Turkey as broken, overcome by

Italy and by her own late subjects, the Balkan States.

Besides if the Germanic Alliance should be victorious,

they felt that they would only be changing one Chris-

tian master for another, and as one Moslem expressed

it, quoting Shakespeare:

“Thus must we from the smoke into the smother.”

In addition to this the wily head of Pan-Islamism

was gone and the Islamic world has a suspicion of, if

not a detestation for, the Young Turks as a set of

worldly, Europeanized men with little care for the

faith as such, and of the Committee of Union and

Progress as a sceptical group of Crypto-Jewish

Dunmas and wine-bibbing modernists, who are playing

with the jihad as a political instrument. Besides they

felt the incongruity of fighting for the faith of Islam

in union with an army partly composed of and com-

manded by Christians.

However, had the Austro-Germans conquered the

Allies and the campaigns of Turkey in Egypt, the

Caucasus, and Persia been successful, the Moslem

world would have been agitated to its depths and its

widest extent. There is no doubt that Egypt, Tripoli,

Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan from east to west, in-

cluding the powerful Sanusiyahs, would welcome an

opportunity to cast off the hated infidel yoke. Persia

would rejoice to attack the Russian bear, could it feel

assured that its teeth were extracted and its paws

disabled. As to India we hear well-worded expres-

sions of loyalty from the official class, but we do not

hear from the great sixty millions of steadfast

Sunnis who, no doubt, would join the Hindus to throw

the British into the Indian Ocean, if confident of ulti-

mate victory. The twenty million Moslems of Russia

are of the same mind. In all these lands there are

few Moslems loyal to their Christian rulers. To be

so is contrary to the law, instinct, and spirit of Islam.

They would prefer to be as Afghanistan, with a civil-

ization of the Middle Ages and under the old-time

absolutism of a Mohammedan ruler, than to have the

culture and education of Aligarh College, under the

British Raj. Albeit their progressive men hope for

twentieth-century civilization with the Mohammedan

faith and political independence. To obtain the latter

they would welcome the first favourable opportunity,

not because the Turks proclaim a jihad, but because

it is the deep and fervent desire of their hearts. Con-

vince them of a successful issue, and rebellion will

follow. In this lies the danger in a repulse of the

Allies at the Dardanelles. For their retreat might be

the signal for a tremendous upheaval in other Mos-

lem lands. It will create a serious problem for the

Christian colonies and camps in Africa and Asia if

the Jihad becomes universal, while the forces of

Christian nations are engaged in Europe.

The Turk, wherever his hand reaches, is waging his

Holy War with terrible reality. See it in action with

all its old-time fanaticism. Tens of thousands of

Christians in Urumia and Salmas, Persia, have fled

for their lives, abandoning all. Their villages, homes,

and churches have been destroyed, and their women

ravished. The tribal Nestorians of the Kurdish

mountains have been driven into the Alpine fast-

nesses to perish of hunger, or to surrender to death

or Islam. Their patriarch, Mar Shimoon, is a fugi-

tive in a foreign land. Look over the mountains and

plains of Asiatic Turkey and see the ruthless Holy

War waged against the defenceless Armenians.

Their strong men butchered in cold blood or drafted

into the army to be slaughtered in the van. The old

men and children set adrift in the wildernesses to per-

ish. All the goodly women subjected to unspeakable

dishonour or carried off to the harams of the Turks

and Kurds and forced to Islamize. Thousands of

villages and towns and districts depopulated. Hun-

dreds of thousands of Christians, Armenians, Nes-

torians, Jacobites, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics,

and Protestants mercilessly destroyed, with the dia-

bolical purpose to wipe out Christianity from Turkey.

This is the ripened fruit of the reform movement of

the Young Turks.

We write over that movement and the attempt to

establish Constitutional government, as over that of

Persia: “Failure! Mene, mene, tekel! Weighed in

the balance! Found wanting! To be divided!” A

righteous issue of the war will be the dismember-

ment of Turkey, with the remnant deprived of the

power ever to proclaim a jihad or to persecute its

non-Moslem peoples.

A review of present-day movements among Mos-

lems shows that Islam is neither dead nor moribund.

It is full of life, action, agitation, of cross-purposes,

the resultant of contrary religious and intellectual

forces. Some are striving for the reform of the social,

intellectual, political, and religious life of Islam; some

are mighty to conserve and spread the old Faith; not

a few would strengthen the old fanatical zeal and

hatred of its people and call into exercise its perse-

cuting spirit. All these movements in Islam are

energetic, aggressive, determined, and anti-Christian.

Upon the Church of Christ, Islam is an urgent call

to duty, to faith and obedience. Facts and conditions

voice anew the command of Jesus Christ: “Go, preach

the Gospel to the Moslems.” The call is for a con-

trite heart, recognizing the long neglect of the Church;

for a sincere love which will overcome our crusader

spirit and quench thought of vengeance in prayer for

their repentance and forgiveness; for heroic faith

because of the supreme difficulties of the task; for

unfailing courage, knowing that the conversion of Is-

lam is the most arduous work that the Church has

undertaken. The need of and hope for Moslems is

a movement Christ-ward.

INDEX

A

Abbasides, 24, 63, 67, 113, 170.

Abdul Aziz, Sultan, 58, 59,

103, 255, 256, 258, 261.

Abdul Baha, 129-131.

Abdul Hamid, 21, 41, 59, 63,

64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 74,

85, 88, 104, 151, 181, 207, 208,

233, 258-265, 272-273, 284.

Abdul Kadir (Algeria), 87,

219.

Abdul Kadir Jilani, 24.

Abdul Mejid, 40, 255, 256.

Abdullah II, 56.

Abdullah, Mulvi, 168.

Abubekr, 20.

Abu Hanifa, 13, 21.

Abul Huda, 63, 64, 264.

Abyssinia, 109.

Acca, 115, 124, 128, 130.

Achmad Abdullah, cited, 99,

103, 105.

Adrianople, 31, 124, 128.

Afghans, Afghanistan, 25, 26,

42, 69, 70, 93, 134, 189, 222,

240, 286, 290.

