BAHÁ'Í STUDIES REVIEW, Volume 7, 1997 || CONTENTS BY VOLUME || CONTENTS BY TITLE || CONTENTS BY AUTHOR || REVIEWS BY TITLE || Commentaries |
![]() ![]() Commentator: Kambiz Maani In the article entitled "The Bahá'í community as a learning organisation," Roy Steiner deals with the notion of "knowledge management systems" and its implications for the Bahá'í community. He proposes a framework based on McKinsey's professional development model where industry groups and key business functions are laid out in a matrix format. In this model each cell of the matrix is assigned to a "practice leadership group" who will take an ownership for collecting, co-ordinating, and assimilating existing knowledge in that area. Steiner proposes an insightful application of this model for the Bahá'í community where dispersed experiences and practices of Bahá'í communities could be collected and made available through electronic media for use by other Bahá'í communities, institutions and individuals. While the article provides useful concepts and insights, it does not reach the depth of "The Learning Organisation;" a concept popularised by Peter Senge, a systems scientist and management educator, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who in his best-seller The Fifth Discipline,(1) provides a model for a transformation process rooted in a holistic approach. The precepts of a learning organisation, while have a much narrower scope, having much in common with Bahá'í teachings. According to Senge, there are five "core disciplines" that collectively form the bedrock of a learning organisation (see the diagram on next page). These disciplines are linked to a "deeper learning cycle" comprising three elements : (1) awareness and sensibilities, (2) attitudes and beliefs, and (3) skills and capabilities. This deep learning cycle, in turn, emanates from an "implicate order" or a "new notion of order" where "everything is enfolded into everything".(2) Below, I briefly describe the five disciplines of a learning organisation and attempt to draw parallels with Bahá'í teachings. ![]() Personal mastery is the spiritual dimension of a learning organisation. It rests on the eternal truth that lasting change starts from within. This is the core of the transformation paradigm: that personal transformation precedes social transformation, that trust in a society is built upon truthfulness and trustworthiness of its individual members. Personal mastery calls for integration of reason and intuition (i.e. science and religion), compassion, commitment to truth, and a personal sense of interconnectedness. This inner transformation paradigm has seen a renewed attention by contemporary management and personal development gurus (e.g. Covey, Dyer, Chopra) and has created a "thought revolution" in management and leadership in the post-modern organisation of the western world. The second discipline - shared vision The third discipline - mental models The fourth discipline - dialogue (team learning) The fifth discipline - systems thinking Viewed in this light, Bahá'í teachings are essentially systemic in nature. The view of humanity as an indivisible whole is paramount in Bahá'í teachings. Yet individual parts are not subdued for the primacy of the whole. On the contrary, the whole and its constituent parts interact harmoniously in what Ackoff calls a "social system."(4) A social system not only has a purpose of its own, each part of the system has its own purpose (e.g. spiritual growth) which cannot be achieved independent of the purpose of the whole (i.e. transformation of human society, ever advancing civilisation). This is in contrast to a mechanistic (Newtonian) system or an organic system, in which parts of the system while having individual functions do not have independent purposes (e.g. while the human body has a purpose, the heart or the lungs do not have a purpose of their own). At the societal level too, Bahá'í teachings are the embodiment of systemic view as they operate in interaction with each other. Stated differently, none of the social teachings of the Faith can singly, and in isolation from other teachings, provide a complete solution on its own. For example, without "independent investigation of truth" and "elimination of prejudices," the goal of "equality of men and women" is unachievable. Steiner's knowledge management system can be further differentiated from a learning organisation by making a distinction between knowledge and learning. Russell Ackoff, a leading systems scientist, defines a progression from data to information, to knowledge, to understanding, and to wisdom. "Knowledge," he asserts, "consists of know-how, .... knowing how a system works or how to make it work in a desired way."(5) Understanding, on the other hand, comes from the answer to "why." Wisdom, however, "is the ability to perceive and evaluate the long-term consequences of behaviour. Wisdom normally associated with a willingness to make short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term gains".