Africa, 21, 22, 26, 33, 42, 62, 77,

87, 0, 99, 145, 173, 196, 212,

217, 219, 222, 223, 226, 227,

236, 290; penetration by Is-

lam, 94-105 (see Sudan).

Africa, South, 96, 102, 109.

Aga Khan, 229; cited, 89, 92,

188.

Ahli Koran, 168.

Ahmad Ahsai, Sheikh, 116, 155.

Ahmad Khan, Sayid, 163, 187,

229.

Ahmad, Sayid of Oudh, 56.

Ahmadiyas, founder, 132;

claims, 133: teachings, 134;

hostile to Christianity, 134;

proofs, 135; imprecations,

136; propaganda, 137; num-

bers, 137; compared to Ba-

haism, 138; Moslems on, 135;

inclusive, 135; use of press,

139

Ahmad Sultan Shah, 247.

Al-Akbar Ibn Arabi, 24.

Al Askari, 170.

Al Azhar, 31, 98, 106, 175-176,

183, 236.

Al Bakri, Sheikh, 158, 160.

Al Sarraj, 17.

Albanians, 62, 182, 239, 270,

273, 276.

Alcohol (see Wine).

Algeria, 25, 26, 45, 77, 87, 95,

104, 219, 290.

Ali Allahis, 61, 125, 126.

Aligarh, 163, 223, 290 (see

Schools; India).

Ali, Imam, 20, 72, 73, 112, 117,

267; exalted to divinity, 27,

29, 44, 126.

Ali Mohammed (see Bab).

Ali Nur-i-Din, Sheikh, 115.

Alivis, 98 (see Ali Allahi).

Allegorical interpretations, 16,

21, 127.

America, 71, 109, 150; Baha-

ism in, 130, 131.

Amir Ali, Justice, 32, 64, 66,

111, 121, 164-167, 169, 170,

201, 212, 229.

Animism, 45, 46.

Annam, 46.

Anti-Christ, 114.

Arabi Pasha, 63, 71, 232.

Arabia, 25, 36, 54, 55, 57, 69,

85, 101, 164, 221, 262.

Arabic, 97, 106, 173, 175, 186,

192, 199.

Arabs, 62, 67, 74, 90, 103, 169,

182, 195, 200, 238, 270, 275,

276.

Armenians, 81, 83, 84, 89, 93,

98, 121, 199, 251, 256, 261,

263, 265, 270, 275, 277, 283,

291 (see Christians, massa-

cres of).

Arnold, T. W. (cited, 45, 47,

57, 86, 94, 95-

Aryans, 22.

Asceticism, 19, 20.

Asia, Central, 162, 163, 174,

175, 218; 289, 290.

Assassins, 114, 125.

Assassinations by Sultans, 66;

by Bahais, 124; as a prac-

tice, 169 note.

Astrology, 33, 45, 63.

Atchin, 65, 87, 93-

Azal (see Subh-i-Azal).

Azalis, 124, 169, 243.

B

Bab, title, 117; history, 116-

120; books, 116, 119 (see

Bayan); claims, 118, 121; at-

titude of government, 119;

imprisonment, 119; execu-

tion, 120; reforms, 121, 122;

successor, 123; 146, 153,

155.

Babis, 62, 74, 169, 243, 250;

wars of, 119; brutalities, 119;

attempt on Shah, 120; in-

carnations among, 123.

Babism, 116-122; doctrines,

121, 123; rites, 122; results,

122, 123.

Bagdad, 24, 52, 63, 67, 112, 123,

124, 170, 183, 215, 268.

Baha Ullah, history, 123, 124,

129; polygamist, 128; claims,

124, 125; as fulfilment, 126;

worshipped, 128; doctrines,

127; writings, 127-128, 133.

Bahaism, its system, 124; rela-

tion to Babism, 123, 124;

laws, 128; rites, 128; peace-

advocate, 129; pilgrimage,

130; its quarrels, 129; propa-

ganda in West, 130-131; con-

verts in America, 130-131;

compared to Ahmadiyas, 138-

139; 146, 155, 169.

Baku, 162.

Balkans, 88, 90, 209, 220, 227,

276, 277, 289.

Batinis, 121, 127.

Battaks, 57, 85, 93, 228.

Bayan, 119, 121.

Bayazid, Sultan, 21.

Becker, Prof., cited, 33, 38.

Beduins, 28, 74, 75, 200, 237.

Beirut, 152, 192, 207, 212, 282.

Beluchistan, 25, 26.

Berbers, 25, 62.

Bliss, E. M., cited, 65, 78, 84.

Books, censored, 78.

Boudros Pasha, 235, 236.

Brahmanism (see Hindus).

Britain, Great, British, 56, 66,

67, 69, 71, 84, 90, 135, 137,

177, 180, 217, 242, 253, 260,

277, 283, 286, 289; partiality

to Islam, 222-225; cultivating

favour, 285-286; in Sudan,

141, 145, 146, 285, 286; in

Egypt, 184, 233-238; in In-

dia, 187, 188, 222, 281, 287.

Brown, J. P., cited, 16, 24, 258.

Browne, E. G., cited, 15, 71, 72,

73, 89, 116, 123, 154, 158, 242,

243.

Bukhara, 65, 76, 175, 211.

Bulgaria, 220, 222, 263, 265,

275, 276.

C

Cairo, 31, 52, 67, 99, 110, 174,

175, 185, 212, 233, 236.

Cairo Conference, 174, 176.

Caliphate, 69, 151; Osmanli,

63-67; by whom acknowl-

edged, 64-65, 103, 104; em-

phasized, 69; ordered massa-

cres, 83.

Caliphs, 13, 43, 52, 56; titles,

64; insignia, 64; qualifica-

tions, 64, 66; may be de-

posed, 67; supreme, 76; 105,

113, 117, 200, 266, 277,

Capitulations, 279-282.

Caste in Islam, 44.

Caucasus, 76, 87, 205, 221, 246.

Celibacy, 20.