(6) Given this perspective, an organisation requires a lot more than a knowledge acquisition and management system to become a learning organisation. Therefore one can suggest that the Bahá'í community (or any religious system for that matter) can be viewed as a learning organisation, based on its fundamental emphasis on Ackoff's premise of understanding and wisdom, namely, a focus on why and a fundamental belief in the long-term (i.e. the continuity of history in this world, and the progression of life in other worlds). Despite their distinctions, there is a dynamic link between knowledge and learning. This link is captured in the concept of the "learning community"(7) - an extension of Learning Organisation. In the Learning Community, three elements of knowledge, practice, and capacity-building interact dynamically toward an ever-advancing whole (i.e. community, society). There is a striking parallel between this concept and Daniel Jordan's "knowledge-volition-action" cycle. Another example of this dynamic cycle is apparent in a recent message of the Universal House of Justice. A close examination of that message in the context of the "institutes" reveals reinforcing dynamics between knowledge (i.e. human resource training and development), practice (i.e. teaching) and capacity building (entry by troops). |
![]() ![]() Commentator: Svenja Tams In "The Bahá'í community as a learning organisation," Roy Steiner outlines the benefits of a system that manages practical knowledge available in the Bahá'í community. Citing the example of a system which was developed by a consulting firm, he suggests a conceptual design for a knowledge management system. As I study how organisations learn and make sense of their environment, it was pleasing to see the first article of its kind in The Bahá'í Studies Review. Social science disciplines have so far been rarely applied to the study of the Bahá'í community itself. Steiner's article is refreshing, because it presents a pragmatic approach, grounded in current managerial practice, towards improving the functioning of our community. The author refrains from theorising on a topic on which explicit Bahá'í references are limited. In response to the author's objective of stimulating a discussion on the topic, my intent here is to unpack some of the underlying assumptions presented in the article. To this end I raise more questions than I answer. This will, I hope, contribute to a more comprehensive approach towards developing information environments within the community. This commentary starts with a discussion on the nature and purpose of social knowledge. Unlike Steiner, I believe that the development of a knowledge system is not foremost a technology or database problem. I propose that the learning within the Bahá'í community is a consultative process rather than the accumulation of past experiences. Such a process perspective, furthermore, enables the community to be proactive and adaptable to unanticipated events. The concept of knowledge The relativism of truth is one of the core principles of the Bahá'í Faith where the authoritative interpretation of the sacred text is only granted to 'Abdu'l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi. The Universal House of Justice's powers are limited to the functions of legislation and implementation as well as elucidation of existing law.(11) The community does not have a law of precedence or of tradition, such as in Islam or in Judaism. Decision-making in the community is not based on a detailed canon of regulations or routines. It is based on a process of consultation as a means for bringing together a wide variety of viewpoints. The guiding objective is to achieve unity and action toward a goal, not an optimising solution. The social nature of decision-making makes it difficult to separate means from their ends and decisions result more often from comparison of a few feasible alternatives,(12) rather than from rational choice alone. Communities should still be informed about administrative procedures or benefit from relevant experiences in order to avoid "reinventing the wheel," as Steiner points out. Yet, the fact that the act of classifying and recording knowledge is an act of interpretation. When publishing past experiences, we select the stories we want to tell. Can we only learn from success stories which are highly context and culturally bound? Can a single person or group represent the historical and situational context of experiences adequately? Is it reasonable to expect that a shared knowledge system allows us to learn from past mistakes? In fact, recent technology development may reduce some of the concerns related to classification. Advanced search engine technology(13) makes it possible to search vast amounts of information distributed around the globe. The two by two matrix structure sketched by Steiner models the old style of relational databases. At a time when the Internet emerges as the de facto communications infrastructure for public as well as private domains, it is unrealistic that the Bahá'í community would build a proprietary system. Thus, questions about how to centralise retrieval and who should "own" information are