Charms, 24, 33.

China, 44, 65, 77, 87, 106, 192,

204, 228.

Chiragh Ali, Maulvie, 167.

Christ, Lord Jesus, 23 (see

Jesus).

Christian converts, 28, 51, 109,

136, 239, 256-257.

Christians, Christianity (see

Missions), 23, 30, 43, 44, 50,

51, 54, 61, 96, 98, 103, 107, 109,

147, 166, 169, 174, 187, 191,

192, 201, 210; hatred for, 74,

75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 103, 220,

221, 259, 277; of the devil,

76; must be subject, 85, 86;

in Babism, 121; in Bahaism,

129, 131; Mirza Ahmed on,

133-135; in Turkey, 59, 63,

69, 181, 224, 279; efforts to

cripple, 78; books censored,

78-79; work repressed, 79;

enslaved, 211; efforts to Is-

lamize, 79, 93; contempt for,

81; persecutions of, 81, 82,

213; churches taken, 82, 83;

massacres of, 66, 261, 275,

282, 283, 291; cause of, 83;

had religious motive, 79; list

of, 83, 84; ordered by Sultan,

83; accepting Islam, 84, 184;

women outraged, 199, 291;

reforms for, 217, 220, 256-

260; united with young

Turks, 263; rejoiced with,

265; under Constitution, 268-

270, 274-276; military ser-

vice, 274, 282; discriminated

against, 223, 224, 225, 274,

275, 277; national aspirations,

227; rights abrogated, 278

(see Armenians; Greeks;

Copts; Nestorians); in Per-

sia, 155, 156, 179, 251, 291; in

Albania, 239, 276; Christian

civilization, 239-240, 262.

Circassians, 45, 273.

Clergy, Mohammedan (see

Mullahs), development of,

29, 30; classes, 31.

Committee of Union and

Progress (see Young Turks).

Constantinople, 21, 22, 31, 34,

41, 52, 56, 64, 69, 71, 81, 82,

84, 98, 104, 105, 152, 169, 190,

207, 212, 217, 224, 229,

233, 237, 270, 271, 274, 277,

286.

Constitution (see Persia, and

Turkey).

Copts, 185, 236, 237.

Crawford, S., 29.

Creed (Moslem), 18, 46, 60,

250.

Cromer, Lord, 12, 77, 158,

169, 192, 194, 204, 214, 224,

233.

Crusades, 43, 60, 91, 220.

D

Damascus, 31, 283.

Danfodio, Osman, 57, 93.

Dar-ul-Harb, 43, 56, 86, 221.

Dar-ul-Islam, 43, 86.

Darvishes, 19, 21, 230, 270;

their feats, 19; lodges, 20,

22, 24, 101; for Pan-Islam-

ism, 68, 77; reforms in, 160,

257; orders of, 19, 21; wide-

spread, 22; influential, 26,

258; propagandists, 95, 98-

105, 108; Maulavis, 18, 22;

Baktashi, 19, 21, 98; Kadiri-

yah, 20, 98, 99, 102; Ma-

daniyah, 77; Nakshbandi, 20;

Mahdiist, 139-145; Rufai,

21, 63; Sadiyah, 160; Sa-

nusiyah, 22, 77, 99-105 (see

Sanusi, Sufiism).

Dissimulation, 120, 129.

Divination, 33.

Divorce, 40, 122, 128, 135, 196-

198.

Dowie, J., 136.

Dreams, 24.

Druses, 82, 114, 125, 282.

Dutch East Indies, Islam in,

22, 26, 33, 34, 35, 45, 46, 81

note, 87, 88 note, 108, 115,

196, 204, 225 (see Java, Su-

matra).

Dwight, H., cited, 31, 32.

E

Edinburgh Conference, 222,

224.

Education, old style, 172-176;

in mosques, 172; curriculum,

173, 174; illiteracy, 176, 187;

traditional, 174 (see Theo-

logical Schools); modern,

152, 158, 162, 177, 187; non-

clerical, 191-192; effects, 192-

193 (see Schools); of girls,

182, 183; in Egypt, 185-186;

India, 187, 205; Russia, 205;

Persia, 206; Turkey, 206-

208, 266; of Moslems in Eu-

rope, 104, 178, 180, 181, 182,

184, 185.

Egypt, Egyptians, 22, 41, 42,

45, 62, 63, 70, 71, 101, 104,

112, 131, 150, 177, 198, 200,

204, 205, 211, 231, 274, 285,

287; Sultan of, 160, 138, 285;

modernism in, 158-160; press,

190; in Sudan, 140, 141, 144;

Nationalists, 70, 90, 231-238,

262, 287; history of, 233-

238; causes, 234; legislature,

237 (see Schools; Educa-

tion).

Enver Pasha, 184, 237, 264.

European influence, 149, 177.

European governments (of

Moslems), 65, 71, 80, 90,

186; hold in subjection, 217-

220; aggressions of, 90, 219,

220; attitude, 97, 109; par-

tiality to Islam, 222-225,

226; assist it, 222, 223, 224;

discriminate against Chris-

tians, 223-225; in India, 229-

231; Egypt, 232-238; num-

bers, 218.

Europeans in Turkey, 59, 69,

255-256, 277, 279-280.

F

Fanaticism, 55, 56, 59, 69, 74,

81, 84, 114, 174, 225, 235, 258.

Farquhar, J. N., cited, 108,

132, 189.

Fast, 54, 58 (see Ramazan).

Fatimides, 61, 67, 112, 114,

125.

France, 95, 149, 177, 211, 218,

224, 276, 277, 283, 286, 287,

288, 289.

French language, 149, 180, 186,

278, 280.

Fulahs, 57, 62.

G

Gairdner, W. H. T., cited, 42,

159, 169, 185.

Gasparinski, Count, 110, 162.

Gazzali, Al, 20, 21.

Germany, 130, 277, 283, 284.

Germany, Emperor of, 65, 226,

274, 284, 285, 288.

God, Sufi doctrine of, 15; as

incarnated, 121, 125, 126, 133;

*hulul*, 126; repetition of

name, 18, 100 (see Zikr).

Goldziher, I., 36, 39, 47, 100,

167.

Gordon College, 98, 146.

Gordon, Gen., 98, 140, 141, 142,

146.

Great Britain (see Britain).

Greeks, Greece, 22, 39, 49, 81,

88, 94, 132, 169, 170, 222, 227,

255, 263, 265, 270, 274, 276,

281; massacred, 82-84.

Griswold, H. D., 133, 137.

Gulam Ahmad, Mirza (see Ah-

madiyas).

H

Habib Ullah, Amir, 42, 240.

Hadi, Haji Sheikh, 157, 242.

Hafiz, 16, 174, 191.

Hajis, 74, 75, 76; guides of, 34

(see Pilgrims).

Hallaj Al, 20.

Haram, 195 (see Woman).

Hasan Khan, Mukhbir-ul-

Mulk, 73, 244.

Hasheesh, Bhang, 16.

Hatti Humayun, 40, 256.

Hatti Sherif, 40, 256, 268.

Hausa, 62, 93.

Hejaz, 52; railway, 74.

Herrick, G., 86, 89.

Hindus, Hinduism, 22, 32, 44,

45, 56, 107, 135, 136, 205, 229,

230, 231, 290.

Hiyat-ul-Qulub, 27.

Holy War (see Jihad).

Houris, 88, 89.

Hughes, T., 22, 112, 114.

Hurgronje, cited, 68, 69, 76,

288.

Husain Ali (see Baha Ullah).

Husain, Imam, 25, 56, 113, 139.

I

Ibn Chaldoun, 15.

Ibn Hanbal, 13.

Ibn Malik, 13.

Ibn Saud, 55.

Ibrahim Pasha, 56.

Idolatry, 44.

Ijma (consensus), 35, 38, 48.

Imams, 12, 23, 35, 50, 51, 54,

87, 112, 113, 116, 121, 146,

166, 249, 272 (see Ali; Hu-

sain; Mahdi).

*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, 45,

137.

India, 28, 43, 45, 49. 56, 69, 70,

71, 74, 77, 87, 89, 90, 131,

132-137, 139, 150, 186, 200,

204, 205, 211, 214, 218, 228,

286, 290; Moslem awakening

in, 107-108, 110, 171; lead-

ers of, 229; press, 190; na-

tionalism in, 229-231; pro-

gram of, 230 (see Moslem

Leagues).

Indonesia (see Dutch East In-

dies).

Indulgences, sale of, 33,

35.

Incarnations, 121, 125.

Innovations (see Islam, modi-

fications of).

*International Review of Mis-*

*sions*, 29, 80, 95, 161, 193,

205, 212, 215, 224, 230.

Irak, 73, 152, 257.

Islam (see Neo-Islam; Mod-

ernism; Moslems), 149, 152;

is it changeable?, 11, 13, 44,

46-48, 49; reformable, 214-

216; signs of decay, 52;

weak, 218; expecting tri-

umphs, 89, 91, 221, 283, 292;

divisions of, 61-62; parties

in, 49-51; unifying forces,

60, 70, 74 (see Sects; Creed;

Superstitions); periodicals

for, 6 (see Press); priest-

craft in, 32-34; scholasti-

cism, 21; lowers woman, 195-

197 (see Woman); propaga-

tion by force, 55, 56, 57, 79,

85-86, 94, 95; by missions

(see Islamic missions, mod-

ifications of, 14, 21, 35, 46-

48, 215; by Sufiism, 14, 20,

22-23; by saint-worship, 23-

26; apotheosis of Moham-

med, 26-29; uncreated Ko-

ran, 29; development of

clergy, 29-35; sheikh medi-

ators, 34; the Canon Law,

35-40; modern codes, 40-43;

accommodation to conditions,

43; local superstitions and

customs, 44-46; process of,

48-49; shows its insufficiency,

23; revival in Islam (see

Wahabism; Pan-Islamism),

52, 53; reasons for, 53, 57;

influence, 57-58; reactionary,

58, 59; propagates the faith,

94, .103, 105, 107.

Islamic missions (see Islam),

94; new spirit of, 96; posi-

tion favourable, 96; means,

96-97; by darvishes, 98-105;

by mullahs, 105; societies,

107, 110; congresses, 110;

press, 108, 109; aided by

Christian governments, 97,

98; success, 5, 102-103; in

Africa, 96-105; in Asia, 105-

110, 222, 223, 224; Christians

Islamized, 105, 109, 137, 138;

in Japan, 110 175.

*Islamic Review*, 17, 137.

Ismieliyah, 61, 112, 114,

125.

Italy, 88, 90, 102, 175, 220, 227,

276.

J

Jabulsa, Jabulka, 113.

Jalal-ud-Din, 15, 17.

Jamal-ud-Din, 70-72, 74, 151,

158, 169, 242, 243, 246.

Jami, 15.

Janissaries, 21, 255.

Japan, 89, 106, 228, 229, 246,

281.

Java, 26, 69, 74, 76, 161, 175,

225.

Javanism, 46.

Jerusalem, 13, 183, 275, 286.

Jessup, H. H., cited, 67, 218,

260.

Jesus Christ, Lord, 114, 132,

133, 134, 138, 141, 164.

Jews, 31, 44, 61, 85, 121, 134,

237, 251, 263, 264, 268, 269,

270, 271, 273, 282.

Jihad, Holy War, 5, 43, 49, 61,

104, 167, 222, 288, 290; used

to propagate faith, 55, 56,

57, 93; also by Wahabis, 54-

56; obligatory, 55, 56; en-

joined by Mohammed, 85;

by Mahdi, 143; till resurrec-

tion, 86; restrained by fear,

87; by expediency, 87; in-

voked against sects, 87, 88;

proclamations of, 88, 106; in

present war, 286-289; effec-

tive, 88; condemned by

Baha, 129; by Ahmadi-

yas, 134; by Neo-Moslems,

168.

Judgment Day, 33.

Junaid, Al, 20.