outdated. The Internet benefits from local ownership of information and public access where lack of access remains a temporary issue. A pre-defined classification system may limit the creation and sharing of new knowledge. Notwithstanding, in an age when everyone owning a computer and a telephone line can publish information, the review capacity of Bahá'í institutions would need to grow exponentially which seems unfeasible. The most likely selection mechanism will be a market mechanism regulated by supply and demand and the moral code of conduct accepted at the individual level, i.e. the information publishers and consumers. It will be increasingly difficult for Bahá'í institutions to prevent "low quality" information from being published. The values and selection criteria of potential users will determine the currency of such information. Those publishers who can build up high credibility and reliability of information could be expected to attract a wider audience. Learning Steiner's ambitious title describing the Bahá'í community as a learning organisation is misleading as he emphasises the descriptive level of applied technology rather than the dynamics of a learning organisation. Steiner's information processing approach implies that by providing access to a broad scope of high-quality knowledge, learning will happen almost naturally. Peter Senge,(14) who is referenced by the author, emphasises the problems of learning from the past. Past experiences rarely match the needs of future, uncertain decision situations. Senge, hence, suggests that organisations should create room for simulated experimentation in what he calls "microworlds." The space of this commentary is too limited to discuss in detail the benefits and limitations of secured heuristic learning. What Senge brings to our attention, though, is that a holistic learning process should not separate analysis of information from its bodily experience and action. Moreover, there remains scope for applied Bahá'í scholarship to investigate the benefits and limitations of two distinct learning processes. The first emphasises the stabilisation of action in routines. This type of learning contributes to the consolidation of the community. The second type of learning makes communities more resilient and able to anticipate and adapt to novel conditions. The latter type of learning, only, allows the community to guide future-oriented social development. As much as learning develops our abilities to understand our world, there is no single way of making sense of reality. Consultation allows us to reveal the differences in perspective. Learning takes place when knowledge appears to be in contradiction, as expressed by 'Abdu'l-Bahá: "The shining spark of truth cometh forth only after the clash of differing opinions."(15) The emphasis in the Bahá'í writings on consultation, "unity in diversity," and individual search for truth shows that there are multiple valid ways of looking at the world and that outcomes will improve the more we become able to reveal these different perspectives. Having a unifying vision does not require convergence on a common culture or single systems of meaning which specifies the one best way of doing things. More important, and central to Bahá'í administration, is a decision-making framework which, in combination with an overarching vision, guides respectful and outcome-oriented interaction. Foundations for the creation of knowledge In conclusion, I join Steiner and hope to stimulate the discussion on how current organisational practices and technologies can best be applied to the development of the Bahá'í community. To prevent the unquestioned transfer of common practice, this discussion should be grounded in the spiritual principles of the Bahá'í teachings. It will benefit from diverse perspectives of Bahá'ís engaged in management practice and social sciences, including economics, sociology, anthropology, technology management, political sciences and education. Such an undertaking offers, moreover, access to Bahá'í studies for more pragmatic-oriented individuals. Learning as a dynamic process needs to facilitate both consolidation of shared meaning as well as questioning and doubt which comes from a variety of views in order to create adaptive and innovative communities. |
![]() ![]() Commentator: Sen McGlinn Seena Fazel and Khazeh Fananapazir, in "Some interpretive principles in the Bahá'í Writings," give two examples to illustrate the point that the interpretations of Shoghi Effendi, Guardian of the Bahá'í Faith, though given in response to the needs of the moment, are not bounded by time. This raises the rather interesting question of how we can distinguish which of his writings are "interpretations" and so cannot be changed, and which are the result of the Guardian working, in lieu of the House of Justice and with full authorization from 'Abdu'l-Bahá's Will and Testament, as the central and highest administrative power in the community. We can illustrate the importance of the distinction rather neatly by looking at the two examples which Fazel and Fananapazir give. They