K

Kaaba, 13, 17, 34, 68.

Kaffirs, 93, 222.

Kamal-ud-Din, 137.

Kazi (Kadi), 30, 31, 32, 41,

285, 286.

Kazim Haji Sayid, 116.

Keane, cited, 75, 147.

Kerbela, 25, 30, 56, 73, 75, 175,

243-

Khairalla, I. G., 130.

Khalifa (see Caliphs), 72, 240.

Khalifa of Mahdi, 113, 141,

144.

Khartum, 139-144.

Khavarij, 64.

Khedive, 56, 71, 74, 140, 169,

175, 176, 184, 204, 231, 232,

234.

Khojas, 68, 271.

Khuda Bakhsh, S., cited, 32,

37, 167-168.

Kibla, 14.

Kirghiz, 76, 205, 222.

Kitchener, Lord, 144, 185, 236,

237.

*Kiyas*, deduction, 36, 37, 38.

Koran, 15, 18, 20, 25, 27, 35,

52, 98, 117, 121, 138, 139,

153, 155, 160, 164, 173, 174,

195, 201, 240; uncreated, 29;

has little legislation, 36, 40;

modernism on, 164, 166-168;

169; “Back to the Koran,”

50, 54, 159, 160, 168; trans-

lations, 138, 167, 190-191;

Ahli Koran, 168; cited, 30

note, 85-86, 87, 88, 135, 200,

203, 210, 287.

Koreish, 43, 64, 67.

Kuenen, cited, 35.

Kufa, 72, 113.

Kurds, 61, 62, 152, 200, 239,

253, 270, 276, 277, 296.

Kuzil Beshi (see Ali Allahi).

L

Lahore, 25, 107, 108, 187.

Lane-Poole, Stanley, 12, 36, 47,

170, 194, 195, 197, 199.

Law, Sacred (*Shariat*), 17, 25,

30, 53, 54, 66, 73, 153, 224,

235-236, 240, 258, 279; inter-

preter of, 31; origin of, 35,

167; small part from Ko-

ran, 36, 167; borrowed, 37-

39, 47; Goldziher on, 36, 39,

47; complex, 38; indebted

to Christianity, 39; supple-

mented by *urfi* in Persia,

40; by code in Turkey, 40-

42, 58, 257; conflict, 41-42;

regarding interest, 41-42; ac-

commodated, 43; mixed with

Hinduism, 44-45; animism,

46; process of change, 48-

49; on jihad, 85-88; Neo-

Islam on, 165, 168, 203; re-

lation to Constitutions, 250,

266-271.

Law, Roman, source of Mos-

lem Law, 37-39, 49, J 67-

Lebanon, 82, 282.

Leeder, S. H., 159, 185.

Lucknow, 108, 187.

M

Macdonald, D. B., 19, 22, 26,

37, 48, 161, 215.

Mahdi, Mahdiism, 51, 62; ex-

pectation of, 50, 113, 114;

doctrine of, 112; history,

112-116; the hidden Imam,

113, 117; Mahdis many, 56,

101, 113, 114, 115, 132, 134,

147, 218 (see Bab; Baha Ul-

lah; Ahmadiyas); causes of,

146-147; significance, 148.

Mahdi of Sudan (Mohammed

Ahmad), 62, 63, 87, 98, 233;

history of, 139-145; propa-

ganda, 139-140; occasion, 140;

victories, 141-143; marks of,

142; laws, 142-143; degen-

eracy, 143; polygamy, 144;

tomb destroyed, 145, 220;

dire results, 145-146.

Mahkama, 40, 59.

Mahmud II, Sultan, 40, 58, 66,

255.

Malays, 22, 76, 109, 173, 223,

225, 227 (see Dutch East

Indies).

Malcom Khan, 242, 243.

Mann, Oscar, 47, 53, 89.

Marabout, 10, 25, 26.

Margoliouth, Prof., 18, 46, 48,

202, 215.

Marriage, 20, 40, 44, 45, 122,

168 (see Polygamy).

Marseya Khan, 25, 34.

Masonic order, 98, 263, 271.

Massacres (see Christians).

McCallagh, F., cited, 67, 260,

273.

Mecca, 13, 25, 33, 34, 43, 51,

52, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64, 67, 68,

70, 72, 74, 75, 99, 106, 110,

117, 147, 164, 174, 211, 240

(see Sherif).

Mediators, 18, 34 (see Saint-

worship; Mohammed Ali).

Medina, 52, 54, 55, 64, 74, 113,

183, 286.

Mehemet Ali, Khedive, 56.

Merrick, J. L., 27.

Miracles, 23, 155, 165, 167.

Miraj, 155. 165, 167.

*Missionary Review of the*

*World*, 32, 35, 57, 77, 87, 88,

91, 107, 115, 133, 147, 161,

162, 225, 239.

Missions, Moslem, 51 (see Is-

lamic missions).

Missions to Moslems, 5, 14,

97; hindered, 98, 132, 281-

282; imperative, 103; need

of, 111, 148, 149, 193; oppor-

tunities, 179, 184, 226; en-

couragement, 213; critical

time, 216, 292; Dutch Gov-

ernment favours, 225; schools

of, 156, 183, 184, 187, 206,

208, 281 (see Christian Con

verts).

Modernism in Islam, 149, 150,

160, 228 (see Neo-Islam).

Modifications in Islam (see Is-

lam, modifications of).

Mohammed, 18, 20, 24, 33, 61,

62, 64, 78, 100, 110, 117, 133,

135, 138, 164, 165; “Life of

Mohammed,” 27, 164, 165,

167, 168; made changes, 13;

glorification of, 26-29, 44,

100, 169; pre-existence, 26-

27; Nur-i-Mohammed, 27,

167; sinlessness, 27, 28, 167;

intercessor, 28, 168; birthday,

29, 54; made few laws, 36;

traditions assigned to, 35,

117, 146, 153, 154, 192; on

sects, 61; enjoined jihad, 85;

on woman, 197-198, 200; as

example, 86, 167, 195, 199,

200; “Back to Mohammed,”

50, 159, 166.

Mohammedanism (see Islam;

Moslems).

Mohammed Abdu, Sheikh, 158,

159, 169, 175-

Mohammed Ahmad (see Mahdi

of Sudan).

Mohammed Ali, Shah, 156,

179, 245, 252.

Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab

(see Wahabism).

Mohammed V Rashad, 22, 273.

Morocco, 68, 74, 90, 99, 101,

175, 211, 276, 290.

Moslems, 121, 150; interest in,

5, 6; movements, 6, 11, 13,

40, 49-51, 94, 114, 147, 148-

151, 177, 191-193, 228, 292;

no longer unitarian, 28-29;

new mode of initiating, 46;

numbers in races, 62, 283;

intellectual life, 172 (see Ed-

ucation; Schools; Press);

reaction, 231; borrowing civ-

ilization, 239-240; expecta-

tions, 114, 148; adjustment

under Christian rule, 219-

222; expatriation, 221; race

secondary, 222, 227; not loyal,

222, 226, 227, 228; allied with

Christians, 43, 289; hatred of

Christians (see Christians;

Massacres; Nationalism; Eu-

ropean Governments; Fanat-

icism); Moslem Leagues, 90,

107, 164, 203, 229, 271; sym-

pathy with Turkey, 90, 230,

277; under Constitutions,

248-253, 265-272.

*Moslem World*, cited, 19, 38,

107, in, 132, 133, 187, 192,

205, 210, 268.

Mosques, 106, 146, 172, 186,

223, 225.

Mufti, 31, 43, 99, 175.

Mufti, Grand, 41, 158, 159, 175,

235.

Muharram, 25, 34, 73, 156, 241.

Mujtahids, 30, 36, 38, 48, 72,

73, 87, 123, 156, 157, 241, 243,

245, 249, 250.

Mullahs, 42, 75, 146, 153, 157,

172, 223, 248, 265; classes of,

in Persia, 30; in Turkey, 31;

duties, 30, 32, 105, 106;

power, 32 (see Clergy;

Ulema).

Muridism, 72.

Music in Islam, 18, 99.

Mustashar-ud-Doulah, 73, 243,

244.

Mutasharis, 53, 155.

Mutavalsul, 64, 67.

Mutazali, 160, 170.

Muzaffar-ud-Din, Shah, 244,

247.

Mystics, Mysticism, 14, 17, 21,

34, 99 (see Sufis).

N

Najef, 30, 73, 174, 243.

Nasr-ud-Din Shah, 71, 157, 169,

179, 241, 242, 243.

Nationalism, 5, 62, 220-221,

227-239; developing, 227; pa-

triotism, 228 (see India;

Egypt; Albanians).

Negroes, 62, 226 (see Africa).

Neo-Islam, 51, 149, 150; how

brought about, 149-150, 152;

how evidenced, 150; repres-

sion of thought, 151-153; lib-

eral thought, 152; among

Ulema, 153; leaders in Per-

sia, 155-157; relation to

Christians, 155-156; religious

dissatisfaction, 157; promot-

ers in Egypt, 158; their cry,

159; retain and modernize,

160; reforms, 160; as to as-

sassination, 169; rapid ad-

vance in Malaysia, 161;

changes of habit in Russia,

161; education, 162; progress

among Tartars, 162, 163;

leaders in India, 163-168; ra-

tionalistic, 164, 166, 170; as

to Mohammed, 165, 167; as

to law, 165, 166, 168; as to

Koran, 164, 166, 168; Mutaza-

lite, 170; anti-Christian, 169;

favours religious liberty, 212,

213, 216; prospects of, 214-

215; can Islam be reformed?,

214-216; reaction from, 231;

modernism in education, 177-

189, 191-193; in society, 194-

211 (see Woman; Slavery).

Nestorians, 82, 251, 291.

New Testament, 30, 31.

Notovich, N., 134.

Nusairiyahs, 114, 117, 125 (see

Ali Allahis).

O

Oman, 65.

Omar, 13, 64, 73, 278.

Omar-i-Khayyam, 17.

Opium, 52, 56, 122.

“Orient,” cited, 92, 182, 183,

209, 283.

Ottoman (see Turkey).

Ottomanization, 182, 266, 268,

276-282; of races, 276, 278,

282; abolishing capitulations,

279-281.

P

Pachpiriyas, 45.

Padri sect, 56.

Palestine, 43.

Palgrave, 12, 21, 32, 34, 52, 53,

57, 92.

Pan-Islamism, 51, 104, 151, 189,

226, 230, 234, 263, 277, 288,

289; development of, 60; na-

ture, 60; object, 60, 61; or-

ganized by Caliph, 63-67;

Mecca as a centre, 67, 68;

agents, 68; use of press, 69,

77; negotiations with Shiahs,

70-74; expense of, 68; apos-

tle of, 71; Pan-Islamic So-

ciety, 72; rejected by rulers,

74; hajis as propagandists,

74-75; congenial to Arabs,

74; widespread, 76-77; anti-

Christian, 78-80; led to mas-

sacres, 85; relied on jihad,

84-89; estimates of, 89-93;

manifestations of, 91, 96.

Pantheism, 14, 15, 44, 115.

Paradise, 88, 135.

Passion-Play, 25, 73.

Pears, Sir Edwin, cited, 65, 66,

81, 98, 104, 153, 194, 204, 209,

213, 283.

Persecutions, 13, 81-82, 212,

213 (see Christians).