say: The principles for the election of National Spiritual Assemblies are unchangeable but were written by Shoghi Effendi in reply to a question of a moment. The Dispensation of Bahá'u'lláh is another instance of a letter written in response to a particular demand, yet containing ... timeless elements ... I would entirely agree with what they say about the timelessness of The Dispensation of Bahá'u'lláh, because it is essentially a theological interpretation of 'Abdu'l-Bahá's Will and Testament, drawing on many other writings. But the first example, the "unchangeable" election principles of national spiritual assemblies, is incorrect. Since this matter relates to a subject on which there is virtually nothing in the writings of Bahá'u'lláh or 'Abdu'l-Bahá to be interpreted, the authors should have expected that Shoghi Effendi's treatment of the election of national spiritual assemblies would be rather different to his approach when interpreting the Will and Testament. Thus our approach to his text, our "hermeneutic," has to be different. The reference Fazel and Fananapazir give, for principles governing the election of national spiritual assemblies, is Bahá'í Administration page 37, but this passage does not refer to the election of national spiritual assemblies, but rather to the establishment--election is not specified--of local spiritual assemblies and their powers and importance. The principles for the election of national spiritual assemblies are given at various points in Shoghi Effendi's letters, such as at pages 40 and 41 of the same volume where he writes that the local and national spiritual assemblies are to be re-elected once a year, at Riván, "pending the establishment of the Universal House of Justice" which, when it is established "will have to consider afresh the whole situation, and lay down the principle which shall direct, so long as it deems advisable, the affairs of the Cause." The basic principles laid down in Shoghi Effendi's letters "must guide the administration of the affairs of the Bahá'í Movement, pending the definite formation of the first authoritative Universal House of Justice."(16) Even the absence of nominations in Bahá'í elections, and the simple plurality system (i.e., a system which elects individuals who receive the highest number of votes, and not necessarily a majority of votes) are "provisionally adopted"(17) and can be changed by the House of Justice.(18) Similarly, the basis of the by-laws of the world's national spiritual assemblies is called a "first and very creditable attempt at codifying the principles of general Bahá'í administration,"(19) and he writes:
Changes in the principles to be applied in electing the assemblies did not remain just a theoretical possibility. For example, in 1937 Shoghi Effendi writes:
This we can contrast with his letter in Principles of Bahá'í Administration, page 47, which sets out the principles and practice which have in fact been adopted:
Similarly, there was at one time provision for alternate members on national spiritual assemblies, but this was later changed.(23) It would be fair to say then that Fazel and Fananapazir have hit on the one subject area which, better than any other, highlights a missing element--a missing "interpretative principle" in fact--in their paper. For they say that "the principles for the election of National Spiritual Assemblies are unchangeable ...", yet it would appear, from the examples given above, that these principles are quite mutable. Since the Guardian's guidance in interpretation results in statements of truth which "cannot be varied,"(24) and since the Guardian did in fact change some of these decisions and the Universal House of Justice has or may change others, one has logically to conclude that some, at least, of the decisions of the Guardian, even in important matters, are not "interpretations": they may have served "the need of the moment" but, contrary to Fazel and Fananapazir's assertion, do not necessarily serve future needs. Other decisions, however, are clearly to be considered as interpretations of the writings. On page 84 of Bahá'í Administration, Shoghi Effendi writes:
These words clearly indicate that a three-stage election has been provided by 'Abdu'l-Bahá for the formation of the International House of Justice, and as it is explicitly provided in His Will and Testament that the "Secondary House of Justice (i.e., National Assemblies) must elect the members of the Universal One," it is obvious that the members of the National Spiritual Assemblies will have to be indirectly elected by the body of the believers in their respective provinces.(25) There is no mention here of anything temporary or to be "adopted pending review" by the Universal House of Justice. The tone is quite different, marked by words such as "expressly," "clearly," "explicitly," and "obvious." The method is also different: two passages from the writings are cited and an interpretation is made based directly on these passages. Compare this with another passage, in Bahá'í Administration pages 135-6, on the question of plurality versus majority voting. Shoghi Effendi begins by saying that there is nothing in the Bahá'í writings to define the method to be used, so that it:
In the meantime, therefore, the question is left to the national spiritual assembly to decide, but the Guardian recommends to them some observations for their "earnest consideration":
In my opinion, this is Shoghi Effendi at his least assertive. In place of the emphatic words we have the optative mood: "should" and "would" in place of "must". Look at the structure of the sentence beginning "It has been felt, with no little justification, that this method, admittedly disadvantageous..." Shoghi Effendi would appear to be approaching his subject rather diffidently, whereas in the previous passage he proceeds in direct, firm strides. There is even a grammatical slip in the previous sentence, where the constructions "irrespective of the fact that" and "irrespective of whether" are confused.(26) Perhaps, even at this early stage in his ministry, he was feeling deeply the force of the principles which he was later to enunciate in The Dispensation of Bahá'u'lláh, where the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice are described as "twin institutions" with separate spheres. The Guardian interprets and does not legislate. The House of Justice legislates and does not interpret--that is, it does not make authoritative interpretations of the writings:
Here Shoghi Effendi provides us with not only the constitutional law governing the relationship between the two institutions but also an important "interpretive principle" which tells us how to read his writings, and those of the Universal House of Justice. If a passage by Shoghi Effendi appears to us to read as legislation then we know that we have misunderstood it, since he assures us that neither of these institutions can, nor will ever, infringe upon the sacred and prescribed domain of the other.(28) We must then return to such a text and seek to interpret it in the light of the a priori understanding that, however much it may look like Bahá'í law, this cannot be the intention. The importance of this cannot be over-emphasized, for if all of the decisions of the Guardian remained perpetually valid, as Fazel and Fananapazir seem to be saying, we would have a whole body of additional law, over and above that revealed by Bahá'u'lláh, which could not be changed. The fact that only the decisions of the Universal House of Justice have the force of law, but that they, unlike the interpretations of the Guardian, do not become part of the sacred text and so can be changed, ensures the continuing flexibility of the Faith. "Such" in the words of Shoghi Effendi,(29) "is the immutability of His revealed Word. Such is the elasticity which characterizes the functions of His appointed ministers. The first preserves the identity of His faith, and guards the integrity of His law. The second enables it, even as a living organism, to expand and adapt itself to the needs and requirements of an ever-changing society." All of this points to the necessity of some systematic means of distinguishing between the interpretations and the many other administrative decisions made by the Guardian. Often there is no difficulty, where he either specifically cites Bahá'u'lláh or 'Abdu'l-Bahá, or specifically says that there is no relevant passage in their Writings. In other cases we may be guided by the method of argument or the tone of the language. There are also some subject areas which Shoghi Effendi specifically excludes from the sphere of the Guardian:
The House of Justice makes a distinction between unity of doctrine, which is guaranteed by the scriptures and the Guardian, and unity of administration, which is guaranteed by the House of Justice. There will be passages in which there is neither explicit interpretation, nor a specific statement that the Guardian is not interpreting the writings, where we will have to be guided by the question of whether the intent of the decision made was only administrative, or whether it defined doctrine in some respect. Some questions remain: if the Guardian is the "expounder of the words of God",(31) what is the status of his interpretations of the Bible and Qur'án? Where the Guardian interprets scripture for an individual, does this have a different status to an interpretation in a letter or book addressed to the whole Bahá'í world? Can we argue that the doctrine "that religious truth is not absolute but relative"(32) implies the possibility of an interpretation authoritative only for a given person or cultural situation? Nevertheless we have the broad outlines of the interpretive principles to be applied: first of all in the doctrine of the separation of the two spheres of the Guardianship and the Universal House of Justice, as defined in The Dispensation of Bahá'u'lláh, second by considering whether the subject matter is a question of administration or of doctrine, and third by listening for the distinctive tone of Shoghi Effendi's writing where he is consciously acting as the Expounder of the words of God. |
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