Persia, 5, 66, 72, 73, 74, 79, 112,

117, 121, 131, 139, 198, 199,

211, 221, 229, 259; home of

Sufiism, 14, 21; Shiahs in,

70-73 (see Shiahs, Babism,

Bahaism); influence on Is-

lam, 14, 22, 37, 39, 170, 171,

215; common law, 40; saint-

worship, 25, 29; mullahs, 30,

32, 248; modernism in, 153-

157, 204; new education,

177-179; Shah’s College, 178;

press, 189; freedom of

speech, 233; borrowing civil-

ization, 239-240; politically,

217, 231, 284, 286; reforms,

241; leaders of, 241-242; agi-

tations, 242-244; cause of,

243, 245-246; tobacco monop-

oly, 273; agrarian conditions,

245; corruption, 246, 252;

Constitution in, 114, 131, 154,

156, 178, 179, 213, 240, 242;

origin of, 246; outline of,

247-248; relation to religion,

248-250; aided by mullahs,

248; relation to liberty, 250-

251; to non-Moslems, 251;

difficulties, 251; Nationalists,

213, 249, 250; causes of fail-

ure, 252-253, 291; character

of reformers, 252-253; Rus-

sia and Great Britain, 253;

in the present war, 93, 284,

285, 290; Christians in, 291.

Persian language, 19, 173, 176,

180, 186, 191.

Persians, 15, 20, 39, 75, 125,

133, 169, 173, 176, 199, 200,

204, 226.

Petrograd, 71, 76, 106, 163.

Philippines, 65.

Pilgrimage, 25, 58, 68, 70, 110,

116, 122, 145, 168.

Pilgrims, 24, 31, 56, 75 (see

Hajis).

Pirs, 23, 24, 26, 35, 48.

Polygamy, 20, 66, 122, 135, 138,

144, 166, 168, 196, 197, 201-

203, 273; decreasing, 204,

222.

Prayer-rite, 26, 54, 58, 122, 143,

167, 168.

Priests, Christian, 30 note.

Priests in Islam, 29, 32-34, 35.

Primal Will, 15, 27, 121.

Punishments, 42, 128, 142, 143.

Q

Qadian, 132, 137.

R

Railways, 74-75.

Rajputs, 44, 45.

Ramazan, 34, 41.

Ramsay, Sir William, cited, 22,

69, 80, 81, 196.

*Review of Religions*, 135,

137.

Rice, W. A., cited, 146, 170.

Russia, 65, 67, 90, 217, 228, 246,

258, 280, 283, 286, 287, 289,

290; in Persia, 156, 177, 243,

245, 247, 250, 253, 254.

Russia, Islam in, 32, 105, 153,

161-163, 190, 205, 211, 222;

Pan-Islamism, 76, 77.

S

Saadi, 16, 174, 191.

Sadra, Mullah, 155.

Saints, intercession of, 23, 26

(see Sheikhs; Imams; Pirs;

Valis).

Saint-worship, 23-26; preva-

lence of, 23, 25, 26, 35, 45,

115; denounced, 54, 100.

Salim I, 63, 64, 82.

Salonika, 152, 263, 271, 273.

Sanusi, Sheikh, 77, 88; history

of, 99-102; Order, 100-101;

Mahdi, 101, 105, 115.

Sanusiyahs, 100 (see Dar-

vishes); influence of, 102;

held slaves, 100, 102; propa-

ganda, 102-104; their army,

104, 105; jihad, 104, 105, 290.

Sayids (descendants of Mo-

hammed), 35, 45, 70, 221, 248.

Schamyl, Sheikh, 72, 87, 115,

219.

Schools (for Moslems) in

Africa, 97, 102, 186, 224;

China, 106; Egypt, 184-186,

224, 235, 237; India, 107, 162,

178; Aligarh College, 163,

167, 187-188; project for

University, 188-189; results,

189; Persia, 154, 172, 173,

178, 179; Russia, 105, 161,

162, 204; Turkey, 59, 173,

176, 180, 181-184, 260,

262, 281 (see Theological

Schools; Education).

Sects, 35, 44, 45, 56, 106, 125,

126, 155; Mohammedan, 61;

number, 61-62, 168.

Sell, Canon, 17, 57, 77, 99, 168,

214.

Senegambia, 93.

Severance, L. H., 6.

Shafi, Imam, 13.

Shah Abdul Azim (asylum),

71, 244.

Shahs of Persia, 62, 73, 74, 113,

119, 121, 155, 177, 221, 249;

no religious authority, 30;

conflict with Shariat, 40, 221.

Shariat (see Law, Sacred).

Shawish, Sheikh, 183, 236, 237.

Sheikhis, 61, 116, 121, 155, 156.

Sheikhs, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 34,

48, 54, 65, 67, 95, 98, 99, 141,

157, 158, 160, 175.

Sheikh-ul-Islam, 31, 71, 153,

206, 267, 269, 272.

Sherif of Mecca, 34, 64, 65, 67,

74, 75.

Shiahs, 23, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34,

35, 44, 48, 55, 65, 73, 75. 87,

112, 114, 117, 121, 139, 154,

174, 198, 246, 249, 250: sects

of, 61, 112 (see Sheikhis);

plan to join Sunnis, 69-73.

Shiraz, 116, 118.

Shrines, 16, 24, 25, 28, 71, 113,

128, 130, 160, 199.

Shuster, Morgan, 207, 247, 248,

252.

Siberia, 162.

Sigat-ul-Islam, 156.

Sikhs, 56.

Simon, G., cited, 22, 26, 29, 32,

46, 65, 76, 88, 89, 91, 93, 226,

227.

Siraj-ud-Din, cited, 24, 28, 132.

Slatin Pasha, 142, 144.

Slavery, 46, 56, 100, 102, 140,

166, 204, 256, 273, 274; slave

girls, 199, 212; Koran or-

dains, 210; abolition, 211,

222; slave-trade being sup-

pressed, 211.

Smith, Bosworth, cited, 35, 47,

86, 166.

Smyrna, 152, 224.

Sohoto, 57, 93.

Spain, 21, 215, 217.

St. Sophia, 56, 65, 66, 270, 271.

Stamboul, 76, 77, 284 (see

Constantinople).

Strafford de Redcliffe, 40, 255.

Subh-i-Azal, 123, 124.

Sudan, 22, 62, 87, 95, 98, 101,

104, 139-146, 196, 211, 212,

223, 290.

Sufis, Sufiism, 14-18, 20-22, 40,

49, 61, 98, 99, 100, 105, 115,

128, 132, 155, 213; Persian,

14; pantheistic, 15; mystical,

16; poets of, 16; antinomian,

17; its paths, 17; zikr, 18;

history, 20-22; prevalence,

21-22; origin, 22; an Indian,

44; rejected by Wahabis, 54

(see Darvishes).

Sultan of Egypt, 169, 184.

Sultan, Osmanli, 31, 40, 56, 58,

62, 64, 65, 67, 73, 77, 89, 102,

109, 140, 180, 183, 184, 211,

218, 226, 234, 237, 257.

Sultans, 65, 279.

Sulus, 65.

Sumatra, 56, 69, 76, 93, 225.

Sunnis, 21, 23, 25, 27, 35, 44,

48, 54, 56, 64, 67, 72, 87, 112,

139, 174, 290.

Swan, G., 19.

Sykes, Mrs., 198, 204.

Syria, 21, 29, 115, 125, 177, 210,

221, 257, 265, 270, 276.

T

Tabriz, 25, 73, 117, 120, 154,

156, 179, 197, 206, 242, 243,

244, 248, 250, 252.

Tagiya (see Dissimulation).

Takia (see Darvish lodges).

Tartars, 76, 162, 163.

Tears, in bottle, 34.

Teheran, 113, 120, 154, 156,

157, 179, 206, 212, 229, 243,

244.

Theological schools, 30, 31, 52,

57, 106; in Mecca, 75; Shiah,

174; Sunni, 174, 176, 183,

185, 186 (see Al Azhar);

condemned, 176.

Tisdall, W. St. C, 165.

Tobacco, 54, 56, 99, 143,

273.

Traditions, 13, 18, 19, 20, 27,

50, 88, 117, 132, 146, 154, 167,

170, 174, 192; for Constitu-

tion, 267; numerous, 35, 167;

not of Arabian origin, 36;

invented, 39, 134; abrogated,

43; on Caliphate, 64; re-

jected, 164-168.

Tripoli, 77, 88, 90, 104, 175,

220, 237, 276.

Tufail, Ibn, 21.

Turkey, 5, 21, 25, 30, 31, 32,

40, 44, 52, 58, 68, 69, 70, 71,

88, 129, 131, 151-153, 226,

229, 231, 286 (see Abdul

Hamid); reforms, 152, 180,

204, 208-210, 239-240, 255-

257, 261; new codes, 40-42,

58, 257, 280; counsels, 68,

106; fear of revolution, 79;

reactions, 58, 191; suppres-

sion of ideas, 78, 139, 151,

281; atrocities, 82-85, 86;

spy-system, 259-262; oppres-

sions, 260; Boy Scouts, 184;

Revolution, 236, 264-265 (see

Turks, Young); Constitu-

tion, 5, 41, 59, 152, 182, 211,

240, 258, 261, 264, 272, 274;

rejoicings, 264-265; provi-

sions of, 266; relation to

Shariat, 266-272; Parlia-

ment, 270, 272; reaction, 270-

272; Sultan deposed, 272;

reforms under, 273-274 (see

Ottomanizing); capitulations

abolished, 278-281; courts

corrupt, 281; failure, 291;

the present war, 5, 93, 169,

226, 253, 282-291; jihad, 286-

287; atrocities against Chris-

tians, 291 (see Christians;

Education; Schools).

Turkestan, 76, 162.

Turks, 22, 43, 49, 62, 73, 84, 85,

86, 90, 103, 140, 185, 194,

220, 222, 234, 237, 270, 275.

Turks, Young, 34, 152, 182,

184, 204, 213, 236, 260-263,

269, 270, 274, 275, 284, 289.

U

Ulema, 21, 30, 31, 32, 40, 42,

43, 58, 64, 68, 74, 87, 99, 146,

147, 150, 166, 174, 183, 213,

230, 234, 246, 257, 258, 266,

268, 270.

Usury, 42.

V

Valis, 23, 26, 48, 99.

Vambery, A., 162, 288.

Veil, 44, 122, 195, 200, 204, 205,

206, 207, 265.

Victoria, Queen, 65, 66.

W

Wahabis, 26, 28, 35, 51, 62, 65,

87, 96, 99, 100, 151, 160; his-

tory of founder, 54; doc-

trines and reforms, 54; ji-

had used, 55; victories, 55;

its influence, 56-57; in In-

dia, 56; in Africa, 57.

War, Holy (see Jihad).

Washburn, Geo., 77.

Watson, C. R., cited, 87, 145,

161, 175, 196, 200, 224.

Weitbrecht, Canon, 191.

Westermann, Prof., 95, 98,

196, 211.

Western Theological Semi-

nary, 6.

Wherry, E. M., cited, 45, 132.

Wingate, Col., cited, 140, 143.

Wine, wine-drinking, 16, 52,

54, 58, 122, 143, 271.

Woking, 109, 137.

Woman (see Education of

Girls; Marriage; Polygamy;

Veil; Divorce), 44, 45, 46,

122, 128, 135, 143, 154, 162,

163, 176, 186, 187, 273; Is-

lamic society a failure, 194;

woman’s degradation, 194;

before Islam, 195-196; greater

in Islam, 197-201; seclusion,

200-201; abductions, 199;

contract wives, 199; haram,

200; scourging, 210; benefits

claimed, 197; Neo-Islam: ad-

vocates freedom, 201; repu-

diates polygamy, 201, 202; is

decreasing, 204; and divorce,

202; seclusion, 202-203; les-

sening, 204-206; improve-

ment, 203-210; examples,

206, 207, 208; under Consti-

tutions, 207, 208, 265; wom-

an’s journals, 162, 208; new

liberty, 208-210; restrained,

209, 271.

Wurz, F., 159, 175.

Y

Yahya, Mirza (see Subh-i-

Azal).

Yezidees, Islamized, 80.

Young, Dr., 216.

Z

Zanzibar, 65, 74, 102.

Zikr, 18, 19, 100, 122, 160.

Zoroastrians, 44, 126, 205, 251.

Zwemer, S. M., cited, 28, 87,

91, 161, 190, 195.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA